Evans v. Spawn

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - Evans' Complaint (filing no. 1 ) is dismissed with prejudice because Spawn is entitled to absolute qualified-judicial immunity. A separate judgment will be entered in accordance with this Memorandum and Order. Ordered by Judge Joseph F. Bataillon. (Copy mailed to pro se party)(GJG)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
CHARLES EVANS III,
Plaintiff,
v.
PATTI SPAWN, (Bailiff to Judge
Coffey),
Defendant.

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8:12CV235

MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER

Plaintiff Charles Evans (“Evans”) filed his Complaint in this matter on July 6,
2012. (Filing No. 1.) Evans has previously been given leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. (Filing No. 5.) The court now conducts an initial review of the Complaint
to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
I.

SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Evans filed his Complaint against Judge Coffey’s Bailiff, Patti Spawn
(“Spawn”). (Filing No. 1.) Evans alleges Spawn violated his due process and equal
protection rights when she “set a hearing on a motion for summary judgment [two]
months away” in a pending state court case. (Id. at CM/ECF p. 1.) Evans seeks an
injunction against further violations of his rights and whatever else the court thinks
is fair and just. (Id. at CM/ECF pp. 2-3.)
II.

APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS ON INITIAL REVIEW

The court is required to review in forma pauperis complaints to determine
whether summary dismissal is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court must
dismiss a complaint or any portion thereof that states a frivolous or malicious claim,

that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
A pro se plaintiff must set forth enough factual allegations to “nudge[] their
claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,” or “their complaint must be
dismissed” for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569-70 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 1950 (2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.”). Regardless of whether a plaintiff is represented
or is appearing pro se, the plaintiff’s complaint must allege specific facts sufficient
to state a claim. See Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).
However, a pro se plaintiff’s allegations must be construed liberally. Burke v. North
Dakota Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 294 F.3d 1043, 1043-44 (8th Cir. 2002) (citations
omitted).
III.

DISCUSSION OF CLAIMS

Like judges, bailiffs enjoy absolute immunity. This “absolute quasi-judicial
immunity” extends to bailiffs for actions “specifically ordered by the trial judge and
related to the judicial function.” Martin v. Hendren, 127 F.3d 720, 721 (8th Cir.
1997); see also Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 436 (1993)
(concluding that when judicial immunity is extended to officials other than judges,
it is because they also exercise discretionary judgment as part of their function).
Here, Evans alleges that Spawn violated his due process and equal protection
rights when she “set a hearing on a motion for summary judgment [two] months
away” in a pending state court case. (Filing No. 1 at CM/ECF p. 1.) The act of
scheduling a hearing is clearly judicial in nature and Spawn is entitled to absolute
quasi-judicial immunity. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 66-67 (2d Cir.
1997) (concluding court clerks were entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for harms
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related to failing to properly manage the court’s calender because a “court’s inherent
power to control its docket is part of its [judicial] function”). Accordingly,

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:
1.
Evans’ Complaint (filing no. 1) is dismissed with prejudice because
Spawn is entitled to absolute qualified-judicial immunity.
2.
A separate judgment will be entered in accordance with this
Memorandum and Order.
DATED this 24th day of August, 2012.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Joseph F. Bataillon
United States District Judge

*This opinion may contain hyperlinks to other documents or Web sites. The
U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska does not endorse, recommend,
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or their Web sites. The court accepts no responsibility for the availability or
functionality of any hyperlink. Thus, the fact that a hyperlink ceases to work or
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