Haltom v. Parks et al

Filing 81

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - The individually-named defendants' motions to dismiss are granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, a. Robert Troyer's motion to dismiss (filing 56 ) is denied. b. David Kucera's motion to dismiss (fili ng 30 ) is granted. c. James Carmer and Mental Health Associates' motion to dismiss (filing 41 ) is granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, to the extent that the defendant moves to dismiss Mental Health Associates, the motion is d enied. To the extent that the defendant moves to dismiss James Carmer, the motion is granted. d. Mental Health Associates' motion to dismiss is denied. e. Barbara Onnen's motion to dismiss (filing 27 ) is granted. f. Melissa Schmid&# 039;s motion to dismiss (filing 51 ) is denied. g. Lisa Blankenau's motion to dismiss (filing 57 ) is denied. h. Ryan Hurd's motion to dismiss (filing 48 ) is denied. 2. The non-governmental entities' motions to dismiss are granted. Specifically, a. KVC Behavioral Healthcare Nebraska's motion to dismiss (filing 60 ) is granted. b. Alegent Creighton Health's motion to dismiss (filing 46 ) is granted. c. ORR Psychotherapy's motion to dismiss (filing 43 ) is granted. CASA and Dawn Rockey's motion to dismiss (filing 69) is granted. Ordered by Judge John M. Gerrard. (GJG)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
JOHN V. HALTOM,
Plaintiff,

8:15-CV-428

vs.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
KAREN PARKS, et al.,
Defendants.
This matter is before the Court on John Haltom's amended complaint
(filing 6). Haltom is suing the state of Nebraska, private medical
practitioners, private entities, and non-profit organizations for various
purported constitutional violations. Several defendants move to dismiss these
claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(4) and (b)(6) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). For
the reasons stated below, the defendants' motions will be granted in part and
denied in part.
BACKGROUND
Haltom's allegations are briefly summarized as follows. In 2009, the
Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) began
investigating domestic disputes between Haltom and his former wife. As part
of its investigation, DHHS allegedly colluded with private health
practitioners and companies to violate Haltom's constitutional rights, and
ultimately, to take away his children. These actions were purportedly
motivated by DHHS's "long standing resentment" of Haltom, which stems
from past litigation, his operation of an adult entertainment business, and
his "political ambitions within the State of Nebraska and its state
departments." Filing 6 at 3; 8, 9. To accomplish its goals, at least according to
Haltom, DHHS and other named defendants—all acting "under color of state
law"—partook in widespread misconduct ranging from the production of false
medical evaluations, to unwarranted "invasions" into Haltom's home. Filing 6
at 5-6, 12. As a result of these actions, Haltom says he has experienced
"extreme emotional and physical distress" and is "[unable] to function in
society." Filing 6 at 5.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the Court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. While the Court must
accept as true all facts pleaded by the nonmoving party and grant all
reasonable inferences from the pleadings in favor of the nonmoving party,
Gallagher v. City of Clayton, 699 F.3d 1013, 1016 (8th Cir. 2012), a pleading
that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action will not do. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Determining whether a
complaint states a plausible claim for relief will require the reviewing court
to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679.
DISCUSSION
As a preliminary matter, Haltom's multiple claim complaint spans
nearly 90 pages, and includes over 40 named defendants. Twelve of these
defendants—including individually named medical practitioners, private
companies, and one non-profit organization—have moved to dismiss Haltom's
complaint on various grounds. For clarity, the Court will address each of the
individually-named defendants' motions separately.1 The Court will then
address pending motions from three private companies: KVC Behavioral
Health, Alegent Creighton Health, and ORR Psychotherapy. Because these
entities raise largely the same legal issues, the Court will consider their
motions together. Finally, the Court will address the motion filed on behalf of
CASA for Lancaster County, a non-profit organization, and a CASA
volunteer, Dawn Rockey.
Before turning to the merits of the defendants' motions, however, the
Court will address two separate, yet related issues. First, in his 89-page
complaint, Haltom refers to individuals and entities by different names,
making it difficult for the parties (and the Court) to determine which counts
apply to which defendants. For example, Haltom initially refers to Alegent
Creighton Health and its individually-named employees as the "Lakeside
Defendants." But in detailing his allegations, Haltom goes on to reference
"Lakeside Hospital Defendants," "Lakeshore Defendants," and "Lakeside."

The one exception to this, as demonstrated below, is James Carmer. Carmer moved for
dismissal on behalf of himself and defendant "Mental Health Associates LLC." Those
motions will be considered together.
1

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See filing 47 at 3. Such inconsistencies, the defendants argue, make it
"impossible to ascertain" Haltom's various claims for relief. Filing 47 at 5.
While the Court shares in the defendants' frustration, it cannot be said
that the parties, on the whole, lack adequate notice of the nature of the
claims against them. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. However, for clarity, the Court
will—where appropriate—specify which claims apply to which parties. In
doing so, the Court considers both the substance of the defendants'
underlying motions (to which the plaintiff has not responded), and the
governing standards under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). This represents the Court's
good-faith effort to make sense of Haltom's unwieldy pleading. If Haltom
meant to plead a claim that the Court has failed to identify below, he may
ask for leave to include it in an amended complaint that sufficiently identifies
it.
Relatedly, several defendants argue that because Haltom has not
alleged facts pertaining to self-incrimination, he has failed to state a claim
under the Fifth Amendment. In this way, the defendants suggest that the
Fifth Amendment applies only to criminal matters, and is therefore
inapplicable to the present dispute. See, filing 49 at 7, filing 44 at 7, filing 47
at 7. Although the defendants' argument misapprehends the law, the Court
nevertheless recognizes that Haltom has failed to allege wrongdoing by any
federal actors. Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465, 484 (8th Cir.
2010). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Haltom's Fifth Amendment claims
as to each of the defendants discussed in this Memorandum and Order.
A. Individually-Named Defendants
As noted above, Haltom alleges various constitutional violations and
conspiracy-related charges against several individually-named health care
practitioners. These allegations broadly relate to the alleged conspiracy
between DHHS and other named defendants to "injure" Haltom, and to
"eliminate [Haltom's] rights to parent his children." Filing 6 at 3-4. Generally
speaking, Haltom alleges that the individually-named defendants sought to
"conceal their conflicts of interest that, under their professional rules of
conduct, [they] were obligated to reveal and to resolve before engaging in
consultation with [Haltom.]" Filing 6 at 4. Several of these defendants—
including Barbara Onnen (filing 27); David Kucera (filing 30); James C.
Carmer (filing 41); Ryan Hurd (filing 48); Melissa Schmid (filing 51); Lisa
Blankenau (filing 57); and Robert Troyer (filing 56)—move to dismiss. Those
motions are addressed in varying order below.

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1. ROBERT TROYER
Robert Troyer seeks dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(4).2 Filing 56.
In support of his motion, Troyer points to a series of orders by the Magistrate
Judge pertaining to service of process. See filings 3-6. Specifically, Troyer
notes a May 3, 2016 order in which the Magistrate Judge granted Haltom's
motion to continue, instructing him to serve his amended complaint on
defendants "[o]n or before June 17, 2016." Filing 4; filing 5. Haltom filed—but
did not serve—the amended complaint on June 17, and then, on June 24,
requested that the Court issue summons. See, filing 7; filing 9. Thus, Troyer
argues, because Haltom "did not comply with the Court's Order" regarding
service of process, the claims against him must be dismissed.3 Filing 55 at 2.
An objection under Rule 12(b)(4) concerns the form of the process
rather than the manner or method of its service. Technically, then, "a Rule
12(b)(4) motion is proper only to challenge noncompliance with the provisions
of Rule 4[a] or any applicable provision incorporated by Rule 4[a] that deals
specifically with the content of the summons." 5B Wright & Miller Federal
Practice and Procedure Civil 3d § 1353. But Rule 12(b)(4) motions will be
granted only when the defect is prejudicial to the defendant. Id. And here,
there is no indication that Troyer was prejudiced by the delayed service of
process. Indeed, while Haltom did not strictly comply with the Magistrate
Judge's order, Troyer received sufficient notice of Haltom's complaint.
Accordingly, Troyer's motion to dismiss (filing 56) will be denied.
2. DAVID KUCERA
Haltom, in his 89-page complaint, refers to Kucera only one time. See
filing 6 at 14. In this reference, Haltom suggests that Kucera is or was an
employee of KVC Behavioral Healthcare Nebraska, another named defendant
in this dispute. But Kucera contends that he "has never worked, associated
with, or been employed by KVC . . . or any similar-type organization[.]" Filing
31 at 1. Nor has he worked for DHHS or any of the other defendants in this
matter. To this end, Kucera believes that he was erroneously served with
Haltom's complaint, and that the intended recipient may have been a
Several, if not all, of the defendants raise similar arguments as at least one basis for
dismissal. Troyer, however, invokes Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(4) and Rule 4(m) as the sole basis
for his motion to dismiss. See, filing 56; filing 55. Thus, to the extent that the remaining
defendants rely on deficiencies in process as grounds for dismissal, those motions—at least
as they relate to Rules 12(b)(4) and 4(m)—will be denied.
2

No proof of service was made to the Court, contrary to Rule 4(l)(1), but pursuant to Rule
4(l)(3), "[f]ailure to prove service does not affect the validity of service." And the Court does
not understand Troyer to be arguing that service was not effected—just that service was
not effected on or before June 17. See filing 55.
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different "David Kucera" living in or around Lancaster County, Nebraska.
Filing 31 at 1. Because Haltom has not responded to the defendants' motions
to dismiss, the Court takes Kucera's factual statements as true. See Neb. Civ.
R. 7.0.1(b)(1)(C). Accordingly, Kucera's motion to dismiss is granted.
3. JAMES CARMER / MENTAL HEALTH ASSOCIATES, LLC
Carmer moves to dismiss Haltom's claims against both himself and
"Mental Health Associates, LLC."4 With respect to the latter entity, Carmer
notes that the business was improperly named in the summons as "Mental
Health Associates, LLC," as opposed to "Mental Health Associates." Filing 42
at 3-4. Thus, because the summons is "facially invalid," and because "Mental
Health Associates, LLC" is not a legal entity subject to suit, it argues that the
summons should be quashed and that "all purported claims against 'Mental
Health Associates, LLC' should be dismissed[.]" Filing 42 at 3. But as stated
above, dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(4) is warranted only upon a
showing of prejudice. And while the defendant may have been improperly
named, that does not—on these facts—warrant dismissal. Accordingly,
Mental Health Associates' motion to dismiss is denied.
However, the Court will grant Carmer's motion to dismiss under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Indeed, other than the case caption, Carmer is mentioned
nowhere in Haltom's amended complaint. Thus, even assuming the truth of
the matters asserted, the amended complaint contains no factual allegations
that support any inference that Carmer is liable for the misconduct alleged.
Accordingly, Carmer's motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is
granted.
In sum, the defendants' motion to dismiss will be granted in part and
denied in part. Specifically, Mental Health Associates' motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(4) is denied, and Carmer's motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6) is granted.5
4. BARBARA ONNEN
The Court will grant Barbara Onnen's motion to dismiss for similar
reasons. Like Carmer, Haltom includes Onnen's name only in the case
caption, providing no factual allegations regarding her role in the alleged
violations. Without more, Haltom has failed to state a claim against Onnen

Carmer shares an office suite with other providers, and those providers do business as
"Mental Health Associates."
4

The Court notes that Haltom has not asked for leave to amend his complaint. See
Longaker v. Boston Sci. Corp., 715 F.3d 658, 663 (8th Cir. 2013).
5

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upon which relief may be granted. Accordingly, Onnen's motion to dismiss
(filing 27) is granted.
5. MELISSA SCHMID
Melissa Schmid urges dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), noting the
absence of facts suggesting that she "personally had anything to do with the
events alleged by the Plaintiff." Filing 52 at 3-4. But the Court concludes
otherwise. Indeed, although Schmid is referenced only once in the amended
complaint, she is grouped together with other individually-named defendants
under the label "Premier Psychiatric Defendants." Filing 6 at 14. And Haltom
alleges, among other matters, that the "Premier Psychiatric Defendants"
corrupted certain medical evaluations, accepted tainted information, and
otherwise facilitated the alleged violations of Haltom's constitutional rights.
See filing 6 at 28-29. Accepting these allegations as true, and construing
them in Haltom's favor, Bell v. Pfizer, Inc., 716 F.3d 1087 (8th Cir. 2013), the
Court concludes that, at this early stage, Haltom may proceed on his claims
against Schmid as described in counts 3, 7, 14, 15, 16, and 28. Accordingly,
Schmid's motion to dismiss is denied.
6. LISA BLANKENAU
Haltom alleges various constitutional and conspiracy-related charges
against Blankenau under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Blankenau
seeks dismissal, arguing that Haltom has failed to establish that she acted
"under color of state law" for purposes of § 1983 liability. Filing 59 at 4. She
further contends that Haltom has failed to plead sufficient facts to sustain a
plausible conspiracy claim under § 1985. The Court will address each
argument in turn.
(i) Section 1983
Section 1983 allows plaintiffs to bring claims only against persons who
violate their constitutional rights under color of state law. § 1983. A private
actor can be considered to act under color of state law "if, though only if, there
is such a 'close nexus between the State and the challenged action' that
seemingly private behavior 'may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.'"
Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288,
295 (2001) (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)).
This "close nexus" exists where the private party is "'a willful participant in
joint activity with the State' in denying a plaintiff's constitutional rights."
Magee v. Trustees of Hamline Univ., Minn., 747 F.3d 532, 536 (8th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Dossett v. First State Bank, 399 F.3d 940, 947 (8th Cir. 2005)). Thus,
to survive a motion to dismiss, a "plaintiff must plausibly allege 'a mutual

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understanding, or a meeting of the minds, between the private party and the
state actor.'" Id. This requires something more than "multiple contacts"
between the private party and the state; rather, the plaintiff must plead
"specific facts plausibly connecting" the alleged concerted action to the
alleged violation. Id.
Accepting the allegations as true, and construing them in his favor, the
Court finds that Haltom has pled sufficient facts to overcome the defendants'
motions to dismiss on these grounds. In his amended complaint, Haltom
broadly alleges that the defendants—including Blankenau—worked in
connection with DHHS to produce fraudulent records, to interfere with
Haltom's medical diagnoses, and to impact the outcome of Haltom's court
proceedings. Filing 6 at 12. He further alleges that DHHS had personal
meetings and telephone calls with the defendants "to further their
connections and their conspiracy," and that DHHS otherwise controlled the
defendants' professional livelihoods through licensing and patient referrals.
Filing 6 at 15-17. Thus, Haltom claims, "[t]he defendants who are mental
health care providers . . . yielded to the inappropriate influence, schemes, and
requests of DHHS Defendants in their treatment of John Haltom." See filing
6 at 17.6
Haltom's allegations provide enough at this stage of the proceedings for
the Court to infer a "meeting of the minds" between Blankenau and the
alleged state actor. Magee, 747 F.3d at 536. Accordingly, the Court will deny
Blankenau's motion to dismiss on these grounds at this stage of the
proceedings.
(ii) Section 1985
Haltom also asserts claims against Blankenau under § 1985(3), which
provides:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in
disguise on . . . the premises of another, for the purpose of
depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of
persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges
and immunities under the laws . . . the party so injured or
deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages
occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more
of the conspirators.

The Court recognizes Haltom's limited reference to Blankenau in his amended complaint.
But construed liberally, the Court interprets Haltom to include Blankenau in his broad
description of the defendants' conduct.
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28 U.S.C. § 1985(3).7 To prove the existence of a conspiracy under this
section, a plaintiff must show (1) that the defendants conspired, (2) with the
intent to deprive the plaintiff of equal protection of the laws, or equal
privileges and immunities under the laws, (3) that one or more of the
conspirators did, or caused to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of
the conspiracy, and (4) that the plaintiff was injured or deprived of having
and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. Larson
ex. Rel. Larson v. Miller, 76 F.3d 1446, 1454 (8th Cir. 1996).
Similar to the § 1983 claims, Blankenau argues that Haltom has failed
to plead facts establishing "any specific agreement or meeting of the minds"
between herself and other defendants. Filing 59 at 9. Therefore, Blankenau
contends, Haltom has not satisfied his burden to "allege with particularity
and specifically demonstrate with material facts that the defendants reached
an agreement." Filing 59 at 10 (citing City of Omaha Employees Betterment
Ass'n v. City of Omaha, 883 F.2d 650, 652 (8th Cir. 1989)). But Haltom need
only "point to at least some facts which would suggest that [defendants]
reached an understanding to violate [his] rights." Nelson v. City of McGehee,
876 F.2d 56, 59 (8th Cir. 1989). And here, for the reasons discussed above,
Haltom has preliminarily satisfied this burden. Accordingly, Haltom has
alleged enough at this stage of the proceeding to move forward on the
following claims against Blankenau: 4, 8, 24, and 37. Blankenau's motion to
dismiss is denied.
7. RYAN HURD
The Court will deny Hurd's motion to dismiss for similar reasons.
Indeed, Hurd—like Blankenau—argues that he is not a "state actor" for
purposes of § 1983, and therefore cannot be liable for the alleged
constitutional violations. See filing 49 at 6. He further argues, for purposes of
§ 1985, that there are "no allegations rising to the level of Hurd conspiring
with another person, nor of him directly or indirectly depriving Plaintiff of
equal protection of the laws." Filing 49 at 7. Again, accepting Haltom's
allegations as true, and construing them in his favor, the Court concludes
that Haltom may proceed, at this early stage, on his claims against Hurd as
described in count 34 of the amended complaint. Filing 6 at 78. Accordingly,
Hurd's motion to dismiss on these grounds is denied.

It appears that Haltom has also asserted claims against Blankenau under 42 U.S.C. §
1985(2) and 42 U.S.C. § 1986, which the defendant does not expressly address in her motion
to dismiss. See filing 6 at 30, 60. The Court will not dismiss those claims in the absence of
an argument from the defendant explaining why it should do so.
7

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B. Non-Governmental Defendants
As noted above, Haltom claims that certain non-governmental entities
(1) violated his constitutional rights, (2) conspired to violate his rights, and/or
(3) neglected to prevent the conspiracy to interfere with his civil rights.
Haltom implicates the following defendants in at least one of these alleged
violations: KVC Behavioral Healthcare Nebraska, Alegent Creighton Health,
and ORR Psychotherapy. He has also sued CASA, a non-profit organization,
and a CASA volunteer, Dawn Rockey.
1. PRIVATE ENTITY DEFENDANTS
KVC, Creighton Health, and ORR Psychotherapy argue that Haltom's
claims under §§ 1983 and 1985 must be dismissed because Haltom has not
alleged that the entities' respective employees acted pursuant to an
unconstitutional policy, practice, or custom. After reviewing Haltom's
complaint, the Court agrees with the defendants' contention, and will
therefore grant their motions to dismiss. Indeed, like municipalities, private
entities acting "under the color of state law" cannot be held liable for
constitutional torts under a theory of respondeat superior. See, Monell v.
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Smith v. Insley's Inc., 499 F.3d 875,
880 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Sanders v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 984 F.2d 972, 976
(8th Cir. 1993)); Dier v. City of Hillsboro, 2004 WL 1243845, at *8 (D. Oregon
2004); Di Maggio v. O'Brien, 497 F. Supp. 870, 875-76 (E.D. Pa. 1980); cf.
Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1247 (2d Cir. 1979). And because there is no
indication that the defendants acted pursuant to a policy or a custom—or
that the alleged wrongdoing was at the hands of a final decisionmaker—
Haltom has failed to state a claim upon which relief can granted. See Davison
v. City of Minneapolis, 490 F.3d 648, 660 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Pembaur v.
City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986)).8
2. DAWN ROCKEY AND CASA
(i) Dawn Rockey
Haltom's amended complaint makes only one reference to Rockey, and
as CASA points out, that reference is misplaced. On this point, Haltom
suggests that Rockey is an employee of Cedars Youth Services, when in fact,
she was—at all relevant times—a CASA volunteer. See, filing 6 at 15; filing
71 at 5. As such, Rockey is immune from suit pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. §§
43-3701 et seq. Specifically, § 43-3716 shields CASA volunteers from liability
And because a conspiracy under § 1985 is a prerequisite to a claim under § 1986, Haltom's
claims on the latter grounds are similarly dismissed as to the private entity defendants.
Sebastian v. U.S., 531 F.2d 900, 904 n.11 (8th Cir. 1976).
8

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"to the full extent provided in the federal Volunteer Protection Act of 1997."
That act, in turn, limits liability to the extent that (1) the volunteer was
acting within the scope of his or her responsibilities to CASA; (2) the
volunteer was properly trained under Nebraska law; and (3) "the harm was
not caused by willful or criminal misconduct, gross negligence, reckless
misconduct, or a conscious, flagrant indifference to the rights or safety of the
individual harmed by the volunteer[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 14503.
After reviewing the complaint in full, the Court concludes that Haltom
has failed to plead facts to overcome the aforementioned immunity
provisions.9 Accordingly, CASA's motion to dismiss Dawn Rockey is granted.
Filing 69.
(ii) CASA
CASA's motion to dismiss (filing 69) will also be granted. Although
Haltom briefly discusses CASA in the background section of his complaint, he
fails to name the organization in any of the 37 causes of action. Filing 6 at 13.
Therefore, other than claiming that CASA "worked in conjunction with
DHHS" and "acted under color of state law," Haltom has not stated a claim
upon which relief may be granted. Accordingly, CASA's motion to dismiss is
granted. The Court does not reach CASA's alternative grounds for dismissal.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the defendants' motions are granted in
part and denied in part.
IT IS ORDERED:
1. The individually-named defendants' motions to dismiss are
granted in part and denied in part. Specifically,
a. Robert Troyer's motion to dismiss (filing 56) is
denied.
b. David Kucera's motion to dismiss (filing 30) is
granted.

As noted, Haltom incorrectly lists Rockey's employment as with Cedars Youth Services.
Further, even more so than the other defendants, the Court is unable to glean Rockey's
involvement with Haltom and the other defendants.
9

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c. James Carmer and Mental Health Associates' motion
to dismiss (filing 41) is granted in part and denied in
part. Specifically, to the extent that the defendant
moves to dismiss Mental Health Associates, the
motion is denied. To the extent that the defendant
moves to dismiss James Carmer, the motion is
granted.
d. Mental Health Associates' motion to dismiss is
denied.
e. Barbara Onnen's motion to dismiss (filing 27) is
granted.
f. Melissa Schmid's motion to dismiss (filing 51) is
denied.
g. Lisa Blankenau's motion to dismiss (filing 57) is
denied.
h. Ryan Hurd's motion to dismiss (filing 48) is denied.
2. The non-governmental entities' motions to dismiss are
granted. Specifically,
a. KVC Behavioral Healthcare Nebraska's motion to
dismiss (filing 60) is granted.
b. Alegent Creighton Health's motion to dismiss (filing
46) is granted.
c. ORR Psychotherapy's motion to dismiss (filing 43) is
granted.
d. CASA and Dawn Rockey's motion to dismiss (filing
69) is granted.

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Dated this 8th day of March, 2017.
BY THE COURT:

John M. Gerrard
United States District Judge

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