Tyler v. Huber et al

Filing 8

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION - The Court has conducted an initial review of the Petition ("Petition") for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Filing No. 1 ) to determine whether the claims made by petitioner are, when liberally construed, potentially cogniza ble in federal court. Petitioner has failed to allege sufficient facts to establish that the threat of "debtors prison" is a severe or immediate restraint on his liberty. Thus, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus in this matter and this action will be dismissed. A separate order will be entered in accordance with this memorandum opinion. Ordered by Senior Judge Lyle E. Strom. (Copy mailed/e-mailed to pro se party)(GJG)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
BILLY TYLER,

)
)
Petitioner,
)
)
v.
)
)
HUBER and DOUGLAS COUNTY
)
DISTRICT COURT,
)
)
Respondents.
)
______________________________)

8:11CV103

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The Court has conducted an initial review of the
Petition (“Petition”) for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Filing No. 1) to
determine whether the claims made by petitioner are, when
liberally construed, potentially cognizable in federal court.
Petitioner has also filed three motions, which the Court
construes as motions to amend his original petition (Filing Nos.
5, 6 and 7).

The Court will grant these motions and consider

them “as supplemental to, rather than as superseding, the
original pleading.”

NECivR 15.1(b).

Petitioner alleges that a Nebraska state court denied
his “29-2412 motion,” leaving him threatened with “debtor’s
prison.”1

1

(Filing No. 1 at CM/ECF pp. 2-3.)

Petitioner also

Nebraska Revised Statute § 29-2412(1) states: “Whenever it
is made satisfactorily to appear to the district court, or to the
county judge of the proper county, after all legal means have
been exhausted, that any person who is subject to being or is
confined in jail for any fine or costs of prosecution for any
criminal offense has no estate with which to pay such fine or
costs, it shall be the duty of such court or judge, on his or her
own motion or upon the motion of the person so confined, to

asserts that he spent the weekend of “April 8, 2011” in
“[d]ebtor’s prison” because of his inability to pay fines and
costs (Filing No. 6).
In Preiser v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court clarified
that a habeas corpus action “is an attack by a person in custody
upon the legality of that custody.”

411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973).

If a petitioner is not challenging the validity of his
conviction, the length of his detention, or collateral
consequences attached to a conviction, then a writ of habeas
corpus is not the proper remedy.

See id. at 499; Spencer v.

Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 9 (1998) (describing how a writ of habeas
corpus can still benefit a petitioner, even after he has been
released from confinement, by eliminating some of the “collateral
consequences that attached to the conviction as a matter of
law”).
Here, petitioner alleges that he is threatened with
“debtor’s prison” because he cannot pay the fine or cost
associated with his offense (Filing No. 1 at CM/ECF pp. 2-3).
See also Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2412(1).

Petitioner does not

allege that he is challenging the validity of his conviction, but
instead appears to be challenging the state court’s refusal to

discharge such person from further imprisonment for such fine or
costs, which discharge shall operate as a complete release of
such fine or costs.”

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release him from the financial obligations associated with his
conviction (See Filing Nos. 1 and 6).

However, a person who is

threatened with confinement for failing to pay a fine is not “in
custody” if the threat of confinement is “no more than a
speculative possibility.”

Edmunds v. Won Bae Chang, 509 F.2d 39,

41 (9th Cir. 1975); see also Toolasprashad v. Grondolsky, 570 F.
Supp. 2d 610, 635 (D.N.J. 2008) (concluding that petitioner’s
challenge to a future parole eligibility hearing was too
speculative to warrant habeas relief);

Obado v. New Jersey, 328

F.3d 716, 717 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[A] fine-only conviction is not
enough of a restraint on liberty to constitute ‘custody’ within
the meaning of the habeas corpus statutes.”).

Indeed, the habeas

custody requirement “is designed to preserve the writ as a remedy
for severe restraints on individual liberty.”
Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973).

Hensley v.

Because it “is an

extraordinary remedy[,] . . . its use has been limited to cases
of special urgency, leaving more conventional remedies for cases
in which the restraints on liberty are neither severe nor
immediate.”

Id.

Petitioner has failed to allege sufficient facts to
establish that the threat of “debtors prison” is a severe or
immediate restraint on his liberty.

Thus, this Court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus in

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this matter and this action will be dismissed.

A separate order

will be entered in accordance with this memorandum opinion.
DATED this 18th day of July, 2011.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Lyle E. Strom
____________________________
LYLE E. STROM, Senior Judge
United States District Court

* This opinion may contain hyperlinks to other documents or
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directs the user to some other site does not affect the opinion
of the Court.
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