Perkins v. University of Nebraska et al
AMENDED MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, ECF No. 15 , converted, in part, to a motion for summary judgment, are granted; Plaintiff Jeremiah Perkins's first cause of action is dismissed, with prejudice; Plaintiff Jeremiah Perkins's second cause of action is dismissed, without prejudice; and A separate judgment will be entered. Ordered by Chief Judge Laurie Smith Camp. (SLP)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA, BOARD
OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
NEBRASKA, UNIVERSITY OF
POLICE DEPARTMENT, OWEN
YARDLEY, Police Chief, University of
JACKSON, Vice Chancellor for
Business and Finance for the University
of Nebraska-Lincoln; and JOHN AND
JANE DOE 1 TO 100, unknown State
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, ECF No. 15.
Defendants assert that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and/or that Plaintiff
Jeremiah Perkins failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Because all
parties have submitted matters outside the pleadings, the Court will convert the Motion,
in part, to one for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, the Motions will be
Except as indicated, the following facts are those alleged in the Complaint, ECF
No. 1, and assumed true for purposes of the Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter
Properly referenced and undisputed material facts also have been
considered for purposes of summary judgment, regarding the Defendants’ assertion that
the Plaintiff has not presented a claim on which relief can be granted.
Plaintiff Jeremiah Perkins was a student at the University of Nebraska on its
Lincoln (UNL) campus since the fall of 2016. On April 14, 2017, one or more students
assaulted Perkins. On April 15, 2017, Defendant University Police Department (UPD)
issued Perkins a “Trespass Warning Ban and Bar Notice” (the “Ban”), which banned
Perkins from the UNL campus, as well as any other University of Nebraska property, for
a period of not less than 4 years. The Ban allowed Perkins to submit an appeal within 5
business days after receipt, which Perkins did.
On April 20, 2017, Defendant Vice Chancellor Christine Jackson issued a denial
of the appeal without a formal hearing. Perkins alleges that Jackson and Defendant
Owen Yardley, the UPD Chief of Police, had the discretion and authority to afford
Perkins the opportunity for a hearing on the Ban, but failed to do so. Perkins further
alleges that he was not advised he would be given the opportunity to make any further
challenge to the Ban until after he filed his Complaint in this case. Perkins Aff., ECF No.
18-1, Page ID 126.
After the Ban was issued, an investigator with UNL contacted Perkins. Title IX1
charges were brought against Perkins, and Perkins met with Title IX investigators as
early as June 6, 2017. Id. Perkins alleges that the Title IX investigators represented to
him that, regardless of the outcome of the Title IX investigation, the Ban would not be
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688. The Court presumes
that UNL brought charges against Perkins under Title IX’s implementing regulations. Perkins does not
describe the nature of the Title IX charges against him and they are not relevant to the outcome of the
affected. However, at some point after Perkins filed his Complaint, on June 13, 2017,
the University of Nebraska notified Perkins that the Title IX proceedings could affect the
On August 7, 2017, the UNL Student Conduct Board held a hearing regarding
the Title IX charges against Perkins. The Board held that Perkins violated the UNL
Student Code of Conduct and imposed sanctions. Perkins was sent notice of the
Board’s decision on August 10, 2017, and was informed that he could file an appeal of
the decision before August 18, 2017.
Also on August 10, 2017, Yardley emailed a letter to Perkins informing him that
the Ban had been lifted. ECF No. 16-1, Page ID 101. The University’s trespass
procedures had been amended to provide that a person filing an appeal of a ban-andbar notice could request an in-person or telephonic hearing. Id. Unless such a request
were made and granted, appeals were to be submitted based on written documentation.
Perkins alleges that although the Ban was lifted and the procedures for
challenging the Ban were amended, he was deprived of due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment, and he incurred significant attorney’s fees and other damages
due to Defendants’ failure to provide him an opportunity for a hearing. See Perkins Aff.
¶ 7, ECF No. 18-1, Page ID 126. Defendants argue that the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction and that they are entitled to immunity from suit.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
I. Mootness Under Rule 12(b)(1)
“[M]ootness and standing are questions of subject matter jurisdiction.” Doe v.
Nixon, 716 F.3d 1041, 1047 (8th Cir. 2013). “In a facial challenge to jurisdiction, the
court presumes all of the factual allegations concerning jurisdiction to be true and will
grant the motion only if the plaintiff fails to allege an element necessary for subject
matter jurisdiction.” Young America Corp. v. Affiliated Comput. Servs., 424 F.3d 840,
843-44 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Titus v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1993). In a
factual challenge to jurisdiction, “there is substantial authority that the trial court is free
to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the
Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 730 (8th Cir. 1990). “In short, no
presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s allegations, and the existence of disputed
material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of
jurisdictional claims.” Iowa League of Cities v. EPA, 711 F.3d 844, 861 (8th Cir. 2013)
(citing Osborn, 918 F.2d 724, 730). The plaintiff has the burden of proving jurisdiction
exists; “[h]owever, the ‘heavy’ burden of proving mootness falls on the party asserting
the case has become moot.” Kennedy Building Associates v. Viacom, Inc., 375 F.3d
731, 745 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631
“Once the evidence is submitted, the district court must decide the
jurisdictional issue, not simply rule that there is or is not enough evidence to have a trial
on the issue.” Osborn, 918 F.2d 724.
II. Conversion to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
The Court will convert Defendants’ Motion, in part, into one for summary
judgment because both parties submitted matters outside the pleadings. Rule 12(b)
“does not require the court to give affirmative notice to the parties of its intent to
consider matters outside the complaint.” Angel v. Williams, 12 F.3d 786, 788 (8th Cir.
Constructive notice of the court’s intention to consider matters outside the
pleading is sufficient. See id. at 789. In George v. City of St. Louis, the Eighth Circuit
held that the district court properly converted a motion to dismiss to one for summary
judgment where the defendants’ motion was clearly worded in the alternative; plaintiffs
themselves submitted to the district court matters outside the pleadings; and plaintiffs
specifically addressed the summary judgment standard in their brief to the district court.
26 F.3d 55, 57 (8th Cir. 1994).
All parties in this case submitted evidence outside the pleadings in support of
their respective positions. See Defendants’ Index of Evidence, ECF Nos. 16, 20;
Plaintiff’s Index of Evidence, ECF No. 18. Although Defendants did not word their
Motion in the alternative, Perkins himself submitted an affidavit that addressed several
matters not alleged in his Complaint. Perkins’s affidavit included assertions regarding
the damages he has suffered and the sufficiency and expediency of the hearing he
received. In his brief, Perkins specifically discussed the Court’s discretion to consider
matters outside the pleadings and convert the Motion into one for summary judgment
and, similar to the plaintiffs in George, referenced the summary judgment standard. Pl.
Br. at 4, ECF No. 19, Page ID 132. The Court has considered the parties’ evidence
outside the pleadings with respect to Defendants’ assertion of the qualified immunity
defense. Accordingly, for purposes of evaluating qualified immunity, the Court converts
Defendants’ Motion to one for summary judgment.
“Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, presents no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Garrison v. ConAgra Foods
Packaged Foods, LLC, 833 F.3d 881, 884 (8th Cir. 2016) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
“Summary judgment is not disfavored and is designed for every action.” Briscoe v. Cty.
of St. Louis, 690 F.3d 1004, 1011 n.2 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Torgerson v. City of
Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1043 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc)). In reviewing a motion for
summary judgment, the Court will view “the record in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party . . . drawing all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Whitney v.
Guys, Inc., 826 F.3d 1074, 1076 (8th Cir. 2016) (citing Hitt v. Harsco Corp., 356 F.3d
920, 923–24 (8th Cir. 2004)). Where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof
at trial on a dispositive issue, “Rule 56(e) permits a proper summary judgment motion to
be opposed by any of the kinds of evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), except the
mere pleadings themselves.” Se. Mo. Hosp. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 642 F.3d 608, 618 (8th
Cir. 2011) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)). The moving
party need not produce evidence showing “the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact.” Johnson v. Wheeling Mach. Prods., 779 F.3d 514, 517 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325). Instead, “the burden on the moving party may be discharged
by ‘showing’ . . . that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s
case.” St. Jude Med., Inc. v. Lifecare Int’l, Inc., 250 F.3d 587, 596 (8th Cir. 2001)
(quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325).
In response to the moving party’s showing, the nonmoving party’s burden is to
produce “specific facts sufficient to raise a genuine issue for trial.” Haggenmiller v. ABM
Parking Servs., Inc., 837 F.3d 879, 884 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Gibson v. Am.
Greetings Corp., 670 F.3d 844, 853 (8th Cir. 2012)). The nonmoving party “must do
more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,
and must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.” Wagner v. Gallup, Inc., 788 F.3d 877, 882 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Torgerson, 643
F.3d at 1042). “[T]here must be more than the mere existence of some alleged factual
dispute” between the parties in order to overcome summary judgment.
Dickinson State Univ., 826 F.3d 1054, 1061 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Vacca v. Viacom
Broad. of Mo., Inc., 875 F.2d 1337, 1339 (8th Cir. 1989)).
In other words, in deciding “a motion for summary judgment, facts must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a genuine
dispute as to those facts.” Wagner, 788 F.3d at 882 (quoting Torgerson, 643 F.3d at
1042). Otherwise, where the Court finds that “the record taken as a whole could not
lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party,” there is no “genuine issue of
material fact” for trial and summary judgment is appropriate. Whitney, 826 F.3d at 1076
(quoting Grage v. N. States Power Co.-Minn., 813 F.3d 1051, 1052 (8th Cir. 2015)).
Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint on several grounds. First, they argue
that Perkins’s claims are moot; therefore, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
Second, they allege that the Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska (BRUN),
the University of Nebraska, UNL, the UPD (collectively, the “Nebraska Defendants”),
and Jackson and Yardley in their official capacities are immune from suit under the
Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution. Third, Defendants allege that
Perkins’s claims against Yardley and Jackson in their individual capacities fail under the
doctrine of qualified immunity. The Court concludes that Perkins’s federal claims must
be dismissed, with prejudice, and his state law claims dismissed, without prejudice.
In addition to money damages, Perkins seeks declaratory prospective relief
against all Defendants. “[U]nder the doctrine set forth in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908), state officials may be sued in their official capacities for prospective injunctive
relief without violating the Eleventh Amendment.” Monroe, 495 F.3d at 594. Thus, “Ex
parte Young simply permits an injunction against a state official in his official capacity to
stop an ongoing violation of federal law.” Randolph v. Rodgers, 253 F.3d 342, 348 (8th
The Ex Parte Young exception does not apply here, because the Ban against
Perkins was lifted and his claims for prospective relief are moot. See In re Gretter
Autoland, Inc., 864 F.3d 888, 891 (8th Cir. 2017). Further, UNL’s procedures were
amended to provide that a person wishing to appeal a ban-and-bar notice may request
an in-person or telephone hearing. Thus, there is no indication that Perkins’s claims for
prospective relief are “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” See Ayyoubi v. Holder,
712 F.3d 387, 391 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149
(1975)). Accordingly, claims for prospective relief are moot, and must be dismissed.
II. Sovereign Immunity
Sovereign immunity bars any suit brought in federal court against a state or state
agency, regardless of the nature of the relief sought, unless Congress has abrogated
the states' immunity or a state has consented to suit or waived its immunity. See
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 74 (1996); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). The Eighth Circuit has held that “[w]hile under the
doctrine set forth in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), state officials may be sued in
their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief without violating the Eleventh
Amendment, the same doctrine does not extend to states or state agencies.” Monroe v.
Arkansas State Univ., 495 F.3d 591, 594 (8th Cir. 2007); see also Anthony K. v. State,
855 N.W.2d 802, 785 (Neb. 2014).
a. Sovereign Immunity of the Nebraska Defendants
Both the Nebraska Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals have
held that the BRUN and the University of Nebraska, including UNL, are state agencies
and thus entitled to state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution. See Doe v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Neb., 788 N.W.2d 264,
281, n. 51 (Neb. 2010) (affirming dismissal of claims against the BRUN and concluding
that the universities within the University of Nebraska system are state agencies entitled
to sovereign immunity); see also Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Neb. v. Dawes, 370 F.
Supp. 1190, 1193 (D. Neb. 1974) (concluding that Neb. Rev. Stat. § 85–105 does not
grant the BRUN the power to waive immunity from suit in federal court). The Nebraska
Supreme Court has also recognized that the UPD is a department of UNL. See Univ.
Police Officers Union, Int'l Bhd. of Police Officers, Local 567 v. Univ. of Neb., 277
N.W.2d 529, 539 (Neb. 1979).
There is no evidence that the BRUN has waived its sovereign immunity as to
Perkins’s claims, nor is there evidence that the University of Nebraska, UNL, or UPD
have waived their sovereign immunity. Accordingly, Perkins’s claims against the BRUN,
the University of Nebraska, UNL, and the UPD will be dismissed.
b. Claims Against Jackson and Yardley in Their Official Capacities
In addition to barring claims against a state, “the Eleventh Amendment prohibits
federal-court lawsuits seeking monetary damages from individual state officers in their
official capacities because such lawsuits are essentially ‘for the recovery of money from
the state.’” Treleven v. Univ. of Minn., 73 F.3d 816, 818 (8th Cir. 1996) (footnote
omitted) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945)); see
also Grand River Enters. Six Nations, Ltd. v. Beebe, 467 F.3d 698, 701 (8th Cir. 2006)
(“The Eleventh Amendment protects states from being sued in federal court without
their consent and also bars suits against state officers acting in their official capacities
when the state itself is ‘the real, substantial party in interest.’” (quoting Ford Motor Co.,
323 U.S. at 464)). Perkins’s Complaint asserts claims against Jackson and Yardley in
their official capacities and seeks relief that includes money damages. For such claims,
the state entities are the real parties in interest and Perkins’s claims for money
damages against Jackson and Yardley in their official capacities must be dismissed.
III. Qualified Immunity
The only potential federal claims remaining are Perkins’s claims for money
damages against Jackson and Yardley in their individual capacities. Defendants argue
that Jackson and Yardley in their individual capacities are entitled to qualified immunity.
To determine whether they are “entitled to qualified immunity, [the Court] must conduct
a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, demonstrate the deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right; and (2)
whether the right was clearly established at the time of the deprivation.” Solomon v.
Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 786 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Jones v. McNeese, 675 F.3d 1158,
1161 (8th Cir. 2012)). “Courts have discretion to decide the order in which to engage
these two prongs.” Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014) (citing Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)).
The Court concludes that Perkins has not
identified a clearly established constitutional right that these Defendants allegedly
violated. Even if the right he asserts were clearly established, Perkins has failed to
show that these Defendants deprived him of such a right.
A. Clearly Established Right
Perkins asserts that he has a “protected property interest in his education at the
Defendant University of Nebraska” and a “protected liberty interest in his education at
the Defendant University of Nebraska.” Complaint ¶¶ 28, 30, ECF No. 1, Page ID 6. For
such rights to be “clearly established,” “[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently
clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that
right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). Perkins must identify
analogous case law or a statute establishing that reasonable officials should have
known that their conduct was unlawful. See Casteel v. Pieschek, 3 F.3d 1050, 1053 (7th
The Eighth Circuit has stated that “procedural due process must be afforded a
student on the college campus ‘by way of adequate notice, definite charge, and a
hearing with opportunity to present one's own side of the case and with all necessary
protective measures.’” Jones v. Snead, 431 F.2d 1115, 1117 (8th Cir. 1970) (quoting
Esteban v. Cent. Mo. State Coll., 415 F.2d 1077, 1089 (8th Cir. 1969)). The Eighth
Circuit later specified that “expulsion proceedings entitled [a student] to some level of
due process. See Woodis v. Westark Cmty. Coll., 160 F.3d 435, 440 (8th Cir. 1998)
(citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975)). In Esteban, the court also noted that it was
not certain “whether attenance [sic] at [a public university], or staying there once one
has matriculated, is a right rather than a privilege.” 415 F.2d at 1089.
Perkins was not expelled, nor is there any indication that he was threatened with
expulsion. Defendants submitted evidence that Perkins has been enrolled at UNL from
the fall of 2016 until the present time, and he completed his 2016-2017 second
semester classes on April 29, 2017, in good academic standing. Morrell Aff. ¶ 2, ECF
No. 20-1, Page ID 143. Perkins counters that the Ban prevented him from attending his
classes from April 15, 2017, through the end of the semester and that, as a result, his
cumulative grade point average dropped from a 3.8 to a 3.6. Perkins Aff. ¶ 7, ECF No.
18-1, Page ID 125. Even if the Ban prevented Perkins from attending his classes for the
last two weeks of the Spring 2017 semester, he was not expelled nor suspended.
Perkins has cited no authority suggesting he had a property interest or liberty interest
entitling him to enter UNL’s campus during the time he was subject to the Ban, and the
Court cannot conclude that Perkins had a clearly established constitutional right to enter
B. Deprivation of Right
Even if the Ban was tantamount to expulsion, and even if Perkins had a clearly
established right to enter the UNL campus until such right was curtailed through due
process, Perkins has not shown that he was deprived of procedural due process. The
Eighth Circuit has stated that although students may be entitled to due process for
student discipline, “we have cautioned ‘that it is not sound to draw any analogy between
student discipline and criminal procedure.’” Jones, 431 F.2d at 1117 (quoting Esteban,
415 F.2d at 1089). Thus, this Court has recognized that it “must exercise ‘care and
restraint’ in reviewing a school's decision to expel a student.” Swait v. Univ. of Neb. at
Omaha, No. 8:08CV404, 2008 WL 5083245, at *2 (D. Neb. Nov. 25, 2008) (quoting
Woodis, 160 F.3d at 438).
Perkins alleges that he did not have an opportunity to challenge the Ban, but the
record contradicts that assertion. In Perkins’s own affidavit, he described the disciplinary
proceedings in which he was represented by counsel. ECF No. 18-1, Page ID 126. The
UNL Code of Conduct Board met on August 7, 2017, for a hearing on the charges
against Perkins. After the hearing, the Board issued a decision and indicated to Perkins
how to file an appeal. ECF No. 16-2, Page ID 110. Moreover, not only did Perkins
receive a hearing, the Ban was lifted. Thus, as to the Ban, Perkins obtained his desired
outcome. Based on the evidence in the record, Defendants provided Perkins an
opportunity for a hearing, an opportunity for appeal, and the opportunity to consult with
counsel. Perkins does not deny that the hearing took place, nor does he assert that the
procedures at the hearing were inadequate.
Perkins argues that, even though the Ban was lifted, the nature and timing of the
proceedings entitle him to damages. He relies on Scoggin v. Lincoln Univ., 291 F. Supp.
161 (W.D. Mo. 1968), where two students sued a public university, alleging that they
were dismissed in violation of the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 162.
The university reinstated the students after the court found in their favor. Id. at 170.
After reinstatement, the university sought to dismiss the students’ remaining claims as
moot. Id. The court rejected the university’s argument, concluding that the students had
yet to receive due process for their claim of wrongful suspension. Id. at 170-71.
The reasoning in Scoggin is inapplicable to Perkins’s case for several reasons.2
In Scoggin, the court rejected the university’s mootness claims, and found that the
students’ rights had been violated because they never received notice or an opportunity
to be heard. Here, it is undisputed that Perkins was given the opportunity for a hearing;
he had actual notice of the hearing; he was represented by counsel; and he was given
an opportunity for an appeal. After the hearing, and before any judgment or decision in
this Court, the Ban was lifted and the University’s policies were amended to clarify due
process rights in such proceedings.
Although Perkins appears to argue that he should have been provided a hearing
before he missed any classes in the Spring 2017 semester, he offers no authority or
explanation as to why the timing of the hearing was unreasonable under the
circumstances. The court in Scoggin noted that, when applying student discipline, an
institution “need not fear that one of its students will be able to maintain some sort of
federal court action before the institution has had a reasonable period of time under the
circumstances within which to conduct a proper disciplinary proceeding in accordance
with its established code.” 291 F. Supp. at 173.
Finally, Perkins implies that UNL violated his due process rights because UNL
Title IX representatives initially told him the disciplinary proceedings would not affect the
Ban. Yet Perkins admits that the University of Nebraska did inform him that the results
of the disciplinary proceedings could affect the Ban. ECF No. 18-1, Page ID 126.
Perkins refers to Scoggin as an Eighth Circuit case and even indicates that Scoggin was
reported in “291 F. Supp. 161 (8th Cir. 1968).” Pl. Br. at 7, ECF No. 19, Page ID 134. Perkins citation
clearly refers to a district court case published in the Federal Supplement. Scoggin is not an Eighth Circuit
decision, and Perkins has not pointed to any Eighth Circuit decision expressly adopting the holding or
reasoning in Scoggin.
Perkins suggests that because this notice did not come until after he filed his Complaint,
he would not have received due process if he had not filed the Complaint. The Court
concludes that UNL conducted its disciplinary proceedings within a reasonable time,
resulting in the Ban being lifted, and even if Perkins had a property or liberty interest in
maintaining access to the UNL campus, Jackson and Yardley did not deny him such a
right without due process. Accordingly, they are entitled to qualified immunity from suit.
IV. State Law Claim
Perkins asks that the Court exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his remaining
state law claim. When supplemental jurisdiction is relevant and a “district court has
dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,” then “[t]he district court[ ]
may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367. If the district court
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, then the district court has the discretion
to remand the case to state court or to dismiss the case without prejudice.
Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988). The Court will decline to
exercise its supplemental jurisdiction, and elects to dismiss Perkins’s state law claim,
The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Nebraska Defendants and
the individual Defendants in their official capacities under the doctrine of sovereign
immunity and mootness. Jackson and Yardley, in their personal capacities, are entitled
to qualified immunity from suit, because the rights Perkins seeks to vindicate were not
clearly established, nor has he shown that he was deprived of the rights he asserts. The
Court will decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over Perkins’s state law claim.
IT IS ORDERED:
Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, ECF No. 15, converted, in part, to a
motion for summary judgment, are granted;
Plaintiff Jeremiah Perkins’s first cause of action is dismissed, with
Plaintiff Jeremiah Perkins’s second cause of action is dismissed, without
A separate judgment will be entered.
Dated this 13th day of November, 2017.
BY THE COURT:
s/Laurie Smith Camp
Chief United States District Judge
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