Peter Kiewit Sons', Inc. v. Wall Street Equity Group, Inc. et al

Filing 263

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER regarding pending motions: 1) Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a reply brief, (filing no. 255 ), is granted and the court reviewed and considered the proposed reply brief, (filing no. 255 -1), as well as Defendants ' responsive brief, (filing no. 256 ).2) Defendants' motion to amend its answer, (filing no. 179 ), is denied.3) Defendants' motion for a protective order, (filing no. 158 ), is granted in part and denied in part as set fort h in the body of this Memorandum and Order. A protective order shall be entered separately by this court.4) Plaintiff's motion for sanctions, (filing no. 135 ), is granted in part and denied in part as stated. The pretrial conference and trial are continued pending further order of the court. A telephonic status conference before the undersigned magistrate judge will be held on September 5, 2012 at 10:00 a.m. (CDT) to discuss further case progression. Counsel for plain tiff shall place or arrange the call. IT IS FURTHER HEREBY RECOMMENDED to the Honorable John M. Gerrard that an adverse jury instruction be given at trial, with the jury instructed as follows: You may, but are not required to, assume that information stored on the discarded server [Server 1] would have been adverse, harmful, or detrimental to the defendants' claims and defenses. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Cheryl R. Zwart. (JAB)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
PETER KIEWIT SONS’, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
WALL STREET EQUITY GROUP,
INC., WALL STREET GROUP OF
COMPANIES, INC., SHEPHERD
FRIEDMAN, and STEVEN S. WEST,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

8:10CV365

FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATION
AND ORDER

This matter is before the court on Defendants’ motion for protective order, (filing no.
158), Defendants’ motion for leave to amend their amended answer, (filing no. 179), and
Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions, (filing no. 135).

For the reasons set forth below,

Defendants’ motion for protective order is granted in part and denied in part, Defendants’
motion to amend is denied, and Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions is granted in part and denied
in part.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case involves claims by Plaintiff Peter Kiewit Sons’, Inc. (“Kiewit”) against
Defendants Wall Street Equity Group, Inc. (“WSE”“), Wall Street Group of Companies, Inc.
(“WSG”), Shepherd Friedman (“Friedman”), and Steven West (“West”)(collectively
“Defendants”) for the alleged violation of various aspects of federal and state trademark law,
unfair competition, and commercial misrepresentation. Filing No. 1.

Plaintiff is a construction and mining company with its principal place of business
in Omaha, Nebraska. Defendants are in the mergers and acquisitions business and assist

with introducing potential buyers to clients who are interested in selling their business. As
part of this process, Defendants require their clients to pay Defendants for a valuation of
their businesses. Defendants’ quoted fees for the valuations ranged from $19,000 to
$22,000 in one instance, (filing no. 11, p. 5), and from $20,000 to $30,000 on a second
occasion, (filing no. 11, p. 10).

Plaintiff alleges the Defendants have misused the service mark “Kiewit,” U.S. Service
Mark Registration No. 2569239 (the “Kiewit Mark” or the “Service Mark”), in Defendants’
attempts to solicit clients. Specifically, Kiewit contends Defendants have improperly used
the Kiewit Mark by “falsely representing an association with and/or authorization from
Kiewit to Defendants’ customers and potential customers.” Filing No. 1, ¶9. Plaintiff
concurrently filed a motion for a temporary restraining order in order to prevent Defendants
from using the Kiewit Mark in connection with any representations Defendants were making
to clients or potential clients, or otherwise representing that Defendants were associated with
Kiewit. Filing No. 7, ¶¶1 & 2.

In support of its motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction,
Kiewit submitted copies of two letters between Defendants (or a representative of
Defendants) and third parties in which Defendants, or representatives thereof, suggested
Kiewit as a potential buyer of the potential client’s business. Filing No. 11. For instance,
a letter dated April 23, 2010 to Hladky Construction Corp. signed by Defendant Steven West
stated he had enclosed “[b]ackground on buyer, Kiewit” and indicated he would “seek out
2 additional buyers to create competition for Kiewit.”1 Filing No. 11, pp. 4-5. Plaintiff

1

A similar letter from WSG, dated June 25, 2008, addressed to Waterfront Marine

Construction and signed by Shepherd Friedman, was also submitted as evidence. Filing No. 11, p.9.

2

alleges it was not aware the name “Kiewit” was being used in this capacity and asserts this
conduct was unauthorized and amounts to a misuse of the Kiewit Mark. Defendants did not
oppose the motion for a TRO,2 and the TRO and preliminary injunction were ordered by the
Honorable Laurie Smith Camp on October 4, 2010. Filing No. 17.

Defendants filed an answer to the Complaint denying Plaintiff’s allegations and
alleging three affirmative defenses: 1) Plaintiff did not establish a right to an accounting; 2)
Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrine of unclean hands; and 3) Plaintiff suffered no
damages or failed to mitigate damages. Filing No. 28, ¶¶ 40-42. The parties completed their
Rule 26(f) planning report on December 6, 2010. Filing No. 36. The final progression order
was entered on December 14, 2010. Filing No. 38.

On February 2, 2011, Defendants moved for Rule 11 sanctions against Kiewit and
its counsel, asserting the claims lacked any factual or legal basis.3 (Filing No. 39). The
motion was denied. Filing No. 49.

The parties commenced written discovery and depositions in February of 2011 with
only minor skirmishes between the parties.4 On August 1, 2011, Kiewit filed a notice of

2

Defendants did not concede any wrongdoing; they simply agreed not to use the Kiewit

name in additional correspondence to potential clients.
3

Defendants filed their motion for sanctions before the expiration of any of the major

discovery deadlines, including the deadline for mandatory disclosures. As the court noted in its
memorandum and order, dated April 18, 2011, (filing no. 49), Defendants essentially attempted to
argue a dispositive motion under the guise of a Rule 11 motion for sanctions.
4

For example, the discovery deadlines were extended due to the parties’ inability to agree

on certain deposition dates. Filing No. 59.
3

intent to serve a Subpoena Duces Tecum on Arthur Bertke. Filing No. 73. Mr. Bertke is the
landlord of the building where the corporate defendants’ offices are located and Defendants’
records are kept. Bertke also provided certain computer services for Defendants, such as
data recovery, registering domain names, and server storage. Filing No. 137, Ex. A. The
subpoena commanded Bertke to produce the following documents and electronically stored
information:

[C]opies of any and all computer electronically stored information, including,
but not limited to, all backup data and/or tapes regarding accounts receivable,
money paid for business valuations, financial statements, and any
correspondence referencing [Kiewit] or the word “Kiewit” for Wall Street
Equity Group, Inc., Wall Street Group of Companies, Inc., Shepherd
Friedman and Steven S. West for the time period from January 1, 2008 to the
present time.
Filing No. 73, p. 3. Defendants objected to Plaintiff’s intent to serve the subpoena on
Bertke. Filing No. 78.

On September 9, 2011, Kiewit filed a motion for an order authorizing service of a
Subpoena Duces Tecum to Bertke. Filing No. 87. Kiewit asserted that Bertke maintained
back-up files of Defendants’ electronic business records. Kiewit claimed Defendants failed
to provide complete answers to Plaintiff’s discovery requests, and stated it believed
Defendants’ electronic files likely contained documents responsive to Plaintiff’s discovery
requests. Filing No. 88. In support of its motion, Plaintiff filed an affidavit of Tara Bethel,
a former employee of defendant WSE. Bethel swore that she “observed at least one-hundred
(100) instances in which a WSE employee would represent to a prospective client-business
owner that Peter Kiewit Sons’, Inc. was a ready, willing, and interested buyer of the
prospective client-business owner’s business.”

Filing No. 119-1, ¶ 8.

She stated

Defendants drafted proposals for clients and saved the proposals in computer files named
4

“Carla” and “Carlita,” (filing no. 119-1, ¶7), and Mr. Bertke maintained Defendants’
electronic files. Filing No. 119-1, ¶¶ 5-7.

On October 7, 2012 Defendants objected to the issuance of the subpoena on Bertke,
arguing that Bertke did not have access to or maintain a copy of the electronic files created
by Defendants. Filing No. 117; Filing No. 117-12, West Aff. ¶3 (dated October 7, 2011);
Filing No. 117-13, West Aff. ¶32 (dated October 7, 2011); Filing No. 117, p. 18.
Defendants further denied that Bertke possessed a back-up copy of WSE’s and WSG’s
business records. Filling No. 117-12, West Aff. ¶ 3; Filing No. 117-13, West Aff. ¶32
Filing No. 117, p. 18. Defendants also moved to strike the affidavit of Tara Bethel asserting
it was “full of blatant misrepresentations.” Filing No. 121, Verified Motion to Strike
Affidavit, ¶4. Defendants filed two affidavits from employees who stated Bethel was not
in the same office as the company telemarketers and that during the time Bethel worked for
WSE, “the name ‘Kiewit’ was never mentioned in the office where Bethel worked, verbally
or in writing.” Filing Nos. 121-3, ¶¶ 4-5; 121-4, ¶¶ 4-5. A third affidavit, submitted by
West stated: “During the time Bethel worked for WSE, the name ‘Kiewit’ was mentioned
by me and only on the one occasion I spoke to Mike Hdladky of Hdlaky Construction in
April 2010.” Filing No. 121-5, ¶5.

On September 28, 2011, the plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel, (filing no. 105), and
a Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint. Filing No. 101. Plaintiff’s motion to
amend sought leave to raise allegations to pierce the corporate veils of WSG and WSE, and
to hold Friedman and West personally liable to the Plaintiff. The Motion to Compel sought
a court order directing Defendants to supplement their discovery responses related to
Defendants’ business transactions and valuations, finances, and records containing the term
“Kiewit.” Filing No. 105.

5

Defendants objected to the motion to compel and argued strenuously that most of
Plaintiff’s discovery requests amounted to a “fishing expedition” and that it did not possess
any documents containing the word Kiewit. Defendants further asserted that many of the
documents, such as its customer lists and financial documents, were protected by
confidentiality and, if produced, would severely damage the business. Defendants submitted
the following evidence in opposition to the motion to compel:

•

Affidavit of Pamella Romano stating that she “searched the computers of the
defendants . . . [and] [t]he word ‘Kiewit’ does not appear anywhere in the
computers . . . .” Filing No. 115-3, ¶¶ 2-3.

•

Affidavit of Defendant Steve West, dated October 7, 2011, swearing to the
following:
--

Defendants’ “standard practice” has been not to “save documents
concerning potential clients unless they actually become clients.” Filing
No. 115-16, ¶ 22.

--

Defendants have not ‘failed and refused’ to produce documents as to
the name of ‘Kiewit’; there simply are none. Filing No. 115-16, ¶ 31.

--

WSE’s landlord [Bertke] does not have and does not maintain a copy
of electronic files created by Defendants. Filing No. 115-16, ¶ 32.

--

[T]here exist no files referencing Plaintiff. Filing No. 115-16, ¶ 33.

--

To review all records at WSE’s place of business, in order to locate any
which name or refer to Plaintiff, of which there are none, would cause
undue burden or expense. Filing No. 115-16, ¶ 38.

--

Defendants have fully and honestly responded to every notice of
deposition and discovery request. Filing No. 115-16, ¶ 45.

A hearing was conducted on the pending motions on October 12, 2011 and the
undersigned heard argument on the motions to amend the pleadings, the motion to issue a
6

subpoena, the motion to strike the affidavit of Tara Bethel, and the motion to compel. With
regard to the motion to strike, Defendants’ counsel argued passionately and unequivocally
that Tara Bethel was “a documented liar.” Filing No. 124, Audio File at 48:00 - 50:00.
Counsel further offered as “an officer of the court” to attest that “almost everything in
[Bethel’s affidavit]” is a “lie.”5 Filing No. 124, Audio File at 48:00 - 50:00. Specifically,
defense counsel argued that Kiewit was using the affidavit to try and get records from Bertke
that “he does not have” and that Kiewit was never mentioned while Bethel was working for
Defendants. Id.

The undersigned granted the plaintiff’s motion to amend beyond the motion deadline
because the facts underlying Plaintiff’s claim to pierce the corporate veil were not known,
and could not reasonably have been discovered prior to deposing Defendants’ corporate
representatives. See Filing No. 124, Audio File at 26:30 - 28:40. Therefore, Plaintiff had
exercised due diligence and good cause existed for permitting the complaint to be amended
beyond the deadline set by the court’s scheduling order. Id.

For the reasons stated on the record during the hearing, and in the court’s
memorandum and order filed thereafter, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion to issue a
subpoena, granted in part and denied in part the motion to compel, and denied the motion
to strike the affidavit of Tara Bethel. Filing No. 128. The court determined Defendants’
essentially non-existent document retention policy rendered them an unreliable source of
discovery thereby “open[ing] avenues of third party discovery which would have been

5

The undersigned warned defense counsel that she appeared to be testifying as a witness

regarding Ms. Bethel’s credibility (character for truthfulness or untruthfulness), and that doing so
would likely disqualify her from continuing to serve as counsel for the defendants. Filing No. 124,
Audio File at 1:31:00 - 1:34:00.
7

closed had the defendant retained documents consistent with standard business practices .
. . .” Filing No. 128, p. 12. The court ordered Defendants to respond to the majority of the
disputed interrogatories and requests for production. The memorandum and order was filed
on October 25, 2011.

On November 3, 2011, Plaintiff moved for sanctions, alleging Defendants were
playing a “shell game” with the electronically stored documents requested in the Bertke
subpoena. Filing No. 135. The Plaintiff alleged:

•

Prior to October 24, 2008, Bertke maintained computer files for West which
were which were kept in a separate server room (“Server Room”) controlled
by Bertke. Filing No. 137, Ex. B, ¶¶ 7, 9-10. From October 24, 2008 until
September 20, 2010, West maintained servers located in his own office to
store electronic files. Filing No. 137, Ex. B, Bertke Aff. ¶ 9.

•

On or about September 20, 2010, a server was purchased and installed in the
Server Room and all of “the historical electronic data and files stored on
West’s previous server was transferred onto the new server (“Server 1") in the
Server Room. Filing No. 137, Ex. B, Bertke Aff. ¶ 10.

•

In July of 2011, West directed Bertke to move Server 1 back to West’s office.
Filing No. 137, Ex. B, Bertke Aff. ¶ 11.

•

On August 1, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Notice of its Intention to Serve Subpoena
Duces Tecum on Bertke. Filing No. 73.

•

In August of 2011, West instructed Bertke to install another server (“Server
2") to be maintained in Bertke’s server room. “Some of the electronic files”
were copied from Server 1 to Server 2. Filing No. 137, Ex. B, Bertke Aff. ¶
12.

•

In early September 2011, West provided Bertke with an external hard drive
containing copies of Defendants’ electronic files. Filing No. 137, Ex. B,
Bertke Aff. ¶ 13.

8

•

On October 5, 2011, West directed Bertke to move Server 2 to West’s office.
Filing No. 137, Ex. B, Bertke Aff. ¶ 12.

•

On October 14, 2011, West instructed Bertke to copy the external hard drive
West gave Bertke in early September 2011 onto an additional external hard
drive. Filing No. 137, Ex. B, Bertke Aff. ¶ 13. Bertke did so and kept both
of the external hard drives in a locked cabinet in his office. Filing No. 137,
Ex. B, Bertke Aff. ¶ 13.

•

The order granting leave to issue the subpoena on Bertke was issued on
October 25, 2011. Filing No. 128.

•

On Wednesday, October 26, 2011, West instructed Bertke to return to West
the two external hard drives containing West’s business records. Bertke
returned those hard drives on October 27, 2011. Filing No. 137, Ex. B,
Bertke Aff. ¶ 12.

•

On October 28, 2011, Bertke received the subpoena issued by Plaintiff. Filing
No. 137, Ex. B, Bertke Affidavit ¶ 15. But by that time, Bertke had handed
the hard drives to West. Therefore, Bertke informed Plaintiff’s counsel that
he no longer possessed any of the electronic data and could not respond to the
subpoena.

Plaintiff asserted West’s actions were a deliberate attempt to deprive it of
discoverable information and were conducted in bad faith.

A hearing was held on the

matter on November 8, 2011. Defendant West was instructed to bring the external harddrives to the hearing. In anticipation of the hearing, Defendants submitted affidavits from
West and Bertke alleging the following:

•

On October 26, 2011, West observed the door to Mr. Bertke’s office was
open. Believing Bertke to be out of town and out of concern that the external
hard drives might be stolen, West asked Bertke to return the external hard
drives to West. Filing No. 139-1, West Aff. ¶¶ 4-10; Filing 139-2, Bertke Aff.

•

West had an “independent third party back up [Defendants’] entire computer”
on November 3, 2011. Filing No. 139-1, West Aff. ¶11.
9

•

West had “no knowledge” Plaintiff would be serving a subpoena on Bertke
on October 28, 2011. Filing No. 139-1, ¶ 14.

•

West’s actions were intended to preserve and protect the electronic
information. Filing No. 139-1, ¶ 15.

•

Bertke has provided computer support and has periodically housed
Defendants’ servers since their business relationship began in 1996. Filing
No. 139-2, Bertke Aff.

A hearing was held on the matter on November 8, 2011, with several witnesses
giving testimony, including Bertke, West, and Romano. With leave of the court, defense
counsel, and the witnesses from Florida, participated in the hearing from the videoteleconference (VTC) facility located in the United States District Courthouse in Fort
Lauderdale, Florida. Defendants brought three external hard drives to the hearing; two black
and one blue. West testified that the black hard drives were the drives Bertke created at
West’s request, and the blue hard drive was the one made by the “independent third party”
on November 3, 2011. West admitted that his previous affidavit statement that Bertke did
not have access to electronic copies of Defendants’ business records, (filing no. 115-16, ¶32)
was not accurate. Filing No. 207, 48:13-21. West further testified that when he asked Bertke
on October 26, 2011 to return the external hard drives in Bertke’s possession, West was
“aware that in general there was substantial discussion about discovery” but he was not
“completely” aware that the court had entered an order on October 25, 2011 granting
Kiewit’s motion to issue a subpoena on Bertke. Filing No. 207, 45:22 - 46:4.

Romano testified that she was assigned the task of searching Defendants’ computers
for the term “Kiewit.” When asked about her ability to perform this work, she explained that
she had graduated from high school and was two credits short of receiving an associate’s
degree in business management, (filing no. 207, 86:1-2), but she had no professional training
10

with computers and is not a “computer expert.” Filing No. 207, 91:25-92:2 & 95:9-14.
Bertke had shown her how to perform a key word search from her work station on the
“whole network” using the term “Kiewit,” but she did not search the hard drives on any of
the individual work stations. Filing No. 207, 88:3-11. She testified her word search
returned only two documents, neither of which were the types of solicitation materials or
letters for which Plaintiff was searching. Filing No. 207, 92:14-22.

A ruling on Plaintiff’s motion for discovery sanctions6 was delayed until Defendants
submitted their computer equipment (including Server 27 and the external hard drives) for
forensic examination. Since the defendants had participated in the hearing by VTC, at the
close of the hearing, defense counsel was ordered to take possession of the three external
drives and secure them as an officer of the court for delivery to the plaintiff. The
undersigned ordered Defendants to make its computer equipment available to be examined
by Continuum Worldwide by November 16, 2011.
6

At the November 8, 2011 hearing Defendants’ counsel contended that motion for sanctions

could have been avoided altogether if Plaintiff’s counsel had merely called her once it was
discovered West had asked Bertke to give him the hard drives. Filing No. 207, 113:2-5. Given the
attorneys’ inability to agree on the simplest tasks in the case, the extraordinary number of discovery
motions and briefs filed to date, and the nature and tone of defense counsel’s communications when
speaking to Plaintiff’s counsel and the undersigned judge during prior and lengthy motion hearings,
the court finds defense counsel’s assertion that a simple phone call would have rendered the motion
unnecessary to be extremely dubious.
7

Defendants moved to clarify the order, specifying that they only were in possession of one

server – Server 2 – explaining that Server 1 had “crashed” “some months ago” and was then
“discarded.” Filing No. 152. The court instructed Defendants to produce any servers or devices
which contained electronic data. Filing No. 153. The court did not, at that time, comment on the
propriety (or lack thereof) of Defendants disposal of the “crashed” server. Id.
11

On November 10, 2011, Plaintiff filed an emergency motion to make the server, hard
drives, and other computer equipment available for examination on Friday, November 11,
2011. Defense counsel was leaving the United States for at least two weeks beginning
November 12, 2011, and the plaintiff wanted possession of the external hard drives and
Defendants’ servers imaged8 without having to wait for defense counsel to return from that
trip. The court granted Plaintiff’s motion. Filing No. 160.

Continuum Worldwide representative Rick Clyde traveled to Florida on November
11, 2011 and commenced imaging Server 2 at Defendants’ offices. Filing No. 182-3, Clyde
Aff. ¶ 4. Server 1 was not available for imaging; West had thrown it in a trash dumpster,
without the approval of Kiewit’s counsel or the court, sometime between August 20, 2011
and November 11, 2012. Filing No. 239, 97:24-99:13. One of Defendants’ employees,
Richard Calabria, was present while Clyde imaged Server 2. Filing No. 182-3, ¶ 9. Clyde
was also given three external hard-drives by Bertke which Clyde transported to Nebraska
for imaging. Filing No. 182-3, Clyde Aff. ¶ 11.

Clyde completed the server imaging and returned to Omaha to begin searching for
any documents that contained the word “Kiewit.” At the court’s order, Plaintiff submitted
a supplement to its motion for sanctions providing a preliminary report from Continuum.
Filing No. 182-1. The report contained a finding that the keyword search of “Kiewit”

8

, Because it would have been impractical for Defendants to ship their server to Nebraska for

examination, a forensic examiner was sent to Florida to image the Server 2. “To image a hard drive
is to make an identical copy of the hard drive, including empty sectors.” See The Sedona Conference
Glossary: E-Discovery & Digital Information Management (3d Ed. 2010).
12

returned 3,771 files, of which 181 were carved files.9 Filing No. 182-1, p. 2. As to whether
information had been intentionally removed or destroyed, the report stated the following:

An analysis of the equipment examined did not show intentional removal of
files or entries containing the word “Kiewit.” However, the equipment
provided contained only copies of files originating on another server. The
server on which the files were generated was not presented at the time of
acquisition, therefore, it is unknown whether any files containing the word
“Kiewit” were removed.
Filing No. 182-1, p. 2

The undersigned ordered a hearing on Plaintiff’s motion for discovery sanctions.
Filing No. 184. The hearing was held on January 30, 2012, and upon Defendants’ motion,
was reopened for additional evidence and argument on March 9, 2012.10 Clyde provided
testimony regarding his search of the documents found on Defendants’ computer equipment.
Clyde testified that he was at Defendants’ offices from 12:30 p.m. on November 11, 2011
until 5:00 a.m. on November 12, 2011 to conduct the imaging of Server 2. Filing No. 239,
20:9-10. Upon returning to Omaha, Clyde made duplicates of the hard drives which, due
to the volume of data they contained, took approximately 6 days. Filing No. 239, 23:9-13.

9

According to the report “[d]ata carving is the process of extracting a collection of data from

a larger data set. Data carving techniques frequently occur during a digital investigation when the
unallocated file system space is analyzed to extract files.” Filing No. 182-1, p. 2
10

In addition to the motion for sanctions, the parties presented arguments regarding

Defendants’ motions for a protective order and to amend their amended answer. The Defendants’
motions are discussed infra.
13

The information was then made into a “working copy” and indexed.11 The indexing process
took almost three weeks. Filing No. 239, 25:14-16.

Clyde testified that the search produced 3,771 files containing the term “Kiewit.”12
Filing No. 239, 28:15-21. Clyde was able to identify some letters and emails containing the
word “Kiewit” which had not previously been produced. These included letters to third
parties that were very similar in content to the letters sent to Hdlaky Construction Corp. and
Waterfront Marine Construction that prompted this lawsuit. But at least one document that

11

Clyde described the process of indexing as follows:
The processing and indexing, it goes through the whole image which is an
exact duplicate of everything that’s on the servers or drives. It goes into
deleted space, unallocated space. And it opens up containers that are zip
files, e-mail type repositories, opens them up and extracts out all the
documents. Then it breaks – each documents, it breaks out and takes every
single word out of that document and creates an index of where those words
can be found in documents.

Filing No. 239, 24:19-25:2.
12

Defendants printed out boxes of documents which, on their faces, do not contain the word

“Kiewit.” See exhibit 105. Defense counsel offered these documents into evidence to prove the
number of instances of the word “Kiewit,” as reported by Continuum, was greatly exaggerated.
Clyde testified that Continuum’s search looked for the term “Kiewit” in not only the visible text, but
also the metadata of the documents. Filing No. 239, 49:6-17. “Metadata is generally not reproduced
in full form when a document is printed to paper.” See The Sedona Conference Glossary: EDiscovery & Digital Information Management (3d Ed. 2010).
14

had previously been produced in the litigation was not found during Clyde’s extensive
search of the three hard drives and Server 2.13 Filing No. 239, 45:22-24.

At the hearings held on January 30 and March 9, 2012, West testified:

•

His initial representations to the court--that the Defendants only used Kiewit’s name
in two instances--were false. Filing No. 239, 95:14-18 & 97:2-4.

•

West never asked Bertke to conduct a search of his electronic files even though
Bertke had maintained Defendants’ computer files “for many years.” Filing No. 239,
97:13-23. Instead, West asked Romano, “the most [computer] literate person
[Defendants] had” to conduct a search of the electronic files. Filing No. 239, 159:2224.

•

West discarded Server 1 after it “crashed” in August of 2011, without having it
examined by anyone else, including a computer expert. Filing No. 239, 98:14-99:20.

•

After receiving notice of Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions, Defendants hired a
“separate expert” to make copies of their electronic data. Filing No. 239, 161:6-9.

•

When presented with a list of businesses to which Defendants had sold valuations,
a copy of which had been provided to Plaintiff by one of Defendants’ former
employees, West testified he did not know such a list existed.14 Filing No. 239,

13

One of the letters that the Continuum investigation did not find was the letter to Randy

Sutton of Waterfront Marine Construction. See n. 1, supra; see also Plaintiff’s Ex. 18; Filing No.
11, p. 9.
14

The list in question came from Defendants’ former employee, Humberto Garcia.

Defendants object to the use of the list claiming it contains trade secret information and was stolen
by Garcia. Garcia’s former supervisor acknowledges that he provided Garcia with the list of
company receipts to determine what commission Garcia might be owed, but Garcia was required to
return the list. Filing No. 236-1, ¶7. If Garcia misappropriated the list, Defendants may have a
claim against Garcia in Florida. However, the fact remains – at the 30(b)(6) deposition, Defendants’
15

110:6-8. During a prior 30(b)(6) deposition, West, as the corporate defendants’
designated witness, had also testified that no such list existed. Filing No. 248-7,
34:3-9. However, he later testified that list was provided by Defendants to their
former employee in a different lawsuit–clearly indicating that such lists were created
by, or were in the possession of, Defendants at some point in time.
•

Of the companies identified in communications discovered as a result of the forensic
examination of Defendants’ computer equipment, some had paid Defendants for
valuations of their companies. Defendants solicited these clients by presenting Kiewit
as a potential buyer for their respective companies. Filing No. 239, 133:21-25.

•

Defendants produced all of the responsive hard copies of documents in their
possession. Filing No. 239, 141:12-16.

•

Defendants send out 10,000 letters a week and its telemarketers make 1- to 2,000
phone calls a day to solicit business. Filing No. 239, 154:13-18.

•

Server 1 experienced a “fried motherboard” and all of the information from Server
1 was transferred to hard drives that were subsequently transferred to Plaintiff. Filing
No. 239, 178:13-179:14. West never identified who allegedly examined the server
to conclude the motherboard was “fried,” or who allegedly transferred all data on
Server 1 to another drive. All testimony of record indicates West was not able to
perform these investigations and functions.

•

Information from January 1, 2011 and after was transferred to Server 2. Filing No.
239, 180:6-10.
Defendant Shepherd Friedman also appeared at the January 30, 2012 hearing and

provided the following testimony:

representative, West, testified no such list existed. The court has allowed the list into evidence for
the sole purpose of confirming that the list exists and contains information responsive to Plaintiff’s
discovery requests. West confirmed, to the best of his knowledge, that the lists from 2009 and 2010
appeared to be accurate. Filing No. 239, 112:12-19 & 116:2-7.
16

•

A file named “Carlita” was maintained by one of Defendants’ “associates” to send
out emails, and it contained copies of “various communications and correspondence”
but it was nothing Friedman worked with directly. Filing No. 239, 189:4-9.

•

To the best of his belief, “once a contact was established with a potential client,
information would be sent to them through the Carlita file. This would include
background on a potential buyer . . .” Filing No. 239, 191:7-11.

•

The “Carla” file “had records or allegedly had records of virtually every client
[Defendants] had ever had any successful contact with.” Filing No. 239, 192:16-18.

•

It was “quite possible” Defendants’ telemarketers maintained a list of companies that
were already being actively pursued and were not to receive further contact from the
telemarketers. Filing No. 239, 198:2-200:2.

•

Defendants “kept lists of folks who paid [Defendants] monies to value their company
in the hopes that they would sell them.” Filing No. 239, 207:2-5.

•

Individual “producers” kept their own records. Financial information was kept on
the computer or in hard copies. Filing No. 239, 214:17-18.
On March 9, 2012, the final hearing on the pending motions, testimony from Richard

Calabria, president of Defendant WSE, was elicited. Mr. Calabria testified:

•

Calabria began working for Defendant WSE on February 21, 2011 as a part-time
accountant and is currently the president of WSE. Filing No. 259, 6:11-14.

•

When he commenced his accounting duties for WSE, he began to use the
Quickbooks accounting program to keep track of receivables and income, but the
prior bookkeeper did not record that information. Filing No. 259, 64: 8-18.

•

No employee of Defendants had the knowledge or skill to perform the type of search
Continuum performed. Filing No. 259, 21:19-22.

•

An outside vendor was brought in to back-up Defendants’ computer files. The
outside vendor was not called to testify. Filing No. 259, 27:17-28:2.

17

•

Calabria is concerned that Defendants’ clients will be harmed if Plaintiff is allowed
to contact those clients. Filing No. 259, 42:8-19.

•

Calabria does not know whether any of Defendants’ employees were required to
surrender their files to determine if they contained documents responsive to the
plaintiff’s discovery. Filing No. 259, 100:10-12.

•

Defendants use an accounting program called “Quickbooks.” The program could
produce a list of clients who paid fees to Defendants. Filing No. 259, 65:13-22.

The parties submitted additional briefs after the hearing and the matter is now fully
submitted.15

ANALYSIS

Before the court are three separate motions: (1) Defendants’ motion to amend its
complaint; (2) Defendants’ motion for a protective order; and (3) Plaintiff’s motion for
sanctions.

Motion to Amend

Once the time for amending a pleading as a matter of course has expired, a pleading
may be amended only if the opposing party provides written consent or with leave of the
court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).

15

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a reply brief, (filing no. 255), is granted and the court

reviewed and considered the proposed reply brief, (filing no. 255-1), as well as Defendants’
responsive brief, (filing no. 256).
18

In general, courts are encouraged to allow amendments liberally. See Shen v. Leo A.
Daly Co., 222 F.3d 472, 478 (8th Cir. 2000). However, “[i]f a party file[s] for leave to
amend outside of the court’s scheduling order, the party must show cause to modify the
schedule.” Sherman v. Winco Fireworks, Inc., 532 F.3d 709, 716 (8th Cir. 2008)(quoting
Popoalii v. Corr. Med. Servs., 512 F.3d 488, 497 (8th Cir. 2008). Indeed, the “good cause”
requirement found in Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b) for amending pleadings after the expiration of
the scheduling deadline for doing so has passed “is not optional.” Id. at 716. “The primary
measure of good cause is the movant's diligence in attempting to meet the order's
requirements.” Id. at 716-17 (quoting Rahn v. Hawkins, 464 F.3d 813, 822 (8th Cir.2006).

The Defendants’ initial answer was filed on November 12, 2010. Filing No. 28. The
deadline for filing amendments to pleadings was February 11, 2011. Defendants filed a
motion to amend their answer on August 29, 2011. The Plaintiff filed a motion to amend
its complaint on September 28, 2011. After extensive briefing and oral argument, the
undersigned granted Plaintiff’s motion to amend16 and denied as moot Defendants’ motion
to amend. Filing No. 123. Defendants filed their amended answer in response to the
amended complaint on October 30, 2011.

Defendants requested leave to amend their amended answer on December 12, 2011.
Defendants seek to add the following affirmative defenses: (1) Defendants’ alleged use of
the term “Kiewit” did not constitute trademark use and (2) Defendants’ alleged use of the
Service Mark constitutes nominative fair use. Filing No. 181-4.

16

The undersigned conducted an analysis under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b) and specifically found

good cause existed for Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend. Filing No. 124 at Audio File 26:3028:40.
19

In an attempt to meet their burden of proving good cause exists, Defendants argue
that a brief filed by Plaintiff in regard to a motion for protective order “brought into sharp
and imminent focus Plaintiff’s claim of a need and a right to contact Defendants’ clients
without court approval or oversight.” Filing No. 180, ¶ 11. Further, “[d]iscussions with
others in the industry . . . caused Defendants to consult trademark counsel, to determine
whether they could now support trademark defenses.” Filing No. 180, ¶ 14. Defendants
allege that it was not until December 8, 2011 that “Defendants’ learned from trademark
counsel that they indeed now have the basis necessary to allege additional affirmative
defenses against Plaintiff’s claims, in the context of Plaintiff’s demands to contact
Defendants’ client without any oversight. . . .” Filing No. 180, ¶15. Finally, Defendants
argue their attempts to gain information regarding Plaintiff’s intellectual property claims
were thwarted by Plaintiff during discovery. Filing No. 180.

From its inception, this law suit has centered on Plaintiff’s allegations that
Defendants violated federal and state law addressing intellectual property, including claims
under the Lanham Act for trademark infringement, unfair competition and false
representation. See Filing No. 1, ¶¶ 13-39. Plaintiffs further detailed the factual basis for
their trademark claims in the Rule 26(f) Report and in response to Defendants’ First Set of
Interrogatories. Filing No. 36.

Simply put, Defendants have been on notice from the

moment they were served with the complaint that Plaintiff’s primary claims alleged
violations of federal and state trademark law.

Defendants’ two alleged justifications for waiting almost a year after the deadline to
amend their answer are unpersuasive. Defendants first assert that the issue was not brought
into “sharp and imminent” focus until Plaintiff professed its desire to contact Defendants’

20

clients without court supervision.17 Having been provided multiple opportunities to brief
the matter, to present evidence, and to provide oral argument, Defendants have failed to
provide any connection between Plaintiff’s allegedly sudden revelation of intent to contact
Defendants or former clients and the proposed additional affirmative defenses. Case law
provided by Defendants addressed the merits of the proposed affirmative defenses, but did
not explain why they could not have been asserted until Defendants allegedly first learned
of Plaintiffs’ discovery intentions. Indeed, the court can find no reason why Plaintiff’s
desire to conduct discovery on Defendants’ clients or former clients would suddenly
motivate the Defendants to assert affirmative defenses against the primary claims in this law
suit.

Moreover, even if there was some connection between Plaintiff’s discovery plan and
the affirmative defenses, at the October 12, 2011 hearing, Defendants stated their concern
with Plaintiff contacting Defendants’ clients, (see Filing No. 124, Audio File at 52:05 to
52:25), providing clear evidence Defendants were aware of Plaintiff’s plan of discovery.
By October 31, 2011 Defendants’ were certainly aware of the possibility of Plaintiff
contacting current and former clients and could have moved to add the proposed affirmative
defenses to their answer that day.

Defendants also assert that Plaintiff has stonewalled Defendants’ discovery attempts
to receive information regarding Plaintiff’s trademark claims. However, when pressed by
this court to explain what information they could have received in discovery that would have
sparked them into action earlier, Defendants can point to none. To the contrary, the Plaintiff

17

Of course, as is discussed infra, the Defendant is actually concerned about the level of

court supervision. This is an active lawsuit and none of the parties’ discovery actions are undertaken
without oversight of the court.
21

described the conduct that led to the filing of this suit in their discovery answers. See Filing
No. 186-5, p. 3, Answer to Interrogatory No. 5. If Defendants believed Plaintiff was not
being forthcoming in discovery, Defendants could have sought court intervention through
a motion to compel. They did not, thus their claims that Plaintiff’s objections to discovery
prevented Defendants from obtaining the information necessary to raise the proposed
affirmative defenses rings hollow.

More likely the key to Defendants’ delay in amending its answer can be found in their
brief in support of their motion to amend – “[d]iscussions with others in the industry . . .
caused Defendants to consult trademark counsel, to determine whether they could now
support trademark defenses.” Filing No. 180, ¶ 14. Waiting to contact an attorney with
expertise in the subject area of the litigation does not constitute good cause for seeking to
amend a pleading after the deadline has passed. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for leave
to amend is denied.

Motion for Protective Order

A court will enter an order protecting a party from certain types of discovery only
upon a showing of good cause. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). The party seeking the protective
order bears the burden of demonstrating the existence of good cause for entering such an
order. See Miscellaneous Docket Matter No. 1 v. Miscellaneous Docket Matter No. 2, 197
F.3d 922, 926 (8th Cir. 1999). A showing of “good cause” requires “a particular and
specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from . . . conclusory statements.” Gulf Oil
Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 102 n. 16 (1981) (quoting 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 2035, p. 265 (1970)); Miscellaneous Docket Matter, 197 F.3d at
926. Thus, the parties seeking protection must show that specific prejudice or harm will
result if no protective order is granted. See Frideres v. Schiltz, 150 F.R.D. 153, 156
22

(S.D.Iowa 1993). A determination of whether “good cause” for a protective order exists
“must also include a consideration of the relative hardship to the non-moving party should
the protective order be granted.” General Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1204,
1212 (8th Cir. 1973) (citing United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1970)). The court has
broad discretion in determining whether a protective order is warranted and the degree of
protection required. Roberts v. Shawnee Mission Ford, Inc., 352 F.3d 358, 362 (8th Cir.
2003).

Plaintiff has stated it has no objection to the entry of a protective order, however the
parties disagree over the amount of protection necessary. At the heart of the dispute is
whether, and to what degree, Plaintiff should be allowed to contact Defendants’ current or
former clients. Plaintiff argues that it should be able to contact Defendants’ clients and
former clients in an effort to determine whether Defendants used the Kiewit Mark to solicit
business and what, if any, representations Defendants made regarding their relationship with
Kiewit. Defendants have strenuously argued that any contact with their current or former
clients will cause Defendants’ business to suffer “irreparable harm” because any such
contact would violate confidentiality agreements Defendant entered into with their clients.
Defendants seek not only a protective order, but a court-controlled procedure for Plaintiff’s
contacts with Defendants’ current or former clients wherein all correspondence with
Defendants’ clients would be conducted in writing. See Filing No. 158, ¶¶ 22-23 & Filing
No. 177, pp. 15-16.

It is true that courts are often reluctant to allow direct contact with litigants’ clients
or customers in lawsuits involving intellectual property disputes. In general, these courts
are concerned with the impact such contacts may have on the litigants’ businesses, such as
when the parties are “fierce competitors” and the information sought could be gained by

23

other means. See Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 772 F.Supp. 842, 849 (D. Del. 1991).

Kiewit must first demonstrate the information it seeks from Defendants’ clients is
relevant and necessary.18 In re Remington Arms Co., Inc., 952 F.2d 1029, 1032 (8th Cir.
1991). Kiewit has represented that it intends to ask Defendants’ past and current clients to
what extent, if any, Defendants represented Kiewit was an interested or potential buyer of
the clients’ businesses. Kiewit seeks information regarding written correspondence and any
other communications Defendants had with their clients regarding Kiewit’s role in a
potential sale.

In the Memorandum and Order regarding the initial discovery dispute in this case, the
court noted that Defendants were an unreliable source of information because of their
document retention19 policies. Filing No. 128, p. 11-13.

18

After many discovery disputes

For the purposes of this motion, Plaintiff assumes that the identities of Defendants’ clients

constitute trade secret information; thus, the court will not address that issue.
19

It may be more appropriate to refer to Defendants’ policies as document “destruction”

policies rather than “retention” policies since, according to Defendants, they kept very little
correspondence with clients, including paperwork on completed transactions (as evidenced by the
fact Defendants could produce few, if any, documents pertaining to Kiewit’s completed transaction
with Jett Industries, which Defendants facilitated). Filing Nos. 106-3 & 106-7. But there were,
literally, terabytes of documentary information on Defendants’ remaining server and its external hard
drives, and client correspondence was located within this repository–leaving the court to wonder
what the Defendants’ actual policies were and are with respect to keeping documents. The court
need not answer that question because irrespective of any policies they may have for retaining
documents, the Defendants have proven to be an untrustworthy source for searching and disclosing
such documents in discovery.
24

and reams worth of discovery motions, briefs and other filings, the court’s initial impression
has been reinforced, not allayed. Defendants are simply not a reliable source of information.

At the heart of the matter is what representations, if any, Defendants made to their
clients regarding Kiewit’s interest in buying the clients’ respective businesses. Initially,
Defendants stated the Kiewit name was invoked only twice in communications with
potential clients, and those contacts did not result in a business valuation or a completed
sale.

During his deposition, Hdlaky (one of the recipients of the correspondence

Defendants initially acknowledged) stated that during follow-up communications with
Defendants, they reiterated Kiewit’s interest in purchasing his company. Defendants deny
this assertion.

A forensic examination has been done: Defendants’ initial assertion regarding the
number of times it referenced Kiewit to a potential buyer was patently false. Additional
contacts with other potential clients discussing Kiewit as a potential buyer were discovered.
At least four of those clients paid Defendants for a business valuation. Filing No. 239,
133:21-25.

Defendants continue to attempt to use client confidentiality as a means of preventing
Plaintiff from discovering relevant information. They argue Plaintiff has not asserted it has
any damages in this case. However, in Lanham Act cases, successful plaintiffs are entitled
to a defendant’s profits for misuse of a service mark. 15 U.S.C. § 117(a). Without speaking
directly to Defendants’ clients regarding any written and verbal communications, Plaintiff
has no reliable means of discovering exactly what, if any, representations were made to the
clients beyond what appears in the limited written communications that have been produced.
Plaintiff has met its burden of showing the information sought is relevant and necessary to
its case.
25

Under In re Remmington, the court must balance the injury Defendants will suffer
against Kiewit’s need for the information. Defendants argue their business will be
essentially ruined, and they offered the testimony of no fewer than four experts to discuss
the importance of confidentiality in the field of mergers and acquisitions. Having reviewed
the testimony of each expert, the court has no doubt confidentiality is viewed as essential in
the field of mergers and acquisitions. However, even the experts were not able to offer
anything more than speculation as to what impact, if any, Plaintiff’s discreet contacts with
clients or former clients may have.

More importantly, Defendants share the majority of the responsibility for whatever
peril they face if Plaintiff contacts Defendants’ clients. Defendants’ lack of records
retention, its disorganized method of storing the documents they do keep, and its lack of
candor with the Plaintiff and this court during the discovery process convinces me that
Plaintiff must contact Defendants’ clients to reliably obtain relevant discovery. For example,
this court previously ordered Defendants to produce “every record . . . showing the number
of appraisal and/or business valuation [Defendants] have sold since 2008" and identifying
the number of appraisals and valuations sold since 2008 and the fee collected for each one
of the appraisals or valuations sold. Filing No. 128. In response to the court’s order,
Defendants submitted a hodgepodge of documents including deposit slips and redacted bank
statements that are barely decipherable and offer little in the way of identifying the number
of valuations sold since 2008. Had Defendants maintained or produced anything resembling
complete and accurate records in an organized fashion, and had they been honest and
forthright in the discovery process from the beginning, other discovery options might have
been available for determining whether, and to what extent, Defendants profited from using
the Kiewit name. At a minimum, Kiewit could have reviewed correspondence and contracts

26

without first contacting the clients. Based on that information, Kiewit, and this court, could
have better decided to what extent Kiewit would be allowed to contact Defendants’ clients.

But that option is not available. This court has no confidence that Defendants have
fully met their discovery obligations or will fully respond to Plaintiff’s discovery requests.
The court will enter a protective order, but will not require the restrictions proposed by
Defendants. Plaintiff will be allowed to contact Defendants’ former and current clients,
subject to the following restrictions as tailored for this case:

1)

Plaintiff may contact any of Defendants’ clients or potential clients which
were identified from the Continuum forensic examination as having received
solicitation information from the Defendants which included the word
“Kiewit.”

2)

In addition,
a.

b.

Plaintiff may contact any of the businesses identified by the Plaintiff
as engaged primarily in the construction and/or mining business and
that have paid Defendants for a business valuation, appraisal, or
profile.

c.

20

Defendants shall provide Plaintiff with a listing of businesses or
entities that purchased a business valuation, appraisal, or business
profile from Defendants since January 1, 2008. Plaintiff shall identify
any businesses on that list that are primarily engaged in the
construction and/or mining business.20

Before contacting any specific business(es), the Plaintiff shall notify
the Defendants of its intent to contact the business regarding the

This information should be readily accessible; Defendant West testified that Defendants

used Standard Industrial Classification codes to identify the nature of the business of potential
clients. Filing No. 259, 118:2-6. Moreover, the Defendants are required to retain income tax
records–which should include 1099s or other income records for the years in question.
27

matters in this lawsuit. If Defendants have a record of which
individual or individuals they corresponded with at the target
businesses, Defendants shall provide, in writing, the contact
information to Plaintiff within one week of receiving the Plaintiff’s
notice.
d.

To the extent possible, Plaintiff shall initiate contact with the
individual or individuals at the target businesses which Defendants
identified as the contact person. If Defendant is unable to identify a
specific contact person, Plaintiff may contact the president or owner
(past and/or present) of the company or entity.

This method of discovery is aimed at ensuring Plaintiff’s inquiries remain discrete
and limited while providing Plaintiff an opportunity to discover information that either
proves or disproves its claims.21 See, e.g., Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., case
no. 09cv2319, 2010 WL 2011526 (S.D.Cal 2010) (allowing plaintiff to make contact with
defendant’s customers, but ordering plaintiff to make inquiry based on information provided
by the defendant).

Motion for Sanctions

Plaintiff seeks sanctions for the Defendants’ obstreperous conduct during the course
of this litigation, particularly as it pertains to false statements in discovery responses and
during court hearings, and its destruction and failure to produce electronic discovery.

Under the facts presented in this case, the court’s authority to sanction the misconduct
of parties and their attorneys is derived from the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure and the
inherent power of the court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 & 37; Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501

21

The court notes this is essentially identical to the procedure Defendants requested in the

initial hearing on the motion for protective order on October 12, 2011.
28

U.S. 32, 44 (1991); Sylla-Sawdon v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 47 F.3d 277, 280 (8th Cir.
1995).

The court has the power to shape the appropriate remedy including default

judgment, striking pleadings, an adverse jury instruction, and an award of attorney’s fees and
costs. See Stevenson v. Union Pacific R. Co., 354 F.3d 739, 745-46 (8th Cir. 2004). The
most severe sanctions are reserved for those litigants demonstrating “ ‘blatant disregard of
the Court’s orders and discovery rules’ [and] engaging in a pattern of deceit by presenting
false and misleading answers and testimony under oath in order to prevent their opponent
from fairly presenting its case.” Chrysler Corp. v. Carey, 186 F.3d 1016, 1022 (8th Cir.
1999).

1.

False Affidavits and Testimony.

Defendant West submitted several affidavits to the court in which he stated there
were two and only two instances in which Defendants represented Kiewit as a potential
buyer to clients. He further confirmed this testimony during a deposition. During the course
of this litigation, West has made the following statements under oath, which are now known
to be false:

•

Defendants suggested Kiewit as a potential buyer on only two occasions over
several years. Filing No. 174-3, ¶ 28 (Affidavit of Steven West).

•

WSG's and WSE's standard practice is, and always has been, not to save
documents concerning potential clients unless they actually become clients.
That is why there are no documents referencing "Kiewit" in WSG's or WSE's
computers. Filing No. 115-16, ¶ 22 (Affidavit of Steven West).

•

West’s inquiries and checking revealed no more than two occasions in which
Kiewit was mentioned to prospective clients. Filing No. 115-16, ¶¶ 29-33
(Affidavit of Steven West).

29

•

Defendants have not "failed and refused" to produce documents as to the
name "Kiewit"; there simply are none. Filing No. 115-16, ¶¶ 29-33 (Affidavit
of Steven West).

•

WSE's landlord, Bertke, does not have and does not maintain a copy of the
electronic files created by Defendants. Filing No. 115-16, ¶ 33. Further, there
are no files referencing Plaintiff. Filing No. 115-16, ¶¶ 32-33 (Affidavit of
Steven West).

•

Defendants have fully and honestly responded to every notice of deposition
and discovery request. Filing No. 115-16, ¶45 (Affidavit of Steven West).

•

The Defendants carefully researched their records, and over a period of three
years, found only two instances of using name Kiewit other than brokering
Kiewit’s purchase of a twenty-five million dollar company. Filing No. 199-1
(Deposition of Steven West taken July 12, 2011).22

•

During the time Bethel worked for WSE, the name ‘Kiewit’ was mentioned
by West only once; when speaking to Mike Hdladky of Hdlaky Construction
in April 2010. Filing No. 121-5, ¶5.

Defendants’ counsel made numerous other statements in briefs strenuously arguing
that no records existed beyond the two letters that were the basis for this lawsuit. Filing No.
115, p. 40 (Defendants’ brief in opp. to motion to compel) (Defendants have no documents
mentioning Kiewit); Filing No. 117, p. 16 (Defendants’ brief in opp. to subpoena); Filing
No. 117, p. 19 (Defendants’ brief in opp. to subpoena) (asserting no additional records
naming Kiewit).

22

West was the 30(b)(6) representative for the corporate Defendants’ depositions. As such,

West was designated to testify as to “[a]ny and all representations involving Peter Kiewit Sons’, Inc.
to Wall Street Equity Group, Inc.’s potential clients . . . [and] [a]ll use by Wall Street Equity Group,
Inc. of the name ‘Peter Kiewit Sons’, Inc.,’ ‘Kiewit,’ . . . or any similar name which is affiliated with
the Plaintiff.” Filing No. 62 (Notice to take 30(b)(6) Deposition of Wall Street Equity Group, Inc.)
30

Defendants and their counsel called witness and Defendants’ former employee, Tara
Bethel, a liar.23 Bethel provided an affidavit, submitted to the court by the Plaintiff, which
stated that while she worked for WSE, she “observed at least one-hundred (100) instances
in which a WSE employee would represent to a prospective client-business owner that Peter
Kiewit Sons’ Inc. was a ready, willing, and interested buyer client-business owner’s
business. These representations were made both orally over the telephone and in written
follow-up letters.” Filing No. 119-1. In the end, the forensic examination, which West so
vehemently resisted and attempted to delay, revealed Bethel was telling the truth.

But West, WSE Vice President R.J. Rios, and WSE group employee Steven Blum did
provide false statements to this court. The Continuum examination revealed additional
documents comparable to the Hdlaky and Waterfront Marine letters and naming Kiewit as
a potential buyer. The examination also revealed email correspondence that was purportedly
from Defendant West which mentions Kiewit as a potential buyer of companies. The
evidence also establishes that Bertke possessed back-up copies of Defendants’ electronic
files at the time West stated he did not. The Rios affidavit submitted of record stated that
“[d]uring the time [Tara] Bethel worked for WSE, the name ‘Kiewit’ was never mentioned
in the office where Bethel worked, verbally or in writing.” Filing No. 121-3, ¶5. Blum
submitted an identical affidavit. Filing No. 121-4, ¶5. The assertions made by West, Rios,
and Blum are directly contradicted by the documents obtained as a result of the forensic
examination, to include emails naming Kiewit as a potential buyer, sent under Rios’

23

During the course of hearings before the undersigned, Defense counsel has also muttered

“that’s a lie,” or words to that effect, several times in response to statements made by Plaintiff’s
counsel. Despite the hostile and often volatile environment of the court proceedings, I have not
found any instance where Plaintiff or its counsel misrepresented the record or the facts to this court.
31

signature by Bethel, and of which Rios received a copy. See, e.g., Filing No. 182-1, pp. 3,
6, 9 &12.

Defendants appear surprisingly unconcerned that they misrepresented a large portion
of the factual basis upon which their initial defense of this lawsuit relied.24 Rather than
initiating a contrite dialogue with Plaintiff’s counsel and this court to fix the mess they
caused, the Defendants waited for the Plaintiff to report the problem, and Defendants then
attempted to explain away their patently false and repeated statements from multiple sources
by stating they were simply “mistaken.” Defendants have seamlessly changed their defense
from “there were only 2 letters total” to “there were only 23 letters over five years,” Filing
No. 259, 257:8-9.

Defendants also assert they could not have known about the additional letters
mentioning Kiewit because it was their practice to delete solicitations that did not produce
business for them. This claim is simply not believable. Defendants’ search of their
electronic files to provide discovery responses was woefully inadequate. And having heard
and observed Defendant West testify on several occasions, the undersigned magistrate judge
finds Defendant West is not a credible witness, and his claim that he cannot remember
communicating with potential clients regarding Kiewit is not credible. The forensic
examination produced several copies of letters bearing West’s signature and indicating he

24

Defendants asserted just the contacts with Hdlaky and Waterfront Marine existed and,

presumably because Defendants’ did not profit from those contacts, Plaintiff could not prove any
damages. In fact, Defendants even moved for sanctions on the issue, calling the lawsuit frivolous
based, in part, on these incorrect factual assertions. While the court need not decide the underlying
merits of the lawsuit, Defendants’ motion for sanctions against the Plaintiff based on Defendants’
false representations to this court was clearly improper, bordering on unconscionable.
32

had spoken with the individuals personally regarding the potential sales of their companies
to Kiewit. See, e.g., Filing No. 182-1, pp. 39, 48, 53, 55, 60. West was presented as a
30(b)(6) witness, yet there is no indication he diligently prepared for those depositions, and
he was quick to claim he did not have any first hand knowledge of any list of WSE’s and
WSG’s clients. The lists were, at least at one time, in the Defendants’ possession. Filing
No. 239, 112:7-115:5. West claims he knows nothing about computers, but admits he
dumped Server 1 in the trash, after the discovery battles had erupted and with no notice to
the Plaintiff or this court, upon concluding the motherboard was “fried.” Simply put, West
was not a believable witness and his pattern of dishonesty under oath, and cavalier attitude
while doing so, is a “direct affront to the court.” Chrysler Corp., 186 F.3d at 1021.

2.

Electronic Discovery

Once a party is involved in or reasonably anticipates litigation, several duties arise
related to finding and preserving discoverable information. These duties include:

•

A party must suspend its routine document destruction policy and put a
“litigation hold” in place;

•

Counsel must become fully aware of client’s retention policy and
“architecture”;

•

Counsel must communicate with the “key players” to determine how
information is stored;

•

Counsel must reasonably monitor compliance with the “litigation hold” so that
all sources of discoverable information are identified and searched; and

•

Having identified all sources of relevant information, a party and its counsel
are under a duty to retain that information and produce information responsive
to the opposing party’s requests.

33

Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O’Lakes, 244 F.R.D. 614, 625 (D. Colo. 2007)(citing
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422, 431-433 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).

a.

Equipment in Arthur Bertke’s possession.

Plaintiff asserts Defendants intentionally moved electronic storage devices in order
to prevent Bertke from responding to a subpoena issued by Plaintiff. Plaintiff served its
notice to issue a subpoena on Bertke on August 1, 2011. The proposed subpoena
commanded Bertke to produce:

documents, electronically stored information, or objects and permit their
inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of the material: copies of any and all
electronically stored information, including, but not limited to, all backup data
and/or tapes regarding accounts receivable, money paid for business
valuations, financial statements, and any correspondence referencing Plaintiff
or the word “Kiewit” for Wall Street Equity Group, Inc., Wall Street Group
of Companies, Inc., Shepherd Friedman and Steven West for the time period
January 1, 2008, to the present time.
Filing No. 73.

Defendants served a notice that they intended to object to the issuance of the
subpoena and Plaintiff subsequently moved for a court order to issue the subpoena.
Defendants objected stating that they did not have any records referencing “Kiewit” and
further asserted by affidavit:

All of the business records of Wall Street Group of Companies, Inc. and Wall
Street Equity Group, Inc. are maintained in the offices of Wall Street Equity
Group, Inc., and are not in the possession and/or control of any third party.

34

Filing No. 117-12, ¶3.

A second affidavit submitted by West swore that “WSE’s landlord does not have and
does not maintain a copy of the electronic files created by Defendants.” Filing No. 115-16,
¶ 32.

These assertions were false. Defendants had placed copies of their electronic files
in the possession of Bertke – WSE’s landlord. Moreover, immediately after the undersigned
authorized the issuance of the subpoena on Bertke, but before it was actually served on
Bertke, West contacted Bertke and instructed him to return equipment containing
Defendants’ electronically stored information. Bertke did so and by the time he received the
subpoena, he no longer possessed any responsive materials. Having learned of West’s
actions, Kiewit moved for sanctions.

West again asserted the false statements in his affidavits were mistakes and that he
simply forgot Bertke possessed copies of Defendants’ files. He also asserts his motivation
in removing the equipment from Bertke’s possession was to ensure its safety because he
walked by the room where Bertke stored Defendants’ files, noticed the usually locked door
was ajar, and simultaneously remembered Bertke had the equipment. This allegedly
prompted West to contact Bertke and ask for all of the equipment to make sure it was safely
stored. Further, West asserted he had only a general knowledge that discovery in the suit
was ongoing, but was not aware Bertke was going to be served a subpoena directing him to
produce the exact equipment West commanded Bertke to return.

West’s explanation for retrieving all computer drives from Bertke before a subpoena
could be served is not credible, and his actions were in bad faith. Plaintiff initially noticed
the subpoena of Bertke on August 1, 2011. The matter was contested, with briefs and
35

evidence submitted by both parties. At the motion hearing, West testified that he was not
fully aware of the discovery process because Defendants’ main communication with their
attorney came through Richard Calabria, the current President of WSE. But West himself
submitted an affidavit, filed on October 7, 2011, in support of Defendants’ objection to
issuing the Berktke subpoena. West also testified as Defendants’ 30(b)(6) witness, has
testified at multiple hearings, and has submitted several affidavits in this case. To suggest
he was unaware of the discovery process, including the particulars involved in the dispute
over the issuance of the subpoena to Bertke, is disingenuous.

Defendants removed the electronic storage devices from Bertke on the eve of the
service of the court ordered subpoena and only produced the equipment after the
undersigned ordered the Defendants to do so.25 The court finds Defendants’ conduct with
regard to the initial objection to the Bertke subpoena and the subsequent movement of the
electronic storage devices to constitute bad faith.

b.

Search for Electronically Stored Evidence.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) addresses a party’s duty in preserving and producing
electronic data.

A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from
sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue
burden or cost. On motion to compel discovery or for a protective order, the

25

West argues that he turned over the electronic files to his counsel prior to being ordered

to do so, indicating he was acting in good faith. Whatever his motivation for giving the electronic
storage devices to counsel, I do not believe it was an act of “good faith” or in any way offsets his
intentional disruption of the discovery process.
36

party from whom discovery is sought must show that the information is not
reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. If that showing is
made, the court may nonetheless order discovery from such sources if the
requesting party shows good cause, considering the limitations of Rule
26(b)(2)(C). The court may specify conditions for the discovery.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B).

The federal rules further provide that a court may limit the frequency or extent of
discovery if it determines that:

(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be
obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome,
or less expensive;
(ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the
information by discovery in the action; or
(iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely
benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the
parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the
importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C).

Thus, unless the producing party can make a showing that the discovery requests at
issue seek inaccessible information, or responding to those requests will be overly
burdensome in light of other options available for obtaining the requested information, the
producing party will bear the cost of production. See Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. William
Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also Zubulake v. UBS
Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)(cost-shifting should only be

37

considered when electronic discovery imposes an “undue burden or expense” on the
responding party).

[W]hether production of documents is unduly burdensome or expensive turns
primarily on whether it is kept in an accessible or inaccessible format (a
distinction that corresponds closely to the expense of production). . . . [I]n the
world of electronic data, thanks to search engines, any data that is retained in
a machine readable format is typically accessible.
Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 318.

In this case, Plaintiff is seeking to require Defendants to pay for the costs associated
with the forensic computer examination conducted by the representative from Continuum.
Conversely, Defendants argue they were incapable of finding the letters and other
communications discovered as a result of the forensic examination. Defendants’ basis for
their argument is two-fold: 1) Defendants argue they had Romano, their most “computer
literate” employee, conduct a keyword search for “Kiewit” from her work station and that
search revealed no letters or communications with potential clients containing the term
“Kiewit;” and (2) the search conducted by Continuum took several weeks and Defendants
could not have performed such an extensive search on their own.

Defendants cite to no authority stating they may meet their burden of showing the
electronic discovery in this case was unduly burdensome and too costly to produce because
the information was not disclosed through a keyword search at a computer work station.
Although Romano, who performed the keyword search, testified she consulted with Bertke
prior to performing the search, she is not a computer expert and has no formal training in
computer sciences. Defendants have offered no evidence that they spoke with a forensic
examiner or any other computer expert to even evaluate what the cost and burden of

38

thoroughly searching Server 2. Considering Defendants’ very liberal policy of not keeping
documents, consolidating their records in one location, or organizing their files, their efforts
to locate relevant electronic files were woefully inadequate.

Defendants’ argument that they were not capable of performing a search similar to
Continuum’s search is equally unpersuasive. Defendants focus on the amount of time it took
Clyde to complete the imaging and search of their electronic equipment. However, the
length of a search has very little to do with whether the requested data was accessible.
Simply stating the Continuum analysis took a long time, and no one in the employ of
Defendants could perform the search, does not meet the burden of showing the information
was “inaccessible” for the purposes of discovery. See Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 320 (even
“accessible”data may take “days” to actually access).

Thus, Defendants have not shown the documents were inaccessible. Further, by
relying on an employee’s simple key word search from her work station, the court finds
Defendants did not conduct a good faith search for the electronically stored information.
Accordingly, Defendants shall pay for Plaintiff’s reasonable attorney’s fees and the expenses
associated with Continuum’s forensic examination of Defendants’ computer equipment, and
for filing and litigating the motion to compel and all other motions and hearings associated
with retrieving and searching Defendants’ computer files.

c.

Spoliation.

Plaintiff alleges Defendants should be sanctioned for intentionally destroying
evidence. “A spoliation-of-evidence sanction requires ‘a finding of intentional destruction
indicating a desire to suppress the truth.’ ” Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Wade, 485 F.3d 1032,
1035 (8th Cir. 2007)(quoting Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 354 F.3d 739, 746 (8th Cir.
39

2004)). Intent is rarely proved by direct evidence, and a district court has substantial leeway
to determine intent through consideration of circumstantial evidence, witness credibility,
motives of witnesses in a particular case, and other factors.” Morris v. Union Pac. R.R., 373
F.3d 896, 902 (8th Cir. 2004). Where evidence has been intentionally destroyed to suppress
the truth, one appropriate sanction is an adverse jury instruction regarding the contents of
the destroyed evidence. See Stevenson, 354 F.3d at 746-47.

Plaintiff alleges Defendant West intentionally destroyed evidence when he discarded
Server 1 after it crashed in August or September of 2011. West admits to disposing of
Server 1, but alleges all of the information on Server 1 was preserved on a hard drive prior
to the time it was discarded. In support of this contention, West offered affidavits from
Bertke with the following statements:

•

Bertke copied the data from the black hard drive given to him by West in
September 2011 on to another black hard drive on October 14, 2011. Filing
No. 174-1, ¶5.

•

Bertke did not review the data on the black hard drives, but the amount of data
on those drives is consistent with being all the data from Defendants’ original
server [Server 1]. Filing No. 174-1, ¶6.

•

Bertke examined a Black Western Digital My Passport external USB hard
drive, serial number WX81A5116889 and discovered that it contains 130,423
files in 6,031 folders,(filing no. 229-1, ¶4), with the earliest file dated July 29,
1998, and the latest file dated December 31, 2010. Filing No. 229-1, ¶5.

•

Bertke’s findings on the Black Western Digital My Passport external USB
hard drive are consistent with what he would expect to find on a backup of the
server put in service for Defendants on September 20, 2010 [Server 1]. Filing
No. 229-1, ¶6.

•

All files dated after December 31, 2010 were moved to a new server put in
service in August 2011 [Server 2]. Filing No. 229-1, ¶7.
40

•

The server put in service on September 20 , 2010 [Server 1] contained all the
remaining files; the files on the black hard drives appear to be those files.
Filing No. 229-1, ¶8.

West instructed Romano to create a back-up copy, presumably on one of the black
hard drives that was subjected to the forensic examination, of all the files on Server 1 prior
to its disposal. Filing No. 259, 175:14-25 & Filing No. 207, 91:13-92:2. Thus, West argues
that all of the files on the crashed server had been preserved. West further argues that he
knows very little about computers and despite being in the middle of contentious litigation,
did not think keeping the “fried” server was necessary. West states that he did not dispose
of Server 1 with the intent to destroy evidence.

Although Romano may be the most “computer literate” person employed by
Defendants, she undoubtedly lacks the experience or training to ensure that all files and
other information from Server 1 were preserved in the transfer. And Bertke provided
credible evidence, but his testimony regarding what was transferred to a hard drive from
Server 1 was qualified; Bertke states the information it contained was what he “would
expect to find” on the backup of Server 1 and the amount of information was “consistent”
with being all of the data from Server 1. He could not unequivocally state that all of the data
and files were transferred before Server 1 was discarded. Finally, the Plaintiff presented
evidence of one letter sent by Defendants containing the term “Kiewit” that was not located
during the forensic examination conducted by Continuum – the June 25, 2008 letter
addressed to Randy Sutton at Waterfront Marine. Filing No. 259, 175:14-25. This lends
support to Plaintiff’s claim that evidence was destroyed, with no backup copy, when West
tossed Server 1 in a dumpster.

41

West disposed of Server 1 in the middle of this litigation, and shortly after he was on
notice of Plaintiff’s intention to seek and review Defendants’ electronic records and
equipment. Defendants claim they experienced numerous computer problems over time and
have been through several servers,26 but this argument misses the point. The Plaintiff is not
complaining that Defendants replaced a server: It is stating West intentionally tossed out the
“fried” Server in the middle of litigation without first taking reasonable measures to
determine whether all the information was preserved or forensically examined.

West’s false affidavits and false deposition testimony, particularly combined with the
false affidavits submitted by Rios and Blum (see filing nos. 121-3, ¶¶ 4-5; 121-4, ¶¶ 4-5),
West’s conduct of throwing a computer server in a dumpster while motions for discovery
of electronic information were pending, and his removal of computer hard drives and servers
from Bertke’s possession immediately after the court ruled that Bertke could be subpoenaed
to produce these drives, provide ample evidence that Defendants intentionally submitted
false evidence and testimony in bad faith, committed fraud on this court, and intentionally
destroyed evidence with a desire to suppress the truth in this case.27 Such conduct warrants
26

This is akin to arguing that they were following standard operating procedures in

discarding an allegedly malfunctioning server. However, like document retention policies, even if
this is acceptable conduct outside of the context of litigation, Defendants cannot hide behind it once
litigation has started and they are on notice of Plaintiffs’ intention to seek production of the
equipment. See, e.g., Lewy v. Remington Arms Co. Inc, 836 F.2d 1104, 1112 (8th Cir. 1988)(“a
corporation cannot blindly destroy documents and expect to be shielded by a seemingly innocuous
retention policy.”)
27

The court also reviewed West’s deposition testimony, such as it was. See Filing Nos. 248-

6, -7, -8, and -9. On many occasions, it was difficult to determine who was testifying: West or
Defendants’ counsel. But one thing was clear--West was evasive and uncooperative throughout the
deposition.
42

the imposition of an adverse jury instruction. See Stevenson, 354 F.3d at 750 (finding the
power to give an adverse jury instruction is support by Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 or the “court’s
inherent power”). Specifically, the defendants’s discovery abuse warrants instructing the
jury that it may assume that the contents of the discarded server would have been adverse,
or detrimental, to Defendants’ case.

CONCLUSION

As summarized below, Defendants, and particularly Defendant West, engaged in a
pattern of sanctionable conduct.

•

Defendants argued passionately and unequivocally that no more than two letters were
sent to potential clients mentioning “Kiewit.” Defendants made these representations
under oath, in answers to written discovery, in briefs, and at oral argument before the
undersigned. These representations were false.

•

West told the court that Arthur Bertke did not possess any of Defendants’ electronic
files. This representation was false.

•

Defendants submitted affidavits from two of its employees stating the name “Kiewit”
was never mentioned in writing while Tara Bethel was employed by Defendants.
This representation was false.

•

Defendant West tossed a computer server in a dumpster the same month Defendants
received notice that Plaintiff was seeking Defendants’ electronic records.

•

Defendants’ only search of its electronic files was a key word search conducted by
an employee with no professional training in information services and who admitted
she is not a computer expert.

43

West attempts to explain away these multiple misrepresentations and improper actions
as the “mistakes” of a computer illiterate.28 This explanation is neither satisfactory nor
believable. In fact, the more West testified regarding these matters, the less credible he
appeared. One false affidavit statement may be a mistake. A series of misrepresentations,
particularly in the context of the pattern and timing of the events in this case, is conduct
committed in bad faith to perpetuate fraud on the court. Severe sanctions are warranted.

IT IS ORDERED:

1)

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a reply brief, (filing no. 255), is granted and
the court reviewed and considered the proposed reply brief, (filing no. 255-1),
as well as Defendants’ responsive brief, (filing no. 256).

2)

Defendants’ motion to amend its answer, (filing no. 179), is denied.

3)

Defendants’ motion for a protective order, (filing no. 158), is granted in part
and denied in part as set forth in the body of this Memorandum and Order. A
protective order shall be entered separately by this court.

4)

Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions, (filing no. 135), is granted in part and denied
in part as set forth below:
a.

28

Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs associated with its
Motion for Issuance of Subpoena on Arthur Bertke; Plaintiff’s request
for costs associated with the forensic examination of Plaintiff’s
electronic equipment; Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees and costs
associated with Plaintiff’s motion to compel, and associated motions
and hearings; and its motion for sanctions, are granted. Plaintiff shall
submit an itemized billing statement of fees and expenses associated

The court finds it extremely ironic that Defendants so readily characterize Tara Bethel as

a liar based on one affidavit she submitted when her affidavit actually led to the discovery of
responsive documents, while Defendants have submitted multiple patently false affidavits to this
court which Defendants simply characterize as “mistakes.”
44

with the above referenced motions and the Continuum forensic
examination of Defendants’ electronic equipment, on or before June 1,
2012, in support of its motion for sanctions. Plaintiff shall refer to
NECivR 54.4 for guidance in preparing the statement.
c.

Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions is denied in all other respects.

d.

The pretrial conference and trial are continued pending further order
of the court. A telephonic status conference before the undersigned
magistrate judge will be held on September 5, 2012 at 10:00 a.m.
(CDT) to discuss further case progression. Counsel for plaintiff shall
place or arrange the call.

IT IS FURTHER HEREBY RECOMMENDED to the Honorable John M. Gerrard
that an adverse jury instruction be given at trial, with the jury instructed as follows:
You may, but are not required to, assume that information stored on the
discarded server [Server 1] would have been adverse, harmful, or detrimental
to the defendants’ claims and defenses.
DATED this 18th day of May, 2012.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Cheryl R. Zwart
United States Magistrate Judge

*This opinion may contain hyperlinks to other documents or Web sites. The U.S. District
Court for the District of Nebraska does not endorse, recommend, approve, or guarantee any third
parties or the services or products they provide on their Web sites. Likewise, the court has no
agreements with any of these third parties or their Web sites. The court accepts no responsibility for
the availability or functionality of any hyperlink. Thus, the fact that a hyperlink ceases to work or
directs the user to some other site does not affect the opinion of the court.
45