Stelly v. Agarwal et al

Filing 7

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER that on the court's own motion, Plaintiff will have 30 days from the date of this Memorandum and Order to file an amended complaint that sets forth the basis for this court's subject matter jurisdiction. Failure to do s o will result in dismissal of this matter without further notice. The clerk's office is directed to set a pro se case management deadline in thismatter: April 4, 2016: Deadline for Plaintiff to file amended complaint. Ordered by Senior Judge Richard G. Kopf. (Copy mailed to pro se party) (LAC)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
MATTHEW C. STELLY, on behalf of
himself and the class he seeks to
represent,
Plaintiff,
v.
ARUN AGARWAL and WHITE
LOTUS MANAGEMENT,
Defendants.

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8:15CV407

MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER

Plaintiff Matthew Stelly, a non-prisoner, filed a “Complaint for a Preliminary
Injunction” on November 6, 2015. (Filing No. 1.) Stelly has been given leave to proceed in
forma pauperis. (Filing No. 5.) The court now conducts an initial review of Plaintiff’s
claims to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)
(requiring the court to dismiss actions filed in forma pauperis if they are frivolous or
malicious, fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief).
I. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT
Stelly purports to bring this action on behalf of a class of “objectors” or “potential
objectors” who oppose Defendants’ purchase of property in Omaha, Nebraska, known as the
Great Plains Black Museum. Stelly does not allege that Defendants are state actors or that
the property at issue is public property. Stelly wishes to stop the purchase of this property
because he believes the purchase will “create a hostile atmosphere throughout the community
. . . as the purchaser is someone who has not put any time or work into said area.” (Filing
No. 1 at CM/ECF p. 2.) Stelly asks this court to intervene by issuing a preliminary injunction
restraining Defendants from purchasing the property.
II. DISCUSSION
Federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life
Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal
district courts is generally set forth in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Under these statutes,

federal jurisdiction is available only when the parties are of diverse citizenship and the
amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, or when a “federal question” is presented. “If the
court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss
the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
Subject matter jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, commonly referred
to as “diversity of citizenship” jurisdiction, when “the citizenship of each plaintiff is different
from the citizenship of each defendant.” Ryan v. Schneider Natl. Carriers, Inc., 263 F.3d
816, 819 (8th Cir. 2001). In addition, the amount in controversy must be greater than
$75,000.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
Subject matter jurisdiction is also proper under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 when a plaintiff
asserts a “non-frivolous claim of a right or remedy under a federal statute,” the Constitution,
or treaties of the United States, commonly referred to as “federal question” jurisdiction.
Northwest South Dakota Prod. Credit Ass’n v. Smith, 784 F.2d 323, 325 (8th Cir. 1986).
Under this type of jurisdiction, a plaintiff must allege that the defendants deprived him of a
right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and that the alleged deprivation
was committed under “color of state law” in order to bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993).

Stelly’s Complaint does not allege that the parties are diverse; Stelly does not allege
an amount in controversy; his allegations present no “federal question”; and he fails to
identify the authority under which this court may intervene to prevent private-party
Defendants from purchasing private property.1 Therefore, Stelly has failed to establish a basis
upon which this court may exercise jurisdiction in this matter.
1

In addition, Stelly has not alleged any particularized injury sufficient to establish
standing. See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014). He has no
apparent connection to the property aside from being a concerned member of the community.
Moreover, as a pro se party, Stelly may not represent parties other than himself. See Tyler
v. Term Limit Statute of State of Neb., No. 8:08CV129, 2008 WL 2129828, at *1 (D. Neb.
May 19, 2008) (“Pro se litigants may not represent other parties, even in class action
proceedings.”) (citing Fymbo v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 213 F.3d 1320, 1321 (10th Cir.
2000)).

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On the court’s own motion, Plaintiff will have 30 days from the date of this
Memorandum and Order to file an amended complaint that sets forth the basis for this court’s
subject matter jurisdiction. Failure to do so will result in dismissal of this matter without
further notice.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:
1.
On the court’s own motion, Plaintiff will have 30 days from the date of this
Memorandum and Order to file an amended complaint that sets forth the basis for this court’s
subject matter jurisdiction. Failure to do so will result in dismissal of this matter without
further notice.
2.
The clerk’s office is directed to set a pro se case management deadline in this
matter: April 4, 2016: Deadline for Plaintiff to file amended complaint.
DATED this 4th day of March, 2016.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Richard G. Kopf
Senior United States District Judge

*This opinion may contain hyperlinks to other documents or Web sites. The U.S. District Court for the District of
Nebraska does not endorse, recommend, approve, or guarantee any third parties or the services or products they provide on their
Web sites. Likewise, the court has no agreements with any of these third parties or their Web sites. The court accepts no
responsibility for the availability or functionality of any hyperlink. Thus, the fact that a hyperlink ceases to work or directs the
user to some other site does not affect the opinion of the court.

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