Lo Grande v. Douglas County Correction Center et al

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - Plaintiff's motion to waive his filing fee (Filing No. 8 ) is denied. On the court's own motion, Plaintiff is granted a 30-day extension of time in which to pay his $14.00 initial partial filing fee. Accordin gly, Plaintiff shall pay an initial partial filing fee of $14.00 by October 1, 2013. If the initial partial filing fee is not received by this date, Plaintiff's case will be dismissed. The clerk's office is directed to set a pro se case management deadline in this case using the following text: October 1, 2013: initial partial filing fee payment due. The clerk's office is directed to send a copy of this order to the appropriate official at Plaintiff's institution. Ordered by Chief Judge Laurie Smith Camp. (Copy mailed to pro se party and as directed)(GJG)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
CHARLES J. LO GRANDE,
Plaintiff,
v.
DOUGLAS COUNTY CORRECTION
CENTER, et al.,
Defendants.

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CASE NO. 8:13CV181

MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER

This matter is before the court on correspondence received from Plaintiff Charles
Lo Grande, which the court liberally construes as a motion to waive his filing fee. (Filing
No. 8.) Plaintiff’s correspondence states, in part: “I do not have [the] $14.00 filing fee that
you are requesting in my current complaint (8:13CV181). Will you respond to me and tell
me what the next appropriate step for me to take would be? Thank you for your valued
time.” (Id.)
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, an indigent inmate who files a lawsuit in
federal court must pay the $350.00 filing fee, first by making an initial partial payment and
then by sending the remainder of the fee to the court in installments. The method for
collecting the filing fee from a prisoner is specifically provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).
Section 1915(b) is written in mandatory terms (“shall”), leaving no discretion to the district
court to waive an in forma pauperis prisoner’s filing fee.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(b)(1), Plaintiff must pay an initial partial filing fee in the amount of 20 percent of the
greater of Plaintiff’s average monthly account balance or average monthly deposits for the
six months preceding the filing of the complaint.
Here, Plaintiff’s trust account statement reflects that his average monthly account
balance is $70.00. (See Filing No. 6.) Accordingly, the court determined that his initial

partial filing fee was $14.00, which is 20 percent of $70.00. The court ordered Plaintiff to
pay his initial partial filing fee by September 1, 2013. (See Filing No. 7.)
As set forth above, Plaintiff’s payment of the $350.00 filing fee is mandatory, and
the court may not waive his payment of it. However, on the court’s own motion, the court
will grant Plaintiff a 30-day extension of time in which to pay his initial partial filing fee.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED:
1.

Plaintiff’s motion to waive his filing fee (Filing No. 8) is denied;

2.

On the court’s own motion, Plaintiff is granted a 30-day extension of time in
which to pay his $14.00 initial partial filing fee. Accordingly, Plaintiff shall pay
an initial partial filing fee of $14.00 by October 1, 2013. If the initial partial
filing fee is not received by this date, Plaintiff’s case will be dismissed;

3.

The clerk’s office is directed to set a pro se case management deadline in
this case using the following text: October 1, 2013: initial partial filing fee
payment due; and

4.

The clerk’s office is directed to send a copy of this order to the appropriate
official at Plaintiff’s institution.

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DATED this 19th day of August, 2013.
BY THE COURT:

s/Laurie Smith Camp
Chief United States District Judge

*This

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