Tyler v. Vicki et al

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - Plaintiff will have 30 days from the date of this Memorandum and Order to amend his Complaint to set forth good-faith factual allegations regarding: (a) the claims brought in the Douglas County case the Defendants have allegedl y prevented him from appealing; (b) how the Defendants' actions caused Plaintiff to suffer actual injury or prejudice; and (c) the existence and contents of an official policy, custom, or a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise that caused a violation of Plaintiff's constitutional right to access the courts. The court reserves the right to conduct further review of Plaintiff's claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) after Plaintiff addresses the matters set forth in this Memorandum and Order. Any claims not presented in the amended complaint will be deemed abandoned. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in accordance with this order, this case will be dismissed without further notice to him. The clerk of the court is directed to set a pro se case management deadline in this matter with the following text: July 21, 2016: Check for amended complaint; dismiss if none filed. Ordered by Senior Judge Richard G. Kopf. (Copy mailed to pro se party) (KLF)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
BILLY TYLER,
Plaintiff,
v.
VICKI, ETTA GRAVES, and
LESLIE DOUGLAS, Clerks of
Douglas County Court,
Defendants.

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8:16CV189

MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER

This matter is before the court on initial review of Plaintiff’s Complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
I. APPLICABLE STANDARDS ON INITIAL REVIEW
The court is required to review in forma pauperis complaints to determine
whether summary dismissal is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court must
dismiss a complaint or any portion of it that states a frivolous or malicious claim, that
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Pro se plaintiffs must set forth enough factual allegations to “nudge[] their
claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,” or “their complaint must be
dismissed.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569-70 (2007); see also
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged”).

“The essential function of a complaint under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure is to give the opposing party ‘fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds
for a claim, and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.’” Topchian v.
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hopkins v.
Saunders, 199 F.3d 968, 973 (8th Cir. 1999)). However, “[a] pro se complaint must
be liberally construed, and pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than
other parties.” Topchian, 760 F.3d at 849 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
II. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT
Plaintiff, a nonprisoner, has filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against three
clerks of the Douglas County Court in their official and individual capacities,
requesting an injunction requiring the clerks to “file our notices of appeal in criminal
traffic cases CR16-8023 etc. take appeal to judge.” (Filing No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges
that the clerks “have destroyed” his appeals and have failed to take his “NRS 29-2412
motions to judge for his . . . order.”1 Plaintiff seeks $1 million in damages.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Access to the Courts
Liberally construing Plaintiff’s limited allegations, Plaintiff seems to be
claiming that the county clerks’ actions have deprived him of his constitutional right
to access the courts. While the constitutional basis for this right has been recognized

1

This reference may refer to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2412 (Westlaw 2016), which
deals with a confined defendant’s obligation to pay fines or costs of prosecution when
the defendant “has no estate with which to pay such fines or costs.”
2

as “unsettled,” Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 & n.12 (2002),2 an accessto-the-courts claim (whatever its constitutional basis) requires a plaintiff to have a
nonfrivolous, arguable, underlying claim, id., and the plaintiff must show that the
county clerks’ actions caused the plaintiff to suffer actual injury or prejudice. Maness
v. Dist. Court of Logan Cty., 495 F.3d 943, 944 (8th Cir. 2007). The right of access
to the courts “applies not only to the actual denial of access to the courts, but also to
situations in which the plaintiff has been denied meaningful access by some
impediment put up by the defendant.” Scheeler v. City of St. Cloud, Minn., 402 F.3d
826, 830 (8th Cir. 2005).
In this case, Plaintiff alleges nothing about the case the Defendants have
prevented him from appealing or about the claims at issue in that case such that the
court can analyze whether Plaintiff has a nonfrivolous, arguable, underlying claim and
whether the Defendants’ actions caused Plaintiff to suffer actual injury or prejudice.
Plaintiff will be given leave to file an amended complaint in order to make such
allegations.
B. Quasi-Judicial Immunity
Court clerks are absolutely immune for “discretionary” acts, which are those
taken at a judge’s direction or pursuant to court rule. Geitz v. Overall, 62 Fed. App’x
744, 2003 WL 1860542, at *1 (8th Cir. 2003) (unpublished) (citing Antoine v. Byers
& Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 436 (1993)). “Court clerks have absolute
quasi-judicial immunity from damages for civil rights violations when they perform
tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process, unless the clerks acted in the clear

2

The Harbury court noted that the Supreme Court has grounded the right of
access to the courts in the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, the First
Amendment Petition Clause, the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, the
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause. Harbury, 536 U.S. at 415 n.12 (citing cases).
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absence of all jurisdiction.” Boyer v. County of Washington, 971 F.2d 100, 102 (8th
Cir. 1992) (internal brackets, quotation, and citation omitted).
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that where a pro se plaintiff
claiming denial of access to the courts alleged that court clerks intentionally failed to
file the plaintiff’s submissions, failed to notify the plaintiff of court orders, and failed
to respond to the plaintiff’s inquiries—which the court decided were arguably
“ministerial” acts—and where the pro se plaintiff did not allege that the court clerks
were acting pursuant to court rules or judicial instructions, the plaintiff stated a § 1983
claim against the clerks. Geitz, 2003 WL 1860542, at * 2 (reversing dismissal of court
clerks under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 in pro se § 1983 case for denial of access to the courts).
Similar to Geitz, Plaintiff has alleged that Defendants have “destroyed” his
appeal and have “failed” to present Plaintiff’s motions to the assigned judge for ruling,
and he does not state that these actions were taken pursuant to court rules or
instructions from a judge, making Defendants’ actions arguably “ministerial.”
Therefore, it does not appear upon initial review that quasi-judicial immunity is
applicable to Defendants. Maness v. Dist. Court of Logan Cty., 495 F.3d 943, 944 (8th
Cir. 2007) (court clerk’s failure to present plaintiff’s IFP application to judge was
ministerial and, therefore, clerk was not shielded by absolute quasi-judicial immunity)
(collecting cases).
C. Official-Capacity Claims
Naming a government official in his or her official capacity, as Plaintiff does
here, is the equivalent of naming the government entity that employs the
official—Douglas County in this case. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). “Section 1983 liability for a constitutional violation may
attach” to a county only “if the violation resulted from (1) an official . . . policy, (2)
an unofficial custom, or (3) a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise.”

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Atkinson v. City of Mountain View, Mo., 709 F.3d 1201, 1214 (8th Cir. 2013)
(brackets, citations, and quotations omitted).
Because Plaintiff makes no allegations whatsoever that would subject Douglas
County to liability under this standard, he shall be given leave to amend his Complaint
to make good-faith factual allegations sufficient to state a claim against Defendants
in their official capacities.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED:
1.
Plaintiff will have 30 days from the date of this Memorandum and Order
to amend his Complaint to set forth good-faith factual allegations regarding: (a) the
claims brought in the Douglas County case the Defendants have allegedly prevented
him from appealing; (b) how the Defendants’ actions caused Plaintiff to suffer actual
injury or prejudice; and (c) the existence and contents of an official policy, custom,
or a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise that caused a violation of
Plaintiff’s constitutional right to access the courts.
2.
The court reserves the right to conduct further review of Plaintiff’s claims
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) after Plaintiff addresses the matters set forth in this
Memorandum and Order.
3.
Any claims not presented in the amended complaint will be deemed
abandoned. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in accordance with this
order, this case will be dismissed without further notice to him.
4. The clerk of the court is directed to set a pro se case management deadline
in this matter with the following text: July 21, 2016: Check for amended complaint;
dismiss if none filed.
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DATED this 20th day of June, 2016.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Richard G. Kopf
Senior United States District Judge

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