Hudson v. Tri-Con Industry et al

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER that: Case Numbers 4:15-cv-03034-JMG-PRSE and 8:15-cv-00258-JMG-PRSE are dismissed without prejudice. The court will enter separate judgments in accordance with these memoranda and orders. Ordered by Judge John M. Gerrard. (Copy mailed to pro se party) (JSF)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
BEATRICE HUDSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
OASIS STAFFING, and TRI-CON
INDUSTRIES,
Defendants.
BEATRICE HUDSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
TRI-CON INDUSTRY, U-STOP
CONVENIENT STORE, LINCOLN
POLICE DEPARTMENT,
Defendants.

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8:15CV258

MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER

8:15CV3034

MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER

This matter is before the court on Plaintiff Beatrice Hudson’s Complaint filed
in Case Number 8:15-cv-00258-JMG-PRSE (Filing No. 1). Upon review of Hudson’s
Complaint, the court finds that both of the above-captioned cases should be dismissed
for the reasons set forth below.
I. BACKGROUND
Hudson filed a Complaint in Case Number 4:15-cv-3034-JMG-PRSE (Filing
No. 1) on March 25, 2015, against Tri-Con Industry, U-Stop Convenient Store, and
the Lincoln Police Department. The court conducted a pre-service screening of
Hudson’s Complaint on July 6, 2015 (Filing No. 6). The court noted Hudson had

described a series of events that occurred between November of 2014 and March of
2015, but it was not apparent from her allegations how any of the events described
were related. The court could discern from Hudson’s allegations that she was
employed by Tri-Con Industry (“Tri-Con”), but her employment was terminated
following an incident that occurred at a U-Stop convenience store. The court could
also discern from her allegations that Hudson believed her termination was somehow
retaliatory or racially motivated, but she alleged no facts to support such a claim. On
the court’s own motion, the court gave Hudson 30 days in which to file an amended
complaint.
Rather than file an amended complaint, Hudson filed a new case, this time
naming Tri-Con as a defendant and also Oasis Staffing, which is the employment
agency that placed her with Tri-Con. (See Case Number 8:15-cv-00258-JMG-PRSE,
Filing No. 1.) Hudson again described being hired by Tri-Con and later terminated
following an incident that occurred at a U-Stop convenience store. In addition,
Hudson alleged, in conclusory fashion, that: (1) Oasis Staffing dismissed her as a
client because she filed a lawsuit, a complaint with the Nebraska Equal Opportunity
Commission, a complaint with the Nebraska Attorney General, and the Lincoln Police
Department, (2) an Asian supervisor at Tri-Con subjected her to “disparate treatment,”
and (3) Tri-Con fired her in retaliation for the complaints she made about U-Stop and
the Lincoln Police Department. (See generally Filing No. 1 at CM/ECF pp. 1-8.)
II. DISCUSSION
A plaintiff need not plead facts sufficient to establish a prima facie case of
employment discrimination in her complaint. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534
U.S. 506, 511-512 (2002) (holding a complaint in employment discrimination lawsuit
need not contain “facts establishing a prima facie case,” but must contain sufficient
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face), abrogated in part on other
grounds by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). However, the
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elements of a prima facie case are relevant to a plausibility determination.
See Rodriguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2013) (stating
elements of a prima facie case are “part of the background against which a plausibility
determination should be made” and “may be used as a prism to shed light upon the
plausibility of the claim”); see also Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1191
(10th Cir. 2012) (“While the 12(b)(6) standard does not require that Plaintiff establish
a prima facie case in her complaint, the elements of each alleged cause of action help
to determine whether Plaintiff has set forth a plausible claim.”).
Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(1). Title VII also prohibits retaliation against an employee “because he has
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or
because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
Here, Hudson made only conclusory allegations of discrimination and
retaliation. She did provide any facts to support her claims that Oasis Staffing
dismissed her as a client because she filed lawsuits and complaints, that an Asian
supervisor at Tri-Con subjected her to “disparate treatment,” or that Tri-Con fired her
in retaliation for the complaints she made about U-Stop and the Lincoln Police
Department. Even when liberally construed, her Complaints do not contain any
plausible claims for relief. Therefore, the court will dismiss both Case Numbers
4:15-cv-03034-JMG-PRSE and 8:15-cv-00258-JMG-PRSE for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted.

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that: Case Numbers 4:15-cv-03034-JMGPRSE and 8:15-cv-00258-JMG-PRSE are dismissed without prejudice. The court will
enter separate judgments in accordance with these memoranda and orders.
DATED this 23rd day of September, 2015.
BY THE COURT:
s/ John M. Gerrard
United States District Judge

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of Nebraska does not endorse, recommend, approve, or guarantee any third parties or the services or products they
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