Hall v. Housing Authority et al

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed without prejudice. A separate judgment will be entered in accordance with this Memorandum and Order. Ordered by Judge Joseph F. Bataillon. (Copy mailed/e-mailed to pro se party)(GJG)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
DEBER HALL,
Plaintiff,
v.
HOUSING AUTHORITY,
CARMELIA SMITH, JONETTA
HENRY, and GEORGE ACHOLA,
Attorney,
Defendants.

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8:11CV408

MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER

Plaintiff filed her Complaint in this matter on December 5, 2011. (Filing No.
1.) Plaintiff has previously been given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Filing
No. 5.) The court now conducts an initial review of Plaintiff’s’ claims to determine
whether summary dismissal is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
I.

SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Summarized and condensed, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants instituted
eviction proceedings against her in Nebraska state court in November, 2011. (Filing
No. 1 at CM/ECF p. 11.) Plaintiff further alleges that she failed to receive the
required “30 day notice” prior to her eviction and that the state court did not
adequately consider the reasoning behind her failure to pay rent. (Id. at CM/ECF p.
7.) Plaintiff also alleges that she disagrees with the state-court decision to permit her
eviction and that she could not read the forms she signed relating to her eviction
because she didn’t have her glasses at the court hearing. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that
the $1,653.00 she owes Defendants in “back rent” is not the correct amount because
she received spider bites while living in the apartment. (Id. at CM/ECF p. 27; see
also Filing No. 6.) Plaintiff requests that the court allow her “more time to move,”

and prevent Defendants from offsetting the back rent due with her section 8 voucher
money. (Id. at CM/ECF p. 5.)
II.

APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS ON INITIAL REVIEW

The court is required to review in forma pauperis complaints to determine
whether summary dismissal is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The court
must dismiss a complaint or any portion thereof that states a frivolous or malicious
claim, that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B).
A pro se plaintiff must set forth enough factual allegations to “nudge[] their
claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,” or “their complaint must be
dismissed” for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569-70 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 1950 (2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.”). Regardless of whether a plaintiff is represented
or is appearing pro se, the plaintiff’s complaint must allege specific facts sufficient
to state a claim. See Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).
However, a pro se plaintiff’s allegations must be construed liberally. Burke v. North
Dakota Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 294 F.3d 1043, 1043-44 (8th Cir. 2002) (citations
omitted).
III.

DISCUSSION OF CLAIMS

Liberally construed, Plaintiff requests that this court prevent Defendants from
proceeding with her eviction in accordance with the ongoing proceedings in Nebraska
state court. (Filing No. 1.) However, to promote comity between state and federal
judicial bodies, “federal courts should abstain from exercising jurisdiction in cases
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where equitable relief would interfere with pending state proceedings.” Aaron v.
Target Corp., 357 F.3d 768, 774 (8th Cir. 2004). Courts use the doctrine developed
in Younger v. Harris to carry out this policy. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Under Younger,
a federal court should abstain from jurisdiction “‘when (1) there is an ongoing state
judicial proceeding which (2) implicates important state interests, and when (3) that
proceeding affords an adequate opportunity to raise the federal questions presented.’”
Norwood v. Dickey, 409 F.3d 901, 903 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fuller v. Ulland, 76
F.3d 957, 959 (8th Cir.1996); see also Boyer v. Scott Bros. Inv. Corp., No.
4:11CV1172, 2011 WL 3847412, *6 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 27, 2011) (abstaining under
Younger where the plaintiff challenged her eviction and finding that “[e]viction is a
relatively complex procedure extensively regulated by state law, which dictates
stringent notice requirements and the nature of the eviction proceedings themselves”);
Newell v. Rolling Hills Apartments, 134 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1036 (N.D. Iowa 2001)
(noting the split of authority and abstaining under Younger where state-court eviction
action was pending and specifically finding that eviction actions implicate important
state interests because states “so extensively regulate[] . . . landlord-tenant law” and
“the state has the further interest in determining, in the first instance, what defenses
may appropriately be raised to a forcible entry and detainer action”).
Plaintiff’s pleadings show that Defendants have initiated eviction proceedings
against her in Nebraska state court. (Filing No. 1 at CM/ECF pp. 11-12, 26-30.) This
state-court eviction action is a parallel, ongoing proceeding1 which implicates

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The record currently before the court is unclear regarding whether a final
judgment has been entered in the state-court eviction proceedings or whether a statecourt appeal is pending. Regardless, even if the Nebraska eviction action is final, this
court would be barred from exercising jurisdiction over that final state-court
judgment because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits lower federal courts from
exercising appellate review of state-court judgments. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460
U.S. 462, 482 (1983); see also Jacobs v. Gear Props., 2 F. App’x 617, 617 (8th Cir.
2001) (affirming dismissal of civil rights action relating to state-court eviction in
accordance with Rooker-Felman doctrine).
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important state interests. In addition, Plaintiff has not alleged, nor demonstrated, that
the ongoing state-court eviction proceedings will not provide her with the opportunity
to raise the claims and arguments raised in her Complaint. Plouffe v. Ligon, No. 083996, 2010 WL 2178863, *2 (8th Cir. June 2, 2010) (applying Younger and finding
abstention warranted where the plaintiff failed to show that the state court
proceedings did “not afford him an adequate opportunity to raise his constitutional
claims”). To the contrary, Plaintiff attaches at least one document she filed in the
state-court proceeding which sets forth nearly identical claims to those set forth in
this matter. (Filing No. 1 at CM/ECF pp. 27-28.) Notably, Plaintiff does not set forth
any specifi federal constitutional claim (or other federal claim) in her Complaint,
making the case for abstention even greater. Accordingly, the court will abstain from
exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims. However, the court will dismiss
Plaintiff’s Complaint without prejudice to reassertion in state court.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:
1.

Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed without prejudice.

2.
A separate judgment will be entered in accordance with this
Memorandum and Order.
DATED this 22nd day of December, 2011.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Joseph F. Bataillon
United States District Judge

*This opinion may contain hyperlinks to other documents or Web sites. The U.S. District
Court for the District of Nebraska does not endorse, recommend, approve, or guarantee any third
parties or the services or products they provide on their Web sites. Likewise, the court has no
agreements with any of these third parties or their Web sites. The court accepts no responsibility for
the availability or functionality of any hyperlink. Thus, the fact that a hyperlink ceases to work or
directs the user to some other site does not affect the opinion of the court.

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