Washington v. Grieser et al

Filing 18

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and is dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). A separate judgment will be entered in accordance with this Memorandum and Order. Ordered by Senior Judge Richard G. Kopf. (Copy mailed to pro se party) (KLF)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
JUSTINE BRYANT
WASHINGTON,
Plaintiff,
V.
DOUGLAS GRIESER, RUSSELL
DERR, NICHOLAS ANDREW
DEPETRO, JESSICA CLARK WEST,
ROBERT TRIBOLET, and JOSEPH S.
TROIA, District Court Judge,
Defendants.

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8:16CV12

MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER

Plaintiff Justine Washington (“Plaintiff”) filed his Complaint in this matter on
January 13, 2016. (Filing No. 1.) Plaintiff filed a supplement to his Complaint on
March 8, 2016. (Filing No. 15.) Plaintiff has been given leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. (Filing Nos. 7, 14.) The court now conducts an initial review of his claims
to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
I. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT
Plaintiff’s claims are difficult to decipher. It appears Plaintiff asserts that his
constitutional rights were violated when the State of Nebraska enforced a child
support order that was entered against him in Colorado. (Filing No. 15 at CM/ECF
p. 4.) Plaintiff names Nebraska state court judges, as well as several Nebraska
attorneys, as defendants. As relief, Plaintiff asks this court to “[f]ree [him] of all
relation to this event plus all the money [he has] put into this fight plus pain and
suffering, mental stress.” (Filing No. 15 at CM/ECF p. 3.)

II. STANDARDS ON INITIAL REVIEW
The court is required to review in forma pauperis complaints to determine
whether summary dismissal is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court must
dismiss a complaint or any portion of it that states a frivolous or malicious claim, that
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Pro se plaintiffs must set forth enough factual allegations to “nudge[] their
claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,” or “their complaint must be
dismissed.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569-70 (2007); see also
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”).
“The essential function of a complaint under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure is to give the opposing party ‘fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds
for a claim, and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.’” Topchian v.
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hopkins v.
Saunders, 199 F.3d 968, 973 (8th Cir. 1999)). However, “[a] pro se complaint must
be liberally construed, and pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than
other parties.” Topchian, 760 F.3d at 849 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s Complaint and supplement are rambling, and somewhat difficult to
comprehend. As best the court can tell, Plaintiff is challenging Nebraska’s
enforcement of a Colorado child support order. Plaintiff claims that Defendants’
errors in attempting to collect child support have amounted to a violation of his rights
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. There are multiple reasons why Plaintiff’s claims cannot
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proceed in this court.
Plaintiff essentially seeks an order barring the State of Nebraska from
enforcing a child support order entered against him in Colorado. This claim is subject
to dismissal under the domestic relations doctrine. It is well-settled that the “whole
subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the
laws of the states, and not to the laws of the United States.” In re Burrus, 136 U.S.
586, 593-94 (1890). The United States Supreme Court has recognized a domestic
relations exception “to the jurisdiction of the federal courts in light of long-held
understandings and policy considerations.” Whiteside v. Nebraska State Health and
Human Services, No. 4:07CV3030, 2007 WL 2123754, *1 (D. Neb. July 19, 2007)
(citing Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 694-95 (1992). It is clear from the
Complaint and the supplement thereto that granting Plaintiff the relief sought would
require the court to entangle itself into issues of state child support law, an area in
which it does not have jurisdiction.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine also precludes consideration of Plaintiff’s claim.
This doctrine provides that, with the exception of habeas corpus petitions, lower
federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over challenges to state court judgments
and state proceedings. Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 931 (8th Cir. 2005). See D.C.
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263
U.S. 413 (1923). Specifically, the doctrine “bars federal courts from hearing cases
brought by the losing parties in state court proceedings alleging ‘injury caused by the
state-court judgment and seeking review and rejection of that judgment.’” Mosby, 418
at 931 (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005)).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine also applies to state proceedings that are essentially
judicial in nature. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 467. See also Ballinger v. Culotta, 322 F.3d
546, 548 (8th Cir. 2003). It appears that Nebraska state courts have entered orders
regarding Plaintiff’s child support obligations and Nebraska’s enforcement of the
Colorado order. (Filing No. 1 at CM/ECF p. 14.) In order for Plaintiff to properly
challenge these state court orders, he must seek the appropriate state remedies.
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Moreover, to the extent that any portion of Plaintiff’s Complaint could survive
the jurisdictional bars of the domestic relations doctrine or Rooker-Feldman doctrine,
Younger abstention is warranted. Under the Younger abstention doctrine, abstention
is mandatory where: (1) there is an ongoing state proceeding; (2) an important state
interest is implicated; and (3) the plaintiff has an avenue open for review of
constitutional claims in the state court. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); see
Aaron v. Target Corp., 357 F.3d 768, 774 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Under Younger v. Harris,
[] federal courts should abstain from exercising jurisdiction in cases where equitable
relief would interfere with pending state proceedings in a way that offends principles
of comity and federalism”).
Therefore, Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1.
Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted and is dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
2.
A separate judgment will be entered in accordance with this
Memorandum and Order.
DATED this 29th day of April, 2016.
BY THE COURT:
Richard G. Kopf
Senior United States District Judge

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