Rucker et al v. Nebraska Separate Juvenile Ct.

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - Plaintiff's Complaint (filing no. 1 ) is dismissed without prejudice. All pending motions are denied. A separate judgment will be entered in accordance with this Memorandum and Order.Ordered by Judge Joseph F. Bataillon. (Copy mailed to pro se party)(GJG)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
DAWN RUCKER,
Plaintiff,
v.
NEBRASKA SEPARATE
JUVENILE CT.,
Defendant.

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8:13CV173

MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER

Plaintiff filed her pro se Complaint in this matter on June 7, 2013. (Filing No.
1.) Plaintiff has previously been given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Filing
No. 7.) The court now conducts an initial review of the Complaint to determine
whether summary dismissal is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
I. BACKGROUND
On June 20, 2013, the court reviewed Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed
In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”), which she submitted on behalf of her biological son,
Demetrius Rucker. (Filing Nos. 2 and 7.) Plaintiff filed this Motion along with a
Complaint alleging that her social security disability survivors benefits were
improperly given to Tina C. Davis and that the Nebraska Juvenile Court misplaced
her child. (Filing No. 1.)
The court informed Plaintiff that she could not represent her son as a nonattorney pro se litigant. (Filing No. 7.) However, the court liberally construed
Plaintiff’s Motion and allegations to assert her own legal rights. (Id.) The court also
gave Plaintiff the opportunity to obtain counsel. (Id.) In doing so, the court warned
Plaintiff that if counsel did not appear by July 19, 2013, the court would dismiss
Demetrius Rucker as a plaintiff and this matter would proceed on her claims only.

(Id. at CM/ECF p. 2.) Counsel did not appear. (See Docket Sheet.) Accordingly,
Demetrius Rucker is dismissed from this matter and the court will conduct an initial
review of Plaintiff’s claims only.
II. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT
Condensed, summarized, and liberally construed, Plaintiff alleges that her
social security disability survivors benefits were improperly withheld and given to
Tina C. Davis. (Filing No. 1.) She also alleges that the Nebraska Juvenile Court
misplaced her child. (Id. at CM/ECF pp. 1-5.) Plaintiff has attached numerous state
court documents to support her Complaint. (Id. at CM/ECF pp. 6-55.) Within these
documents is a District Court of Douglas County, Nebraska, order that changed the
payee of child support specified “in a decree entered on August 8, 1996,” from Dawn
N. Rucker to Tina C. Davis. (Id. at CM/ECF p. 43.) Plaintiff also attached a Separate
Juvenile Court for Douglas County, Nebraska, order that placed Demetrius Rucker
in the custody of the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services. (Id. at
CM/ECF p. 38.) Plaintiff asks the court to allow her son to live with her and to
correct Judge Wadie Thomas’s errors and crimes. (Id. at CM/ECF pp. 2-3.) Liberally
construed, Judge Wadie Thomas is the Douglas County Juvenile Court Judge
presiding over Plaintiff’s child custody matters. (Id. at CM/ECF pp. 39, 47.)
III. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS ON INITIAL REVIEW
The court is required to review in forma pauperis complaints to determine
whether summary dismissal is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court must
dismiss a complaint or any portion thereof that states a frivolous or malicious claim,
that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
A pro se plaintiff must set forth enough factual allegations to “nudge[] their
claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,” or “their complaint must be
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dismissed” for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569-70 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 1950 (2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.”). Regardless of whether a plaintiff is represented
or is appearing pro se, the plaintiff’s complaint must allege specific facts sufficient
to state a claim. See Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).
However, a pro se plaintiff’s allegations must be construed liberally. Burke v. North
Dakota Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 294 F.3d 1043, 1043-44 (8th Cir. 2002) (citations
omitted).
IV. DISCUSSION OF CLAIMS
Liberally construed, Plaintiff’s claims are brought pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment protects a parent’s liberty interest in the
“care, custody, and management of their children.” Manzano v. S.D. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 60 F.3d 505, 509-10 (8th Cir. 1995). However, to promote comity between
state and federal judicial bodies, federal courts have developed a strong policy against
exercising jurisdiction over these matters when state court proceedings have already
commenced. Aaron v. Target Corp., 357 F.3d 768, 774 (8th Cir. 2004). Courts use
the doctrine developed in Younger v. Harris to carry out this policy. 401 U.S. 37
(1971). Under Younger, a federal court should abstain from jurisdiction “‘when (1)
there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding which (2) implicates important state
interests, and when (3) that proceeding affords an adequate opportunity to raise the
federal questions presented.’” Norwood v. Dickey, 409 F.3d 901, 903 (8th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Fuller v. Ulland, 76 F.3d 957, 959 (8th Cir.1996)).
Plaintiff’s Complaint clearly indicates that she is involved in state court
proceedings regarding the care, custody and management of her son. (Filing No. 1
at CM/ECF pp. 1-55.) Plaintiff has not alleged, nor demonstrated, that these
proceedings do not provide her with the opportunity to raise her Fourteenth
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Amendment claims.1 Accordingly, the court will abstain from exercising jurisdiction
over Plaintiff’s claims. However, the court will dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint without
prejudice to reassertion in the proper forum.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:
1.

Plaintiff’s Complaint (filing no. 1) is dismissed without prejudice.

2.

All pending motions are denied.

3.
A separate judgment will be entered in accordance with this
Memorandum and Order.
DATED this 27th day of August, 2013.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Joseph F. Bataillon
United States District Judge

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To the extent that Plaintiff asks this court to review and reverse a state court order, this
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits lower federal courts
from exercising appellate review of state court judgments. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S.
413, 416 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983). In fact, federal
district courts do not have jurisdiction “over challenges to state-court decisions . . . even if those
challenges allege that the state court’s action was unconstitutional.” Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486; see
also Ballinger v. Culotta, 322 F.3d 546, 548-49 (8th Cir. 2003) (dismissing claims under RookerFeldman doctrine where the relief requested in the complaint would effectively reverse or undermine
the state court decision or void its ruling and noting that “[f]ederal district courts thus may not
‘exercis[e] jurisdiction over general constitutional claims that are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with
specific claims already adjudicated in state court” (citation omitted)). Put simply, a federal district
court does not possess authority in a civil rights case to review or alter final judgments of a state
court judicial proceeding.

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