Brown v. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
46
MEMORANDUM OPINION - The Court will affirm the denial of benefits and will deny all pending motions. A separate order will be entered in accordance with this memorandum opinion. Ordered by Senior Judge Lyle E. Strom. (Copy mailed to pro se party) (AOA)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
ALBERT BURGESS BROWN, JR.
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
)
Commissioner of the Social
)
Security Administration,
)
)
Defendant.
)
______________________________)
8:13CV80
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on the motion of the
plaintiff, Albert Brown (“Brown”), to reopen his First
Application because of Due Process and similar fault violations.
Brown also appeals a final decision by the Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying Brown’s
application for disability benefits.
After review of the
parties’ respective positions, the Court makes the following
findings.
The Second Application decision of the Administrative
Law Judge (“ALJ”) is supported by the substantial evidence on the
record and the Court will dismiss the remainder of the claim.
There are two applications for Disability Insurance
Benefits in this case:
(1) an application dated October 5, 2006
(“First Application”), and (2) an application dated August 17,
2009 (“Second Application”).
The Court will first address the
merits of Brown’s First Application claims.
The Court will then
proceed to address the merits of the Second Application claims.
I.
REVIEW OF FIRST APPLICATION
BACKGROUND
Brown was a forty-one-year-old man at the beginning of
the First Application (Brown v. Astrue (“Brown I”), 4:08CV483,
2009 WL 88049, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 12, 2009)).
He possessed a
high school diploma and worked in computer installation, computer
maintenance, and system analysis (Id.).
While on those jobs,
Brown lifted weights ranging from 25-100 pounds (Id.).
Brown
left his last job in December 2004 in preparation for another job
that never came to fruition (Id.).
Brown collected unemployment
benefits from December 20041 until August 2005 (Id.).
Concurrent
with the end of his unemployment benefits, Brown experienced a
fall which injured his back (Id.).
Brown received no medical
treatment or medication for this or any other of his ailments,
though he once visited a clinic but determined that the line was
too long and left without undergoing an examination (Id.).
On October 5, 2006, Brown filed his First Application
claiming disability based upon his back injury, obesity, high
1
Therefore, the final date which Brown could be eligible
for Title II benefits was December 31, 2009, his date last
insured (“DLI”). See 42 U.S.C. § 423(c)(1); Tr. 15.
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blood pressure, and sleep apnea (Id. at *1-2).
SSA provided
Brown with a consultive medical evaluation with Dr. Elbert Cason
on November 16, 2006 (Id. at 3).
Dr. Cason provided a thorough
medical analysis of Brown and diagnosed Brown with low back pain
with radiation down the right posterior thigh; unregulated high
blood pressure; sleep apnea caused by morbid obesity; and morbid
obesity (Id.).
The ALJ in the First Application scheduled Brown
for additional medical examination on February 18, 2008, but
Brown informed the ALJ that he would not participate in further
medical examinations (Id. at 4).
Initially, SSA denied the First Application on December
8, 20062 (Id. at *1).
The ALJ denied Brown’s First Application
on February 20, 2008.
The Appeals Council, the District Court
for Eastern District of Missouri, and the Eighth Circuit upheld
the ALJ’s decision (Brown v. Astrue (“Brown II”), 09-1355, 2009
WL 4825179 (8th Cir. 2009)).
Brown asserts one factual error in his First
Application claim; he claims the signature of J.M. Boone
(“Boone”) on a residual functional capacity (“RFC”) assessment
2
Because Brown filed the Second Application on August 17,
2009, over two years after this “Initial Determination,” SSA
could not reopen the First Application under 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.1488(a) or (b). See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1488(a), (b). SSA
could reopen that case under subsection c.
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form misled the ALJ into granting a higher deference to Boone’s
lay opinion.
Boone signed the RFC assessment which she completed
December 7, 2008.
Boone signed her name in a signature box with
the typeface “Medical Consultant’s Signature.”
However, Boone is
not a Medical Consultant as defined under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1616(b)
and the SSA does not refute that fact in any of its briefs.
Brown cites Dewey v. Astrue, for the proposition that the First
Application’s proceedings were harmful error based upon a nonConsultant signing the Medical Consultant’s signature box.
In the case before this Court, Brown contends that the
greater deference the ALJ purportedly awarded Boone’s opinion
violated his Due Process rights and constituted reversible error.
SSA contends that the Court cannot review the First Application
because of the doctrine of res judicata.
The Court has reviewed
the arguments and determines Brown’s claims are unfounded and the
ALJ’s error, if any, was harmless.
LAW & ANALYSIS
1.
RES JUDICATA
“Res judicata bars subsequent applications for SSDI and
SSI based on the same facts and issues the Commissioner
previously found to be insufficient to prove the claimant was
disabled.”
Hillier v. SSA, 468 F.3d 359, 364-65 (8th Cir. 2007)
(citations omitted).
If res judicata applies, “the medical
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evidence from the initial proceeding cannot be subsequently
reevaluated.”
Hillier, 468 F.3d at 365.
An ALJ may refuse to
consider any issue pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata.
20
C.F.R. § 404.957(1).
The Commissioner may waive the res judicata defense by
reopening the claimant's previous application.
F.3d at 364 n.2 (citations omitted).
constitute a reopening.
See Hillier, 468
A second application may
See Roesch v. Apfel, 17 F. Supp. 2d
1080, 1087 (D. Neb. 1998) (citation omitted).
Here, the ALJ refused to reopen Brown’s First
Application when the ALJ stated that the previous decision was
the “ultimately final and binding decision of the Commissioner.”
Tr. 15.
Generally, “federal courts lack jurisdiction to review
an administrative decision not to reopen a previous claim for
benefits.”
Byam v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 172, 179 (2d Cir. 2003)
(citing Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 107–09 (1977)).
However, “[f]ederal courts may review the Commissioner's decision
[not to reopen a case] in two circumstances: where the
Commissioner has constructively reopened the case, and where the
claimant has been denied due process.”
2.
Id. at 180.
CONSTRUCTIVE REOPENING
The Court must evaluate the actions of the Second
Application’s ALJ to ascertain whether that ALJ constructively
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reopened the First Application.
Brown contends that the Second
Application’s ALJ used evidence from the First Application and
therefore “opened the door” for the Court to reconsider his First
Application.
Filing No. 32, at 3.
Brown’s claim is baseless.
“If the Commissioner ‘reviews the entire record and
renders a decision on the merits, the earlier decision will be
deemed to have been reopened, and any claim of administrative res
judicata to have been waived’ and thus, ‘the claim is . . .
subject to judicial review.’”
Byam, 336 F.3d at 180.
However,
“[t]he ALJ's use of evidence presented with a prior application
in order to determine the claimant's medical history does not
amount to a reopening of the first application.”
Howard v.
Apfel, 17 F. Supp. 2d 955, 966 (W.D. Mo. 1998) (citations
omitted); see Hillier, 486 F.3d at 364 n.2 (citations and
quotation omitted).
The ALJ in the Second Application reviewed limited
medical evidence from the First Application and then expressly
refused to adjudicate the First Application anew.
Tr. 15.
The
ALJ did not review the entire record of the First Application.
Therefore, the Commissioner did not waive its defense of res
judicata through constructively reopening the First Application.
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3.
DUE PROCESS
Brown also contends Boone’s assessment form violated
his Due Process rights.
Brown cites Dewey v. Astrue, for the
proposition that the signature of a non-consultant in a
Consultant’s signature box materially misled the ALJ.
1, at 4-5.
Filing No.
First, Brown’s contentions fail because Dewey is
distinguishable from the case at hand.
Second, even if the ALJ
erred, it was a harmless error.
Dewey is distinguishable from the present case because
the ALJ did not grant greater deference to lay opinion over a
contrary expert opinion.
See Snyder v. Astrue, No. 11-063, 2012
WL 4425335, at *18-19 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 25, 2012).
In Dewey, an
ALJ mistakenly believed that a lay opinion was an expert opinion.
Dewey v. Astrue, 509 F.3d 447, 449-50 (8th Cir. 2007).
The ALJ
favored the lay opinion of a non-consultant’s RFC assessment over
the conflicting expert opinion of the claimant’s treating
physician.
Dewey, 509 F.3d at 449-50.
In the First Application, Brown presented no evidence
from a treating physician because he received no medical
treatment or medication for any of his ailments.
4:08cv483, 2009 WL 88049, at *2.
medical examination.
Id. at 4.
Brown I,
Brown also refused further
Therefore, Dewey is
distinguishable because Brown had no treating physician and
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therefore the ALJ did not weigh Boone’s opinion over that of a
treating physician.
See Snyder, No. 11-063, 2012 WL 4425335, at
*18-19).
Second, the ALJ’s error, if any, was harmless.
The
Eighth Circuit recognizes the doctrine of harmless-error in
Social Security cases.
(8th Cir. 2012).
See Byes v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 913, 917-18
In order to prove an error was not harmless,
Brown must provide “some indication that the ALJ would have
decided differently if the error had not occurred.”
Id. at 917
(citing Van Vickle v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 825, 830 (8th Cir. 2008);
Hensley v. Barnhart, 352 F.3d 353, 357 (8th Cir. 2003)).
Specifically, this Court must decide whether “the ALJ inevitably
would have reached the same result had he understood that the
Residual Functional Capacity Assessment was completed by a lay
person and not a physician.”3
Jones v. Astrue, 07-cv-698, 2008
3
Brown proffers an additional argument: Although
“[Program Operations Manual System (“POMS”)] guidelines do not
have legal force and do not bind the Commissioner, this Court has
instructed that an ALJ should consider the POMS guidelines."
Filing No. 36, at 7 (citing Shontos v. Barnhart, 328 F.3d 418,
424 (8th Cir. 2003)). Brown’s POMS states "[i]t must be clear to
the appeal-level adjudicator when the SSA-4734-BK was completed
by an SDM because SDM completed forms are not opinion evidence at
the appeal levels." SSA (“POMS”), DI 24510.50, available at
https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/lnx/0424510050 (April 13,
2012). However, this iteration of DI 24510.50 did not exist on
February 20, 2008, at the time of the First Application’s
adjudication, and its predecessor was silent on clarifying
whether an SDM completed the RFC assessment. See POMS DI
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WL 1766964, at *9 (S.D. Ind. April 14, 2008), Dewey v. Astrue,
509 F.3d 447, 449–50 (8th Cir. 2007).
The ALJ would have come to
the same determination without Boone’s assessment.
In the transcript of the First Application, the ALJ
expressly referred to Boone as “adjudicator J.M. Boone.”
The ALJ knew that Boone was not a Consultant.
Tr. 33.
Furthermore, the
ALJ’s eleven-page opinion never cited or mentioned Exhibit 2F,
Boone’s assessment.
Tr. 32-42.
The ALJ did not rely upon the
RFC assessment in the First Application at all.
The ALJ in the
First Application would have inevitably reached the same result
because he understood that the RFC Assessment was completed by a
lay person and not a physician.
See Dewey, 509 F.3d at 449–50.
Even if the ALJ erred, it is harmless.
On the face of
the First Application’s decision, the ALJ never cited Boone’s
assessment.
In addition, Brown presented no conflicting expert
opinion from a treating physician to outweigh Boone’s lay
opinion.
The mere possibility of error is insufficient for Brown
to prevail in his claim.
Brown has not shown any indication that
the ALJ would have decided differently if the error had not
24510.050 (effective April 2, 2003 - July 28, 2008) (stating
under Medical Consultant Signature “[a]fter form completion,
sign, enter your code, and date the SSA-4734-U8.”). The ALJ
sufficiently considered the then-existing POMS in the First
Application.
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occurred.
See Byes, 687 F.3d at 917-18.
Therefore, because the
ALJ in the First Application did not cite Boone’s assessment and
expressly referred to Boone as an adjudicator, the ALJ would have
inevitably reached the same result.
See Dewey, 509 F.3d at
449–50.
In conclusion, Brown’s First Application is not
reopened by either constructive reopening or violation of Due
Process.
The ALJ in the First Application did not afford any
weight to Boone’s assessment, and if such an error had occurred,
the error was harmless.
The SSA correctly relies upon the
doctrine of res judicata to foreclose Brown’s First Application
complaints.4
II.
REVIEW OF SECOND APPLICATION
BACKGROUND
On August 17, 2009, while Brown’s First Application was
still pending in the Eighth Circuit, Brown filed a Second
Application for disability insurance benefits and again alleged
disability beginning August 1, 2005 (Tr. 12).
Brown contended
that he was disabled due to congestive heart failure, extreme
fatigue and weakness, renal dysfunction, circulatory deficits in
4
Brown also asserts a Bivens action against the SSA. That
claim will be dismissed. See Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S.
412, 420-29 (1988).
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his feet and legs, arthritis in both knees, obesity, low back
pain, sleep apnea, and high cholesterol (Tr. 16).
this application on December 13, 2010 (Tr. 12).
The SSA denied
On January 3,
2011, Brown filed for an ALJ hearing but later waived his right
to the hearing in March 2012 (Tr. 109).
The ALJ issued an unfavorable opinion in which the ALJ
made two determinations.
First, the ALJ would not review the
merits of the First Application because the last SSA opinion for
the First Application constituted the “ultimately final and
binding decision of the Commissioner” (Tr. 15).
Second, the ALJ
determinated her opinion was limited between February 9, 2008,
until December 31, 2009.
According to the ALJ, February 9, 2008,
was the day after the last SSA decision in the First Application
and December 31, 2009, was Brown’s DLI (Tr. 15).5
The ALJ
incorporated the decision of the First Application’s ALJ to the
extent that it pertained to the period prior to February 9, 2008
(Tr. 18).
The ALJ then determined that, between February 2008 and
December 2009, Brown was not disabled under the meaning of the
5
The actual date of the final SSA decision for the First
Application was February 20, 2008 (Filing Nos. 31, at 2; 43, at 2
n.2; Brown I, 4:08CV483, 2009 WL 88049, at *1). The Second
Application ALJ assessed Brown’s claims under the earlier of the
two dates, and therefore any error is in the plaintiff’s favor.
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Social Security Act (Tr. 23).
The ALJ found Brown was severely
impaired by morbid obesity, hypertension, and chronic lower back
pain (Tr. 15).
Brown adduced no evidence to support that he
suffered from other ailments prior to his DLI (Tr. 16).
The ALJ
stated that Brown did not have an impairment or combination
thereof that medically equaled the listings of 20 C.F.R. Part
404, Subpart P (Id.).
The ALJ went on to make a credibility
determination of Brown’s allegations of the intensity,
persistence, and limiting effects of his ailments (Tr. 17).
Importantly, the ALJ noted that the record primarily constituted
materials outside the time frame of Brown’s Second Application
(Tr. 19).
Finally, the ALJ determined Brown’s RFC to be a full
range of light work (Tr. 22).
The Appeals Council affirmed the
ALJ’s decision in the Second Application.
The Court will
therefore review the ALJ’s decision, which stands as the
Commissioner’s final decision (Tr. 21).
STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Section 42, U.S.C. § 405(g) provides for judicial
review of a the Commissioner’s “final decision” under Title II.
The standard for judicial review for federal district courts is
whether the substantial evidence supports the decision of the
Commissioner.
See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Howard v. Apfel, 17 F.
Supp. 2d 955, 965 (W.D. Mo. 1998) (citing Richardson v. Perales,
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402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Johnson v. Chater, 108 F.3d 178, 179
(8th Cir. 1997); Andler v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1389, 1392 (8th Cir.
1996)).
“Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but
enough that a reasonable mind might accept it as adequate to
support a decision.”
Cir. 2008).
Juszczyk v. Astrue, 542 F.3d 626, 631 (8th
If it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions
from the evidence and one of those positions represents the
Commissioner's findings, we must affirm the denial of benefits.
Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
Thus, the Court will
uphold the Commissioner’s final decision “if it is supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole.”
Finch v. Astrue,
547 F.3d 933, 935 (8th Cir. 2008).
LAW & ANALYSIS
Brown asserts the following errors in his Second
Application:
the weight the ALJ granted evidence, Brown’s
credibility, and Brown’s RFC.
Weight of the Evidence
Three kinds of medical evidence are in question in
Brown’s Second Application:
evidence from the First Application
(Tr. 344-59), Missouri Department of Family Support Evaluation
(Tr. 298, 299-300, 364-66), and VA records (367-98).
For reasons
set forth above, the ALJ was correct when he asserted res
judicata and did not re-weigh the evidence from the First
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Application.
See supra SECTION I.
The ALJ also granted little
weight to the other two forms of evidence.
Records and medical opinions from outside the insured
period can only be used in “helping to elucidate a medical
condition during the time for which benefits might be rewarded.”
Cox v. Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006).
“The ALJ
need not consider medical records created after the date last
insured unless they relate to [claimant]'s condition before the
date last insured.”
Bannister v. Astrue, 730 F. Supp. 2d 946
(S.D. Iowa 2010).
The ALJ correctly afforded little weight to the
Missouri Family Support evidence.
First, this evidence includes
a copy of an undated card from the Missouri Department of Social
Services.6
Tr. 298.
The card states “possession of this card
does not certify eligibility or guarantee benefits.”
Tr. 298.
On its face, this card does not prove that Brown was eligible for
benefits at any time.
Second, transcript pages 364-366 illustrate that
Missouri Family Support denied Brown benefits on August 20, 2009.
Tr. 364-66.
Finally, transcript pages 299-300 contain a notice
that Brown’s benefits from Missouri Family Support would end
6
time.
Brown admits this card was issued outside the relevant
Filing No. 36, at 13.
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effective August 23, 2011.
Tr. 299-300.
This letter does not
pertain to any period prior to Brown’s DLI, does not prove that
Brown ever received benefits relevant to his alleged disability,
and does not show that the department reversed its earlier
decision.
The ALJ correctly afforded little weight to the VA
records.
Although a disability rating by the VA is not binding
on the ALJ, it is “entitled to some weight and must be considered
in the ALJ's decision.”
See Hamel v. Astrue, 620 F. Supp. 2d
1002, 1025 (D. Neb. 2009).
“If the ALJ rejects the VA's finding
disability, reasons should be given to enable a reasoned review
by the courts.”
Id.
Here, the ALJ rejected the VA decision
because medical evidence did not address the period in question.
Tr. 20-21.
First, the ALJ rejected the medical evidence from 1982
and 1986 because Brown was gainfully employed for many years
following those examinations.
Tr. 20.
examinations occurred after Brown’s DLI.
Second, the later VA
The first examination
was in March 2010; this examination was not indicative of
disability in and of itself.
Id.
Then, Brown underwent a series
of examinations from April - June 2011.
Id.
Because the VA
records were outside the relevant period of purported disability,
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the ALJ did not err in affording it little weight.
See
Bannister, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 954-55.
Brown’s Credibility
The ALJ found that Brown’s subjective complaints of
limitations and pain level precluding all types of work not fully
credible because of inconsistences with the objective medical
evidence, the lapse of Brown’s medical treatment, and the lack of
medical opinions and other medical evidence.
Tr. 17, 19.
“[T]he duty of the court is to ascertain whether the ALJ
considered all of the evidence relevant to the plaintiff's
complaints . . . under the Polaski standards and whether the
evidence so contradicts the plaintiff's subjective complaints
that the ALJ could discount his or her testimony as not
credible.”
Brown I, 4:08cv483, 2009 WL 88049, at *8 (quoting
Masterson v. Barnhart, 363 F.3d 731, 738–39 (8th Cir. 2004)).
The ALJ must “specifically demonstrate in his decision that he
considered all of the evidence.”
Id. (citing Masterson, 363 F.3d
at 738; Cline v. Sullivan, 939 F.2d 560, 565 (8th Cir. 1991).
“The determination of a claimant's credibility is for the
Commissioner, and not the Court, to make.”
Id. (citing Tellez v.
Barnhart, 403 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 2005); Pearsall, 274 F.3d
at 1218).
The Second Application’s ALJ made an express
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determination of Brown’s credibility and highlighted numerous
inconsistences between the record and Brown’s impairments.
A claimant’s allegations may be discredited by evidence
that the claimant has received minimal treatment when compared to
the symptoms he alleges.
See Dukes v. Barnhart, 436 F.3d 923,
928 (8th Cir. 2006) (upholding credibility determination in light
of “absence of hospitalizations . . . , limited treatment of
symptoms, [and] failure to diligently seek medical care”); Singh
v. Apfel, 222 F.3d 448, 453 (8th Cir. 2000) (stating that
allegations of disabling pain are discredited by “evidence that
the claimant has received minimal medical treatment and/or has
taken only occasional pain medications.”); see also Brown I,
4:08CV483, 2009 WL 88049, at *9.
Brown did not seek medical
attention or take medication for a period of four years, which
encompassed the relevant period.
Tr. 15, 19, 393).
Filing No. 43, at 8-9 (citing
The evidence shows that Brown did not
participate in sleep apnea treatment, had only mild muscular and
skeletal abnormalities, exhibited no symptoms of fatigue or
cardiovascular distress, and lacked a prescription for his cane.
Tr. 18-19.
The ALJ also mentioned that Brown declined to undergo
weight loss and physical therapy and that his range of motion was
only mildly limited.
Tr. 19.
The ALJ considered all the
evidence in the record and that evidence was inconsistent with
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Brown's subjective complaints; the ALJ correctly found Brown’s
allegations of limitation and pain level were not fully credible.
Brown’s RFC
Brown argues that, without Boone’s assessment, the
First and Second Applications lacked sufficient medical opinion
evidence to establish his RFC.
36, at 5.
Filing No. 1, at 9; Filing No.
SSA argues that the ALJ had sufficient evidence to
establish Brown’s RFC, and to the extent that the ALJ lacked such
evidence, Brown was the cause of the deficiency.
Tr. 41 (Brown
“failed his burden of establishing a more restrictive residual
functional capacity [than light work].”), Tr. 21 (“[t]here are no
medical opinions in the instant case from State agency medical
consultants, though the Court affords the general benefit of the
doubt in finding that the claimant would be limited to light
work, considering the findings established in the previous
hearing decision. . . .”).
Residual functional capacity represents the most that a
claimant can still do despite his physical or mental limitations.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a).
“When determining whether a claimant
can engage in substantial employment, an ALJ must consider the
combination of the claimant's mental and physical impairments and
determine the claimant's RFC.”
Baldwin, 349 F.3d at 556 (quoting
Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001)).
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“It
is the claimant's burden, and not the Social Security
Commissioner's burden, to prove the claimant's RFC.”
Id.
“The
ALJ must determine the claimant's RFC based on all relevant
evidence, including medical records, observations of treating
physicians and others, and claimant's own descriptions of his
limitations.”
Id. (citing Anderson v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 777, 779
(8th Cir. 1995)).
The medical evidence of Brown’s impairments in the
Second Application is sparse.
Brown failed to seek medical
attention for a period of four years.
Brown refused to attend a
medical examination ordered by the ALJ.7
at the hearing on his Second Application.
Brown failed to appear
Nonetheless, medical
evidence other than opinion evidence does exist, including
examinations of Brown by Drs. Carson, Boodram, Abbas, and
Vasireddy.
Tr. 18, 19, 342, 345-51, 369, 390, 396.
“[T]he
claimant's failure to provide medical evidence with this
information should not be held against the ALJ when there is
medical evidence that supports the ALJ's decision.”
Steed v.
Astrud, 524 F.3d 872, 876 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Goff v.
Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 791 (8th Cir. 2005).
7
Therefore, the ALJ
The refusal to attend a consultive examination without
good cause is grounds alone to find a claimant is not disabled.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1518(a); Brown I, 4:08cv483, 2009 WL 88049, at
*15.
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did not err in assigning Brown’s RFC as “light work;” the
substantial weight of the record supports the ALJ’s RFC.
CONCLUSION
There was neither a constructive reopening or Due
Process violation in Brown’s First Application and, therefore,
the doctrine of res judicata forecloses this Court’s review of
Brown’s First Application.
constitutional rights.
There was no violation of Brown’s
The substantial evidence of the Second
Application supports the ALJ’s determinations.
The Court will
affirm the denial of benefits and will deny all pending motions.
A separate order will be entered in accordance with this
memorandum opinion.
DATED this 16th day of January, 2014.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Lyle E. Strom
____________________________
LYLE E. STROM, Senior Judge
United States District Court
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