Clayborne v. Lancaster County et al

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER that on the Court's own motion, Clayborne will be given 30 days in which to file an amended complaint that states a claim upon which relief may be granted. Failure to file an amended complaint will result in dismissal of thi s case without further notice to Clayborne. Clayborne's amended complaint will supersede Clayborne's original complaint and, therefore, the amended complaint must not incorporate any part of Clayborne's original complaint. Clayborne is encouraged to use the blank civil complaint form to draft his amended complaint, which the clerk of the court will provide to him. To avoid confusion, any amended complaint Clayborne sends to the clerk of the court for filing in this case must clear ly display the case number and must reflect it is his amended complaint. The clerk of the court is directed to set the following pro se case management deadline: December 7, 2015: check for amended complaint; dismiss if none filed. The clerk of the court is directed to send to Clayborne a blank civil complaint form. Ordered by Senior Judge Lyle E. Strom. (Copies mailed as directed) (LAC)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
ROBERT EARL CLAYBORNE, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
LANCASTER COUNTY, et al.,
Defendant.

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8:15CV144

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff Robert Earl Clayborne, Jr., filed this case
on April 27, 2015.

Clayborne has been granted leave to proceed

in forma pauperis.

The Court now conducts an initial review of

Clayborne’s complaint (Filing No. 1-1) to determine whether
summary dismissal is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)
and 1915A.
I.

SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Clayborne relayed the following chronology of events
relating to his claims.

Upon Clayborne’s arrest for second-

degree assault, he was incarcerated at the Lancaster County Jail
on December 27, 2011.

On this same date, he informed a paralegal

from the Lancaster County Public Defender’s Office that he
suffers bipolar disorder, but he was not taking medication or
seeing a doctor for the condition.
2.)

(Filing No. 1-1 at CM/ECF p.

On February 1, 2012, defendant Mary Howell, a mental
health practitioner at the jail, evaluated Clayborne.

Clayborne

informed Howell that he had previously taken mood stabilizers
while residing in Washington, but he was no longer taking the
medication.

He also advised her he was receiving “Social

Security disability.”
mood stabilizers.

Howell recommended that Clayborne take

Clayborne alleged Howell “recommended referral

to psychiatry with no follow up on plaintiff.”
at CM/ECF p. 3.)

(Filing No. 1-1

The Court cannot discern from this allegation

whether Howell failed to “follow up” with Clayborne’s treatment
or whether psychiatry failed to “follow up” with Howell’s
recommendation, or whether Clayborne intended to allege something
else entirely.
On May 21, 2012, Clayborne appeared for a “plea
hearing” in a state district court in Lancaster County, Nebraska,
with defendant Judge Stephanie Stacy presiding.

Clayborne was

represented at this hearing by his public defender, defendant
Christopher Eickholt, and the State of Nebraska was represented
by defendant Lori Pasold.1

(Filing No. 1-1 at CM/ECF p. 3.)

According to Clayborne, during these proceedings, Clayborne

1

For context, the Court notes the copies of public records
attached to Clayborne’s complaint reflect he pled “no contest” to
charges of second-degree assault and use of a deadly weapon to
commit a felony in May of 2012 in the District Court of Lancaster
County, Nebraska. (See Filing No. 1-1 at CM/ECF p. 21.)
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informed Judge Stacy he has been suffering from bipolar disorder,
depression, and anxiety since his youth, but had not taken
medication for his depression since 2009.

(Filing No. 1-1 at

CM/ECF p. 4.)
On June 26, 2012, Clayborne appeared for a sentencing
hearing.

He again noted his mental illnesses, but Judge Stacy

determined Clayborne “was not amendable [sic] to the treatment
options that was [sic] provided” and sentenced him to prison
terms of 10 to 15 years and 15 to 20 years.

(Filing No. 1-1 at

CM/ECF p. 5.)
Clayborne alleged he filed a motion for postconviction
relief in the state district court on October 12, 2013, in which
he argued he was mentally incompetent at the time he committed
the crimes underlying his criminal conviction.

He also alleged

Judg Stacy, Eickholt, and Pasold failed to “have [him] evaluated
for competency.”

(Filing No. 1-1 at CM/ECF p. 5.)

In addition,

he alleged medical staff within the jail failed to provide him
psychiatric care.

(Filing No. 1-1 at CM/ECF p. 5.)

Defendant

Patrick Condon represented the State of Nebraska during these
post-conviction proceedings.

(Filing No. 1-1 at CM/ECF p. 5.)

Clayborne alleged Judge Stacy denied his motion for postconviction relief.

(Filing No. 1-1 at CM/ECF p. 6.)

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In this action, Clayborne has sued all of the
defendants mentioned above -- i.e., Howell, Judge Stacy,
Eickholt, Pasold, and Condon -- and also Lancaster County, the
Lancaster County Jail Director, the Lancaster County Medical
Director, the Lancaster County Correct Care Solutions Medical
Department, and the State of Nebraska.
p. 1.)

(Filing No. 1-1 at CM/ECF

The Court will discuss Clayborne’s claims against these

defendants in detail below.
II.

STANDARDS ON INITIAL REVIEW

The Court is required to review prisoner and in forma
pauperis complaints seeking relief against a governmental entity
or an officer or employee of a governmental entity to determine
whether summary dismissal is appropriate.
1915(e) and 1915A.

See 28 U.S.C. §§

The Court must dismiss a complaint or any

portion of it that states a frivolous or malicious claim, that
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
Pro se plaintiffs must set forth enough factual

allegations to “nudge[] their claims across the line from
conceivable to plausible,” or “their complaint must be
dismissed.”

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569-70

(2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A

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claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”).
“The essential function of a complaint under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to give the opposing party
‘fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a claim, and
a general indication of the type of litigation involved.’”
Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th
Cir. 2014) (quoting Hopkins v. Saunders, 199 F.3d 968, 973 (8th
Cir. 1999)).

However, “[a] pro se complaint must be liberally

construed, and pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading
standard than other parties.”

Topchian, 760 F.3d at 849

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Liberally construed, plaintiff here alleges federal
constitutional claims.

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the
United States Constitution or created by federal statute and also
must show that the alleged deprivation was caused by conduct of a
person acting under color of state law.

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.

42, 48 (1988); Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir.
1993).

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III.

DISCUSSION

Liberally construed, Clayborne alleges violations of
his Eighth Amendment rights brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
He also references the Americans with Disabilities Act and
“Gender and Racial discrimination.”

However, having presented no

allegations of disparate treatment or failure to accommodate a
disability, the Court will disregard these conclusory statements
and focus its analysis on Clayborne’s § 1983 claims.

For the

reasons discussed below, the Court finds Clayborne has not stated
claims upon which relief may be granted against any of the
defendants named in the complaint.
A.

Defendant State of Nebraska
Clayborne’s claims against the State of Nebraska are

barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States
Constitution, which provides states with immunity from suits
brought by citizens of other states and from suits brought by a
state’s own citizens.

See Hadley v. North Arkansas Cmty.

Technical Coll., 76 F.3d 1437, 1438 (8th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 1148 (1997); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15
(1890).
B.

Defendants Lancaster County and Lancaster County Employees
Acting in Their Official Capacities
Clayborne has sued Lancaster County and Lancaster

County employees acting in their official capacities.
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A

plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable under § 1983 must
“identify a municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that caused the
plaintiff’s injury.”

Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v.

Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997).

“Locating a ‘policy’ ensures

that a municipality is held liable only for those deprivations
resulting from the decisions of its duly constituted legislative
body or of those officials whose acts may fairly be said to be
those of the municipality.” Id. at 403-04. “Similarly, an act
performed pursuant to a ‘custom’ that has not been formally
approved by an appropriate decisionmaker may fairly subject a
municipality to liability on the theory that the relevant
practice is so widespread as to have the force of law.”

Id. at

404.
Here, Clayborne has not alleged Lancaster County was
the moving force behind any of his alleged injuries.

Therefore,

his complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted against Lancaster County and against Lancaster County
employees acting in their official capacities.
C.

Defendant Judge Stacy
Clayborne has sued a state district court judge and, in

part, he seeks money damages from her in her individual capacity.
The Court must consider whether such claims are barred under the
doctrine of judicial immunity.

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A judge is immune from suit, including suits brought
under Section 1983 to recover for alleged deprivation of civil
rights, in all but two narrow sets of circumstances.
Young, 687 F.3d 370, 373 (8th Cir. 2012).

Schottel v.

“First, a judge is not

immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not
taken in the judge’s judicial capacity.

Second, a judge is not

immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the
complete absence of all jurisdiction.”
omitted).

Id. (internal citations

An act is judicial if “it is one normally performed by

a judge and if the complaining party is dealing with the judge in
his judicial capacity.”

Id. (internal citations omitted).

Here, Clayborne alleged no facts against Judge Stacy
that would fall outside the scope of her duties in presiding over
his criminal proceedings.

Accordingly, his individual-capacity

claims against her for money damages are barred on the basis of
judicial immunity.
Clayborne also seeks injunctive relief in this case in
the form of a psychiatric evaluation.

However, to the extent

Clayborne seeks such relief because he believes it will undermine
his criminal conviction, he should be aware that he may not use
this action to challenge the validity of his criminal
proceedings.

In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court held a

prisoner may not recover damages in a § 1983 suit where the

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judgment would necessarily imply the invalidity of his
conviction, continued imprisonment, or sentence unless the
conviction or sentence is reversed, expunged, or called into
question by issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

512 U.S. 477,

486-87 (1994); Schafer v. Moore, 46 F.3d 43, 45 (8th Cir. 1995).
See Sheldon v. Hundley, 83 F.3d 231, 233 (8th Cir. 1996)
(indicating that, under Heck, court disregards form of relief
sought and instead looks to essence of plaintiff’s claims);
Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370, 375 (4th Cir. 2002) (Heck applies
to claims for damages, as well as to claims for injunctive relief
that necessarily would imply the invalidity of plaintiff’s
conviction); Lawson v. Engleman, 67 Fed. Appx. 524, 526 n. 2
(10th Cir. 2003) (Heck applied to plaintiff’s claims for
monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief; Heck should apply
when the concerns underlying Heck exist).
For these reasons, the court finds Clayborne has not
stated any claim upon which relief may be granted against Judge
Stacy.
D.

Defendants Pasold and Condon
Clayborne has sued two prosecutors and, in part, he

seeks money damages from them in their individual capacities.
The Court must consider whether such claims are barred under the
doctrine of prosecutorial immunity.

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Prosecutors “are entitled to absolute immunity from
civil liability under § 1983 when they are engaged in
prosecutorial functions that are ‘intimately associated with the
judicial process.’”

Schenk v. Chavis, 461 F.3d 1043, 1046 (8th

Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).

Thus, absolute immunity attaches

when a prosecutor’s actions are “prosecutorial” rather than
“investigatory or administrative.”

Id.

“Absolute immunity

covers prosecutorial functions such as the initiation and pursuit
of a criminal prosecution, the presentation of the state’s case
at trial, and other conduct that is intimately associated with
the judicial process.”
1266 (8th Cir.1996).

Brodnicki v. City of Omaha, 75 F.3d 1261,

However, where a prosecutor’s actions are

investigatory or administrative, that individual is entitled only
to qualified immunity.

Id.

The focus in determining the nature

of the prosecutor’s actions is “whether the [prosecutor’s] act
was closely related to [her] role as advocate for the state.”
Id. at 1267.
Here, Clayborne alleged no facts against Pasold or
Condon that would fall outside the scope of their prosecutorial
duties during Clayborne’s criminal proceedings and the related
post-conviction proceedings.

Accordingly, his individual-

capacity claims against Pasold and Condon for money damages are
barred on the basis of prosecutorial immunity.

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Moreover, as

already explained, to the extent Clayborne has sued Pasold and
Condon in an attempt to challenge his criminal conviction, he is
barred from doing so under the precedent established in Heck v.
Humphrey.
E.

Defendant Eickholt
Clayborne has sued his court-appointed public defender

for violations of his civil rights.

However, 42 U.S.C. § 1983

specifically provides a cause of action against a person who,
under color of state law, violates another’s federal rights.
West, 487 U.S. at 48.

“[A] public defender does not act under

color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional
functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.”
Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981).

Indeed, when a

public defender represents an indigent defendant in a state
criminal proceeding, he is “not acting on behalf of the State; he
is the State’s adversary.”

Id. at 322, n. 13.

For these reasons, the Court concludes Clayborne has
not stated a claim upon which relief may be granted against
Eickholt.
F.

Defendants Lancaster County Jail Director and Lancaster
County Medical Director
These directors of the Lancaster County Jail are

referenced only in Clayborne’s introduction of the defendants.
(See Filing No. 1-1 at CM/ECF p. 1.)
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That is, Clayborne did not

allege either of these defendants were personally involved in the
alleged violations of his constitutional rights.

A complaint

that only lists a defendant’s name in the caption without
alleging that the defendant was personally involved in the
alleged misconduct fails to state a claim against that defendant.
See Krych v. Hvass, 83 F. App’x 854, 855 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing
Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding
that court properly dismissed a pro se complaint where the
complaint did not allege that defendant committed a specific act
and the complaint was silent as to defendant except for his name
appearing in caption)).
Accordingly, the Court finds Clayborne has not stated a
claim upon which relief may be granted against the Lancaster
County Jail Director or the Lancaster County Medical Director.
G.

Defendant Howell
Clayborne has sued Mary Howell and Howell’s employer,

the Lancaster County Correct Care Solutions Medical Department.
Liberally construed, Clayborne seeks relief from Howell in her
individual and official capacities for violations of the Eighth
Amendment.

For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that

Clayborne’s allegations do not suggest Howell violated his rights
under the Eighth Amendment.

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To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, Clayborne must
prove that Howell acted with deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs.
(1976).

See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106

The deliberate indifference standard includes both an

objective and a subjective component.

Clayborne must demonstrate

that (1) he suffered from objectively serious medical needs, and
(2) the defendants knew of, but deliberately disregarded, those
needs.

See Jolly v. Knudsen, 205 F.3d 1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 2000)

(quoting Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1239 (8th Cir.1997)).
Here, Clayborne alleged only that Howell evaluated him
and then referred him to psychiatry based on her recommendation
that he take mood stabilizers.

(Filing No. 1-1 at CM/ECF p. 3.)

These allegations do not suggest Howell was deliberately
indifferent to Clayborne’s medical needs.

Accordingly, the Court

finds Clayborne has failed to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted against Howell.
IT IS ORDERED:
1.

On the Court’s own motion, Clayborne will be given

30 days in which to file an amended complaint that states a claim
upon which relief may be granted.

Failure to file an amended

complaint will result in dismissal of this case without further
notice to Clayborne.

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2.

Clayborne’s amended complaint will supersede

Clayborne’s original complaint and, therefore, the amended
complaint must not incorporate any part of Clayborne’s original
complaint.

Clayborne is encouraged to use the blank civil

complaint form to draft his amended complaint, which the clerk of
the court will provide to him.

To avoid confusion, any amended

complaint Clayborne sends to the clerk of the court for filing in
this case must clearly display the case number and must reflect
it is his amended complaint.
3.

The clerk of the court is directed to set the

following pro se case management deadline:

December 7, 2015:

check for amended complaint; dismiss if none filed.
4.

The clerk of the court is directed to send to

Clayborne a blank civil complaint form.
DATED this 6th day of November, 2015.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Lyle E. Strom
____________________________
LYLE E. STROM, Senior Judge
United States District Court
* This opinion may contain hyperlinks to other documents or
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of the Court.
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