Thompson v. United States Marshals

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM OPINION on the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 1 submitted by Toshua Thompson, on behalf of her detained son, Dillon Krivohlavek. A separate order will be entered in accordance with this memorandum opinion. Ordered by Senior Judge Lyle E. Strom. (MKR)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
TOSHUA THOMPSON,

)
)
Petitioner,
)
)
v.
)
)
UNITED STATES MARSHALS,
)
)
Defendant.
)
______________________________)

8:12CV105

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on initial review of
the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Filing No. 1) brought by
Toshua Thompson on behalf of her detained son, Dillon
Krivohlavek.

In the Petition, Thompson alleges that her son is

being illegally detained by the United States Marshal’s Service
based on an alleged violation of his probation.

Thompson also

alleges that her son “has committed no crime of any kind and is
entitled to be free.”

(Id. at CM/ECF p. 2.)

Because the Petition was signed and filed by Thompson,
and not the detainee, the Court must determine whether Thompson
has standing to pursue this petition as the detainee’s “next
friend.”

See 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (“Application for a writ of habeas

corpus shall be in writing signed and verified by the person for
whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in his
behalf.”).

The United States Supreme Court has discussed the

criteria for allowing “next friend” standing in habeas
proceedings as follows:

“[N]ext friend” standing is by no
means granted automatically to
whomever seeks to pursue an action
on behalf of another. Decisions
applying the habeas corpus statute
have adhered to at least two firmly
rooted prerequisites for “next
friend” standing. First a “next
friend” must provide an adequate
explanation -- such as
inaccessibility, mental
incompetence or other disability -why the real party in interest
cannot appear on his own behalf to
prosecute the action . . . .
Second, the “next friend” must be
truly dedicated to the best
interest of the person on whose
behalf he seeks to litigate . . .
and it has been further suggested
that a “next friend” must have some
significant relationship with the
real party in interest. . . . The
burden is on the “next friend”
clearly to establish the propriety
of his status and thereby justify
the jurisdiction of the court.
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163-64 (1990).
The Court does not have jurisdiction to consider the
habeas petition in this case because Thompson has not met her
burden of establishing the propriety of her status as “next
friend.”

Nothing in the Petition suggests that the detainee is

unable to litigate the case on his own behalf.

Thus, the first

prerequisite of “next friend” standing has not been met and the
court need go no further in its analysis.

Accordingly, the Court

will dismiss the Petition without prejudice for lack of

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jurisdiction.

A separate order will be entered in accordance

with this memorandum opinion.
DATED this 25th day of April, 2012.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Lyle E. Strom
____________________________
LYLE E. STROM, Senior Judge
United States District Court

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