Wang Anderson v. The State of Nebraska et al

Filing 587

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - KVC's motion for entry of final judgment (filing 576 ) is denied. Alegent and Bhatia's motion for entry of final judgment (filing 579 ) is denied. The plaintiff's motion to extend (filing 582 ) is denied as moot. Ordered by Chief Judge John M. Gerrard. (LKO)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
CATHERINE YANG WANG
ANDERSON,
4:17-CV-3073
Plaintiff,
vs.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

THE STATE OF NEBRASKA, et al.,
Defendants.
This matter is before the Court on motions filed by KVC Behavioral
Healthcare Nebraska, Inc. (filing 576) and Alegent Creighton Clinic and
Shashi Bhatia (filing 579) to certify the Court's orders dismissing the plaintiff's
claims against them as final judgments pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Those
motions will be denied.
Rule 54(b) provides, in relevant part, that an order adjudicating the
rights and liabilities of one or more, but fewer than all of the parties, does not
end the action as to those parties—unless the Court directs entry of a final
judgment after expressly determining that there is no just reason for delay.
But Rule 54(b) is to be used sparingly. Jones v. W. Plains Bank & Tr. Co., 813
F.3d 700, 702 (8th Cir. 2015). Certification should be granted only if there
exists some danger of hardship or injustice through delay which would be
alleviated by immediate appeal. Id. at 703. Factors that should be considered
in determining whether such danger of hardship or injustice exists include:
(1) the relationship between the adjudicated and unadjudicated
claims; (2) the possibility that the need for review might or might
not be mooted by future developments in the district court; (3) the

possibility that the reviewing court might be obliged to consider
the same issue a second time; (4) the presence or absence of a claim
or counterclaim which could result in setoff against the judgment
sought to be made final; [and] (5) miscellaneous factors such as
delay, economic and solvency considerations, shortening the time
of trial, frivolity of competing claims, expense, and the like.
Downing v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 810 F.3d 580, 585-86 (8th Cir. 2016).
Here, the movants suggest that they will be subjected to hardship
because the case could still take a long time, and they might be prejudiced by
that delay if the claims against them were ultimately revived, by this Court or
on appeal. See filing 577 at 12-14. But that presents one of the fundamental
problems with their motion: Rule 54(b) was intended to permit a party to take
an interlocutory appeal, not force an opposing party to take an interlocutory
appeal. See Nix v. Sword, 168 F.3d 490 (6th Cir. 1998); Stewart v. Gates, 277
F.R.D. 33, 36-37 (D.D.C. 2011); Fisher v. Pelstring, 817 F. Supp. 2d 791, 829
(D.S.C. 2011); Northway, Inc. v. TSC Indus., Inc., 361 F. Supp. 108, 117 (N.D.
Ill. 1973). Compelling the plaintiff to take an interlocutory appeal now might
serve the movants' interests, but could only further delay the proceedings as
to the remaining defendants by diverting the plaintiff's attention from this
Court. See Fisher, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 829; Meade v. Parsley, No. 2:09-CV-388,
2010 WL 3432821, at *1 (S.D. W.Va. Aug. 31, 2010); Northway, 361 F. Supp.
at 117. And it would
effectively invert the purpose of Rule 54(b) from one of enhancing
the appellate rights of a losing party in circumstances when delay
of an appeal would cause undue hardship or possible injustice, to
one in which a prevailing party could prematurely force an appeal
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of part of a case by a losing party, who must comply with timeliness
requirements for exercising appellate rights.
Stewart, 277 F.R.D. at 36.
Furthermore, it would squarely implicate the interest in preventing
piecemeal appeals. Interlocutory appeals are generally disfavored, and only a
special warrants an immediate appeal from a partial resolution of the lawsuit.
Dean v. Cty. of Gage, 807 F.3d 931, 937-38 (8th Cir. 2015). The Court must
evaluate the interrelationship of the claims so as to prevent piecemeal appeals
in cases which should be reviewed only as single units. See id. at 938. And here,
the claims are clearly interrelated.
In arguing to the contrary, the movants insist that factually, the claims
against them are distinct from the claims against other defendants. See filing
577 at 10-12. But that argument doesn't survive even a cursory review of the
orders dismissing them. Alegent and Bhatia were dismissed by an order that
applied essentially the same reasoning to three sets of defendants. See filing
486. KVC got its own order, but the issues that were decided in its favor were
essentially the same issues that were discussed with respect to nearly all of
the other defendants. See filing 490; see generally filing 568. And factually,
although there are distinct allegations as to each of the moving defendants,
those allegations are presented in a context that intertwines them with the
allegations against each of the other defendants.
Simply put, "[w]here each claim requires familiarity with the same
nucleus of facts and involves analysis of similar legal issues, the claims should
be resolved in a single appeal." Id. (quotation omitted). The relationship here
between the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims is obvious, as is the
probability—if not certainty—that some of the same issues would be presented
more than once to a reviewing court. And that's all on top of the inefficiency
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and unfairness of forcing the plaintiff, against her will, to pursue appeals at
the same time that proceedings in this Court move forward.
The movants are rightly concerned with the lack of progress made in this
case to this point. See filing 577. But the remedy they propose for them would
benefit them at the expense of the plaintiff and the other defendants, and
would generate a substantial risk of delaying case progression even further.
This is not a case in which certification of a final judgment is warranted.
IT IS ORDERED:
1.

KVC's motion for entry of final judgment (filing 576) is
denied.

2.

Alegent and Bhatia's motion for entry of final judgment
(filing 579) is denied.

3.

The plaintiff's motion to extend (filing 582) is denied as moot.

Dated this 5th day of September, 2019.
BY THE COURT:

John M. Gerrard
Chief United States District Judge

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