Oppong-Peprah v. Holder et al

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - Respondents' Motion to Dismiss (filing no. 18 ) is granted. Petitioner Kwadwo Oppong-Peprahs Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (filing no. 1 ) is denied in all respects and this action is dismissed with prejudice. All other pending motions are denied as moot. A separate judgment will be entered in accordance with this Memorandum and Order. Ordered by Senior Judge Richard G. Kopf. (Copy mailed/e-mailed to pro se party)(GJG)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
KWADWO OPPONG-PEPRAH,

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Petitioner,
v.
ERIC HOLDER, et al.,
Respondents.

8:11CV383

MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER

This matter is before the court on Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss. (Filing No.
18.) In support of their Motion, Respondents have submitted a Brief and Index of
Evidence. (Filing Nos. 19 and 20.) As set forth below, the Motion to Dismiss is
granted.
I.

BACKGROUND

On November 10, 2011, Petitioner Kwadwo Oppong-Peprah filed his Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”), alleging that he was being unlawfully held in
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) because the six-month detention period had expired
and his removal to Ghana was “not significantly likely to occur in the reasonably
foreseeable future.” (Filing No. 1.) Plaintiff sought release from Respondents’
custody. (Id.) Respondents removed Petitioner to Ghana on January 23, 2012.
(Filing No. 20-1, Attach. 1 at CM/ECF pp. 1-2.)
II.

ANALYSIS

Individuals seeking release from the custody of the United States through a
habeas corpus petition must be “in custody.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c). An individual
satisfies the “in custody” requirement if he is incarcerated “at the time the petition was
filed” and a petition for a writ of habeas corpus does not become moot simply because

the petitioner fulfills his sentence. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998). However,
if a petitioner is released from custody while his habeas corpus petition is pending, the
petition is moot unless “some concrete and continuing injury other than the nowended incarceration . . . some ‘collateral consequence’” exists. Id. (citation omitted).
Such “collateral consequences” are required in order to satisfy the jurisdictional “case
or controversy requirement” for federal judicial proceedings. Id. Stated another way,
the petitioner “must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to
the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision,” or his
petition is moot. Id. (quotation omitted).
Although Petitioner filed his Petition while he was still in custody, Respondents
removed him to Ghana on January 23, 2012. (Filing No. 20-1, Attach. 1 at CM/ECF
pp. 1-2.) Therefore, unless Petitioner is subject to some collateral consequence, his
Petition is moot. Petitioner has not submitted any argument or evidence regarding
collateral consequences and none are apparent in the record. In fact, Petitioner sought
to be released from Respondents’ custody pending removal to Ghana. (Filing No. 1.)
Petitioner was removed to Ghana. Because the court finds that there is no continuing
injury traceable to Respondents, the Petition is dismissed.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:
1.

Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss (filing no. 18) is granted.

2.

Petitioner Kwadwo Oppong-Peprah’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(filing no. 1) is denied in all respects and this action is dismissed with prejudice.
3.

All other pending motions are denied as moot.

4.

A separate judgment will be entered in accordance with this

Memorandum and Order.

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DATED this 2 nd day of March, 2012.
BY THE COURT:
Richard G. Kopf
Senior United States District Judge

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