Williams v. Dakota County Board of Commissioners et al

Filing 75

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER regarding Motion to Dismiss 60 . Defendant Rodney Herron's motion to dismiss claims against him in his individual capacity (Filing No. 60 ) is denied. Ordered by Chief Judge Joseph F. Bataillon. (JAB)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT F O R THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA C H A R V E T T E W IL L IA M S , Plaintiff, v. C O U N T Y OF DAKOTA, NEBRASKA, a n d RODNEY HERRON, in his official c a p a c ity and personally, D e f e n d a n ts . ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

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M E M O R A N D U M AND ORDER

T h is matter is before the court on defendant Rodney Herron's motion to dismiss p la in tiff's claims against him in his individual capacity, Filing No. 60. This is an action for d e p r iv a tio n of rights in connection with discrimination in employment. The only claims r e m a in in g in this action are plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against defendants County o f Dakota and Rodney Herron in his individual and official capacities (Counts II & III).1 I n her Second Amended Complaint, the plaintiff alleges that defendant Dakota C o u n ty, as an official policy, or as a practice, procedure or custom, "has discriminated a g a in s t women by establishing, maintaining and enforcing policies which create or foster a s e x u a lly hostile work environment, and by treating women differently than men" and that d e fe n d a n t Rodney Herron, either pursuant to an official policy or individually, deprived her o f "rights protected by the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U n ite d States Constitution by establishing, maintaining or enforcing policies which create or f o s te r a sexually hostile work environment." See Filing No. 59, Second Amended Complaint
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The Dakota County Board of Com m is s io n e r s and the Dakota County Departm e n t of Corrections w e r e dism is s e d as defendants in an earlier order and the plaintiff's Title VII and Equal pay Act claim s against t h e County and Jam e s L. W a g n e r , the Dakota County Sheriff (Counts I & IV) will be dism is s e d pursuant to a n offer of judgm e n t and acceptance thereof. See Filing No. 56, Mem o r a n d u m and Order; Filing No. 69, Offer o f Judgm e n t ; Filing No. 70, Response; Filing No. 71, Order and Judgm e n t .

a t 6-7 (Page ID # 313-14). She alleges that Herron, her superior, engaged in a sexual re la tio n s h ip with her and that she felt she had no choice but to continue the relationship b e c a u s e he was in a position of authority over her. C o m p la in t at 3-4 (Page ID # 310-11). In his motion to dismiss claims against him in his individual capacity, defendant H e rro n asserts that the plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim for relief because it alleges o n ly consensual behavior, and the plaintiff made no claim for assault. He further asserts s h e fails to identify the class to which she belongs and cannot bring an action as a "class of o n e ." See Filing No. 61, Brief at 2-3 (Page ID # 321-22). Under the Federal Rules, a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of th e claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The Rules r e q u ir e a "`showing,' rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief." Bell Atlantic C o r p . v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 n.3. (2007) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). "Specific fa c ts are not necessary; the statement need only `give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2 0 0 7 ) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In order to survive a motion to dismiss under F e d . R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the `grounds' of his `entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the e le m e n ts of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In addition, when ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as tru e all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94. The c o m p la in t must plead "enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Id . at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows th e court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct a lle g e d ." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (stating that the plausibility
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Filing No. 59, Second Amended

s ta n d a rd does not require a probability, but asks for more than a sheer possibility that a d e fe n d a n t has acted unlawfully). A plaintiff's "right to be free from gender discrimination is secured by the equal p r o t e c tio n clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Tipler v. Douglas County, Neb., 482 F.3d 1 0 2 3 , 1027 (8th Cir. 2007); Ottman v. City of Independence, 341 F.3d 751, 756 (8th Cir. 2 0 0 3 ) ("intentional gender discrimination in public employment by persons acting under color o f state law violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"). Equal p ro te c tio n claims may be asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Mercer v. City of C e d a r Rapids, 308 F.3d 840, 844 (8th Cir. 2002). Discrimination based on gender that c re a te s a hostile or abusive working environment also violates § 1983. Weger v. City of L a d u e , 500 F.3d 710, 171 (8th Cir. 2007) (hostile work environment claims under Title VII a n d § 1983 are subject to the same analysis). To state a claim for hostile environment d is c rim in a tio n , an employee must show: (1) she belongs to a protected group; (2) she was s u b je c t to unwelcome harassment: (3) the harassment was based on race or disability; (4) th e harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) her employer k n e w or should have known of the harassment and failed to take proper remedial action. M c C o w n v. St. John's Health System, Inc., 349 F.3d 540, 542 (8th Cir. 2003). An

e m p lo ym e n t discrimination plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case of discrimination to s u r v iv e a Rule 12(b)(6) motion because framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 4 1 1 U.S. 792, 800 (1973), is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement. S w ie rk ie w ic z v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002). U n d e r Section 1983, to establish liability against a defendant in his individual capacity, b e c a u s e vicarious liability is inapplicable to § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each g o ve rn m e n t-o ffic ia l defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the
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C o n s titu tio n . Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 993, 1001 (8th Cir. 2010); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. a t 1948. "Thus, `each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for h is or her own misconduct.'" Parrish, 594 F.3d at 1001 (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949).

Personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a government official for actions he takes under color of state law. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985); Parrish, 594 F.3d at 996. "Official-capacity suits, in contrast, `generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.'" Graham, 473 U.S. at 165-66 (quoting Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55, 1978). An official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity. Id. at 166 (noting that "it is not a suit against the official personally, for the real party in interest is the entity"). To "establish personal liability in a § 1983 action, it is enough to show that the official, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. at 166 (emphasis in original). In contrast, because the governmental entity is liable in an official-capacity claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the entity's policy or custom played a part in the violation of the plaintiff's rights. Id.; see Monell v. Department of Social Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (when the execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts an injury, the government as an entity can be held responsible under § 1983).
T h e court finds that the Second Amended Complaint states a plausible claim for d e p riv a tio n of federally-protected rights against defendant Herron in his individual capacity, a s well as his official capacity, under § 1983. She alleges a claim for sexual harassment and

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a hostile work environment. She alleges conduct that is severe or pervasive enough that a re a so n a b le person would find it hostile or abusive. W illia m s also alleges conduct by d e fe n d a n t Herron that could give rise to individual liability. She alleges that defendant H e rr o n was acting under color of state law and that he deprived her of a federal right. N o th in g more is required to allege personal liability. d e fe n d a n t's motion should be denied. IT IS ORDERED that defendant Rodney Herron's motion to dismiss claims against h im in his individual capacity (Filing No. 60) is denied. DATED this 17 th day of August, 2010. B Y THE COURT: Accordingly, the court finds the

s / Joseph F. Bataillon Chief United States District Judge

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