Tyler v. State of Nebraska

Filing 5

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER that upon initial review of the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 1 , the court determines that Tyler's claims are not cognizable in a federal court habeas corpus action and his petition is dismissed without prejudice. The court will enter a separate Judgment in accordance with this Memorandum and Order. Ordered by Senior Judge Joseph F. Bataillon. (Copy mailed to pro se party)(ADB)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
BILLY TYLER,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF NEBRASKA,
Respondent.

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8:15CV173

MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER

The court has conducted an initial review of Petitioner Billy Tyler’s Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus (Filing No. 1) brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to determine
whether Tyler’s claims are potentially cognizable in federal court. Though Tyler’s
habeas corpus petition is almost entirely indecipherable, the court can discern that State
of Nebraska officials have threatened to arrest Tyler for nonpayment of fines, and he
seeks an order from this court enjoining them from placing him in “debtor’s prison.”
Tyler was not incarcerated at the time he filed this action. (See Docket Sheet.)
A habeas corpus action “is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of
that custody.” Presier v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). In order to be in
custody, there must have been a “significant restraint” on one’s liberty. Russell v. City
of Pierre, South Dakota, 530 F.2d 791, 792 (8th Cir. 1976) (finding a $25 fine was not
a significant restraint on one’s liberty); Snelling v. State of Missouri, 26 F.3d 127 (8th
Cir. 1994) (unpublished table decision) (finding a $150 fine was not a significant
restraint); Obado v. New Jersey, 328 F.3d 716, 718 (3d Cir. 2003) (“The payment of
restitution or a fine, absent more, is not the sort of ‘significant restraint on liberty’
contemplated in the ‘custody’ requirement of the federal habeas corpus statutes.”).
Here, Tyler does not allege that he is challenging the validity of any conviction,
but instead appears to be challenging the state court’s prospective ability to confine him
for failing to pay a fine. Nothing in the record indicates that Tyler is currently in custody
or has been arrested for nonpayment of any fine. A person who is merely threatened
with confinement for failing to pay a fine is not “in custody” if the threat of confinement

is “no more than a speculative possibility.” Edmunds v. Won Bae Chang, 509 F.2d 39,
41 (9th Cir. 1975). The habeas custody requirement “is designed to preserve the writ of
habeas corpus as a remedy for severe restraints on individual liberty.” Hensley v. Mun.
Court, San Jose-Milpitas Judicial Dist., Santa Clara, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973). Because
it “is an extraordinary remedy[,] . . . its use has been limited to cases of special urgency,
leaving more conventional remedies for cases in which restraints on liberty are neither
severe nor immediate.” Id.
Here, Tyler has failed to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that he is
challenging anything more than the state’s ability to confine him in the future, and
therefore, his claim is not cognizable in a federal habeas action. Specifically, he fails to
demonstrate that “debtor’s prison” is a severe or immediate restraint on his liberty.
Therefore, the court will dismiss his petition.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:
1.
Upon initial review of the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Filing No.
1), the court determines that Tyler’s claims are not cognizable in a federal court habeas
corpus action and his petition is dismissed without prejudice.
2.
The court will enter a separate Judgment in accordance with this
Memorandum and Order.
DATED this 26th day of August, 2015.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Joseph F. Bataillon
Senior United States District Judge
*This opinion may contain hyperlinks to other documents or Web sites. The U.S. District Court for the District
of Nebraska does not endorse, recommend, approve, or guarantee any third parties or the services or products they provide
on their Web sites. Likewise, the court has no agreements with any of these third parties or their Web sites. The court
accepts no responsibility for the availability or functionality of any hyperlink. Thus, the fact that a hyperlink ceases to work
or directs the user to some other site does not affect the opinion of the court.

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