Williams v. Dakota County Board of Commissioners et al

Filing 56

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - The defendants' motion 39 to dismiss or strike is granted in part and denied in part. The defendants' motion to dismiss is granted with respect to defendants Dakota County Board of Commissioners and Dakota County Department of Corrections, and denied in all other respects. Defendants shall file a responsive pleading within 10 days thereafter. Ordered by Chief Judge Joseph F. Bataillon. (JAE)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT F O R THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA C H A R V E T T E W IL L IA M S , Plaintiff, v. D A K O T A COUNTY BOARD OF C O M M IS S IO N E R S , DAKOTA COUNTY D E P A R T M E N T OF CORRECTIONS, R O D N E Y HERRON, in his official c a p a c ity and personally, COUNTY OF D A K O T A , NEBRASKA, and JAMES L. W A G N E R , Dakota County Sheriff in his o ffic ia l capacity and personally, D e f e n d a n ts . ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

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M E M O R A N D U M AND ORDER

T h is matter is before the court on the motion to dismiss and/or strike filed by d e fe n d a n ts Dakota County Board of Commissioners, Dakota County Department of C o rr e c tio n s , James L. W a g n e r and Rodney Herron, Filing No. 39. This is an action for d is c rim in a tio n in employment. I. Background

In her amended complaint, the plaintiff Charvette W illia m s asserts claims for race d is c r im in a tio n under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 & 1983 and gender discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e ("Title VII"). Filing No. 20, Amended Complaint. Specifically, s h e alleges that defendants discriminated against her by paying her less than similarly s itu a te d white male counterparts and treating her differently with respect to work a s s ig n m e n ts. e n v ir o n m e n t. Id. at 3-4. She also alleges that she was subjected to a hostile work

W illia m s alleges that a superior officer, Rodney Herron, engaged in a

"p r e d a to r y sexual relationship" with her. Id. at 4. She also alleges that the defendants c re a te d a work environment in which "superiors took advantage of their position of power for

th e ir own sexual gratification." Id. at 5. W illia m s further alleges that Sheriff James L. W a g n e r and W illia m s 's supervisor, Defendant Rodney Herron, had numerous sexual re la tio n s h ip s with other employees, resulting in favorable treatment of those employees, to th e detriment of W illia m s . Id. at 5, 11. She alleges that Dakota County was on notice of the b e h a v io r, acquiesced in it, and took no steps to correct it. Id. at 6, 12. She further alleges th a t she was retaliated against for pursuing her right to be free from discrimination in pay. Id . at 4-5. She asserts that defendants' actions were willful and wanton and seeks punitive d a m a g e s .1 Id. at 16. W illia m s also alleges that she has satisfied prerequisites to filing this a c tio n and has received a right to sue letter from the EEOC. Id. at 3. In their motion, the defendants move to dismiss W illia m s 's amended complaint in its e n tire ty for failure to comply with the "short and plain statement" provision of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (a )(2 ), or, in the alternative, to strike certain statements in the amended complaint for v io la tio n of the rule or as irrelevant, repetitive, and/or scandalous under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). D e fe n d a n ts further move to dismiss the amended complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) fo r failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Defendants Board of

C o m m is s io n e r s and Department of Corrections assert they are not entities properly subject to suit. Defendants also assert that W illia m s has failed to exhaust administrative remedies u n d e r a collective bargaining agreement. II. D is c u s s io n A. Law

U n d e r Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f), courts may strike "from any pleading an insufficient d e f e n s e or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed. R. Civ. P.
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Though framed as a separate claim, a request for punitive damages is properly viewed as part of W illia m s 's prayer for relief. In her response to the defendants' motion, W illia m s states that she agrees that D a k o ta County and the defendants in their official capacities "cannot be sued and are immune from punitive d a m a g e s . " Filing No. 48, Response at 2. The court will consider W illia m s 's claim for punitive damages to h a v e been abandoned with respect to those defendants. 2

1 2 (f ). Courts enjoy liberal discretion to strike pleadings under this provision.

BJC Health

S ys te m v. Columbia Cas. Co., 478 F.3d 908, 917 (8th Cir. 2007). Striking a party's pleading, h o w e v e r, is an extreme and disfavored measure. Id. A motion to strike, is neither an a u th o rize d nor a proper way to procure the dismissal of all or part of a claim. 5C W rig h t & M ille r, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 1380 (2008). Under the Federal Rules, a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of th e claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The Rules r e q u ir e a "`showing,' rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief." Bell Atlantic C o r p . v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 n.3. (2007) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). "Specific fa c ts are not necessary; the statement need only `give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2 0 0 7 ) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In order to survive a motion to dismiss under F e d . R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the `grounds' of his `entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the e le m e n ts of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In addition, when ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as tru e all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94. This is so, "even if it appears that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. The complaint must plead "enough f a c ts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. "A claim has facial p la u s ib ility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the r e a s o n a b le inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iq b a l, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (stating that the plausibility standard does not require a probability, but asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted u n la w fu lly). The court must find "enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest" that
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"d is c o v e r y will reveal evidence" of the elements of the claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. "[W ]h e n the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief," the complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 2 (b )( 6 ). Id. at 558; Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (stating that "where the well-pleaded facts do n o t permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has a lle g e d -- b u t it has not `show[n]'-`that the pleader is entitled to relief.'"). T h e Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as amended in 1991, gives all persons the e q u a l right to "make and enforce contracts" and provides a cause of action "for d is c r im in a tio n in the employment relationship." King v. Hardesty, 517 F.3d 1049, 1057 n.4 (8 th Cir. 2008). The prohibition on racial discrimination in § 1981 covers retaliation claims a n d hostile environment claims. CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, --, 128 S. C t. at 1955 (2008); Greer v. St. Louis Reg'l Med. Ctr., 258 F.3d 843, 847 (8th Cir. 2001). A § 1981 claim against a public employer must be asserted through § 1983. Artis v. Francis H o w e ll North Band Booster Ass'n, Inc., 161 F.3d 1178, 1181 (8th Cir. 1998); Jackson v. City o f St. Louis, 220 F.3d 894, 897 (8th Cir. 2000) (noting that claims under § 1981, § 1983, and T itle VII represent "alternative theories of recovery for the same injuries"). Plaintiffs' "right to be free from gender discrimination is secured by the equal p r o t e c tio n clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Tipler v. Douglas County, Neb., 482 F.3d 1 0 2 3 , 1027 (8th Cir. 2007); Ottman v. City of Independence, 341 F.3d 751, 756 (8th Cir. 2 0 0 3 ) ("intentional gender discrimination in public employment by persons acting under color o f state law violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"). Equal protection claims may be asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Mercer v. City o f Cedar Rapids, 308 F.3d 840, 844 (8th Cir. 2002). Discrimination based on gender that c re a te s a hostile or abusive working environment also violates § 1983. Weger v. City of L a d u e , 500 F.3d 710, 171 (8th Cir. 2007) (hostile work environment claims under Title VII
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a n d § 1983 are subject to the same analysis). To state a claim for hostile environment d is c rim in a tio n , an employee must show: (1) she belongs to a protected group; (2) she was s u b je c t to unwelcome harassment: (3) the harassment was based on race or disability; (4) th e harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) her employer k n e w or should have known of the harassment and failed to take proper remedial action. M c C o w n v. St. John's Health System, Inc., 349 F.3d 540, 542 (8th Cir. 2003). Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), the timely filing of a charge of discrimination with the E E O C is a prerequisite to the later commencement of a civil action in federal court. Cobb v. S trin g e r, 850 F.2d 356, 358 (8th Cir. 1988). The purpose of filing the charge is to provide th e EEOC with an opportunity to investigate and attempt to resolve the controversy through c o n c ilia tio n before permitting the aggrieved party to pursue a lawsuit. Id. at 359. A Title VII p la in tiff must also receive a "right to sue" letter from the EEOC in order to exhaust her re m e d ie s . Shannon v. Ford Motor Co., 72 F.3d 678, 684 (8th Cir. 1996). G o v e rn m e n t entities are not liable under section 1983 for an employee's actions u n d e r a theory of respondeat superior, but the county may be liable if the plaintiff can prove a n official policy or a widespread custom that violated the law and caused the plaintiff's in ju ry. See Artis, 161 F.3d at 1181. Locating a "policy" ensures that a municipality is held lia b le only for those deprivations resulting from the decisions of its duly constituted legislative b o d y or of those officials whose acts may fairly be said to be those of the municipality. Board o f County Comm'rs of Bryan County, Oklahoma v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-04 (1997). " [A ] n act performed pursuant to a `custom' that has not been formally approved by an a p p ro p ria te decisionmaker may fairly subject a municipality to liability on the theory that the r e l e v a n t practice is so widespread as to have the force of law." Id. at 404 (citing Monell v. D e p 't of Soc. Serv. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 668, 690-91 (1978).

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U n d e r section 1983, to establish liability against a defendant in his individual capacity, b e c a u s e vicarious liability is inapplicable to § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each G o v e rn m e n t-o ffic ia l defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the C o n s titu tio n . Parrish v. Ball, 2010 W L 445736, *6 (8th Cir. Feb. 10, 2010); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 1 2 9 S. Ct. at 1948. "Thus, `each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only lia b le for his or her own misconduct.'" Parrish at *6 (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949). A s u p e rv is in g officer can be liable for an inferior officer's constitutional violation only if he d ir e c tly participated in the constitutional violation, or if his failure to train or supervise the o ff e n d in g actor caused the deprivation. Parrish at *7; Ottman v. City of Independence, Mo., 3 4 1 F.3d 751, 761 (8th Cir. 2003) (stating that the supervisor must know about the conduct a n d facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what [he or she] might s e e ). A supervisor is not liable in his individual capacity under Title VII. Roark v. City of H a ze n , Arkansas, 189 F.3d 758, 761 (8th Cir. 1999). B. A n a l ys is

The court finds that W illia m s 's amended complaint states a plausible claim for race d is c rim in a tio n under section 1981, gender discrimination under § 1983, and race d is c rim in a t io n , gender discrimination and retaliation under Title VII. In her amended

c o m p la in t, W illia m s alleges disparate pay by reason of race and gender. She alleges a c la im for sexual harassment and for a hostile work environment. She alleges facts showing s h e was treated differently than similarly-situated male employees with respect to work a s s ig n m e n ts and pay and further alleges conduct that is severe or pervasive enough that a re a s o n a b le person would find it hostile or abusive. W illia m s alleges conduct by defendants W a g n e r and Herron that would give rise to individual liability. A lth o u g h W illia m s presents sufficient allegations that the acts of W a g n e r and Herron w e re official policies or customs, the Dakota County Department of Corrections and the
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D a k o t a County Board of Commissioners are not entities that are subject to suit under § 1 9 8 3 . See Williams v. Pulaski County Detention Facility, 278 Fed. Appx. 695, 695 (8th Cir. 2 0 0 8 ) (unpublished opinion); De La Garza v. Kandiyohi County Jail, Correctional Inst., 18 F e d . Appx. 436, 437 (8th Cir. 2001). The proper defendant is the county. Accordingly, the d e fe n d a n ts' motion to dismiss the Dakota County Department of Corrections and the Dakota C o u n ty Board of Commissioners will be granted. Consideration of the defendants' arguments that the relationship was consensual and th a t W illia m s 's remedies are affected by a collective bargaining agreement is not

a p p ro p ria te at this time. The court considers only the allegations that appear on the face of th e amended complaint. Accordingly, the court finds the defendants' motion should be d e n ie d in all other respects. IT IS ORDERED that: 1. The defendants' motion to dismiss or strike is granted in part and denied in part. 2 . The defendants' motion to dismiss is granted with respect to defendants Dakota C o u n ty Board of Commissioners and Dakota County Department of Corrections, and denied in all other respects. 3. Defendants shall file a responsive pleading within 10 days thereafter. DATED this 10 th day of March, 2010. B Y THE COURT:

s / Joseph F. Bataillon Chief United States District Judge

*This opinion m a y contain hyperlinks to other docum e n ts or W e b sites. The U.S. District Court for th e District of Nebraska does not endorse, recom m e n d , approve, or guarantee any third parties or the services o r products they provide on their W e b sites. Likewise, the court has no agreem e n ts with any of these third p a r tie s or their W e b sites. The court accepts no responsibility for the availability or functionality of any h yp e r lin k . Thus, the fact that a hyperlink ceases to work or directs the user to som e other site does not affect t h e opinion of the court. 7