Wang Anderson v. The State of Nebraska et al

Filing 487

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 280 Motion to Dismiss. Christian Heritage Children's Home's Motion to Dismiss 280 is granted in part and denied in part. Ordered by Judge John M. Gerrard. (DCD)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
CATHERINE YANG WANG
ANDERSON,
4:17-CV-3073
Plaintiff,
vs.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

THE STATE OF NEBRASKA, et al.,
Defendants.
This matter is before the Court on the motion to dismiss filed by the
Christian Heritage Children's Home (filing 280). That motion will be granted
in part and denied in part.
I. BACKGROUND
The plaintiff, Catherine Yang Wang Anderson (Wang Anderson) is the
mother of two girls, X.C.W. and Y.C.W. Filing 154 at 2. Wang Anderson's
husband, Bo Wang (Wang) is their father. Filing 154 at 2. X.C.W. was a minor
when this case was filed, and Wang Anderson sued both in her own capacity
and as "next friend" of X.C.W. Filing 154 at 2.
Very generally, Wang Anderson alleges that X.C.W. was unlawfully
made a ward of the State of Nebraska and held by the State against her will.
Filing 154 at 2. But it was Y.C.W. who first drew the attention of authorities:
she reported to school officials on October 8, 2013 that Wang Anderson had
threatened her. Filing 154 at 28. Based on Y.C.W.'s report that she didn't feel
safe going home, sheriff's officers removed Y.C.W. from Wang Anderson's
residence. Filing 154 at 33.

One of the sheriff's deputies observed that when Wang Anderson
answered the door, she was wearing a rubber glove, and suspected that Wang
Anderson might be mentally ill. Filing 154 at 29-31. Investigators from the
Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services went to Wang
Anderson's residence that evening, and reported hazardous conditions. Filing
154 at 35. So, after X.C.W. went to school the next day, she was also placed in
the temporary custody of the state. Filing 154 at 36.
X.C.W. and Y.C.W. were placed with the same foster parent. Filing 154
at 34, 37. That foster parent was allegedly employed by Christian Heritage, a
Nebraska nonprofit corporation that provides foster care and social services.
Filing 154 at 5, 17. Respite care for Y.C.W. was provided by another woman,
who may have been employed by Christian Heritage. Filing 154 at 18.
A juvenile proceeding was initiated in the Separate Juvenile Court of
Douglas County, Nebraska. Filing 154 at 44. The petition alleged—Wang
Anderson says wrongly—that X.C.W. and Y.C.W. had been subjected to
inappropriate discipline, not provided with safe housing, deprived of proper
parental care and support, and that Wang Anderson had been seen acting in a
manner consistent with untreated mental health needs. Filing 154 at 44-45.
An ex parte juvenile court order placed the girls in the temporary custody of
DHHS, then after a hearing, the juvenile court continued DHHS's temporary
custody. Filing 154 at 45-46.
On January 28, 2014, the Douglas County Attorney petitioned the
juvenile court to terminate Wang Anderson's parental rights. Filing 154 at 75.
The juvenile court dismissed the termination petitions, but the girls were
finally adjudicated as being juveniles within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. §
43-247(3). Filing 154 at 81.

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In May 2016, the juvenile court changed the permanency objective for
X.C.W. to independent living. Filing 154 at 121. She moved to another foster
home, then to an "independent living arrangement," then to a dormitory at the
University of Nebraska-Lincoln. Filing 154 at 121. But in December 2016, she
was returned to her foster home. Filing 154 at 123. After that, she was sent to
another foster placement, where she remained when this complaint was filed.
Filing 154 at 124.
Wang Anderson asserts several federal and state-law claims against
sixty-nine different defendants, on behalf of herself and X.C.W. Filing 154 at
1-2. She claims a number of federal constitutional violations, including
violation of the rights to due process and familial association, unlawful seizure,
a deliberately indifferent failure to protect, retaliation for constitutionally
protected activity, violation of Wang Anderson's First Amendment rights, and
discrimination against Wang Anderson because of her Chinese origin. Filing
154 at 124-30, 137-47. She also claims X.C.W. wasn't provided with
accommodations required by § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.
§ 794. Filing 154 at 147-48. And, she says, she and X.C.W. were denied
statutory rights arising under 42 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. & 670 et seq. Filing 154
at 150-57. Finally, she asserts state-law claims including negligence, negligent
and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and a civil rights claim
pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 20-148. Filing 154 at 131-37, 148-50.
Specifically, as to Christian Heritage, Wang Anderson asserts her
constitutional policy-or-custom claims, negligence, § 20-148, and negligent and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Filing 154 at 126, 130, 142-43, 14849. Christian Heritage moves to dismiss her claims for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Filing 280.

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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) challenges whether the court has
subject matter jurisdiction. The party asserting subject matter jurisdiction
bears the burden of proof. Great Rivers Habitat Alliance v. FEMA, 615 F.3d
985, 988 (8th Cir. 2010). Rule 12(b)(1) motions can be decided in three ways:
at the pleading stage, like a Rule 12(b)(6) motion; on undisputed facts, like a
summary judgment motion; and on disputed facts. Jessie v. Potter, 516 F.3d
709, 712 (8th Cir. 2008). It appears that the defendants are advancing a "facial
attack" to subject matter jurisdiction, based on the pleadings. See Branson
Label, Inc. v. City of Branson, Mo., 793 F.3d 910, 914 (8th Cir. 2015).
Accordingly, the Court restricts itself to the pleadings and Wang Anderson
receives the same protections as she would defending against a motion brought
under Rule 12(b)(6). Hastings v. Wilson, 516 F.3d 1055, 1058 (8th Cir. 2008).
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must
also contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for
relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged. Id. Where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the
court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged—but has not shown—that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 679.
III. DISCUSSION
Christian Heritage's motion to dismiss raises only three discrete issues:
(1) whether Wang Anderson has standing to pursue relief as "next friend" of
X.C.W., (2) whether the Court should abstain pursuant to the Younger

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abstention doctrine, and (3) whether Wang Anderson's claims are barred by
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Filing 281.1
1. STANDING/REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
The Court already held that Wang Anderson could not assert claims on
X.C.W.'s behalf, and dismissed X.C.W.'s claims without prejudice. Filing 481
at 9-13, 36. The Court will grant Christian Heritage's motion to dismiss to that
extent, for the reasons previously explained by the Court. See filing 481 at 913. Only Wang Anderson's own claims remain at issue here.
2. YOUNGER ABSTENTION
Christian Heritage argues that the Court should abstain from
addressing Wang Anderson's claims in deference to the state juvenile court.
Filing 281 at 6. Generally, federal courts are obliged to decide cases within the
scope of federal jurisdiction. Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72
(2013). But there are certain instances in which the prospect of unduly
interfering with state proceedings counsels against federal relief. Id.
Younger abstention arises in one such class of cases. See id.; Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53-54 (1971). Under Younger, "[w]hen there is a parallel,
pending state criminal proceeding, federal courts must refrain from enjoining

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The Court has also noted the suggestion in Christian Heritage's reply brief that the

allegations in the complaint are insufficient to state a claim against Christian Heritage.
Filing 423 at 6. While there may be some force to that argument, for reasons the Court has
detailed in other orders, the Court concludes that it was newly presented in Christian
Heritage's reply brief, depriving Wang Anderson of a chance to meaningfully respond. So, the
Court declines to consider it. See Torgeson v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 466 F. Supp. 2d 1096,
1121 (N.D. Iowa 2006). Whether Christian Heritage's argument might have merit if asserted
in a Rule 12(c) motion is something the Court does not consider at this time.

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the state prosecution." Sprint Commc'ns, 571 U.S. at 72. The Supreme Court
has extended Younger abstention "to particular state civil proceedings that are
akin to criminal prosecutions . . . or that implicate a State's interest in
enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts." Id. at 72-73. But abstention
is not in order simply because a pending state-court proceeding involves the
same subject matter. Id. at 72.
If the juvenile court proceedings relating to X.C.W. and Y.C.W. were
ongoing, this case might be one of the "exceptional" cases in which Younger
abstention is appropriate. See id. at 73, 77; Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 43335 (1979). But Younger abstention is not applicable where state proceedings
are no longer pending. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 705 (1992); see
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974); see also Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco,
Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11 (1987); Night Clubs, Inc. v. City of Fort Smith, Ark., 163
F.3d 475, 479 (8th Cir. 1998). So, Younger abstention is inapplicable here.
3. ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE
Finally, Christian Heritage argues that Wang Anderson's claims are
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Filing 281 at 9-10; see D.C. Court of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413
(1923). Under that doctrine, "lower federal courts are precluded from
exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments," Lance v.
Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006), and Christian Heritage contends that the
juvenile court's orders qualify. Filing 281 at 9-10.
Rooker-Feldman holds that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257, federal district
courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over "cases brought by state-court losers
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the
district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and
rejection of those judgments." Shelby Cty. Health Care Corp. v. S. Farm Bureau
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Cas. Ins. Co., 855 F.3d 836, 840 (8th Cir. 2017). But § 1257 does not "stop a
district court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction simply because a
party attempts to litigate in federal court a matter previously litigated in state
court." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 293
(2005). "If a federal plaintiff presents some independent claim, albeit one that
denies a legal conclusion that a state court has reached in a case to which he
was a party, then there is jurisdiction and state law determines whether the
defendant prevails under principles of preclusion." Id. (cleaned up).
Given the narrow scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Court
concludes it is inapplicable here, at least as to the claims asserted against
Christian Heritage. The Court has not been asked to review and reject the
juvenile court's orders, even if Wang Anderson's claims are inconsistent with
some of the juvenile court's conclusions. See Dornheim v. Sholes, 430 F.3d 919,
923-24 (8th Cir. 2005); Heartland Acad. Cmty. Church v. Waddle, 335 F.3d 684,
689 (8th Cir. 2003); see also Kovacic v. Cuyahoga Cty. Dep't of Children &
Family Servs., 606 F.3d 301, 310 (6th Cir. 2010); PJ ex rel. Jensen v. Wagner,
603 F.3d 1182, 1194 (10th Cir. 2010); Brokaw v. Weaver, 305 F.3d 660, 668-69
(7th Cir. 2002); Ernst v. Child & Youth Servs. of Chester Cty., 108 F.3d 486,
491-92 (3d Cir. 1997). So, those claims are not barred by § 1257.2
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Christian Heritage's motion to dismiss will be granted to
the extent that the Court has already dismissed X.C.W.'s claims, but the
balance of Christian Heritage's motion will be denied.

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To be clear: Rooker-Feldman may be implicated by other claims against other defendants,

if those claims were more directly disposed of by the juvenile court in a final judgment.

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IT IS ORDERED that Christian Heritage Children's Home's
Motion to Dismiss (filing 280) is granted in part and denied in part.
Dated this 16th day of August, 2018.
BY THE COURT:

John M. Gerrard
United States District Judge

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