Harrington v. Hall County Board of Supervisors et al

Filing 132

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - The motion to strike 111 filed by defendants Third City Christian Church and Evangelical Free Church of Grand Island, Nebraska is granted. The Clerk of the Court is directed to strike filings 85, 90, 91, 92, 93, 96, 97, 98, a nd 99. The defendant Kent Mann's motion to dismiss 69 is granted. All claims asserted against Kent Mann are dismissed. The motion to dismiss 46 filed by defendants Third City Christian Church and Evangelical Free Church of Grand Island, Nebr aska is granted. All claims asserted against Third City Christian Church and Evangelical Free Church of Grand Island, Nebraska are dismissed. The motion to dismiss 57 filed by Shay McGowan and the Grand Island Dental Center is granted. All claims a sserted against McGowan and the Grand Island Dental Center are dismissed. The motion to dismiss 73 filed by Hall County Board of Supervisors, Hall County, Chad Nabity, Scott Arnold, Gary Quandt, Jane Richardson, Doug Lanfear, and Pam Lancaster is g ranted. All claims asserted against Hall County Board of Supervisors, Hall County, Chad Nabity, Scott Arnold, Gary Quandt, Jane Richardson, Doug Lanfear, and Pam Lancaster are dismissed. The plaintiff's first motion to consolidate and amend 78 is denied as moot. The plaintiff's second motion to consolidate and amend 114 is denied. The plaintiff's motion to file notice of motion nunc pro tunc or alternatively refile the proposed amended complaint, and to stay the Court's d ecision regarding Hall County's motion to dismiss and compel early disclosures by Hall County 127 is denied. The plaintiff may file a new motion to amend his complaint by April 21, 2016, provided that his proposed amended complaint takes into consideration the principles and analysis set forth above. To the extent the plaintiff believes there are any claims or allegations in his previously filed proposed amended complaint that could survive a motion to dismiss, he may reassert those claims and allegations. Ordered by Judge John M. Gerrard. (KLF)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
SHANE HARRINGTON,
Plaintiff,

4:15-CV-3052

vs.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
HALL COUNTY BOARD OF
SUPERVISORS, et al.,
Defendants.
The plaintiff, Shane Harrington, is a Nebraska resident who operates
an adult entertainment company. He has sued numerous individuals and
entities who, he alleges, have violated his rights by taking steps to prevent
him from opening a juice bar and strip club in Hall County, Nebraska. This
matter is before the Court on several defendants' motions to dismiss (filings
46, 57, 69, 71, and 73), a motion to strike certain evidence the plaintiff has
offered in opposition to these motions to dismiss (filing 111), and two
plaintiff's motions to amend his complaint and consolidate this action with
another case (filing 78 and 114).
BACKGROUND
Briefly summarized, the plaintiff's allegations are as follows.1
Beginning in February 2015, the plaintiff sought to secure a location for an
adult entertainment venue in Hall County. Filing 1 at 4. According to the
plaintiff, he plans to open this business outside of Grand Island city limits,
and more than 1,000 feet from "any restricted areas or districts." Filing 1 at
5. The plaintiff alleges that his proposed business will benefit the community,
and will not lead to any illegal activities. Filing 1 at 5.
According to the plaintiff, the defendants have taken various steps to
prevent him from opening his business in Hall County. First, the plaintiff
alleges that in 2004, defendant Hall County Board of Supervisors adopted a

The Court omits from this summary of the plaintiff's complaint all legal conclusions and
characterizations. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Many passages of
the complaint read more like a brief than allegations of fact. Plaintiff's counsel would do
well to reflect on the purposes of Rule 8: clearly informing the defendant and the Court of
the facts necessary to establish plaintiff's claims for relief.
1

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zoning resolution which restricts sexually oriented businesses to "tiny
industrial districts constituting less than 0.1% of the entire Hall County land
mass, where there are in fact no available locations." Filing 1 at 2. In
addition, the zoning regulation restricts such businesses from operating
between 12 and 6 a.m. Filing 1 at 2.
Next, the plaintiff alleges that "Defendant[s] individually, and
collectively, have created, circulated, signed, published and promoted" a
petition opposing the plaintiff's proposed business. Filing 1 at 6. The plaintiff
specifically alleges that the Evangelical Free Church of Grand Island,
Nebraska, Third City Christian Church, and Kent Mann (the director of
Third City Christian Church) circulated and promoted the petition. Filing 1
at 8. And the plaintiff alleges that John and Jane Does 1–1,000 signed it.
Filing 1 at 13. But otherwise, the plaintiff does not specifically allege that
any particular defendant had a role in creating, circulating, signing,
publishing, or promoting the petition. The complaint reproduces the petition
as follows:
Petition to stop Shane Harrington from opening a strip club. We
the undersigned citizens from the town of Grand Island Nebraska
and surrounding communities petition the Grand Island City
Council and Hall County Board of Supervisors to not allow Shane
Harrington to bring a strip club to this area. A strip club would
promote sexual violence, prostitution, a larger burden on the area
law enforcement officials, and will tear down and destroy families
and individuals. Additionally, whether intentional or not, the
adult entertainment industry promotes the exploitation of women
for the entertainment of others and opens the door for potential
trafficking of women. We demand that the Grand Island City
Council and Hall County Board of Supervisors take any and all
action necessary to protect the City of Grand Island Nebraska
and all surrounding communities from suffering the negative
consequences mentioned above.
Filing 1 at 3.
On May 7, 2015, there was a public hearing in Hall County about the
petition. Filing 1 at 3. The plaintiff alleges that this hearing was held without
notice to him or the public. Filing 1 at 3. The plaintiff alleges that at this
hearing, two members of the Hall County Board of Supervisors made
statements endorsing the petition. First, the plaintiff alleges that the
defendant Pam Lancaster, a member of the Hall County Board of
Supervisors, said, "It really is vital that people—who believe in the Christian
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basis of life stand for them . . . I'm of a similar mind as well." Filing 1 at 7
(alteration in original). Second, the plaintiff alleges that defendant Doug
Lanfear, a member of the Hall County Board of Supervisors, said, "I want to
thank you for bringing your Christian values to the forefront . . . I want to
thank you for getting this petition." Filing 1 at 7 (alteration in original).
In addition, the plaintiff alleges that various individuals made
statements to the press in opposition to his plan to open a strip club in Hall
County. First, the defendant alleges that Chad Nabity, the Regional Planning
Director of Hall County, told the Grand Island Independent that "we have
places where it can be done" and that the plaintiff could open his business in
a "manufacturing or commercially zoned area in Grand Island." Filing 1 at 3.
According to the plaintiff, this assertion was false because adult businesses
are permitted to operate only in industrial districts in Hall County. Filing 1
at 3. Second, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant Shay McGowan, a Grand
Island business owner, told the Independent that strip clubs constitute the
felony of sex trafficking. Filing 1 at 6. Finally, the plaintiff alleges that the
defendant Keith Baumfaulk, a St. Paul resident, told the Independent that
"God put this on my heart with this strip club coming in . . . it's wrong in
God's eyes." Filing 1 at 7 (alteration in original).
According to the plaintiff, the actions of the defendants have "destroyed
[his] reputation to the extent that no one in Hall County will sell or lease
[him] property for his business." Filing 1 at 7. The plaintiff alleges that the
first real estate broker he hired to find a location for his business "informed
[him] that he would not be able to find a location" as a result of the petition
and the defendants' other actions. Filing 1 at 6. The plaintiff alleges that he
retained a new real estate broker, and offered that broker an additional
$10,000 bonus if the broker could obtain a location for the plaintiff's business
in Hall County. Filing 1 at 6. The broker did locate a property, and the
plaintiff and property owners entered into negotiations. Filing 1 at 6.
However, according to the plaintiff, as a result of the defendants' actions, "on
or about May 11, 2015, the property owners informed Plaintiff's real estate
broker that they could not sell the subject property to Plaintiff for any price."
Filing 1 at 7. The plaintiff's broker subsequently informed the plaintiff that
he "could not purchase or lease any property in Hall County, as no individual
or entity will enter into a sale or lease contract" with him. Filing 1 at 7.
Finally, the plaintiff alleges that each of the defendants "have engaged
in a conspiracy to violate Plaintiff's civil rights and defame Plaintiff and are
jointly and severally liable for the damages herein alleged." Filing 1 at 9.
The plaintiff has brought eleven causes of action; each against all of the
defendants. First, he has brought four claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging that the defendants have violated the Establishment Clause of the
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First Amendment, the Freedom of Speech Clause of the First Amendment,
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Nebraska
Constitution, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
Nebraska Constitution. Filing 1 at 14, 18, 20, 21. Next, he has brought antitrust claims, under the Sherman Act and Clayton Act. Filing 1 at 15–17. And
finally, he has brought five state law tort claims: defamation; negligent
hiring, training, and supervision; tortious interference with business
relationships; infliction of emotional distress; and negligence. Filing 1 at 22–
26.
According to the plaintiff, his damages include "lost income, estimated
at $40,000 per month, as well as emotional and psychological injuries,
entitling Plaintiff to compensatory damages in the amount of $10 million."
Filing 1 at 9. The plaintiff additionally seeks "punitive damages in the
amount of $100 million to punish the Defendants and deter such conduct in
the future, together with attorney's fees and the costs of this action." Filing 1
at 9. Finally, the plaintiff seeks "a declaratory judgment enjoining
Defendants from enforcing their zoning resolution as prior restraint," filing 1
at 20, as well as an injunction "precluding Defendants from using Plaintiff's
name in their petition and requiring Defendants to allocate a property in Hall
County for Plaintiff's business," filing 1 at 27.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A complaint must set forth a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This
standard does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more
than an unadorned accusation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
The complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, but must provide
more than labels and conclusions; and a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not suffice. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. For the
purposes of a motion to dismiss a court must take all of the factual
allegations in the complaint as true, but is not bound to accept as true a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation. Id.
And to survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a
complaint must also contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged. Id. Where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the
court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged—but it has not shown—that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at
679.
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Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will
require the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense. Id. The facts alleged must raise a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence to substantiate the necessary elements of the
plaintiff’s claim. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545. The court must assume the
truth of the plaintiff’s factual allegations, and a well-pleaded complaint may
proceed, even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is
improbable, and that recovery is very remote and unlikely. Id. at 556.
DISCUSSION
1. MOTION TO STRIKE
As an initial matter, the defendants Third City Christian Church
("Third City") and Evangelical Free Church of Grand Island, Nebraska
("Evangelical Free Church") (collectively, "the Church Defendants") have
moved to strike certain evidence the plaintiff has offered in opposition to the
defendants' motions to strike. Filing 111. In response to the various motions
to dismiss that are currently pending, the plaintiff has filed six separate but
identical briefs. See, filings 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 94. The plaintiff has filed
multiple indexes of evidence in support of these briefs. See filing 85, 90, 91,
92, 93, 96, 97, 98, 99. Each index of evidence contains a "Narrative Report of
Dr. Daniel Linz Plus 17 Exhibits." See, e.g., filing 99. Evangelical and Third
City move to strike this report, its accompanying attachments, and all
references to the report and its attachments in the plaintiff's briefs opposing
the motions to dismiss. Filing 112 at 2.
When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court is
normally limited to considering the facts alleged in the complaint. If the
Court considers matters outside the pleadings, the motion to dismiss must be
converted to one for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). However, the
Court may consider exhibits attached to the complaint and materials that are
necessarily embraced by the pleadings without converting the motion. Mattes
v. ABC Plastics, Inc., 323 F.3d 695, 697 n.4 (8th Cir. 2003). Documents
necessarily embraced by the pleadings include those whose contents are
alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which
are not physically attached to the pleading. Ashanti v. City of Golden Valley,
666 F.3d 1148, 1151 (8th Cir. 2012). The Court may also take notice of public
records. Levy v. Ohl, 477 F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir. 2007).
Here, Linz's report and its attachments were not mentioned in the
complaint, nor are they public records. The plaintiff contends that the Court
should nonetheless consider them because they are "presented in admissible
form" and are relevant to "the defamatory nature of Defendants' statements
and publications concerning Plaintiff." Filing 124 at 1. But a motion to
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dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests only the sufficiency of the allegations in the
complaint, not the sufficiency of the evidence offered to support those
allegations. Accordingly, the Court will not consider the Linz report and its
attachments in resolving the pending motions to dismiss.
2. MOTIONS TO DISMISS
(a) Kent Mann
The defendant Kent Mann has moved to dismiss (filing 69) on various
grounds. Specifically, he contends that the complaint fails to allege he
participated in the alleged wrongful acts, and that "even if it did, it would fail
to state any actionable claims against him." Filing 70 at 5. Mann also
requests attorney's fees under the Nebraska anti-SLAPP statute, Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 25-21,241 et seq., and 18 U.S.C. § 1988.
1. Motion to dismiss
First, Mann argues that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim against
him because he has failed to allege that Mann personally participated in any
of the alleged wrongs. Filing 70 at 5–6. The complaint mentions Mann
specifically only twice. First, it alleges, "Defendant THIRD CITY
CHRISTAIN [sic] CHURCH authorized and participated in the
aforementioned civil rights violations and defamation by and through their
leadership, including but not limited to . . . Director and Defendant KENT
MANN . . . ." Filing 1 at 8. The second instance merely repeats a portion of
the first: "Defendant KENT MANN is a Director of THIRD CITY
CHRISTIAN CHURCH . . . ." Filing 1 at 13.
Mann's alleged status as director of Third City is insufficient to
establish his liability on any of the plaintiff's claims.2 First, his director
status is insufficient to establish his liability under § 1983. To state a
plausible claim for relief under § 1983 against an individual defendant, the
complaint must allege facts supporting that defendant's "personal
involvement or responsibility for the violations." See Ellis v. Norris, 179 F.3d
1078, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999). The plaintiff has not done so here.
Second, Mann's alleged status as director of Third City is insufficient to
establish his liability for violations of anti-trust laws. The plaintiff brings two
causes of action: one alleging violations of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, and
one alleging violations of §§ 4 and 16 the Clayton Act. But §§ 4 and 16 of the
Clayton Act do not furnish independent causes of action; rather, they permit
private parties to bring an action for relief upon a showing of a separate
Additionally, even if Mann could be held liable for the actions of Third City, as explained
below, the plaintiff has also failed to allege facts giving rise to a plausible claim for relief
against Third City.
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6

violation of the antitrust laws. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26. Accordingly, the Court
construes the plaintiff's complaint as bringing a single cause of action under
§§ 4 and 16 on the basis of alleged violations of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act.
Corporate officers, directors, or agents can be personally liable for a
corporation's anti-trust violations only if they participate in, order, or
authorize those actions. See Bergjans Farm Dairy Co. v. Sanitary Milk
Producers, 241 F. Supp. 476, 482 (E.D. Mo. 1965) aff'd sub nom. Sanitary
Milk Producers v. Bergjans Farm Dairy, Inc., 368 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1966); see
also, 15 U.S.C. § 24; United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 416 (1962). Here,
the plaintiff has not alleged that Mann took any particular action to
participate in, authorize, or order Third City's alleged wrongdoing.
Third, Mann's status as director of Third City is insufficient to
establish his liability under state tort law. Under Nebraska law, the directors
of a corporation are generally not liable to third persons for the acts of the
corporation solely by virtue of their status as directors. Huffman v. Poore, 569
N.W.2d 549, 556 (Neb. Ct. App. 1997). Rather, a director will be individually
liable for the acts of a corporation only if he takes part in their commission.
Id. at 558 (quoting 3A William M. Fletcher, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of
Private Corporations § 1137 at 300–01 (1994)). The plaintiff has not alleged
any particular actions Mann took to participate in Third City's purported
wrongdoing. Thus, the complaint's allegations that Mann is a director of
Third City are insufficient to state a claim against him for any of the wrongs
Third City is alleged to have perpetuated.
In addition to the allegations that mention Mann by name, the
complaint also contains generalized allegations that "Defendants" have all
committed each of the purported wrongs. But the problem with this pleading
strategy is it does not inform any particular defendant of the specific claims
against him in sufficient detail to permit him to defend himself against the
claims. See, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Ellis, 179 F.3d at 1079 (affirming
dismissal of a § 1983 case where the complaint failed to allege facts
supporting any individual defendant's personal involvement in alleged
constitutional violations). Accordingly, these generalized allegations are also
insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief against Mann, and all of the
plaintiff's claims against Mann will be dismissed.
2. Attorney's fees
Mann also argues that he is entitled to attorney's fees under
Nebraska's anti-SLAPP statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,241 et seq. and 42
U.S.C. § 1988.
First, Mann requests attorney's fees under Nebraska's anti-SLAPP
statute, which provides, "A defendant in an action involving public petition
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and participation may maintain an action, claim, cross-claim, or counterclaim
to recover damages, including costs and attorney's fees, from any person who
commenced or continued such action." Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,243. The
statute specifies that costs and attorney's fees are recoverable if "the action
involving public petition and participation was commenced or continued
without a substantial basis in fact and law and could not be supported by a
substantial argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law." Id. An action involving public petition and participation is defined as
one "that is brought by a public applicant or permittee and is materially
related to any efforts of the defendant to report on, comment on, rule on,
challenge, or oppose the application or permission." Neb. Rev. Stat. § 2521,242. A public applicant or permittee, in turn, is "any person who has
applied for or obtained a permit, zoning change, lease, license, certificate, or
other entitlement for use or permission to act from any government body." Id.
The plaintiff argues that he is not a public applicant or permittee
within the meaning of the statute because he never actually applied for
permission from Hall County to open his proposed strip club. And there is no
evidence in the record suggesting that he has. However, the Court need not
determine this point at this stage in the proceedings, because a motion for
attorney's fees has not been made pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54.
State laws providing a right to attorney's fees are considered Eriesubstantive. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 260
n.31 (1975). Accordingly, when a federal court exercises diversity or pendent
jurisdiction over state law claims, it will enforce state law regarding
attorney's fees. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 151 (1988). However,
federal courts will not enforce the procedural components of a state statute
that grants a substantive right. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc.,
518 U.S. 415, 429 (1996).
In other words, this Court is required to give effect to the substantive
right to attorney's fees and costs created by Nebraska's anti-SLAPP statute.
However, the Court shall apply federal procedure, rather than the procedure
set forth by the statute, in deciding whether to award those fees and costs.
The appropriate mechanism for requesting attorney's fees in federal court is
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54. Under this rule, a claim for attorney's fees must be made
by motion, filed no later than 14 days after the entry of the judgment. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 54(d)(2). Thus, if Mann wishes to pursue his claim for attorney's fees
under the anti-SLAPP statute, he may file a motion in accordance with the
provisions of Rule 54.
Mann also requests attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which
provides that for a § 1983 action, "the court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as
8

part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988. But attorney's fees should be awarded
only when the "claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the
plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so." Hughes v. Rowe, 449
U.S. 5, 15 (1980) (per curiam) (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC,
434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978)). A plaintiff's claims are not groundless merely
because they "were properly dismissed for failure to state a claim." Id. at 15.
As long as "the plaintiff has 'some basis' for [his] claim, a prevailing
defendant may not recover attorneys' fees." EEOC v. Kenneth Balk & Assocs.,
Inc., 813 F.2d 197, 198 (8th Cir. 1987) (quoting Obin v. Dist. No. 9 of the Int'l
Ass'n of Machinists, 651 F.2d 574, 587 (8th Cir. 1981)).
Again, the Court need not determine at this stage whether Mann is
entitled to attorney's fees under § 1988. Mann may file a motion pursuant to
Rule 54 to assert his claim to those fees.
(b) Church Defendants
The Church Defendants have moved to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint
on several grounds, arguing that the plaintiff has failed to state any plausible
claim for relief against them. Filing 47 at 3.
1. Consideration of petition
As an initial matter, the Church Defendants have attached to their
motion a copy of the petition the defendants allegedly circulated in opposition
to the plaintiff's plan to open a strip club. Filing 48-2. The Church
Defendants request that the Court consider it in resolving their motion to
dismiss. Filing 47 at 2–3. As discussed above, in considering a motion to
dismiss, the Court may, without converting the motion to one for summary
judgment, consider those documents that are "necessarily embraced by the
pleadings." Mattes, 323 F.3d at 697 n.4. Documents necessarily embraced by
the pleadings include those whose contents are alleged in a complaint and
whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached
to the pleading. Ashanti, 666 F.3d at 1151. Here, the plaintiff alleges the
contents of the petition in his complaint, see filing 1 at 3, and neither party
disputes the authenticity of the petition.3 Accordingly, the Court will consider
the petition without converting the Church Defendants' motion to dismiss to
a motion for summary judgment.

The Court notes that there are some very minor discrepancies between the petition as
reproduced in the plaintiff's complaint, and the copy of the petition attached to the Church
Defendants' motion to dismiss. These discrepancies add up to a few small changes to
individual words and punctuation, and do not alter the Court's analysis.
3

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2. Constitutional violations
The plaintiff alleges that the defendants have violated his rights under
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, the Freedom of Speech
Clause of the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the Equal Protection and Due Process clause of Art. I, § 3 of
the Nebraska Constitution. Filing 1 at 14, 18, 20, 21. He sues under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for the alleged violations of his federal constitutional rights.
Filing 1 at 14.
The Church Defendants have moved to dismiss these claims on the
grounds that only state actors can violate those particular constitutional
rights. See filing 47 at 4. And, indeed, they are correct. The only amendment
of the federal Constitution that can be violated by a non-government actor is
the Thirteenth—which the plaintiff has not alleged a violation of. Edmonson
v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 619 (1991). Likewise, the Equal
Protection and Due Process clauses of the Nebraska Constitution apply only
to government action. See Citizens of Decatur for Equal Educ. v. LyonsDecatur Sch. Dist., 739 N.W.2d 742, 756 (Neb. 2007).
The plaintiff argues that, nonetheless, the Church Defendants can be
held liable for alleged violations of his constitutional rights under § 1983
because they were acting under color of state law. Filing 84 at 12.
Specifically, the plaintiff argues that his complaint "sufficiently pleaded the
conspiracy between the private Defendants and governmental entities acting
under color of law." Filing 84 at 12.
Section 1983 allows plaintiffs to bring claims against persons who
violate their constitutional rights under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A
private actor can be considered to act under color of state law "if, though only
if, there is such a 'close nexus between the State and the challenged action'
that seemingly private behavior 'may be fairly treated as that of the State
itself.'" Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S.
288, 295 (2001) (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351
(1974)).
This "close nexus" exists where the private party is "'a willful
participant in joint activity with the State' in denying a plaintiff's
constitutional rights." Magee v. Trustees of Hamline Univ., Minn., 747 F.3d
532, 536 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Dossett v. First State Bank, 399 F.3d 940,
947 (8th Cir. 2005)). Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, a "plaintiff must
plausibly allege 'a mutual understanding, or a meeting of the minds, between
the private party and the state actor.'" Id. In doing so, the plaintiff must
allege something more than "multiple contacts" between the private party
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and the state; rather, he must plead "specific facts plausibly connecting" the
alleged concerted action to the alleged violation. Id.
Here, the complaint alleges in conclusory terms that "Defendants have
engaged in a conspiracy to violate Plaintiff's civil rights and defame
Plaintiff," and "Defendants have engaged in a conspiracy to adopt and enforce
an unconstitutional zoning resolution." Filing 1 at 9. But "a naked assertion
of conspiracy . . . without some further factual enhancement . . . stops short of
the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief."
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff
has not alleged any facts plausibly suggesting that the Church Defendants
conspired with government actors in any way. Accordingly, the constitutional
claims against the Church Defendants are dismissed as to the Church
Defendants.
3. Anti-trust violations
Next, the plaintiff alleges that the Church Defendants have committed
anti-trust violations. Filing 1 at 15, 17. As explained above, the plaintiff
brings his claim under §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, which allow a plaintiff
to bring suit for separate anti-trust violations. The plaintiff alleges that the
defendants have violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Filing 1 at
16. The Church Defendants argue that to the extent their actions violated the
Sherman Act, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine immunizes them from liability.
Filing 47 at 5.
Under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, "attempts to induce the passage
or enforcement of law or to solicit governmental action" are not prohibited by
anti-trust laws, "even though the result of such activities is to cause injury to
others." Razorback Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. Weaver, 761 F.2d 484, 486 (8th
Cir. 1985); see, E. R. R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,
365 U.S. 127, 143–44 (1961); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381
U.S. 657, 670 (1965). To conclude otherwise would "deprive the people of their
right to petition in the very instances in which that right may be of the most
importance to them." Noerr, 365 U.S. at 139.
The only actions allegedly taken by the Church Defendants are
"creating, promoting, circulating, distributing, copying, publishing, signing
and submitting" a petition opposing the plaintiff's plan to open a strip club.
Filing 1 at 8. This clearly falls within the scope of the Noerr-Pennington
protection. The plaintiff additionally argues that the Church Defendants
were "engaged in a conspiracy to prohibit sexually oriented businesses" in
Hall County, giving rise to anti-trust liability. Filing 84 at 27. But, as
explained above, this naked assertion of conspiracy is insufficient to state a
plausible claim for relief. Consequently, the anti-trust allegations are
dismissed as to the Church Defendants.
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4. Defamation
The plaintiff asserts a claim of defamation against the Church
Defendants, arguing that the petition circulated in opposition to his strip club
"falsely imputed crimes of moral turpitude" to him. Filing 1 at 23. The
Church Defendants move to dismiss, arguing that the petition did not
constitute defamation. Filing 47 at 10.
Under Nebraska law, a claim of defamation requires "(1) a false and
defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, (2) an unprivileged
publication to a third party, (3) fault amounting to at least negligence on the
part of the publisher, and (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective
of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication."
Moats v. Republican Party of Nebraska, 796 N.W.2d 584, 593 (Neb. 2011).
But "when the plaintiff in a libel action is a public figure and the speech is a
matter of public concern, the plaintiff must demonstrate 'actual malice,'
which means knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, by clear
and convincing evidence." Id. at 593–94.
In a defamation suit, the threshold question is "whether a reasonable
fact finder could conclude that the published statements imply a provably
false factual assertion." Steinhausen v. HomeServices of Nebraska, Inc., 857
N.W.2d 816, 828 (Neb. 2015). If a statement is merely one of subjective
opinion, it is protected by the First Amendment and cannot be defamatory.
Id. Under Nebraska law, distinguishing between fact and opinion is a
question of law for the trial judge to decide based on the totality of the
circumstances. Id. In making this determination, courts may consider all
relevant factors, including: "(1) whether the general tenor of the entire work
negates the impression that the defendant asserted an objective fact, (2)
whether the defendant used figurative or hyperbolic language, and (3)
whether the statement is susceptible of being proved true or false." Id.
Context is also important to whether a reader would view a statement
as one of fact or opinion: "where potentially defamatory statements are
published in a public debate . . . the audience may anticipate efforts by the
parties to persuade others of their positions by use of epithets, fiery rhetoric,
or hyperbole," such that "language which generally might be considered as
statements of fact may well assume the character of statements of opinion."
Moats, 796 N.W.2d. at 596.
According to the plaintiff, the defamatory statement in the petition is:
"A strip club would promote sexual violence, prostitution, a larger burden on
the area law enforcement officials, and will tear down and destroy families
and individuals." See filing 1 at 3, 23. The Court finds as a matter of law that
no reasonable fact-finder could conclude that statement implies a provably
false factual assertion, because the statement is not susceptible of being
12

proved true or false. To begin with, the statement does not imply that the
plaintiff's proposed strip club has actually caused any ill effects; rather, it
predicts that it "would." A prediction about a possible future event is an
opinion, not a factual assertion; even if the predicted event does not come to
pass, the prediction itself is not "false" when made. See, Maurer v. Town of
Independence, 45 F. Supp. 3d 535, 552–53 (E.D. La. 2014); WCP/Fern
Exposition Servs., LLC v. Hall, Civil Action No. 3:08–CV–522, 2011 WL
1157699, at *13 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 28, 2011); Rushman v. City of Milwaukee,
959 F. Supp. 1040, 1044 (E.D. Wis. 1997); Bebo v. Delander, 632 N.W.2d 732,
740 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). Additionally, the language in the statement is too
vague to be proved false. It would be impossible to test by any objective
measure whether a strip club would "promote" sexual violence or "tear down"
families and individuals. See Moats, 796 N.W.2d at 597–98 (finding that
vague statements that the plaintiff "mislead[s] creditors" and was not "doing
financially well" were not susceptible of being proved false).
Because the plaintiff's defamation claim fails on the first prong, the
Court will dismiss this claim against the Church Defendants.
5. Tortious interference with business relationships
The plaintiff alleges that the defendants have tortiously interfered with
his business relationships. Filing 1 at 24. Specifically, he alleges that he had
been in negotiations to purchase a property in Hall County for his strip club,
but that as a result of the petition, the property owners refused to sell it to
him. Filing 1 at 25. Additionally, he alleges that a strip club he owns in
Buffalo County suffered "a decrease in patrons and sales" as a result of the
petition. Filing 1 at 25. The Church Defendants move to dismiss on the basis
of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Filing 47 at 13.
Under Nebraska law, the elements of tortious interference with a
business relationship are: "(1) the existence of a valid business relationship or
expectancy, (2) knowledge by the interferer of the relationship or expectancy,
(3) an unjustified intentional act of interference on the part of the interferer,
(4) proof that the interference caused the harm sustained, and (5) damage to
the party whose relationship or expectancy was disrupted." Huff v. Swartz,
606 N.W.2d 461, 466 (Neb. 2000) (quoting Koster v. P & P Enters., 539
N.W.2d 274, 278–79 (Neb. 1995)).
The Eighth Circuit has held that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine applies
in the context of a tortious interference claim. South Dakota. v. Kansas City
S. Indus., Inc., 880 F.2d 40, 52 (8th Cir. 1989). As explained above, the
Church Defendants' alleged creation, circulation, and promotion of their
petition is within the scope of Noerr-Pennington. Accordingly, the plaintiff's
claim of tortious interference with a business relationship is dismissed as to
the Church Defendants.
13

6. Infliction of emotional distress
The plaintiff alleges that the defendants are liable to him for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Filing 1 at 26–27. He alleges that
the petition and statements made in connection with the petition caused him
"severe emotional and mental distress." Filing 1 at 26. The Church
Defendants move to dismiss this claim, arguing that the First Amendment
protects the statements in the petition, and that the statements do not rise to
the level of "outrageous." Filing 47 at 14.
The elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: "(1) that
there has been intentional or reckless conduct, (2) that the conduct was so
outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible
bounds of decency and is to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable
in a civilized community, and (3) that the conduct caused emotional distress
so severe that no reasonable person should be expected to endure it."
Brandon ex rel. Estate of Brandon v. Richardson, 624 N.W.2d 604, 620–21
(Neb. 2001).
The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment can serve as a defense
to this type of claim. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451 (2011). Where the
speech in question is of "public concern," the First Amendment prohibits
holding the speaker liable for it. Id. Determining whether speech is of public
or private concern requires courts to examine the "'content, form, and context'
of that speech." Id. at 453 (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985)).
The content of the petition plainly relates to matters of public concern
See id. at 454. It expresses opposition to a proposed strip club based on the
possible effect it would have on crime, law enforcement, families, and
individuals in Hall County. The form and context of the speech likewise
demonstrate that it is on a matter of public concern; a petition circulated
among the public and submitted to a governing body is a clear hallmark of
"broad issues of interest to society at large." See id. at 454. And the fact that
the petition mentioned the plaintiff by name does not transform the speech
into one of private concern; it does not "change the fact that the overall thrust
and dominant theme" of the petition "spoke to broader public issues." See id.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that the First Amendment protects
the Church Defendants from liability for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and will dismiss that claim against the Church Defendants.
7. Negligence
Next, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants are liable for negligence
against him. Filing 1 at 26. Specifically, he alleges that they were negligent
in preparing the 2004 zoning resolution, in naming the plaintiff in their
petition, in failing to consult with attorneys prior to circulating the petition,
14

in attributing criminal conduct to plaintiff, and in allowing their employees
and other representatives to circulate the petition. Filing 1 at 26–27. The
Church Defendants move to dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiff has
failed to allege facts that state a claim for negligence. Filing 47 at 15.
Under Nebraska law, "an actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise
reasonable care when the actor's conduct creates a risk of physical harm."
A.W. v. Lancaster Cty. Sch. Dist. 0001, 784 N.W.2d 907, 915 (Neb. 2010). The
plaintiff has not alleged that any of the defendants' conduct created such a
risk. Nor has the plaintiff alleged facts establishing any sort of "special
relationship" that could support a finding that the defendants owed the
plaintiff a duty of care. See id. at 917. Rather, to the extent the plaintiff
alleges that the defendants had some duty to refrain from acting as they did,
those duties are embraced by his other claims for relief. In other words, what
the plaintiff styles as his negligence claim is simply a recasting of those other
claims for relief, adding the words "negligent, careless and reckless." See e.g.
filing 1 at 26. The plaintiff has simply not pled a negligence claim, and the
Court will dismiss this claim against the Church Defendants.
8. Negligent hiring, training, and supervision
The plaintiff alleges that "Defendants were negligent, careless, and
reckless in hiring, training, and supervising all individually named
Defendants in this complaint, and all directors, supervisors, and employees,
named herein, as such individuals are permitted and encouraged to engage in
a custom and practice of unconstitutional conduct." Filing 1 at 23–24. The
Church Defendants move to dismiss this claim on the grounds that the
plaintiff has failed to allege facts supporting each of the elements of the
claims. Filing 47 at 16.
Under Nebraska law, an underlying requirement in actions for
negligent supervision and negligent training is that the employee is
individually liable for a tort or guilty of a claimed wrong against a third
person, who then seeks recovery against the employer. Schieffer v. Catholic
Archdiocese of Omaha, 508 N.W.2d 907, 913 (Neb. 1993). Similarly, an
employer is liable for negligent hiring "for physical harm to third persons
caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in selecting an employee."
Kime v. Hobbs, 562 N.W.2d 705, 713 (Neb. 1997).
As explained above, the plaintiff has not alleged facts giving rise to a
plausible inference that the church employees are individually liable for any
tort against him. Nor has the plaintiff alleged that the conduct of any of the
defendants caused him physical injury. Thus, the Court will dismiss the
plaintiff's claim for negligent hiring, training, and supervision against the
Church Defendants.
15

In sum, each of the plaintiff's claims against the defendants
Evangelical Free Church of Grand Island, Nebraska, and Third City
Christian Church, shall be dismissed.
(c) Shay McGowan and Grand Island Dental Center
McGowan and the Grand Island Dental Center move to dismiss each of
the plaintiff's claims against them under both Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and
Nebraska's anti-SLAPP statute. Filing 57. Additionally, they request
attorney's fees pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute. Filing 58 at 19.
As described above, the complaint contains many generalized
allegations that "Defendants" have all committed each of the purported
wrongs. The Court has already explained why such generalized allegations
fail to state a plausible claim for relief against any particular defendant. Only
three portions of the complaint mention McGowan and the Dental Center by
name. First, the complaint alleges that "defendant SHAY MCGOWAN told
The Independent news that strip clubs, including that owned by Plaintiff,
constitute the Felony of 'sex trafficking,' which is additionally defamatory."
Filing 1 at 6. Next, the complaint identifies McGowan as a Nebraska resident
who maintains a place of business in Grand Island. Filing 1 at 13. And
finally, the complaint identifies Grand Island Dental Center as a nonincorporated domestic entity doing business in Grand Island. Filing 1 at 12.
The Court notes that, for the purposes of their motion to dismiss,
McGowan and the Dental Center assume the complaint alleges they
participated in the creation, circulation, or promotion of the petition. See
filing 58 at 1. The complaint does not specifically assert these allegations
against McGowan and the Dental Center. But even if it did, such allegations
would be insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief against McGowan
and the Dental Center for any involvement they may have had with the
petition. Upon review of the complaint, the Court concludes that McGowan
and the Dental Center stand in the same shoes as the Church Defendants
with respect to any claims based on the petition—the plaintiff has not alleged
any specific facts that would differentiate them. Consequently, for the same
reasons the plaintiff failed to state a plausible claim for relief against the
Church Defendants, the plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim for relief
against McGowan and the Dental Center with respect to any actions they
may have taken regarding the petition.
Thus, the Court turns to the question whether the allegation that
"defendant SHAY MCGOWAN told The Independent news that strip clubs,
including that owned by Plaintiff, constitute the Felony of 'sex trafficking,'
which is additionally defamatory" states a plausible claim for relief against
16

McGowan or the Dental Center. The Court concludes that it does not, because
it lacks the level of specificity required by federal pleading standards.
The manner of setting forth allegations is a matter of procedure, not
substance, meaning that when a federal court exercises jurisdiction over state
law claims, federal pleading rules apply. Asay v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 594
F.2d 692, 698–99 (8th Cir. 1979). In the Eighth Circuit, an allegation that a
defendant has made a defamatory statement must be sufficiently specific to
allow the defendant "to form responsive pleadings." See Freeman v. Bechtel
Const. Co., 87 F.3d 1029, 1031 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Asay, 594 F.2d at
699). In most cases, "the use of in haec verba pleadings on defamation
charges is favored" because "generally knowledge of the exact language used
is necessary to form responsive pleadings." Asay, 594 F.2d at 699; Holliday v.
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 256 F.2d 297, 302 (8th Cir. 1958) ("In an action for
slander or libel the words alleged to be defamatory must be pleaded and
proved.").
Here, the plaintiff has failed to identify the exact content of the
statement allegedly made. For instance, it is unclear whether McGowan
specifically said that the plaintiff has committed felony sex trafficking, or
whether he was discussing strip clubs generally, or whether he was making a
prediction about the effect of the proposed strip club, if it were to be opened in
Hall County. Which particular statement is alleged could significantly alter
the types of defenses that may be available to McGowan. Nor does the
complaint contain information regarding the context of the alleged statement,
the date the statement was allegedly made, or whether the statement was
published to others. This lack of clarity is even more pronounced given the
plaintiff's propensity to plead legal conclusions in lieu of factual allegations—
it is simply impossible to discern whether the allegation is meant to be a
literal transcription of the statement made, or whether it represents the
plaintiff's attempt to persuasively characterize the statement. Accordingly,
the Court concludes that this allegation is insufficiently specific to allow the
defendant to form responsive pleadings.
In sum, the Court dismisses all claims against McGowan and the
Dental Center. As such, the Court need not reach McGowan's and the Dental
Center's special motion to dismiss based on Nebraska's anti-SLAPP statute.
McGowan and the Dental Center may assert their request for attorney's fees
by motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54.
(d) Hall County Defendants
The defendants Hall County Board of Supervisors, Hall County, Chad
Nabity, Scott Arnold, Gary Quandt, Jane Richardson, Doug Lanfear, and
17

Pam Lancaster (collectively, "County Defendants") move to dismiss each of
the plaintiff's claims against them, on various grounds. Filing 73.
The Court has already noted that the complaint generally alleges that
all of these defendants have committed all of the alleged wrongdoing. As the
Court has explained, generalized allegations and legal conclusions are
insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief against any particular
defendant. Accordingly, the Court will consider only those portions of the
complaint that specifically allege wrongdoing on the part of one or more of
the County Defendants.
Those allegations are as follows. First, the complaint alleges that
defendant Hall County Board of Supervisors adopted and enforces a zoning
resolution that restricts adult oriented business to industrial districts
constituting less than 0.1% of the entire county, and precludes such
businesses from operating between 12 a.m. and 6 a.m. Filing 1 at 2. Next, the
complaint alleges that defendant Chad Nabity, the regional planning director
of Hall County, told a newspaper that "we have places where it can be done"
and that "the Plaintiff could open a club in a 'manufacturing or commercially
zoned area in Grand Island.'" Filing 1 at 3. Then, the complaint alleges that
the Hall County Board of Supervisors held a public hearing, without
providing the plaintiff notice or an opportunity to be heard, on the petition
opposing the plaintiff's plan to open a strip club in Hall County. Filing 1 at 3.
Next, the complaint alleges that at that hearing, defendant Pam Lancaster, a
member of the Board of Supervisors, stated, "It really is vital that people—
who believe in the Christian basis of life stand for them . . . I'm of a similar
mind as well." Filing 1 at 7 (alteration in original). Finally, the complaint
alleges that at the hearing the defendant Doug Lanfear, a member of the
Board of Supervisors, stated, "I want to thank you for bringing your
Christian values to the forefront . . . I want to thank you for getting this
petition." Filing 1 at 7 (alteration in original). The complaint also identifies
all of the County Defendants: Hall County is a county in Nebraska; the Hall
County Board of Supervisors is Hall County's local governing entity; Gary
Quandt, Jane Richardson, Doug Lanfear, and Pam Lancaster are all Hall
County supervisors; Scott Arnold is the Hall County board chairman; and
Chad Nabity is the Hall County regional planning director. Filing 1 at 11–12.
1. Free Speech Clause violations and standing
The Court will take the County Defendants' arguments out of order to
facilitate efficient resolution of the parties' arguments. First, the plaintiff
alleges that "Defendants' zoning resolution and petition" violate the First
Amendment by "unlawfully infringing upon Plaintiff's protected speech."
Filing 1 at 18. The complaint alleges no facts indicating the County
Defendants participated in creating, circulating, or promoting the petition.
18

Accordingly, the Court will consider whether the complaint has stated a
plausible claim for relief with respect to the County Defendants' involvement
in promoting or enforcing the zoning resolution. The County Defendants
argue that the plaintiff lacks standing to bring constitutional challenges to
Hall County's zoning regulations. Filing 76 at 9.
Federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction only over cases in which
the plaintiff "satisf[ies] the threshold requirement imposed by Article III of
the Constitution by alleging an actual case or controversy." City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983). In other words, federal courts have
no jurisdiction over cases in which the plaintiff lacks standing to bring the
complaint. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). Standing has three
components. First, plaintiffs must show that they have suffered an injury-infact that is both concrete in nature and particularized to them. Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984). Second, the injury must be fairly traceable
to defendants' conduct. Id. at 757. Third, the injury must be redressable—
relief "must be 'likely' to follow from a favorable decision." Id.
In addition to these constitutional standing requirements, the Supreme
Court has adopted certain prudential standing requirements—requirements
that are not constitutionally mandated, but that ensure federal courts do not
decide abstract or hypothetical questions. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527
U.S. 41, 55 n.22 (1999). One of these is the third-party standing rule, which
holds that one party generally may not assert the constitutional rights of
another, except in certain specific circumstances. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S.
106, 113 (1976).
Initially, the plaintiff argues that the requirement to show standing
should be relaxed in this case, because he has asserted a First Amendment
challenge to the zoning ordinance. And the Supreme Court "has altered its
traditional rules of standing to permit—in the First Amendment area—
'attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making
the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a
statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity.'" Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973) (quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486
(1965)). But this exception relates only to the prudential third-party standing
rule—it allows someone injured by a statute to challenge it on the basis that
it violates some other person's rights. It does not obviate the need for
constitutional standing. In other words, even if the exception would allow the
plaintiff to raise the constitutional rights of third parties, he still must
demonstrate that he himself has suffered an injury-in-fact that is traceable to
the statute and would be redressed by a decision in his favor.
Here, although the plaintiff has challenged the zoning ordinance on
First Amendment grounds, the defect he complains of is not that the zoning
19

ordinance is too imprecise, overbroad, or vague, such that it chills free
speech. Accordingly, the exception does not apply. And even if it did, it would
not excuse the plaintiff from the need to establish each of the three
requirements of constitutional standing.
To establish constitutional standing in the context of challenging a
zoning ordinance, a plaintiff "must allege specific, concrete facts
demonstrating that the challenged practices harm him, and that he
personally would benefit in a tangible way from the court's intervention."
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975). The plaintiff need not have a
"present contractual interest in a particular project." Id. at 508 n.18. But the
plaintiff must allege facts from which it reasonably could be inferred that,
absent the restrictive zoning ordinance, "there is a substantial probability
that [he] would have been able to purchase or lease in" the area subject to the
ordinance, "and that, if the court affords the relief requested, the asserted
inability of [the plaintiff] will be removed." Id. at 503.
Thus, for example, plaintiffs have standing to challenge "zoning
restrictions as applied to particular projects that would supply housing
within their means, and of which they were intended residents," because they
are "able to demonstrate that unless relief from assertedly illegal actions was
forthcoming, their immediate and personal interests would be harmed." Id. at
507.
But plaintiffs lack standing to challenge a zoning ordinance where they
have no present interest in property affected by the ordinance, where they
have not been denied a variance or permit by officials, and where they have
not demonstrated any indication that if the zoning ordinance were to be
stricken down, there would be property that would "satisf[y] [their] needs at
prices they could afford." Id. at 507. In other words, there is no standing
where the plaintiffs fail to allege facts suggesting that "were the court to
remove the obstructions attributable to respondents, such relief would
benefit" them. Id.
Here, the plaintiff has alleged that the zoning ordinance has restricted
his ability to find a suitable location for his proposed strip club. However, he
has not alleged that, were the zoning ordinance to be released, he would be
able to purchase or lease land suitable for the club. Indeed, his complaint
asserts that "no individual or entity will enter into a sale or lease contract
with Plaintiff as the defamatory petition has destroyed Plaintiff's reputation
to the extent that no one in Hall County will sell or lease Plaintiff property
for his business." Filing 1 at 7. In short, the facts alleged "fail to support an
actionable causal relationship" between the zoning ordinance and the
plaintiff's inability to find a suitable location for his strip club in Hall County.
See Warth, 422 U.S. at 507. Accordingly, the plaintiff lacks standing to
20

challenge the constitutionality of the zoning ordinance, and the Court has no
jurisdiction over such a challenge. Thus, the Court will dismiss the plaintiff's
claim that the County Defendants violated the Free Speech Clause of the
First Amendment. And to the extent any of the plaintiff's other claims are
based on his objections to the constitutionality of the zoning ordinance, those
claims are dismissed as well.
2. Establishment Clause violations
Next, the County Defendants move to dismiss the plaintiff's claim
under § 1983 alleging they have violated the Establishment Clause. Filing 76
at 6. They argue that none of the County Defendants' actions constitute
official government action, and that even if they did, those actions did not
violate the Establishment Clause. Filing 76 at 9.
It is somewhat unclear from the complaint what conduct specifically
the plaintiff believes violated the Establishment Clause. However, the
plaintiff's briefing clarifies that his claim is based on the zoning resolution
and on the statements that Lancaster and Lanfear made at the public
hearing. See filing 84 at 14. As the Court has explained, it has no jurisdiction
over constitutional challenges to the zoning ordinance, Accordingly, it shall
limit its inquiry to whether, as a matter of law, Lancaster and Lanfear's
alleged statements might constitute a violation of the Establishment Clause.
The purpose of the Establishment Clause is to "prevent, as far as
possible, the intrusion of either [the church or the state] into the precincts of
the other." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971). However, it "do[es]
not call for total separation between church and state; total separation is not
possible in an absolute sense. Some relationship between government and
religious organizations is inevitable." Id. Indeed, the Constitution
"affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all
religions, and forbids hostility toward any." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
673 (1984). There is no per se rule for deciding when government action
violates the Establishment Clause. Id. at 678. Rather, the Supreme Court has
"repeatedly emphasized [its] unwillingness to be confined to any single test or
criterion in this sensitive area." Id. at 679; see also Van Orden v. Perry, 545
U.S. 677, 686 (2005) (acknowledging that no single test fully delineates the
contours of the Establishment Clause).
It is clear that not all invocations of religion in a government sphere
constitute violations of the Establishment Clause. See id. at 675–76 (listing
numerous ways in which the government has acknowledged the role of
religion in American life). For instance, the Supreme Court found no
Establishment Clause violation when a town invited a predominantly
Christian set of ministers to open town meetings with prayer. Town of Greece,
N.Y. v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1824 (2014). Such a practice was
21

acceptable because the town did not compel its citizens to participate in the
prayer, because the town did not discriminate against any religious group in
deciding who would lead the prayer, and because the prayer had the secular
purpose of "invit[ing] lawmakers to reflect upon shared ideals and common
ends before they embark on the fractious business of governing." Id. at 1823–
24. In reaching its conclusion, the Court noted that "willing participation in
civic affairs can be consistent with a brief acknowledgement of . . . belief in a
higher power, always with due respect for those who adhere to other beliefs."
Id. at 1827–28.
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit found no violation of the Establishment
Clause where the Board of Education in a small town in Missouri enforced a
rule prohibiting school dances. Clayton by Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376,
380–81 (8th Cir. 1989). The decision to retain the prohibition came after a
board meeting at which several members of the public expressed religious
views on the matter. Id. at 380. In addition, several members of the board
indicated that their individual religious beliefs favored the rule. Id. But the
Eighth Circuit found that these circumstances were insufficient to render an
otherwise-acceptable government action unconstitutional, holding that "[t]he
mere fact a governmental body takes action that coincides with the principles
or desires of a particular religious group . . . does not transform the action
into an impermissible establishment of religion." Id. It further explained, "We
simply do not believe elected government officials are required to check at the
door whatever religious background (or lack of it) they carry with them . . . ."
Id.
Here, Lancaster allegedly said, "It really is vital that people—who
believe in the Christian basis of life stand for them . . . I'm of a similar mind
as well." Filing 1 at 7. And Lanfear allegedly stated, "I want to thank you for
bringing your Christian values to the forefront . . . I want to thank you for
getting this petition." Filing 1 at 7. These statements constitute mere brief
acknowledgments of the role of religion in society or, at most, expressions of
individual religious belief. Indeed, they are considerably less religionpromoting than the actions held to be constitutional in Town of Greece and
Clayton. And the Board took no other actions suggesting that these
statements were part of some broader pattern of behavior meant to promote a
particular religious worldview: the Board took no official action on the
petition, did not prohibit the plaintiff from opening a club in Hall County,
and did not indicate that it would refuse input from those with other religious
views. Accordingly, the Court finds as a matter of law that the plaintiff's
allegations fail to state a plausible claim that the County Defendants violated
the Establishment Clause.
22

3. Equal Protection Clause violations
Next, the County Defendants move to dismiss the plaintiff's claim that
they have violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Filing 76 at 18. The plaintiff alleges that the petition, and the
County Defendants' alleged endorsement of it at the public hearing, violated
the Equal Protection Clause by treating him as a "class of one." Filing 1 at
20–21.
The Equal Protection Clause requires that the government treat all
similarly situated people alike. Barstad v. Murray Cty., 420 F.3d 880, 884
(8th Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court recognizes an equal protection claim for
discrimination against a "class of one." Id. (citing Village of Willowbrook v.
Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000)). The purpose of a class-of-one claim is to
secure every person within the state's jurisdiction against intentional and
arbitrary discrimination. Id. A class-of-one claimant may prevail by showing
he has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated
and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. Id.
The plaintiff has alleged no facts here that would allow the Court to
infer either disparate treatment or that such treatment was intentional. The
plaintiff does not identify any other individuals who are "similarly situated,"
nor explain what "similarly situated" means in this context—meaning that
the plaintiff has not actually identified any disparate treatment to which he
has been subjected. See Johnson v. City of Minneapolis, 152 F.3d 859, 862
(8th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the plaintiff's Equal
Protection claim against the County Defendants.
4. Due Process Clause violations
Next, the plaintiff alleges that the County Defendants have violated his
rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by
holding a hearing regarding his proposed strip club without providing him
notice or an opportunity to be heard. The County Defendants move to dismiss
on the grounds that the plaintiff has been deprived of no protected liberty or
property interest. Filing 76 at 19.
To assert a claim for violation of procedural due process, the plaintiff
must allege "(1) he had a life, liberty, or property interest protected by the
Due Process Clause; (2) he was deprived of this protected interest; and (3) the
state did not afford him adequate procedural rights prior to depriving him of
the property interest." Stevenson v. Blytheville Sch. Dist. #5, 800 F.3d 955,
965–66 (8th Cir. 2015).
As the Court understands it, the plaintiff alleges that he was deprived
of a protected property interest when, at the hearing, the defendants
expressed "their intention to deny Plaintiff a conditional use permit" for his
intended strip club. Filing 1 at 22. The County Defendants argue that the
23

plaintiff has no property interest in any conditional use permit, and that even
if he did, he has not been deprived of such interest. Filing 76 at 19.
A plaintiff has "a constitutionally cognizable property interest in a
right or a benefit" if he has "a legitimate claim of entitlement to it."
Stevenson, 800 F.3d at 967–68 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Bd. of
Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). To have a
legitimate claim of entitlement to a benefit, "a person clearly must have more
than an abstract need or desire and more than a unilateral expectation of it."
Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005) (internal
quotations omitted). The Due Process Clause itself does not itself create such
entitlements; rather, they arise "from an independent source such as state
law." Id.
Assuming arguendo that the plaintiff has a "legitimate claim of
entitlement" to a conditional use permit, he has not been deprived of that
benefit. All he alleges is that "Defendants" (he does not identify which ones)
expressed their intention to deny him a conditional use permit. The plaintiff
fails to allege even that he has applied or will apply for a conditional use
permit. Thus, the plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim for relief that
the County Defendants violated the Due Process Clause, and that claim will
be dismissed.
5. Anti-trust Violations
The plaintiff next alleges that the County Defendants have violated
anti-trust laws because they "control, regulate and dictate policies for zoning
and conditional use permits" in Hall County. Filing 1 at 18. The County
Defendants move to dismiss, asserting both that the plaintiff has failed to
allege facts establishing a monopoly exists, and that they are entitled to
Parker immunity. Filing 76 at 11–13.
As explained above, the Court construes the plaintiff's complaint as
bringing a single cause of action under §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act on the
basis of alleged violations of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, makes unlawful "[e]very contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States." And § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §
2, makes it illegal to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States."
The Supreme Court has held that the Sherman Act does not apply to
anticompetitive restraints imposed by the states "as an act of government."
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943). Although Parker immunity does
not apply directly to local governments—such as county governments—the
Supreme Court has held that a local government's "restriction of competition
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may sometimes be an authorized implementation of state policy, and [has]
accorded Parker immunity where that is the case." City of Columbia v. Omni
Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 370 (1991). For the action of a local
government to be "an authorized implementation of state policy," the local
government must have both the authority to regulate, and the "authority to
suppress competition." Id. at 370, 372.
A local government has authority to regulate where the state has
delegated to the local government the power to enact the regulation in
question. Here, the Hall County Board of Supervisors clearly had authority to
regulate under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 23-114, which expressly gives county boards
the power to adopt zoning resolutions.
A local government has the authority to suppress competition if there is
a "'clear articulation of a state policy to authorize anticompetitive conduct' by
the municipality in connection with its regulation." Omni Outdoor, 499 U.S.
at 372 (quoting Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 40 (1985)).
The Supreme Court has "rejected the contention that this requirement can be
met only if the delegating statute explicitly permits the displacement of
competition." Id. Rather, it is sufficient to show that "suppression of
competition is the 'foreseeable result' of what the statute authorizes." Id. at
373 (quoting Hallie, 471 U.S. at 42). Where a local government has acted
pursuant to its power to adopt zoning resolutions, that condition is "amply
met," because "[t]he very purpose of zoning regulation is to displace
unfettered business freedom in a manner that regularly has the effect of
preventing normal acts of competition." Id.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the County Defendants are immune
from liability for anti-trust violations, because the zoning resolution adopted
by the Hall County Board of Supervisors was "an authorized implementation
of state policy." See Omni Outdoor, 499 U.S. at 370. The Court additionally
notes that the plaintiff has also alleged that "Defendants enforce their
monopoly and restraint of trade through boycotts, blacklists and concerted
refusals to deal with Plaintiff." Filing 1 at 18. This contention is unsupported
by specific factual allegations, and is therefore insufficient to state a
plausible claim for relief. Thus, the anti-trust claims against the County
Defendants will be dismissed.
6. Defamation
Next, the County Defendants move to dismiss the plaintiff's state law
defamation claim against them on several grounds. See filing 76 at 31–34. In
part, the County Defendants argue that they are immune from suit for claims
of defamation. Filing 76 at 32.
Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-902, a political subdivision and its
employees are immune from tort claims except as provided by the Political
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Subdivisions Tort Claims Act (PSTCA), Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-901, et seq. The
PTSCA specifies that it does not waive immunity for "[a]ny claim arising out
of assault, battery, false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution,
abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference
with contract rights." Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-910(7).
The County Defendants are clearly immune from the plaintiff's claim of
defamation—libel and slander are on the list of torts for which Nebraska has
not waived immunity. Accordingly, these claims will be dismissed against the
County Defendants.
7. Interference with business relationships
Next, the County Defendants move to dismiss the plaintiff's state law
tortious interference with business relationships claim, mostly repeating the
same arguments they made with respect to the defamation claim. See filing
76 at 34. And as with defamation, the County Defendants are immune from
claims of tortious interference with business relationships. This claim arises
from "interference with contract rights," one of the torts for which Nebraska
has not waived sovereign immunity. See Teetor v. Dawson Pub. Power Dist.,
808 N.W.2d 86, 94–95 (Neb. 2012). Accordingly, this claim will be dismissed
against the County Defendants.
8. Infliction of emotional distress
Next, the County Defendants move to dismiss the plaintiff's infliction of
emotional distress claim on several grounds. In part, the County Defendants
contend that the plaintiff has failed to allege facts giving rise to a plausible
claim for relief for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Filing 76 at 41.
To recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress under
Nebraska law, a plaintiff must prove (1) intentional or reckless conduct (2)
that was so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond
all possible bounds of decency and is to be regarded as atrocious and utterly
intolerable in a civilized community, and (3) that the conduct caused
emotional distress so severe that no reasonable person should be expected to
endure it. Roth v. Wiese, 716 N.W.2d 419, 431 (Neb. 2006).
Here, the plaintiff alleges that he has suffered emotional distress as a
result of "Defendants' petition and the statements made in conjunction with
its circulation, distribution, and publication." Filing 1 at 26. Presumably, the
statements complained of include the comments Lanfear and Lancaster made
at the public hearing. While the plaintiff has alleged intentional conduct, that
conduct was clearly not atrocious or intolerable. See Roth, 716 N.W.2d at 431.
Nor has the plaintiff sufficiently alleged facts showing emotional distress so
severe that no reasonable person should be expected to endure it. Id. Thus,
the Court will dismiss this claim against the County Defendants.
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9. Negligence
The County Defendants next move to dismiss the plaintiff's negligence
claim against them for various reasons, including because the plaintiff has
failed to allege that the Defendants owed him a duty. Filing 76 at 40. The
plaintiff has alleged generally that "Defendants" have committed several acts
of negligence against him. Filing 1 at 26. The only allegations that appear to
apply to the County Defendants is that they "were negligent, careless and
reckless in preparing, adopting, and enforcing their zoning resolution." Filing
1 at 26.
As explained above with respect to the Church Defendants, under
Nebraska law, "an actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care
when the actor's conduct creates a risk of physical harm" or when the facts
establish a special relationship giving rise to a tort duty. See A.W., 784
N.W.2d at 915. The plaintiff has not alleged that any of the defendants'
conduct created such a risk. Rather, to the extent the plaintiff alleges that
the defendants had some duty to refrain from acting as they did, those duties
are embraced by his other claims for relief. Accordingly, the Court will
dismiss the negligence claim against the County Defendants.
10. Negligent hiring, supervision, and training
As explained previously with respect to the church defendants, under
Nebraska law, "an underlying requirement in actions for negligent
supervision and negligent training is that the employee is individually liable
for a tort or guilty of a claimed wrong against a third person, who then seeks
recovery against the employer." Schieffer v. Catholic Archdiocese of Omaha,
508 N.W.2d 907, 913 (Neb. 1993). As set forth above, the plaintiff has not
alleged facts giving rise to a plausible inference that any of the County
Defendants could be individually liable for committing any tort against him.
Thus, the Court will dismiss the plaintiff's claim for negligent hiring,
training, and supervision against the County Defendants.
In sum, the Court will dismiss all claims against the County
Defendants. As such, the Court need not reach the County Defendants'
motion to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP statute, or any of their other
arguments in support of dismissal.
3. MOTIONS TO AMEND AND CONSOLIDATE
(a) Motion to Consolidate and Amend
The plaintiff moved to consolidate this suit with another suit he has
brought against Seward County, and to amend his complaint (filing 78). He
subsequently filed a new motion to amend, consolidate, and join parties
(filing 114), and withdrew his first motion to amend and consolidate. Filing
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114 at 2. Accordingly, the plaintiff's first motion to amend and consolidate is
denied as moot.
(b) Motion to Amend
The plaintiff has renewed his request to consolidate this case with the
Seward County case, and moved to amend his complaint. See filing 114 at 2.
1. Consolidation
The plaintiff previously moved to consolidate this lawsuit with a
separate lawsuit he brought against Seward County and other defendants
(4:15-CV-3068). Filing 78. He renews that request here. Filing 114 at 2. In
essence, his complaint in the Seward County case alleges that Seward
County, the Seward County Board of Commissioners, the Seward County
Attorney, and several individuals serving as Seward County Commissioners
violated his rights by adopting a zoning ordinance limiting his ability to open
an adult entertainment venue in that county.
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a), "If actions before the court involve a
common question of law or fact, the court may . . . consolidate the actions."
"Consolidation is inappropriate, however, if it leads to inefficiency,
inconvenience, or unfair prejudice to a party." EEOC v. HBE Corp., 135 F.3d
543, 551 (8th Cir. 1998). District courts have broad discretion to decide
whether to consolidate an action. Enter. Bank v. Saettele, 21 F.3d 233, 235
(8th Cir. 1994).
Here, these two cases rely on completely different sets of facts. One
relates to actions taken by various individuals and entities in Hall County,
and one relates to actions taken by different individuals and entities in
Seward County. The two cases will, therefore, require different,
individualized proof based on the unique factual circumstances in each. And
although there are a few common questions of law, there are also several
significant legal issues that are unique to each case. Accordingly, the Court
concludes that consolidation would be impractical and inappropriate here,
and it will deny the plaintiff's request to consolidate.
2. Amendment
The plaintiff has moved to amend his complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(2), which allows amendment before trial "only with the opposing party's
written consent or the court's leave. The court should freely give leave when
justice so requires." But "there is no absolute right to amend and a finding
'undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure
deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the nonmoving party, or futility of the amendment' may be grounds to deny a motion
to amend." Doe v. Cassel, 403 F.3d 986, 990–91 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Becker v. Univ. of Neb. at Omaha, 191 F.3d 904, 908 (8th Cir. 1999)). The
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opposing parties have not consented to the plaintiff's proposed amended
complaint.
The Court finds that, in light of the above analysis, the plaintiff's
amended complaint suffers from many of the same deficiencies that
warranted dismissal of most of the claims in the original complaint. In other
words, the proposed amended complaint would be futile. But the Court will
grant the plaintiff leave to file a new motion to amend, provided that his new
proposed amended complaint takes into consideration the principles and
analysis set forth above. The Court further notes that, to the extent the
plaintiff believes there are claims in his current proposed amended complaint
that could survive a motion to dismiss, he may reassert those claims in his
next proposed amended complaint.
(c) Motion to file notice of motion nunc pro tunc
Finally, the plaintiff has filed a motion (filing 127) requesting leave to
file a notice of motion nunc pro tunc or alternatively allow him to refile the
proposed amended complaint, and requesting that the Court stay its decision
regarding Hall County's motion to dismiss and compel early disclosure by
Hall County. As the Court understands it, this motion is an attempt to
correct certain technical deficiencies in the plaintiff's earlier motions to
amend. Because the Court has already denied those motions to amend on the
merits, this motion to file a notice of motion nunc pro tunc will be denied as
moot. Additionally, because the posture of this case has changed significantly
as a result of this order, the Court denies the remainder of the motion as
moot without prejudice to reassertion before the Magistrate Judge.
IT IS ORDERED:
1.

The motion to strike (filing 111) filed by defendants Third
City Christian Church and Evangelical Free Church of
Grand Island, Nebraska is granted. The Clerk of the Court
is directed to strike filings 85, 90, 91, 92, 93, 96, 97, 98, and
99.

2.

The defendant Kent Mann's motion to dismiss (filing 69) is
granted. All claims asserted against Kent Mann are
dismissed.

3.

The motion to dismiss (filing 46) filed by defendants Third
City Christian Church and Evangelical Free Church of
Grand Island, Nebraska is granted. All claims asserted

29

against Third City Christian Church and Evangelical Free
Church of Grand Island, Nebraska are dismissed.
4.

The motion to dismiss (filing 57) filed by Shay McGowan
and the Grand Island Dental Center is granted. All claims
asserted against McGowan and the Grand Island Dental
Center are dismissed.

5.

The motion to dismiss (filing 73) filed by Hall County Board
of Supervisors, Hall County, Chad Nabity, Scott Arnold,
Gary Quandt, Jane Richardson, Doug Lanfear, and Pam
Lancaster is granted. All claims asserted against Hall
County Board of Supervisors, Hall County, Chad Nabity,
Scott Arnold, Gary Quandt, Jane Richardson, Doug
Lanfear, and Pam Lancaster are dismissed.

6.

The plaintiff's first motion to consolidate and amend (filing
78) is denied as moot.

7.

The plaintiff's second motion to consolidate and amend
(filing 114) is denied.

8.

The plaintiff's motion to file notice of motion nunc pro tunc
or alternatively refile the proposed amended complaint,
and to stay the Court's decision regarding Hall County's
motion to dismiss and compel early disclosures by Hall
County (filing 127) is denied.

9.

The plaintiff may file a new motion to amend his complaint
by April 21, 2016, provided that his proposed amended
complaint takes into consideration the principles and
analysis set forth above. To the extent the plaintiff believes
there are any claims or allegations in his previously filed
proposed amended complaint that could survive a motion to
dismiss, he may reassert those claims and allegations.

30

Dated this 31st day of March, 2016.
BY THE COURT:

John M. Gerrard
United States District Judge

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