Tyler v. Bazis

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER that plaintiff's Complaint 1 is dismissed without prejudice. A separate judgment will be entered in accordance with this Memorandum and Order. Ordered by Chief Judge Laurie Smith Camp. (Copy mailed to pro se party) (JSF)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
BILLY TYLER,
Plaintiff,
v.
BAZIS, County Court judge Douglas
County and all Judges of such court,
Defendants.

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8:14CV328

MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER

Plaintiff Billy Tyler (“Plaintiff”) filed his Complaint (Filing No. 1) in this matter on
October 23, 2014. Plaintiff has been given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Filing No.
5.) The Court now conducts an initial review of the Complaint to determine whether
summary dismissal is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
I. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT
Plaintiff has sued all judges of the Douglas County Court. He alleges these judges
have arrested and jailed him “many times on warrant[s] emanating from unpaid fines [and]
costs that were imposed” by them. (Filing No. 1 at ECF 2.) He alleges the judges’ actions
deprived him of due process and equal protection of law. In addition, he alleges their
actions violate the Nebraska Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Holloway, 322 N.W.2d
818 (Neb. 1982). 1

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In State v. Holloway, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that, under Nebraska Revised Statutes §§
29-2206 and 29-2412: “a defendant, upon whom a fine has been imposed and who has the ability to pay a
fine, must be given the opportunity to do so, and that a defendant who can pay but not in one lump sum must
be given an opportunity to pay in installments.” 322 N.W.2d at 821.

II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS ON INITIAL REVIEW
The Court is required to review in forma pauperis complaints to determine whether
summary dismissal is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The Court must dismiss a
complaint or any portion of it that states a frivolous or malicious claim, that fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Pro se plaintiffs must set forth enough factual allegations to “nudge[] their claims
across the line from conceivable to plausible,” or “their complaint must be dismissed.” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569-70 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.”).
“The essential function of a complaint under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
is to give the opposing party ‘fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a claim, and
a general indication of the type of litigation involved.’” Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hopkins v. Saunders, 199 F.3d 968, 973
(8th Cir. 1999)). However, “[a] pro se complaint must be liberally construed, and pro se
litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than other parties.” Topchian, 760 F.3d at
849 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Liberally construed, Plaintiff here alleges federal constitutional claims. To state a
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the
United States Constitution or created by federal statute and also must show that the

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alleged deprivation was caused by conduct of a person acting under color of state law.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir.
1993).
III. DISCUSSION OF CLAIMS
Plaintiff seeks monetary relief from “all judges” of the Douglas County Court
because he “has been arrested and jailed many times on warrant emanating from unpaid
fines [and] costs that were imposed by the defendant county court.” (Filing No. 1 at ECF
2.)
Judges are immune from suit in all but two narrow sets of circumstances. Schottel
v. Young, 687 F.3d 370, 373 (8th Cir. 2012). “First, a judge is not immune from liability for
nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity. Second, a judge
is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all
jurisdiction.” Id. (internal citations omitted). An act is judicial if “it is one normally
performed by a judge and if the complaining party is dealing with the judge in his judicial
capacity.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
Here, the actions of which Plaintiff complains appear to have been quintessential
judicial acts taken by the Douglas County Court judges in their judicial capacities about
criminal matters over which they had jurisdiction. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-517. Plaintiff
has not alleged that the judges’ actions were nonjudicial in nature or that their actions were
taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. The Court need not provide Plaintiff with
an opportunity to amend his claims against Defendants because amendment would be
futile, as this court does not have subject matter to review previous judgments entered by

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a state court. Other than the United States Supreme Court, federal courts are without
jurisdiction to adjudicate claims which seek review of a state decision on the ground that
the decision violated the federal constitutional rights of one of the parties. See District of
Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-86 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity
Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); see also Lemonds v. St. Louis Cnty., 222 F.3d 488, 492
(8th Cir. 2000) (“A general federal claim is inextricably intertwined with a state court
judgment if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly
decided the issue before it.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In addition, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to have this court intervene in a matter
currently pending in state court, abstention from entertaining such a claim is warranted
under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Under Younger, a federal court should
abstain from jurisdiction “‘when (1) there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding which (2)
implicates important state interests, and when (3) that proceeding affords an adequate
opportunity to raise the federal questions presented.’” Norwood v. Dickey, 409 F.3d 901,
903 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fuller v. Ulland, 76 F.3d 957, 959 (8th Cir.1996)).
Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint clearly indicates that a state court case (presumably a
criminal case) is ongoing. (See Filing No. 1 at ECF 1-2 (“the judges of the county
defendant court are currently threatening Plaintiff with [jail] in an ongoing case”).) He has
not alleged that he cannot assert his concerns in the state court proceedings. Moreover,
the prosecution of crimes is an important state interest. Accordingly, this Court will abstain
from exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief.

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IT IS ORDERED:
1.

Plaintiff’s Complaint (Filing No. 1) is dismissed without prejudice; and

2.

A separate judgment will be entered in accordance with this Memorandum
and Order.

DATED this 11th day of February, 2015.
BY THE COURT:
s/Laurie Smith Camp
Chief United States District Judge

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