Chapman v. Douglas County Official's et al

Filing 100

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER that Plaintiff's Motions for New Ruling (filings 90 , 91 , and 92 ) and Motion for Leave to file an amended complaint (filing 99 ) are denied. Ordered by Senior Judge Richard G. Kopf. (Copy mailed to pro se party) (JSF)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
BILLIE JOE CHAPMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
TRAVIS JARZYNKA, et al.,
Defendants.

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8:12CV370

MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER

This matter is before me on three Motions for a new ruling filed by Plaintiff.
(Filings 90, 91, and 92.) Also pending is Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to file a third
amended complaint. (Filing 99.)
I.

Motions for New Ruling

In his Motions for a new ruling, Plaintiff asks me to reconsider my September
30, 2014, Memorandum and Order. (Filings 90, 91, and 92.) In that Memorandum
and Order, I granted, in part, a Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative,
Motion to Dismiss, filed by Defendants Travis Jarzynka (“Jarzynka”) and E. Jones
(“Jones”). (Filing 87.) Specifically, I dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Jarzynka
and Jones under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. (Id.) I also dismissed Plaintiff’s unlawful arrest claims
because the record showed that Plaintiff was arrested on a valid outstanding Iowa
warrant by duly authorized federal officers acting under the supervision of the U.S.
Marshal Service. (Id.)
In his first Motion for New Ruling, Plaintiff asserts that he was never asked to
“show exhaustion of administrative remedies” and submits unauthenticated documents
attempting to show that he did exhaust his administrative remedies. (Filing 90.) This
Motion lacks merit for two reasons. First, Jarzynka and Jones clearly argued that
Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies in their Brief supporting their

Motion to Dismiss his FTCA claim. (See Filing 66 at CM/ECF pp. 29-30.) Thus,
Plaintiff had notice of the exhaustion issue, and the opportunity to counter Jarzynka
and Jones’ argument, but he chose not to do so until after his FTCA claim was
dismissed.
Second, even if I were to consider the unauthenticated documents that Plaintiff
submitted, those documents do not show that Plaintiff filed an administrative tort
claim with the U.S. Marshal Service. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s first Motion for a New
Ruling (filing 90) is denied.
In his second and third Motions for a new ruling, Plaintiff reasserts his claim
that Defendants unlawfully arrested him. (Filings 91 and 92.) I addressed this claim
in my September 30, 2014, Memorandum and Order and I decline to do so again. (See
Filing 87.) Plaintiff’s second and third Motions for a New Ruling (filings 91 and 92)
are therefore denied.
II.

Motion for Leave to Amend

On November 21, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to file a third
amended complaint. (Filing 99.) Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that courts should freely give a party leave to amend when justice so
requires. The applicable standard is summarized in Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178,
182 (1962), which states:
If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be
a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test
his claims on the merits. In the absence of any apparent reason–such as
undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, . . .
undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of the allowance of the
amendment, futility of amendment, etc.–the leave sought should, as the
rules require, be freely given.

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Id. (internal quotations omitted).
In the Motion, Plaintiff asks the court to hold Defendants “Jarzynka, Jones and
Anderson” liable for claims he previously asserted in prior complaints. (See Filing
99; see also Filings 1, 14, and 16.) Plaintiff also asserts that “nothing has been argued
or discussed” regarding his unlawful extradition and excessive force claims. (Filing
99.) Plaintiff attaches a proposed amended complaint seeking to add allegations
against the United States Marshal Service for its involvement in his alleged unlawful
arrest. (Id.)
I have carefully reviewed Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to file a third amended
complaint. Again, I have already concluded that Plaintiff failed to state an unlawful
arrest claim upon which relief may be granted. (Filing 87.) Plaintiff’s proposed
addition of the United States Marshal Service as a defendant for that claim, and his
reasserted allegations, do not change that result. (See Id. at CM/ECF p. 7 (finding
Plaintiff was arrested on a valid outstanding Iowa warrant by duly authorized federal
officers under the supervision of the U.S. Marshal Service . . . . Neb. Rev. Stat. §
29-742 (“The arrest of a person may be lawfully made also by any peace officer or a
private person, without a warrant upon reasonable information that the accused stands
charged in the courts of a state with a crime punishable by death or imprisonment for
a term exceeding one year.”)). My September 30, 2014, Memorandum and Order also
dismissed Plaintiff’s improper extradition claims against Jardzynka and Jones. (See
Filing 87 at CM/ECF p. 8.) Plaintiff’s proposed amendment does nothing to change
that analysis.1 (See Filing 99.) In light of these findings, Plaintiff’s proposed
amendment would be futile and his Motion for Leave to Amend is denied.

I note that Plaintiff’s excessive force claims against Jarzynka and Jones, and
his improper extradition claims against Eric Rogers and Steve Barrier, remain
pending. (See Filing 87.)
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Moreover, Plaintiff is warned that if he continues to file meritless motions, he
could be subject to sanctions, including, but not limited to, dismissal of this matter or
being enjoined from filing any further pleadings, motions, or other items in this matter
without prior authorization from this court. Indeed, the Eighth Circuit has held that
litigants who have abused the judicial system may be enjoined from filing future
litigation. See In re Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1292 (8th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that there
is “no constitutional right of access to the courts to prosecute an action that is
frivolous or malicious” and that “[f]rivolous, bad faith claims consume a significant
amount of judicial resources, diverting the time and energy of the judiciary away from
processing good faith claims” (citations omitted)). “The Court may, in its discretion,
place reasonable restrictions on any litigant who files non-meritorious actions for
obviously malicious purposes and who generally abuses judicial process.” Id.
(citations omitted).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motions for New Ruling
(filings 90, 91, and 92) and Motion for Leave to file an amended complaint (filing 99)
are denied.
DATED this 26th day of November, 2014.
BY THE COURT:
Richard G. Kopf
Senior United States District Judge

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