Temple v. Chadron Community Hospital and Health Services et al

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER- Temple will have 30 days from the date of this Memorandum and Order to notify the court in writing of the date on which she received a right-to- sue notice in response to her charge of discrimination dated November 13, 2013 (se e Filing No. 1 at CM/ECF p. 9). To the extent Temple did not file suit within 90 days of her receipt of the right-to-sue notice, she must show that equitable or exceptional circumstances exist that warrant tolling of the 90-day period. Temple w ill have 30 days from the date of this Memorandum and Order to notify the court in writing of the date on which she received a right-to- sue notice in response to her charge of discrimination dated February 10, 2014 (see id. at CM/ECF p. 8). To the extent Temple did not file suit within 90 days of her receipt of the right-to-sue notice, she must show that equitable or exceptional circumstances exist that warrant tolling of the 90-day period. Failure to respond to this Memorandum and Order w ill result in dismissal of this action without further notice. ***Pro Se Case Management Deadlines: ( Pro Se Case Management Deadline set for 1/19/2015: check for response from Temple) Ordered by Senior Judge Richard G. Kopf. (Copy mailed to pro se party)(MKR)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
JENNIFER F. TEMPLE,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHADRON COMMUNITY
HOSPITAL AND HEALTH
SERVICES, and PRAIRIE PINES
LODGE,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

8:14CV273

MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER

This matter is before the court on review of Plaintiff Jennifer Temple’s
Complaint (Filing No. 1). Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis in
this matter. The court now reviews the Complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e).
I. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT
Temple, a Native American female, filed her Complaint against Chadron
Community Hospital and Health Services and Prairie Pines Lodge. Temple alleged
she worked for Prairie Pines Lodge, which is owned by Chadron Community Hospital
and Health Services, for approximately 10 years. Liberally construed, Temple brings
this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
Plaintiff attached two charges of discrimination to her Complaint, which she filed with
the Nebraska Equal Opportunity Commission (“NEOC”)/Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Plaintiff generally alleged in the Complaint and
two charges of discrimination that her supervisor and coworkers harassed her because
she is Native American and because she is disabled. As best as the undersigned judge

can tell, Plaintiff identified her disability as “psychotic [with] depression.” (Filing
No. 1 at CM/ECF p. 3.)
II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS ON INITIAL REVIEW
The court is required to review in forma pauperis complaints to determine
whether summary dismissal is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The court
must dismiss a complaint or any portion thereof that states a frivolous or malicious
claim, that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B).
Pro se plaintiffs must set forth enough factual allegations to “nudge[] their
claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,” or “their complaint must be
dismissed” for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569-70 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.”). Regardless of whether a plaintiff is represented
or is appearing pro se, the plaintiff’s complaint must allege specific facts sufficient to
state a claim. See Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985). However,
a pro se plaintiff’s allegations must be construed liberally. Burke v. North Dakota
Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 294 F.3d 1043, 1043-44 (8th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
Temple attached two charges of discrimination to her Complaint. One was filed
with the NEOC/EEOC on November 13, 2013 (Filing No. 1 at CM/ECF p. 9), and the
other was filed February 10, 2014 (id. at CM/ECF p. 8). The charges of
discrimination describe different instances of discrimination and retaliation. Temple

2

did not set forth the date on which she received right-to-sue notices from the
NEOC/EEOC with respect to either charge of discrimination.
Both Title VII and the ADA require a plaintiff to exhaust her administrative
remedies by first seeking relief through the NEOC or the EEOC. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2000e-5(f)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a). The NEOC/EEOC will then investigate the
charge and determine whether to file suit on behalf of the charging party or make a
determination of no reasonable cause. If the NEOC/EEOC determines that there is no
reasonable cause, the agency will then issue the charging party a right-to-sue notice.
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(1); see also Hanenburg v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 118
F.3d 570, 573 (8th Cir. 1997). The charging party has 90 days from the receipt of the
right-to-sue notice to file a civil complaint based on her charge. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2000e-5(f)(1).
Here, it is unclear whether Temple filed suit in a timely manner in this court.
On the court’s own motion, the court will give Temple 30 days in which to notify the
court of the dates on which she received right-to-sue notices from the NEOC/EEOC
with respect to her charges of discrimination.
To be clear, Temple must notify the court in writing of the date on which she
received a right-to-sue notice in response to her charge of discrimination dated
November 13, 2013 (see Filing No. 1 at CM/ECF p. 9). To the extent Temple did not
file suit within 90 days of her receipt of the right-to-sue notice, she must show that
equitable or exceptional circumstances exist that warrant tolling of the 90-day period.
Temple must also notify the court in writing of the date on which she received
a right-to-sue notice in response to her charge of discrimination dated February 10,
2014 (see id. at CM/ECF p. 8). To the extent Temple did not file suit within 90 days
of her receipt of the right-to-sue notice, she must show that equitable or exceptional
circumstances exist that warrant tolling of the 90-day period.

3

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:
1.
Temple will have 30 days from the date of this Memorandum and Order
to notify the court in writing of the date on which she received a right-to-sue notice
in response to her charge of discrimination dated November 13, 2013 (see Filing No.
1 at CM/ECF p. 9). To the extent Temple did not file suit within 90 days of her
receipt of the right-to-sue notice, she must show that equitable or exceptional
circumstances exist that warrant tolling of the 90-day period.
2.
Temple will have 30 days from the date of this Memorandum and Order
to notify the court in writing of the date on which she received a right-to-sue notice
in response to her charge of discrimination dated February 10, 2014 (see id. at
CM/ECF p. 8). To the extent Temple did not file suit within 90 days of her receipt of
the right-to-sue notice, she must show that equitable or exceptional circumstances
exist that warrant tolling of the 90-day period.
3.
Failure to respond to this Memorandum and Order will result in dismissal
of this action without further notice.
4.
The clerk’s office is directed to set a pro se case management deadline
using the following text: January 19, 2015: check for response from Temple.
DATED this 18th day of December, 2014.
BY THE COURT:
Richard G. Kopf
Senior United States District Judge

*This opinion may contain hyperlinks to other documents or Web sites. The U.S. District Court for the District
of Nebraska does not endorse, recommend, approve, or guarantee any third parties or the services or products they
provide on their Web sites. Likewise, the court has no agreements with any of these third parties or their Web sites. The
court accepts no responsibility for the availability or functionality of any hyperlink. Thus, the fact that a hyperlink ceases
to work or directs the user to some other site does not affect the opinion of the court.

4