Carroll v. Colvin

Filing 25

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER- The Commissioner's decision is affirmed; The appeal is denied; and Judgment in favor of the defendant will be entered in a separate document. Ordered by Chief Judge Laurie Smith Camp. (MKR)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA

JOHN W. CARROLL,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 8:13CV0255

vs.
MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.

John W. Carroll filed a complaint on August 19, 2013, against Carolyn W. Colvin,
the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration. (ECF No. 1.) Carroll
seeks a review of the Commissioner’s decision to deny his application for disability
insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (the Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et
seq. The defendant has responded to Carroll’s complaint by filing an answer and a
transcript of the administrative record. (See ECF Nos. 11-12). In addition, pursuant to
the order of Senior Judge Warren K. Urbom, dated November 26, 2013, (ECF No. 15),
each of the parties has submitted briefs in support of his or her position. (See generally
Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 18; Def.’s Br., ECF No. 24). After carefully reviewing these materials,
the court finds that the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Carroll, who was born on May 24, 1956, (tr. 78) filed an application for
supplemental security income (SSI) benefits under Title XVI of the Act on June 7, 2010.
(Tr. 89). The application was denied on June 28, 2010, because Carroll had too much
income to be eligible for SSI. (Tr. 89). He filed an application for disability insurance

1

benefits under Title II on June 14, 2010. (Tr. 144-45). He alleged an onset date of
March 15, 2010, (tr. 146), but later amended it to May 24, 2011, the date he turned 55.
(Tr. 20). Carroll’s application for disability benefits was denied initially on September 21,
2010, (tr. 97) and on reconsideration on November 18, 2010. (Tr. 105-08). On
November 22, 2010, Carroll requested a hearing before an administrative law judge
(ALJ). (Tr. 114). A hearing was held on January 3, 2012. (Tr. 37-77). On February 23,
2012, the ALJ found that Carroll had not been under a disability from May 24, 2011,
through the date of the decision. (Tr. 17-34).
An ALJ is required to follow a five-step sequential analysis to determine whether
a claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The ALJ must continue the
analysis until the claimant is found to be “not disabled” at steps one, two, four or five, or
is found to be “disabled” at step three or step five. See id. Step one requires the ALJ to
determine whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity
(SGA). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i), (b). The ALJ found that Carroll had not been
engaged in SGA since May 24, 2011, the alleged onset date. (Tr. 22). Although Carroll
drew unemployment benefits and worked for nearly two years after the alleged disability
onset date, the ALJ determined that it was not clear whether the work activity rose to
the level of SGA, which was $1,000 per month for 2010. Carroll earned $550 per month
as a part-time apartment manager and was provided a free apartment. However, the
value of the apartment rent was not part of the record. The ALJ gave Carroll the benefit
of the doubt in determining that he had not engaged in SGA since the alleged onset
date. (Tr. 22). .

2

Step two requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant has a “severe
impairment.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). A “severe impairment” is an impairment or
combination of impairments that significantly limits the claimant’s ability to do “basic
work activities” and satisfies the “duration requirement.” See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c), 404.1509 (“Unless your impairment is expected to result in death,
it must have lasted or must be expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12
months.”). Basic work activities include “[p]hysical functions such as walking, standing,
sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling”; “[c]apacities for seeing,
hearing, and speaking”; “[u]nderstanding, carrying out, and remembering simple
instructions”; “[u]se of judgment”; “[r]esponding appropriately to supervision, co-workers
and usual work situations”; and “[d]ealing with changes in a routine work setting.” 20
C.F.R. § 404.1521(b). If the claimant cannot prove such an impairment, the ALJ will find
that the claimant is not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c). The ALJ found
that Carroll had the following severe impairments: schizophrenia, anxiety, ischemia,
congestive heart failure, coronary artery disease, and hypertension. (Tr. 22). The ALJ
also found that Carroll suffered from obesity, but it was a nonsevere impairment
because there was no evidence that the obesity limited Carroll’s ability to perform workrelated activities. (Tr. 23).
Step three requires the ALJ to compare the claimant’s impairment or impairments
to a list of impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (d); see also 20 C.F.R. Part
404, Subpart P, App’x 1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926). If the
claimant has an impairment “that meets or equals one of [the] listings,” the analysis
ends and the claimant is found to be “disabled.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (d).

3

If a claimant does not suffer from a listed impairment or its equivalent, then the analysis
proceeds to steps four and five. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The ALJ found that
Carroll did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically
equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments. (Tr. 23).
Step four requires the ALJ to consider the claimant’s residual functioning
capacity (RFC)1 to determine whether the impairment or impairments prevent the
claimant from engaging in “past relevant work.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (e),
(f). If the claimant is able to perform any past relevant work, the ALJ will find that the
claimant is not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (f). The ALJ found that
Carroll was unable to perform any past relevant work. (Tr. 29).
At step five, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is able to do any other
work considering his RFC, age, education, and work experience. If the claimant is able
to do other work, he is not disabled. The ALJ found that Carroll had the RFC to perform
medium work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), except he could perform only
unskilled routine and repetitive work. (Tr. 25).
The ALJ found that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy that Carroll could perform. (Tr. 29). Therefore, Carroll had not been under a
disability from May 24, 2011, through the date of the decision. (Tr. 30). The Appeals
Council denied further review on July 2, 2013. (Tr. 1-7). Thus, the ALJ’s decision stands
as the final decision of the Commissioner, and it is from this decision that Carroll seeks
judicial review.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
1

"'Residual functional capacity' is what the claimant is able to do despite limitations caused by
all of the claimant's impairments." Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 972 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing 20 C.F.R. §
404.1545(a)).

4

A.

Medical Evidence
Carroll began treatment for hypertension in February 2010. (Tr. 250). He was

prescribed medications and referred to a blood pressure clinic. (Tr. 251). At a follow-up
visit in March 2010, Carroll reported no side effects from the medications. He reported
working out vigorously for 90 minutes a day with no chest pain or shortness of breath.
(Tr. 248).
In April 2010, Carroll reported jaw pain. (Tr. 246). An exercise stress
echocardiogram showed inferior, inferolateral, and lateral wall ischemia. (Tr. 236, 245).
He was prescribed a stronger statin and a beta blocker. (Tr. 245). On April 30, 2010,
Carroll had coronary catheterization that showed nonobstructive atherosclerotic
coronary artery disease. He was prescribed Crestor and metoprolol. (Tr. 236).
In June 2010, it was reported that Carroll’s blood pressure was under good
control on medical therapy and that he had no evidence of ischemia or heart failure. (Tr.
235). At the end of June 2010, Carroll reported that he was tolerating Crestor, but he
had not started taking metoprolol as prescribed because he was concerned it would
cause fatigue. (Tr. 234). He also reported that the testosterone therapy had increased
his stamina and energy. However, Carroll said he had quit his construction job because
he felt he was unable to keep up. (Tr. 234).
After Carroll reported recurrent chest discomfort and intermittent jaw discomfort,
he was evaluated at a cardiac clinic in August 2010. (Tr. 265). It was determined he had
cardiomyopathy with segmental wall motion abnormalities of uncertain etiology;
coronary artery disease, nonobstructive by description (films were not available for
review); hypertension with mild hypertensive heart disease; and hyperlipidemia with an

5

LDL of 182. Carroll’s prescription for Crestor had been changed to simvastatin. (Tr.
267). He was scheduled for a follow-up appointment after the catheterization films had
been obtained and reviewed. Carroll was advised that if he had any jaw discomfort with
exertion or at rest, he should take one or two sublingual nitroglycerin tablets, and if he
continued to have discomfort, he should go to the hospital. (Tr. 267).
On August 25, 2010, Carroll reported no significant jaw discomfort, and he was
found to be fairly stable from a cardiovascular standpoint. Lesions observed in the
cardiac catheterization films were not obstructive in nature. His previous episodes of
chest discomfort with exertion had abated. His blood pressure was not ideally
controlled, so his medications were adjusted. (Tr. 263-64).
The first mention in the record of any mental health issues was on June 20,
2011, when Carroll underwent a psychiatric consultation with Vithyalaks Selvaraj, M.D.,
in the mental health clinic at the Veterans Administration (VA) hospital. (Tr. 404). Carroll
reported that his physician wanted him to go to the clinic for anxiety and post traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD). He reported that when he worked in construction, he believed
people were plotting against him and that he believed he had been discriminated
against because he was African-American. Carroll stated that he had been physically
violent with Caucasian men. He reported that he was separated from his wife because
he was verbally abusive and accused her of cheating and plotting against him. (Tr. 404).
Dr. Selvaraj stated that Carroll’s speech had normal rate and rhythm, his mood
was anxious, and his affect was blunted. (Tr. 406). He was diagnosed with
schizophrenia, paranoid type, and alcohol dependence. Carroll declined a mental health
referral, and he was directed to begin taking Seroquel and to continue outpatient care.

6

(Tr. 406). At a follow-up appointment on July 13, 2011, Carroll reported that he was
tolerating Seroquel, but he did not take it every day. (Tr. 399). He was told that he
needed to take it consistently before the dosage could be increased. (Tr. 399).
On August 4, 2011, Dr. Selvaraj noted that Carroll had prominent paranoia about
people trying to poison him and harm him. Carroll reported that he was tolerating
Seroquel, but he felt too sedated during the day. (Tr. 386). His mood was euthymic. (Tr.
388). Carroll stated he was not willing to take any psychotropic medication, but he
agreed to take Seroquel because it helped him sleep. It was recommended he continue
with outpatient therapy. (Tr. 389).
In August 2011, a cardiologic consultation noted that Carroll’s symptoms had
been stable over the past year. (Tr. 380). After a stress echocardiogram, Carroll was
advised to begin taking coreg rather than metoprolol. (Tr. 383). Later that month, Carroll
reported that he had episodes of dizziness when he exercised. He was able to ambulate
independently at the appointment without any assistive devices. (Tr. 375).
Dr. Selvaraj saw Carroll again on October 4, 2011. He was not compliant with his
medications, even though he admitted that he felt better when he took the medications.
(Tr. 372). Dr. Selvaraj noted that Carroll was still paranoid, but his mood was euthymic.
(Tr. 373-74). It was recommended that he continue current medications and continue as
an outpatient. (Tr. 374).
In November 2011, Carroll reported that he continued to have chest pain
associated with strenuous exercise which lasted for hours but improved with
nitroglycerin. He reported that he had fewer episodes of chest pain since starting coreg.
(Tr. 368). Later that month, it was noted that Carroll was not compliant with simvastatin.

7

He was to be rechecked on the next visit and if he was not at his goal, he would need a
more potent statin. (Tr. 370). On December 22, 2011, x-rays of Carroll’s chest showed
no evidence of cardiac enlargement and the lungs were normal. There was mild
prominence of the ascending aorta, which could be due to aging or actual developing
small ascending aortic aneurysm. (Tr. 304).
B.

Medical Opinion Evidence
Jerry Reed, M.D., completed a physical RFC on September 17, 2010. (Tr. 291-

98). He determined that Carroll could occasionally lift and/or carry 50 pounds and could
frequently lift and/or carry 25 pounds. (Tr. 292). He could sit, stand, or walk about six
hours in an eight-hour workday. He had no limitations in the ability to push and/or pull.
Dr. Reed stated that Carroll should reasonably avoid heavy/strenuous activities but was
noted to be remarkably fit and an avid exerciser, frequently working out for up to two
hours a day. He retained the ability to perform a wide range of activities. (Tr. 292).
Carroll had no postural, manipulative, visual, communicative, or environmental
limitations. (Tr. 293-95). James Bane, M.D., affirmed Dr. Reed’s physical RFC on
November 16, 2010. (Tr. 300).
A mental RFC assessment was completed on January 23, 2012, by Dr. Selvaraj.
(Tr. 425). He stated that Carroll had marked limitation in the ability to deal with work
stress. He had paranoid delusions and believed people were trying to poison him, and
he had isolated himself. (Tr. 425). Carroll also had marked limitation to complete a
normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based
symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and
length of rest periods. Dr. Selvaraj stated Carroll was distractible, irritable, and actively

8

psychotic. He had extreme limitation in the ability to accept instructions and respond
appropriately to criticism from supervisors or coworkers. Carroll had a history of physical
aggression, and Dr. Selvaraj did not think he would take criticism well. (Tr. 426).
C.

Hearing Evidence
At a hearing on January 3, 2012, Carroll stated that he had no inpatient

hospitalizations in the last year. (Tr. 39-40). Carroll stated that he graduated from high
school and attended college for two years but he did not receive a degree. (Tr. 44). He
attended a union school to become a carpenter. At the time of the hearing, Carroll was
working part-time as an apartment manager, for which he received a free apartment.
(Tr. 46, 51). Carroll stated that he had quit a carpenter job because he had a lot of
anxiety and he was afraid he would hurt someone. (Tr. 48). Carroll said he drew
unemployment for at least one year. (Tr. 52). During that time, he looked for a less
physical job. (Tr. 53). Carroll said he cannot work because he had chest pain and got
fatigued when he exerted himself. (Tr. 55). Carroll said he had stopped exercising
because he was afraid he would have chest pains and then would have to take
nitroglycerin. (Tr. 57). Carroll said he could walk a couple of miles. (Tr. 61).
During the day, Carroll stated that he helped take care of his 2-year-old son while
the son’s mother looked for work. (Tr. 62-63). In the afternoon, he worked as an
apartment manager, which required him to walk around the building to check for
emergencies. He then returned to his apartment and watched television. Carroll said he
also walked around the building once in the evening. (Tr. 63).
Carroll said he started seeing a psychiatrist for anxiety about 10 months earlier.
(Tr. 65-66). He had also gone through a period where he was concerned that he was

9

going to hurt someone and that he thought people were trying to poison him. He was
given medication to help him sleep. (Tr. 66).
Steven Schill, a vocational expert (VE), stated that an individual with Carroll’s
limitations, who could perform medium exertional work, occasionally lifting or carrying
50 pounds and frequently lifting or carrying 25 pounds, and with no restriction in
standing, sitting, or walking, would be able to return to past work as a carpenter. (Tr. 7273). In the region, there were 6,400 carpenter jobs and in the national economy, there
were 520,000. Schill stated that Carroll could also work as a janitor. There were 36,000
janitorial positions in the region and 965,000 in the national economy. Carroll could work
as a kitchen helper, which is unskilled medium. (Tr. 73). In the region, there were
17,000 positions, and in the national economy, there were 521,000 positions. He could
also be employed as a laundry room worker, which had 2,600 jobs in the region and
86,000 jobs in the national economy. (Tr. 74). If the individual was limited to light
exertional work, meaning he was able to occasionally lift or carry 20 pounds, frequently
lift or carry 10 pounds, and stand, sit, or walk six hours in an eight-hour day,
occasionally do postural activities, and avoid working outside in the cold or heat, Carroll
had no transferable skills. (Tr. 74). Schill stated that if the individual had marked
limitations in mental health, he would be eliminated from employment. (Tr. 75).
D.

Additional Evidence
In interrogatories, Carroll stated that he suffered from congestive heart failure,

high blood pressure, coronary artery disease, schizophrenia, and anxiety. (Tr. 207).
Carroll stated that when he did any physical activity for more than an hour or two he
developed severe pain in his heart which sometimes lasted all night or resulted in a

10

hospital stay. His mental condition made the stress unbearable. (Tr. 207). He had
received unemployment benefits. (Tr. 208). Carroll stated he took medication as
prescribed and it was effective, although some medications made him drowsy during
the day. (Tr. 209). He said he could walk for 20 minutes, stand for 10 minutes, and sit
for 45 minutes in an eight-hour workday. (Tr. 211). Carroll said he could lift 25 pounds
with one hand or 50 pounds with both hands. (Tr. 211). For exercise, he walked for 20
minutes. He watched television for two hours at a time. Carroll said he was able to
shower or bathe, brush his teeth, shave, and perform other personal hygiene. He was
able to perform household chores such as vacuuming, dusting, sweeping, washing
dishes, scrubbing floors, mowing the lawn, making beds, doing laundry, and cooking.
(Tr. 213). Carroll stated he worked two hours a day as an apartment manager. (Tr. 214).
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court must review the Commissioner’s decision to determine “whether there
is substantial evidence based on the entire record to support the ALJ’s factual findings.”
Johnson v. Chater, 108 F.3d 178, 179 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting Clark v. Chater, 75 F.3d
414, 416 (8th Cir. 1996)). See also Collins v. Astrue, 648 F.3d 869, 871 (8th Cir. 2011).
“Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but enough that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support the conclusion.” Kamann v. Colvin, 721 F.3d 945,
950 (8th Cir. 2013) (internal citations omitted). A decision supported by substantial
evidence may not be reversed, “even if inconsistent conclusions may be drawn from the
evidence, and even if [the court] may have reached a different outcome.” McNamara v.
Astrue, 590 F.3d 607, 610 (8th Cir. 2010). Nevertheless, the court’s review “is more
than a search of the record for evidence supporting the Commissioner’s findings, and

11

requires a scrutinizing analysis, not merely a ‘rubber stamp’ of the Commissioner’s
action.” Scott ex rel. Scott v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 818, 821 (8th Cir. 2008) (citations,
brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted). See also Moore v. Astrue, 623 F.3d
599, 602 (8th Cir. 2010) (“Our review extends beyond examining the record to find
substantial evidence in support of the ALJ’s decision; we also consider evidence in the
record that fairly detracts from that decision.”).
This court must also determine whether the Commissioner’s decision “is based
on legal error.” Collins v. Astrue, 648 F.3d 869, 871 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Lowe v.
Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 971 (8th Cir. 2000)). “Legal error may be an error of procedure,
the use of erroneous legal standards, or an incorrect application of the law.”

Id.

(citations omitted). No deference is owed to the Commissioner’s legal conclusions.
See Brueggemann v. Barnhart, 348 F.3d 689, 692 (8th Cir. 2003). See also Collins,
supra, 648 F.3d at 871 (indicating that the question of whether the ALJ’s decision is
based on legal error is reviewed de novo).
IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

RFC Assessment
Carroll argues that the ALJ’s RFC assessment was unsupported by substantial

evidence based on the record as a whole. (Pl.’s Br. at 5). As noted previously, the RFC
is what the claimant is able to do despite limitations caused by all of his impairments.
Lowe v. Apfel, supra. “The RFC is used at both step four and five of the evaluation
process, but it is determined at step four, where the burden of proof rests with the
claimant.” Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 793 (8th Cir. 2005). “The ALJ must assess a
claimant's RFC based on all relevant, credible evidence in the record, ‘including the

12

medical records, observations of treating physicians and others, and an individual's own
description of his limitations.’” Id. A disability claimant has the burden to provide
evidence of his impairments and to prove his RFC. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(a) and
(c), 416.912(a) and (c).
The sole mental RFC assessment in the record was completed by Dr. Selvaraj,
who also treated Carroll. (Tr. 425). Dr. Selvaraj found that Carroll had marked limitation
in the ability to deal with work stress, to complete a normal workday and workweek, and
to perform at a consistent pace. Dr. Selvaraj also stated that Carroll had extreme
limitation in the ability to accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism. (Tr.
426).
The ALJ found that Carroll’s mental impairments did not meet or medically equal
any listing. (Tr. 23). The ALJ stated that Carroll had mild difficulties in social functioning.
Although Dr. Selvaraj opined that Carroll had a serious limitation in social functioning,
the ALJ noted that the record showed Carroll was able to perform duties as an assistant
building manager, to maintain a marriage, and to care for his children. During a mental
status examination, Carroll’s motor behavior was normal, his eye contact was good, his
facial expressions were normal, and his attitude was cooperative. The ALJ gave Carroll
the benefit of the doubt but found that he had no more than a mild limitation in social
functioning. (Tr. 24).
The ALJ found that Carroll had only a moderate limitation in the area of
concentration, persistence or pace. (Tr. 24). Again, Dr. Selvaraj stated that Carroll had a
marked limitation in the ability to deal with work stress and to perform at a consistent
pace. However, the ALJ noted that Dr. Selvaraj found that Carroll’s cognition was

13

grossly intact and his fund of knowledge was average. He had the necessary
concentration to perform the duties of an assistant building manager. (Tr. 24).
The ALJ also noted that after Carroll started treatment for schizophrenia and
anxiety in June 2011, he refused all medications with the exception of Seroquel. (Tr.
27). Thus, there was evidence that Carroll had not been entirely compliant in taking
prescribed medications, which suggested that the symptoms were not as limiting as
Carroll had alleged. The ALJ gave Carroll the benefit of the doubt regarding all his
alleged impairments and stated that the RFC reflected those symptoms. (Tr. 28).
The ALJ gave little weight to Dr. Selvaraj’s opinion because it was not supported
by a majority of the objective medical evidence and was out of proportion with the
Veterans Administration progress notes. In addition, Carroll had very little history of
psychological treatment. (Tr. 28). He was not in counseling and had not yet been taking
medication for 12 months. He was, in fact, responding favorably to the medication when
he chose to take it. (Tr. 29).
An ALJ must give a treating physician’s opinion controlling weight if it is well
supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is
not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record. Brace v. Astrue, 578 F.3d
882, 885 (8th Cir. 2009), citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927 (d)(2). If the
opinion fails to meet these criteria, however, the ALJ need not accept it. Brace, 578
F.3d at 885. An ALJ is warranted in discrediting some of the treating physician's
opinions, in light of other inconsistent or contradictory evidence in the record. Weber v.
Apfel, 164 F.3d 431 (8th Cir. 1999).

14

An ALJ's decision to “discount or even disregard the opinion of a treating
physician” will be upheld where other medical assessments “are supported by better or
more thorough medical evidence,” or “where a treating physician renders inconsistent
opinions that undermine the credibility of such opinions.” Cantrell v. Apfel, 231 F. 3d
1104, 1107 (8th Cir. 2000). “[T]he ALJ is not required to rely entirely on a particular
physician's opinion or choose between the opinions [of] any of the claimant's
physicians.” Martise v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 909, 927 (8th Cir. 2011), quoting Schmidt v.
Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 845 (7th Cir. 2007).
Dr. Selvaraj’s opinion was not due controlling weight because it was inconsistent
with other substantial evidence in the record, including the psychiatrist’s own treatment
notes. Carroll consistently demonstrated good grooming and hygiene, normal motor
behavior and eye contact, a cooperative attitude, and euthymic mood during
appointments with Dr. Selvaraj. (Tr. 373, 388, 400).
In addition, the record showed that Carroll was not always compliant with his
medications. (Tr. 372, 399). Dr. Selvaraj noted that Carroll was unwilling to take any
other psychotropic medication. (Tr. 389). Carroll seemed to understand that his
symptoms could improve when he took medication, as he acknowledged to Dr. Selvaraj
that he felt better when he took the medication. (Tr. 372).
An ALJ has the duty, at step four, to formulate the claimant’s RFC based on all
the relevant, credible evidence of record, including medical records, observations of
treating physicians and others, and an individual’s own description of his limitations.
McKinney v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 2000).

15

The ALJ found that Carroll’s alleged limited daily activities could not be
objectively verified with any reasonable degree of certainty. (Tr. 26). And even if his
daily activities were as limited as alleged, it was difficult to attribute that degree of
limitation to Carroll’s medical condition in view of the relatively weak medical evidence.
Overall, the ALJ determined that Carroll’s reported limitations in daily activities were
outweighed by other factors. The ALJ found that Carroll’s statements concerning the
intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his symptoms were not credible to the
extent they were inconsistent with the RFC. (Tr. 26-27). The objective findings failed to
provide strong support for Carroll’s allegations of disabling symptoms and limitations
resulting from his impairments.
The ALJ properly gave the opinion of Dr. Reed significant weight because it was
supported by a majority of the objective medical evidence, Dr. Reed had expertise in
disability cases, and he thoroughly reviewed the record. (Tr. 28). Dr. Reed opined that
Carroll could perform medium level exertional work. Dr. Bane also opined that Carroll
was capable of performing medium work.
The ALJ found that Carroll’s credibility was weakened by inconsistencies
between his allegations, his statements regarding daily activities, and the medical
evidence. (Tr. 29). The record showed that Carroll was capable of exercising one hour
daily, could walk two miles, drove a vehicle, cared for his son, and worked part time as
an apartment manager. His cardiac condition was well controlled. He had drawn
unemployment for more than one year. The ALJ noted that the inconsistent information
provided by Carroll might not be the result of a conscious intention to mislead, but the
inconsistencies suggested that the information he provided was not entirely reliable. (Tr.

16

29). The ALJ is in the best position to determine the credibility of the testimony

and is granted deference in that regard. Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145 (8th Cir.
2001). An ALJ is entitled to make a factual determination that a claimant's subjective
complaints are not credible in light of objective medical evidence to the contrary.
Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576 (8th Cir. 2002). The court will not substitute its
opinion for that of the ALJ.
The ALJ weighed the opinions of Drs. Reed, Bane, and Selvaraj. An ALJ
evaluates the findings of State agency consultants as medical opinions under the
regulations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 416.927(f)(2). Social Security Ruling 96-6p
provides that, in appropriate circumstances, opinions from State agency medical and
psychological consultants and other program physicians and psychologists may be
entitled to greater weight than the opinions of treating or examining sources.
The ALJ thoroughly reviewed all of the medical evidence in the record, along with
the opinions of physicians and testimony presented at the hearing. The RFC
established by the ALJ was supported by the evidence.
B.

Failure to Properly Develop Record
Next, Carroll argues that the ALJ failed to properly develop the record. (Pl.’s Br.

at 8). Carroll suggests that the ALJ should have obtained a consultative mental
examination rather than relying only on the opinion of Carroll’s treating psychiatrist, Dr.
Selvaraj. (Pl.’s Br. at 8-9).
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that there is no bright
line rule for when the Commissioner has or has not adequately developed the record.
Mouser v. Astrue, 545 F.3d 634, 639 (8th Cir. 2008). The assessment of whether the
17

record is adequate is made on a case-by-case basis. Id. Where the medical records, the
claimant’s statements, and other evidence constitute sufficient medical evidence to
determine whether the claimant was disabled the ALJ was not required to obtain
additional evidence. Halverson v. Astrue, 600 F.3d 922, 933 (8th Cir. 2010). In the
present case, the ALJ had the benefit of the treatment notes from the Veterans
Administration which detailed Carroll’s appointments with Dr. Selvaraj. The ALJ found
the notes not fully credible. The record contained sufficient evidence the ALJ could use
to formulate Carroll’s RFC, and there was no error in her failure to further develop the
record.
C.

Vocational Expert Testimony
Finally, Carroll asserts that the ALJ submitted an inaccurate hypothetical to the

VE and that the VE testimony did not constitute substantial evidence on which the ALJ
could rely. (Pl.’s Br. at 9). The VE testified that a hypothetical person with Carroll’s
vocational profile and RFC could perform other work as a janitor, kitchen helper, and
laundry room worker. (Tr. 71-74). The ALJ found that Carroll could perform other work
exiting in the national economy. (Tr. 29-30).
Carroll’s argument reiterates his objections to the RFC findings, which the court
discussed above. The ALJ included all of Carroll’s restrictions from the RFC in the
hypothetical question to the VE. For a VE’s opinion to be relevant, an ALJ must
accurately characterize a claimant’s medical conditions in hypothetical questions posed
to the VE. Harvey v. Barnhart, 368 F.3d 1013, 1016 (8th Cir. 2004). A VE’s answer to a
hypothetical question that includes all the limitations in the RFC provides a proper basis
for an ALJ’s decision. See id.

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The burden of persuasion to prove disability and to demonstrate RFC remains on
the claimant, even when the burden of production shifts to the Commissioner at step
five. Stormo v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2004). The Commissioner may
satisfy this burden through the testimony of a VE. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 401.1566(e),
416.966(e). The ALJ was justified in relying on the VE’s testimony as substantial
evidence to find that Carroll was not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1566(e),
416.966(e). The VE’s testimony was supported by the record as a whole.
V.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed, the court concludes that the Commissioner’s decision
is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole and should be affirmed.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED:
1.

The Commissioner’s decision is affirmed;

2.

The appeal is denied; and

3.

Judgment in favor of the defendant will be entered in a separate
document.

Dated this 16th day of July, 2014
BY THE COURT:
s/Laurie Smith Camp
Chief United States District Judge

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