Patterson v. City of Omaha, et al
Filing
159
MEMORANDUM OPINION regarding: MOTION for Summary Judgment on the policy claims 152 filed by Molly Hiatt, Paul Hasiak, City of Omaha. Ordered by Senior Judge Lyle E. Strom. (ADB)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
TYRONE PATTERSON,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
CITY OF OMAHA, a political
)
subdivision of the State of
)
Nebraska; MOLLY HIATT, both
)
individually and officially
)
as an officer of the Omaha
)
Police Department, and PAUL
)
HASIAK, both individually and )
officially as an officer of
)
the Omaha Police Department, )
)
Defendants.
)
______________________________)
8:11CV128
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on the defendants’
motion for summary judgment (Filing No. 152).
I. Background
Plaintiff Tyrone Patterson initiated a suit alleging
damages as a result of excessive force by Officers Molly Hiatt
and Paul Hasiak.
Shortly after trial began, the Court bifurcated
the official capacity claims against the officers and the Monell
claims against the City of Omaha.
individual capacity claims.
Trial then proceeded on the
At the conclusion of the trial, the
jury returned a verdict in favor of Officer Hiatt and against
Officer Hasiak but awarded only $1 in nominal damages.
The only
remaining issue is whether plaintiff can recover an additional
nominal damage award from the City.
The plaintiff’s claims against the City are twofold.
First, plaintiff claims that improper training caused the
excessive use of force by Officer Hasiak.
Second, plaintiff
claims that a practice of failing to discipline officers who have
used excessive force caused Officer Hasiak’s use of force during
the incident with Mr. Patterson.
Defendants contend that there
are no genuine issues of fact regarding whether the City has
policies or customs that caused the use of excessive force by
Officer Hasiak.
II. Legal Standards
Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the facts
and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321–23
(1986).
“The inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of
determining whether there is the need for a trial -- whether, in
other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly
can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may
reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
Anderson v.
Where the moving
party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it bears the
burden of pointing to specific places in the pleadings and the
record that evidence a lack of genuine dispute on a material
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fact.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24.
The burden then shifts to
the non-moving party to “designate specific facts showing that
there is a genuine dispute for trial.”
Id. at 24 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
The remaining claims against the City and the officers
in their official capacity cannot rest merely on respondeat
superior.
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York,
436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
Rather, the claims must rest on an
express policy of the municipality or a custom which, though it
has not been explicitly approved, is so established as to carry
the force of law.
Id. (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398
U.S. 144, 167-168 (1970)); Smith v. Watkins, 159 F.3d 1137 (8th
Cir. 1998) (“In the absence of a written policy, [plaintiff] must
identify a pattern of widespread unconstitutional conduct that
was so pervasive and well-settled that it had the effect of
law.”).
“Where a plaintiff claims that the municipality has not
directly inflicted an injury, but nonetheless has caused an
employee to do so, rigorous standards of culpability and
causation must be applied to ensure that the municipality is not
held liable solely for the actions of its employee.”
Bd. of
Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405
(1997).
In pursuit of a “custom” claim, “it is not enough for a
§ 1983 plaintiff merely to identify conduct properly attributable
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to the municipality.
The plaintiff must also demonstrate that,
through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving
force’ behind the injury alleged.”
Id. at 404.
“A showing of
simple or even heightened negligence will not suffice.”
407.
Id. at
“[C]ontinued adherence to [a training program] that
[municipalities] know or should know has failed to prevent
tortious conduct by employees may establish the conscious
disregard for the consequences of their action-the ‘deliberate
indifference’-necessary to trigger municipal liability.”
Id. at
407 (citing Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390, n.10 (1989).
III. Analysis
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(1) requires that
contentions made in a motion for summary judgment be supported by
materials in the record or by “showing that the materials cited
do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or
that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to
support the fact.”
Defendants have provided copies of the
official written policies pertaining to training on excessive
force and internal review of incidents involving excessive force.
Defendants have also provided affidavits from officials that are
responsible for implementing the City’s training and internal
review procedures.
Plaintiff objects to these materials as irrelevant and
lacking foundation because they do not address the implementation
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and continued monitoring and training of police officers.
The
Court finds these materials highly relevant as they describe the
content of the City’s actual policies and how they were carried
out.
Specific statements by the affiants indicate that officers
were trained in the acceptable use of force1 and that the
internal review process had been successful in appropriately
punishing officers who used excessive force or removing them from
duty.2
The affiants also describe an “early warning system” that
monitors officer conduct so that officers with “a propensity to
use excessive force or otherwise repeatedly violate policy” can
be identified.
Affidavit of Patrick Rowland, Filing No. 154-3,
at ¶ 8.
Defendants point out that none of the materials in the
record suggest a policy or custom that could have caused the
constitutional violation in this case.
Without evidence of such
a policy, no further analysis is needed because no reasonable
jury could find the necessary causal link between the use of
excessive force and the City.
Having pointed to a lack of
genuine dispute on a material issue, the burden shifts to the
1
“Officers are taught nationally accepted methods of
employing various force techniques and when those techniques
should and should not be used.” Affidavit of Jon Edwards, Filing
No. 154-4, at ¶ 2.
2
“I am aware that prior to April 13, 2009, sworn police
employees of the Department have been disciplined for use of
excessive force, including termination of employment.” Affidavit
of Patrick Rowland, Filing No. 154-3, at ¶ 11.
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plaintiff to “designate specific facts showing that there is a
genuine dispute for trial.”
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 24 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Notably, plaintiff does not point to, and the Court
does not find, any part of the materials presented which
constitutes a deficiency that might have lead to the excessive
force used by Officer Hasiak in the present case.
Nor does the
plaintiff designate any evidence that he can use to support his
allegations at trial.
Plaintiff’s brief is primarily concerned
with cross-examining the defendants’ witnesses at trial so as to
discredit their testimony.
Since the burden of proof at trial
will be on the plaintiff to prove his case, poking holes in the
defendants’ case will not be sufficient for a reasonable jury to
find in his favor.
The only evidence in the record that
plaintiff points to as supporting his allegations of policies or
customs that caused Officer Hasiak’s use of excessive force is
“the complete Internal Affairs investigation file prepared in the
investigation of the Plaintiff’s Complaint.”
in Opposition, Filing No. 157, at 7.
Plaintiff’s Brief
This statement fails to
“cit[e] to particular parts of materials in the record,” as
required by Rule 56(c)(1).
Nor can the Court draw any inferences
connecting this single investigation covering a single incident
to the plaintiff’s burden of proving a custom or practice.
plaintiff has failed to identify a genuine dispute based on
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The
materials in the record.
A separate order will be entered in
accordance with this memorandum opinion.
DATED this 11th day of July, 2013.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Lyle E. Strom
____________________________
LYLE E. STROM, Senior Judge
United States District Court
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