Patterson v. City of Omaha, et al

Filing 148

MEMORANDUM OPINION denying the motion of defendants to dismiss the remaining claims against Officer Hiatt, Officer Hasiak and the City of Omaha 133 . Ordered by Senior Judge Lyle E. Strom. (JSF)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
TYRONE PATTERSON,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
CITY OF OMAHA, a political
)
subdivision of the State of
)
Nebraska; MOLLY HIATT, both
)
individually and officially
)
as an officer of the Omaha
)
Police Department, and PAUL
)
HASIAK, both individually and )
officially as an officer of
)
the Omaha Police Department, )
)
Defendants.
)
______________________________)

8:11CV128

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on the motion of
defendants to dismiss the remaining claims against Officer Hiatt,
Officer Hasiak, and the City of Omaha (Filing No. 133).
I. Factual Background
Plaintiff brought excessive force claims against the
City of Omaha and two Omaha Police Officers, both in their
personal and official capacities.

Early in the trial, the claims

against the City and the official capacity claims against the
officers were, on the motion of the City, bifurcated for a
separate trial to avoid the introduction of evidence that was
potentially prejudicial to the officers in their personal
capacities.

The jury found for defendant Hiatt and against

defendant Hasiak but awarded only $1.00 in damages.

II. Analysis
A. Official Capacity Claims
Any claims against the officers in their official
capacity are effectively claims against the municipality.
Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir.
1999).

Thus, the analysis below is sufficient to address all the

remaining claims.
B. Claims Against the City of Omaha
As noted in the Court’s previous orders (Filing Nos.
129 and 131), a consistent reading of the jury’s verdict implies
that while Officer Hasiak did act with excessive force, the
plaintiff failed to prove that any compensable injuries were a
proximate result of those specific acts, as opposed to acts of
necessary force or the plaintiff’s own actions.

Plaintiff has

already litigated the issue of compensatory damages resulting
from excessive force, and the jury found that there were none.
Collateral estoppel precludes further litigation of causation and
compensatory damages in plaintiff’s suit against the City.

See

Manzanares v. City of Albuquerque, 628 F.3d 1237, 1241 (10th Cir.
2010) (“[T]he determination of the amount of the loss resulting
from actual litigation of the issue of damages results in the
injured person's being precluded from relitigating the damages
question.” (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 50 cmt. d
(1982))); Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, N.Y., 170 F.3d 311,

-2-

317 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that after a bifurcated trial against
officers, plaintiff “would not be permitted to re-litigate the
issue of compensable injury in the trial against the City”).

Nor

will plaintiff be able to pursue punitive damages because such
damages are not permitted against a municipality based on a
violation of § 1983.

City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453

U.S. 247, 271 (1981).
This leaves only the possibility of a judgment against
the City of Omaha for nominal damages.

The Ninth Circuit has

held that since recovery against the city would be limited to
nominal damages, “any error by the district court in dismissing
the [municipal policy] claim was harmless.”

George v. City of

Long Beach, 973 F.2d 706, 709 (9th Cir. 1992).

The Tenth Circuit

recently affirmed its adoption of the Ninth Circuit’s rational.
Manzanares, 628 F.3d at 1243 (“little if any justice would be
accomplished” by allowing plaintiff to pursue the additional
nominal damages award because the case against the officers
“succeeded in putting the City on notice about its employees’
conduct.”).
However, a finding of harmless error does not mean that
dismissal is within the Court’s discretion.
have overturned such dismissals.

Two circuit courts

The Ninth Circuit, without any

reference to its holding in George, reversed the district court’s
dismissal of the municipality claim holding that where plaintiff

-3-

“has been fully compensated for his injuries, he may still
recover nominal damages for a ‘separate and distinct
[constitutional] wrong’ irrespective of whether he is entitled to
actual damages for that wrong.”

Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angles,

167 F.3d 514, 524 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Larez v. City of Los
Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 640 (9th Cir. 1991)).

Likewise, the

Second Circuit has held that a plaintiff’s “interest in obtaining
a judgment against the City defendants was [not] fully vindicated
when [plaintiff] obtained a verdict against some of the
individuals.”

Amato, 170 F.3d at 319.

The Second Circuit

reasoned that unlike traditional tort damages, the nominal
damages award available under § 1983 allows for vindication of a
constitutional violation, regardless of whether the violation
caused compensatory damages.

Id. at 318.

The Court finds the

reasoning of the latter two cases persuasive.

Though plaintiff

has been vindicated for the unconstitutional use of force by the
individual police officers, he is also entitled to pursue his
“separate and distinct” claim against the City of Omaha for the
violation premised on their policies, even though the most he can
hope to recover is $1.00 in nominal damages.

This seems

especially appropriate where, as here, bifurcation on the motion
of the defendant prevented the plaintiff from pursuing an award

-4-

against all defendants in one trial.

A separate order will be

entered in accordance with this memorandum opinion.
DATED this 15th day of April, 2013.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Lyle E. Strom
____________________________
LYLE E. STROM, Senior Judge
United States District Court

-5-