Williams v. Raynor Rensch & Pfieffer et al

Filing 255

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - Williams' Motion to Reconsider Under Rule 59(e) (filing 254 ) is denied. The Clerk's Office is directed to mail a copy of this Memorandum and Order to Williams at his address of record. Ordered by Judge John M. Gerrard. (Copies mailed as directed) (MKR)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
SHANNON WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,

8:11-CV-446

vs.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
RAYNOR RENSCH & PFIEFFER, et
al.,
Defendants.
This matter is before the Court on the plaintiff Shannon Williams' pro
se Motion to Reconsider Under Rule 59(e) (filing 254). For the reasons
discussed below, Williams' motion will be denied.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) was adopted to make clear that the Court
possesses the power to rectify its own mistakes in the period immediately
following the entry of judgment. Norman v. Ark. Dept. of Educ., 79 F.3d 748,
750 (8th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, a Rule 59(e) motion serves the limited
function of correcting manifest errors of law or fact or presenting newly
discovered evidence. Holder v. United States, 721 F.3d 979, 986 (8th Cir.
2013). Such a motion cannot be used to introduce new evidence, tender new
legal theories, or raise arguments which could have been offered or raised
prior to entry of judgment. Id. Williams' motion raises several arguments,
which the Court addresses in turn.
Williams first argues that the Court violated the applicable standards
of review in granting defendants' motions for dismissal or summary judgment
and denying his motion for summary judgment. Williams asserts that the
Court erred in "resolving the non-jurisdictional factual challenges," that the
Court "impermissibly weighed the evidence without giving [Williams] a
chance to respond, or present evidence" and that the Court improperly
resolved disputed issues of fact. Filing 254 at 1–2. The Court is not
persuaded. As the Court explained, it resolved the motions on the pleadings,
under Rule 12(b)(6), then went on to consider the evidence in the record and
reached the same conclusion under Rule 56. See filing 251 at 4–5. And
Williams' claim that the Court did not allow him a chance to respond or
present evidence is without merit. Williams submitted numerous briefs and

evidentiary materials (and a verified complaint) which the Court carefully
considered. See filing 251 at 4–5.
Next, Williams contends that the Court failed to separate his official
and individual capacity claims. Filing 254 at 2. In fact, the Court carefully,
and at length, analyzed all of Williams' claims against all defendants in each
of their capacities. See filing 251 at 10–13.
Williams asserts that, contrary to the Court's findings, he has shown
the prejudice required to state a claim for a violation of his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel (in the supervised release proceedings). Williams argues that,
were it not for the fact that the government had intercepted his strategic
legal conversations with his attorney, Steve Lefler, Williams would have
prevailed on the supervised release charges. Thus, Williams' argument
continues, he would not have remained in jail while those charges were
pending. Filing 254 at 5. But as the Court has already explained, the
interception of Williams' calls to Lefler did not prejudice his defense of the
supervised release proceedings.
To begin with, the Sixth Amendment did not guarantee Williams a
right to counsel in the supervised release proceedings. See filing 251 at 22.
But even if an identical right to counsel was available as a matter of due
process, see filing 251 at 22–23, Williams has failed to show the prejudice
required to state a claim for relief.1
To establish a Sixth Amendment violation, Williams must show two
things: first, that defendants knowingly intruded into his attorney-client
relationship; and second, that the intrusion demonstrably prejudiced
Williams, or created a substantial threat of prejudice. See United States v.
Singer, 785 F.2d 228, 234 (8th Cir. 1986); see also, Weatherford v. Bursey, 429
U.S. 545, 558 (1977); United States v. Solomon, 679 F.2d 1246, 1250 & n.8
(8th Cir. 1982); Mastrian v. McManus, 554 F.2d 813, 821 (8th Cir. 1977). A
criminal defendant is prejudiced if, for example, the proceedings leading to
his conviction were adversely affected by the intrusion, or the representation
he received was adversely affected. See United States v. Kriens, 270 F.3d 597,
603 (8th Cir. 2001). But there is generally no prejudice where the substance
of the communications with counsel are not passed on to prosecutors. See
Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 558.
Williams argues that the Court erred in finding that he lacked a Sixth Amendment right
to counsel in the supervised release proceedings. The Court is not persuaded this finding
was mistaken. Williams also argues that the Court erred in not analyzing his right to
counsel in the supervised release proceedings under the Due Process Clause. Filing 254 at
10. In fact, the Court did exactly that, and found Williams' claim to be without merit. See
filing 251 at 23.
1

-2-

Williams claims that the investigators in his case did, in fact, pass the
contents of his calls to Lefler on to prosecutors. But the record contradicts
this claim. Defendant John Stuck testified (on cross-examination by Williams'
attorney) that while the calls to Lefler were monitored, the substance of those
calls was not discussed with prosecutors. Filing 208 at 7–12. As a result,
Williams has failed to show how the interception of his calls prejudiced his
defense.
Next, Williams asserts that the Court erred in failing to credit his
assertion that the supervised release proceedings were, in fact, dismissed
because of the alleged constitutional violations Williams brought to the
Court's attention in his motion to withdraw his plea and dismiss the
Amended Petition. Filing 254 at 6–7. But Rule 12(b)(6) only requires the
Court to accept as true those factual allegations that are plausible. See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). And as the Court has already
explained, Williams' allegations regarding the basis for dismissal of the
Amended Petition lack plausibility, because his allegations are directly
contradicted by the record in the supervised release proceedings—a matter
properly subject to judicial notice. See filing 251 at 4–5, 8–9, 19–20.
The Court next erred, according to Williams, in failing to address his
claim that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated with regard to
the Arizona state court charges. Filing 254 at 8–9. While the Court did not
discuss this claim, it did not fail to consider it—the Court considered and
rejected many of Williams' claims, but found it unnecessary to discuss each
one. In any event, this claim is without merit. Williams has not alleged what
became of these charges. The record shows that the charges were dismissed,
see filing 251 at 7, and Williams has not alleged anything to the contrary.
This claim therefore fails for the same reason as Williams' other Sixth
Amendment claims: he has failed to show prejudice, and absent prejudice,
there is no Sixth Amendment violation.2 See filing 251 at 23.
Williams contends that the Court erred in finding that the cell phone
brought by defendant Terry Haddock into the Douglas County Correctional
Center ("DCCC") was contraband. Filing 254 at 11. Based on this, the Court
concluded that Williams had no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy
in his calls. And this, in turn, led to the dismissal of Williams' claims under
Williams presents several other arguments addressed to Sixth Amendment prejudice. He
asserts that the Court has set the bar for showing prejudice "impossibly high," filing 254 at
9, and generally contends that the Court misapplied the law in this area. See filing 254 at 6,
9. The Court set the bar at the level established by Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit
precedent—no higher—and the Court is not inclined to explain this matter any further.
Williams' additional arguments concerning prejudice, see, e.g., filing 254 at 3, 9, are not
persuasive and do not warrant further discussion.
2

-3-

the Fourth Amendment (and Nebraska's constitutional equivalent) and the
federal and state wiretap acts, as well as his state-law claim for invasion of
privacy.3 See filing 251 at 14–19, 25–26. Williams asserts that there was "not
one reference in the record that the Defendant's [sic] cell phone was
contraband." Filing 254 at 11.
But the record did show the following, as established by materials
submitted by Williams himself. Calls from inmates at the DCCC were
recorded. Filing 208 at 2. The whole point of Haddock sneaking in a phone
was so that Williams could speak freely—hence Williams' willingness to pay
Haddock to bring the phone to the jail. Filing 206 at 43 (citing case no. 8:09cr-457, filing 1011 at 208); filing 208 at 15.
In granting defendants' motion for summary judgment, the Court
viewed the facts in the light most favorable to Williams, and drew all
reasonable inferences in his favor. But the Court was not required to abandon
common sense. The DCCC required inmates to submit their calls to
monitoring, Williams wished to evade this monitoring, and he did so by
paying an attorney to bring a cell phone into the jail. The DCCC sought to
impose a reasonable security measure which Williams sought to evade. The
Court remains persuaded that society would not recognize an expectation of
privacy as legitimate under these circumstances. See filing 251 at 15–17.
Relatedly, Williams argues that the cell phone was not contraband
because the defendants were the ones who orchestrated the scheme whereby
Haddock brought the cell phone to Williams. Filing 254 at 11. And, Williams
asserts, a "jury would recognize [from Williams'] knowledge of these
facts . . . that [Williams] reasonably expected his conversations with Lefler to
become private under these circumstances." Filing 254 at 11. But Williams
didn't know that Haddock was working for the government and recording his
calls—that was the whole point of the operation. And if Williams had known
that, then he would not even have possessed a subjective expectation of
privacy, let alone an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy.
Next, Williams contends that the Court improperly relied upon the Cell
Phone Contraband Act of 2010 in determining whether Williams had an
expectation of privacy in calls made over the cell phone. Filing 254 at 2, 11.
Contrary to Williams' argument, this did not amount to a violation of the Ex
Post Facto Clause. That Clause generally prohibits the retroactive application
of a criminal statute that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater
punishment, for a crime after it was committed. See Peugh v. United States,
133 S. Ct. 2072, 2077–78 (2013). Dismissal of Williams' civil claims does not
The Court also found that these constitutional and wiretap claims were barred by
collateral estoppel. See filing 251 at 14–19.
3

-4-

amount to criminal "punishment." In any event, the Court's citation to the
Act was merely to emphasize the nature of the dangers posed by prisoners'
possession of contraband cell phones. See filing 251 at 16. The Court's
decision, and reasoning, would remain unchanged even in the absence of the
Act.
Williams asserts that the Court erred in "using the supervised release
proceedings to reach the merits of his claims" and in "bas[ing] its findings of
facts" on the supervised release proceedings because Williams was not
allowed to appeal the dismissal of the Amended Petition. Filing 254 at 12.
The Court, however, explicitly found that the supervised release proceedings
were no bar to Williams' claims under either collateral estoppel or Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). See filing 251 at nn.12, 17. The exception,
which was barred by collateral estoppel, was Williams' claim of malicious
prosecution. But on that point, the supervised release proceedings did
proceed to a final judgment, which was affirmed on appeal. See filing 251 at
19–20.
Finally, Williams claims that the Court erred in dismissing his failureto-minimize claim under the federal wiretap act. See filing 254 at 13–14;
filing 251 at 17. But the Court has already rejected Williams' arguments on
this point and is not persuaded its finding was erroneous.
In sum, the Court finds no manifest errors of law or fact in its previous
judgment, and will deny Williams' motion for reconsideration. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED:
1.

Williams' Motion to Reconsider Under Rule 59(e) (filing
254) is denied.

2.

The Clerk's Office is directed to mail a copy of this
Memorandum and Order to Williams at his address of
record.

Dated this 16th day of June, 2015.
BY THE COURT:

John M. Gerrard
United States District Judge
-5-