Patterson v. City of Omaha, et al

Filing 116

MEMORANDUM OPINION on the Plaintiff's Motion for attorney's fess and costs 101 . No attorney's fees or costs are appropriate. A separate order will be entered in accordance with this memorandum opinion. Ordered by Senior Judge Lyle E. Strom. (MKR)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
TYRONE PATTERSON,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
CITY OF OMAHA, a political
)
subdivision of the State of
)
Nebraska; MOLLY HIATT, both
)
individually and officially
)
as an officer of the Omaha
)
Police Department, and PAUL
)
HASIAK, both individually and )
officially as an officer of
)
the Omaha Police Department, )
)
Defendants.
)
______________________________)

8:11CV128

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on the motion of
plaintiff Tyrone Patterson (“Patterson”) for attorney’s fees and
costs (Filing No. 101).

The Court finds the motion should be

denied.
I. Background
Defendants Molly Hiatt (“Hiatt”) and Paul Hasiak
(“Hasiak”) arrived at the home of plaintiff’s mother on April 13,
2009, at approximately 6:16 p.m. in response to a request for
police assistance made by plaintiff’s mother.

In her

conversation with the 911 dispatcher, plaintiff’s mother
indicated that Patterson refused to leave her property.

The

officers’ first interactions with the plaintiff were contentious
but calm.

After several requests by the officers for Patterson

to leave willingly, the officers made a decision to handcuff the
plaintiff and remove him from the property.

Patterson resisted,

eventually engaging in a protracted physical altercation with one
of the officers.

After his arrest and detention, Patterson

sought medical treatment for broken ribs and other internal
injuries.

The parties stipulated that the cost of treatment for

injuries Patterson incurred on the day of the incident was
$148,729.49.
Patterson then brought a suit against the officers for
use of excessive force in violation of his constitutional rights.
There was conflicting testimony regarding the altercation.

In

particular, the testimony of the officers and the plaintiff
differed regarding how Patterson incurred the specific injuries
for which he was treated.

The jury found that Officer Hasiak,

but not Officer Hiatt, had used excessive force.

However, the

jury awarded only $1.00 in damages.
II. Legal Standard
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the Court may grant
“reasonable” attorney’s fees to a “prevailing party” in an action
to enforce rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

This leads to a two-

part inquiry into (1) whether the party requesting fees is a
“prevailing party” in the underlying litigation and (2) whether
the fees requested are “reasonable.”

“[A] plaintiff ‘prevails’

when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters

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the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the
defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the
plaintiff.”

Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1992).

includes a plaintiff who wins only nominal damages.

This

Id. at 112.

Whether the fees are “reasonable” hinges largely on the
“extent of a plaintiff’s success.”
U.S. 424, 440 (1983).

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461

Where a plaintiff seeks significant

compensatory and/or punitive damages but receives only nominal
damages, the litigation may “accomplish[] little beyond giving
petitioner[] ‘the moral satisfaction of knowing that a federal
court concluded that [his] rights had been violated’ in some
unspecified way.

Farrar, 506 U.S. at 114 (quoting Hewitt v.

Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 762 (1987)).
Based on Justice O’Connors’s concurrence in Farrar, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized two other factors
that bear on the degree of plaintiff’s success.

First, “the

significance of the legal issue on which the plaintiff
prevailed.”

Murray v. City of Onawa, Iowa, 323 F.3d 616, 619

(8th Cir. 2003) (citing Farrar, 506 U.S. at 121).

Second, “any

public goal or purpose the lawsuit may have served.”

Id.

The

circuit found that “compelling city officials to make at least
cursory investigations into serious allegations” that an officer
used his position to stalk and harass a former paramour were
“significant legal issues.”

Id.
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In addition, the circuit found

that an award of attorney’s fees in that case, served a “clear
public policy” by putting police on notice that ignoring
allegations of sexual harassment by an officer is
constitutionally impermissible.

Id. at 619-20.

III. Analysis
First, plaintiff argues that attorney’s fees against
Officer Hiatt are appropriate because, “although Officer Hiatt
was not found liable for not taking action to prevent excessive
force against Mr. Patterson and was found not liable for
subjecting Mr. Patterson to excessive force, she certainly has
not ‘prevailed’ in this matter.”

This argument misapplies the

prevailing party requirement, which scrutinizes the degree of
success of the plaintiff, not the defendant.
Hiatt has not prevailed, is irrelevant.

To say that Officer

On the other hand,

plaintiff certainly did not prevail against Officer Hiatt.
jury rendered a verdict in favor of the defendant.

The

Thus, there

was no “actual relief on the merits” that could operate to
“materially alter[] the legal relationship between the parties.”
Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111-12.
Next plaintiff argues that he has prevailed against
Officer Hasiak and that attorney’s fees are reasonable in light
of the public policy and serious legal issues furthered by the
litigation.

Farrar clearly establishes that the jury verdict

against Officer Hasiak makes Patterson a prevailing party for

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purposes of § 1988, despite the award of only nominal damages.
Id. at 112.

Officer Hasiak’s obligation to pay the $1.00 damage

award satisfies the requirement that the legal relationship
between the parties has been materially altered.

Id. at 113.

This leaves only the question of whether the attorney’s
fees requested are reasonable.

Here, the award of nominal

damages is relevant to the extent it evidences that plaintiff had
negligible success in recovering the $148,729.49 in compensatory
damages or any of the unspecified punitive damages sought in his
complaint.

Under Eighth Circuit precedent, this is not an

“outrageous split” that would alone prevent attorney’s fees.
Murray, 323 F.3d 616, 619.

Still, the difference is substantial.

Though it may not be enough to rule out an award of fees, neither
does it indicate a degree of success that would, standing alone,
justify such an award.

Further, an award of nominal damages

indicates that Patterson failed to prove the essential casual
link between an act of excessive force and his injuries.

That

Patterson succeeded against only one of the two defendants is
also evidence of a limited degree of success, but it is not
determinative.

Inquiry into the Eighth Circuit’s additional

reasonableness factors is warranted.
No doubt the protection of constitutional rights is
important.

In particular, curbing the excessive use of force by

police officers is an important public purpose.

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However, the

present litigation does not significantly advance that purpose.
The case did not present any significant legal issues regarding
the type of actions that constitute excessive force.

Rather, the

litigation focused almost entirely on factual disputes over what
acts of force were used and whether plaintiff’s injuries were
caused by an act of excessive force or an application of force
that was reasonable under the circumstances.
The message that such a legal victory sends to police
officers and police departments more generally is not a new one
-- nor does it provide any significant guidance for future
conduct.

The police department’s awareness of the legal

precedent regarding excessive force clearly shaped Officers
Hasiak’s and Hiatt’s actions in this very incident.

Both spoke

of techniques for gaining compliance without force and criteria
for escalating the use of force.

Moreover, the jury’s general

verdict finding that one or more of the many actions taken by
Officer Hasiak constituted excessive force, combined with the
jury’s refusal to award punitive damages, does not give any clear
guidance for future conduct beyond general vigilance in assessing
the amount of force necessary under the circumstances.

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No

attorney’s fees or costs are appropriate.

A separate order will

be entered in accordance with this memorandum opinion.
DATED this 28th day of January, 2013.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Lyle E. Strom
____________________________
LYLE E. STROM, Senior Judge
United States District Court

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