Beck v. Osmund

Filing 37

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Filing No. 31 ) is granted. Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Filing No. 35 ) is denied as moot. A separate judgment will be entered. Ordered by Senior Judge Richard G. Kopf. (Copy mailed to pro se party) (KLF)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
CHRISTOPHER STEPHEN BECK,
Plaintiff,

8:16CV193

vs.
SHERIFF DAN OSMOND, Custer
County Jail; and PAMELA GOLDSBY,

MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER

Defendants.
This matter is before the court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment. (Filing No. 31.) For the reasons that follow, the Motion is granted.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Christopher Stephen Beck (“Beck”) filed this action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Dan Osmond (“Osmond”) and Pamela Goldsby1
(“Goldsby”), asserting that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical
needs in violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment. (Filing No. 19.) Beck alleged that, while confined at the Custer
County Jail, Defendants refused his requests to see a doctor for stomach pain that
affected his ability to eat and move and caused blood in his stool. (Id.) The court
allowed Beck’s Eighth Amendment claim for monetary damages to proceed
against Osmond and Goldsby in their individual capacities. (Filing No. 20.)

1

Beck filed his action against Dan “Osmund” and Pamela “Hunter.”
Pursuant to Defendants’ Answer (Filing No. 24), the court directed the clerk’s
office to correct the records in the case to reflect that the sole defendants are Dan
Osmond and Pamela Goldsby. (See Filing No. 25.)

II. RELEVANT UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS2
1.
From August 14, 2014, until November 18, 2014, Beck was confined
at the Custer County Jail in Broken Bow, Nebraska, where he awaited extradition
to Texas. (Filing No. 32-2 at CM/ECF p. 2.) He had been confined at the Custer
County Jail approximately a dozen times before, dating back to 1997. (Filing No.
32-2 at CM/ECF p. 2; Filing No. 32-3 at CM/ECF pp. 1-26.)

2

Beck, a pro se litigant, is “bound by and must comply with all local and
federal procedural rules.” NEGenR 1.3(g). The court’s local rules require the party
moving for summary judgment to file a brief containing a “separate statement of
material facts about which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to
be tried and that entitles the moving party to judgment as a matter of law.” This
statement of facts “should consist of short numbered paragraphs, each containing
pinpoint references to . . . materials that support the material facts . . . .” NECivR
56.1(a). The opposing party must respond to the moving party’s statement of
material facts in a brief containing separate numbered paragraphs with citations to
supporting references and with identification of material facts that are disputed.
NECivR 56.1(b). See also NECivR 7.1(b)(2)(A) (“When filing the opposing brief,
the opposing party must also file and serve supporting evidentiary material not
previously filed.”). Properly referenced material facts in the movant’s statement of
facts are “considered admitted unless controverted in the opposing party’s
response.” NECivR 56.1(b)(1). The material facts below, appearing in numbered
paragraphs, are those that have not been properly disputed pursuant to the court’s
local rules. Beck opposes some of the material facts set forth by Defendants but
mostly through his own allegations of denial rather than through evidentiary
support. He also submits inmate request forms already in evidence. The court does
consider the facts alleged in Beck’s verified Amended Complaint (Filing No. 19).
See Roberson v. Hayti Police Dep’t, 241 F.3d 992, 994-95 (8th Cir. 2001) (“[t]he
facts alleged in a verified complaint need not be repeated in a responsive affidavit
in order to survive a summary judgment motion.”) (citations omitted).

2

2.
Osmond has served as Sheriff of Custer County since January of
2011. (Filing No. 32-1 at CM/ECF p. 1.) The Custer County Sheriff’s Office
oversees the operation of the Custer County Jail. (Id.)
3.
Goldsby has been the Jail Administrator of the Custer County Jail
since 2011. (Filing No. 32-2 at CM/ECF p. 1.) Goldsby, as Jail Administrator,
oversees the day-to-day operations. (Filing No. 32-1 at CM/ECF p. 2.) As a result,
Osmond is generally not present for or involved in the day-to-day activities at the
jail. (Id.)
4.
Goldsby is personally involved in supervising inmates during her
shifts, and often personally handles and responds to the written request forms
submitted by the inmates. (Filing No. 32-2 at CM/ECF p. 5.)
5.
The inmate handbook provided to inmates at the Custer County Jail at
the time of booking instructs them that if they are experiencing a medical need,
they are to alert a member of the jail staff if it is an emergency, or if not an
emergency, complete and submit a standard written request form which they may
designate as “medical” in nature. (Filing No. 32-2 at CM/ECF p. 3; Filing No. 32-3
at CM/ECF p. 138.)
6.
At all pertinent times, non-emergency medical needs of inmates
confined at the Custer County Jail were addressed during normal business hours
through on-call physicians at the Broken Bow Clinic, P.C. (“BBC”), while
emergency or after-hours inmate medical needs were addressed through on-call
professional medical staff at the local hospital. (Filing No. 32-2 at CM/ECF pp. 35; Filing No. 32-3 at CM/ECF pp. 128-132.) Dr. Shawn Lawrence (“Dr.
Lawrence”) was typically the physician from BBC who responded to calls from
staff at the Custer County Jail. (Filing No. 32-2 at CM/ECF p. 5; Filing No. 32-4 at
CM/ECF pp. 1-2.)

3

7.
Dr. Lawrence is very familiar with Beck’s medical history. His
medical history included acid reflux and related symptoms (chest and stomach and
throat burning/pain), which was usually well controlled with over-the-counter or
prescription antacids. Beck had no history of stomach ulcers or tumors in 2014.
(Filing No. 32-4 at CM/ECF p. 3.)
8.
Beck was confined at the Custer County Jail in late 2006 and early
2007. During that time, Dr. Lawrence controlled Beck’s acid reflux symptoms with
prescription antacid medications, such as Protonix and Prevacid. (Filing No. 32-3
at CM/ECF pp. 29-36; Filing No. 32-4 at CM/ECF pp. 3-4.)
9.
During his 2014 confinement at the Custer County Jail, Beck was
always given access to and frequently took over-the-counter antacids (Tums and
omeprazole) for stomach pain or related symptoms. (Filing No. 32-2 at CM/ECF p.
7; Filing No. 32-3 at CM/ECF pp. 58-60.)
10. On August 26, 2014, Beck submitted an inmate medical request form,
in which he complained of “severe heart burn,” chest pain, heart rate fluctuation,
and “panic attacks.” (Filing No. 32-3 at CM/ECF p. 65.) Beck took Tums for the
heartburn. (Filing No. 32-2 at CM/ECF p. 7; Filing No. 32-3 at CM/ECF pp. 59,
65.)
11. Beck did not submit any further inmate request forms regarding
heartburn or acid reflux symptoms until October 29, 2014. (Filing No. 32-2 at
CM/ECF p. 7; Filing No. 32-3 at CM/ECF pp. 63-97.) On October 29, 2014, Beck
submitted an inmate medical request form, after regular business hours, which
stated, “I am having severe acid reflux but I think I might have an ulcer, cause it
burns and I am in severe pain from my chest to my stomach.” (Filing No. 32-2 at
CM/ECF p. 7; Filing No. 32-3 at CM/ECF p. 82.) Jail staff did not perceive the
existence of any medical emergency, so they left Beck’s inmate medical request
form for Goldsby to address in the morning. (Id.)

4

12. By the next morning, October 30th, Beck had submitted an inmate
grievance form that stated, “I am having severe pains in my stomach and having
severe acid reflux with pain going from my throat deep into my stomach, I need to
see a doctor if I get denied any kind of medical I will start a law suit.” (Filing No.
32-2 at CM/ECF p. 7; Filing No. 32-3 at CM/ECF p. 84.)
13. Goldsby visited with jail staff about Beck. Jail staff reported to
Goldsby that Beck had been eating all of his meals, was sleeping at night, was
engaging in normal activity levels (including taking all opportunities to use the
exercise yard and library), was taking his regular smoke breaks, and that they had
not observed him to exhibit any outward signs of pain or distress during the regular
well-being checks that were conducted at least hourly. (Filing No. 32-2 at CM/ECF
p. 7.)3 The reports were consistent with Goldsby’s own recent personal
observations. (Id.)4

3

These statements from the jail staff, taken from Goldsby’s affidavit, are not
received to prove the truth of the matter asserted but rather to understand the
impact of the words (whether true or not) on the listener. What Goldsby believed is
relevant to both the subjective and objective components of Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence regarding a claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical
need. “[T]he standard is not whether the evidence at the summary judgment stage
would be admissible at trial—it is whether it could be presented at trial in an
admissible form.” See Rule 56(c)(2). Gannon Int’l, Ltd. v. Blocker, 684 F.3d 785,
793 (8th Cir. 2012).
4

Beck alleges that he “could barely eat or get out of bed for several days”
during his 2014, four-month confinement period at the Custer County Jail. (Filing
No. 19 at CM/ECF p. 2.) This conclusory allegation does not create a genuine
dispute as to the personal observations of jail staff during the relevant time period,
October 29th-30th. Importantly, Beck does not allege that he informed anyone or
that anyone observed that he could “barely” eat or get out of bed. “[I]t is black
letter summary judgment law that a conclusory, self-serving affidavit will not
defeat an otherwise meritorious summary judgment motion.” Keiran v. Home
Capital, Inc., 858 F.3d 1127, 1132 (8th Cir. 2017).
5

14. On October 30, 2014, Goldsby relayed, verbatim, Beck’s October
29th inmate medical request form and October 30th grievance form, as well as
information from jail staff about their recent observations of Beck, to Dr.
Lawrence over the phone. (Filing No. 32-2 at CM/ECF pp. 7-8; Filing No. 32-3 at
CM/ECF pp. 82-85; Filing No. 32-4 at CM/ECF p. 3-4; Filing No. 32-5.) Dr.
Lawrence prescribed Beck the antacid medication Zantac, which is similar to other
prescription medications she issued for him in the past to control his acid reflux
symptoms, including stomach pain. (Id.)
15. Later that same day, October 30th, Goldsby personally delivered the
Zantac to Beck for him to take the first dose. (Filing No. 32-2 at CM/ECF p. 8;
Filing No. 32-3 at CM/ECF pp. 82-85.) Beck refused to take it without seeing a
doctor and stated that he “could have a tumor.” (Id.)
16. In her professional medical opinion, if Dr. Lawrence had known that
Beck saw blood in his stool, her course of treatment still would have been to
initially conservatively treat Beck with Zantac, and ask jail staff to monitor him
and report back any worsening symptoms. Only if Beck’s symptoms worsened or
changed would she have scheduled him for an appointment to be seen. (Filing No.
32-4 at CM/ECF p. 4.)
17. According to Dr. Lawrence, acid reflux and heartburn are conditions
that may be optionally treated in a physician’s discretion to relieve patient
discomfort, and as a preventative tool against possible complications. If left
untreated, symptoms usually subside on their own, and a bland diet will usually
assist in minimizing or avoiding symptoms. It is not usually absolutely necessary
that acid reflux or heartburn be treated with medications, unless the patient is
losing weight from being unable to eat, or if other related more serious medical
conditions have developed. (Id.)

6

18. Because Dr. Lawrence was familiar with Beck’s medical history, in
her professional medical opinion, treatment of his complaints on October 29-30,
2014, was optional. (Id.)
19. After October 30, 2014, up until his transfer to Texas authorities on
November 18, 2014, Beck did not submit any additional inmate medical request
forms complaining of stomach pain or related symptoms. (Filing No. 32-2 at
CM/ECF p. 8; Filing No. 32-3 at CM/ECF pp. 63-97.) During this time period,
Goldsby did not see Beck exhibit any outward signs of being in physical distress,
and he appeared to her to be eating, moving, and sleeping normally. (Filing No.
32-2 at CM/ECF p. 9.) Beck was not losing weight. (Id.) Jail staff did not report
any concerns about Beck to Goldsby. (Id.)
20. On one occasion in 2014, Beck approached Osmond in the cell area
about his stomach hurting and requested to see a doctor. (Filing No. 32-1 at
CM/ECF p. 2.) Beck was standing upright speaking to Osmond at the time and did
not appear to be in medical distress. (Id.) Osmond told Beck that he would let
Goldsby know about Beck’s request. (Id.) Osmond promptly spoke to Goldsby,
who later advised Osmond that she called Dr. Lawrence and that Dr. Lawrence
prescribed Beck medication that he refused to take. (Id.)5
21. On November 18, 2014, Goldsby was personally present when Beck
left with Texas authorities. She did not see Beck exhibit any signs of physical
5

These facts are largely consistent with Beck’s allegation that “Sheriff Dan
Osm[o]nd came back into the cell block to check on a maintenance report and I
was able to stop him and explain my situation. Dan Osm[o]nd just referred me
back to Pamela [Goldsby] the head jailor.” (Filing No. 19 at CM/ECF p. 2.) Beck’s
allegations that “[a]t that point the Sheriff knew how much pain I was in” and
“Dan Osm[o]nd is also at fault because he seen the condition the plaintiff was in
and refused to do anything about it,” (Id. at CM/ECF pp. 2-3), are conclusory and
speculative and do not create a genuine dispute as to Osmond’s personal
observations of Beck during their one encounter and Osmond’s prompt discussion
with Goldsby about Beck’s request to see a doctor.
7

distress. From her past experience, she knows that law enforcement from other
agencies will generally not accept transfer of custody of an inmate/detainee who
appears to be or claims to be in acute medical distress, without demanding
clearance to confine through a medical examination. The Texas authorities did not
voice any concerns about taking Beck into their custody. (Filing No. 32-2 at
CM/ECF p. 10.)
Disputed amongst the parties is whether Beck informed Goldsby that he saw
blood in his stool. Beck claims he told Goldsby that “I have seen blood in my
stool.” (Filing No. 19 at CM/ECF p. 3.) Goldsby claims that, when asked, Beck
denied seeing any blood in his stool. (Filing No. 32-2 at CM/ECF p. 8.)
III. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment should be granted only “if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). It is not the court’s function to weigh
evidence in the summary judgment record to determine the truth of any factual
issue. Schilf v. Eli Lilly & Co., 687 F.3d 947, 949 (8th Cir. 2012). In passing upon
a motion for summary judgment, the district court must view the facts in the light
most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Dancy v. Hyster Co., 127 F.3d
649, 652-53 (8th Cir. 1997).
In order to withstand a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party
must substantiate allegations with “‘sufficient probative evidence [that] would
permit a finding in [his] favor on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or
fantasy.’” Moody v. St. Charles Cnty., 23 F.3d 1410, 1412 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting
Gregory v. City of Rogers, 974 F.2d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 1992)). “A mere scintilla
of evidence is insufficient to avoid summary judgment.” Id. Essentially, the test is
“whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a
8

jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986).
B. Exhaustion
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because Beck
failed to exhaust available administrative remedies prior to filing this § 1983
action. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides that “[n]o action
shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title ...
until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(a). To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a grievance must alert prison
officials to the claims the plaintiff has included in the complaint, but need only
provide the level of detail required by the grievance system itself. Jones v. Bock,
549 U.S. 199, 218-19 (2007). The purpose of the exhaustion requirement is to give
officials “time and opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing the
initiation of a federal case.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-25 (2002).
Administrative exhaustion is an affirmative defense that defendants have the
burden to plead and prove. See Jones, 549 U.S. at 218-19.
Defendants’ evidence shows that the Custer County Jail has a grievance
procedure that merely requires an inmate to write his or her complaint on an
inmate request form. (Filing No. 32-3 at CM/ECF p. 141.) There is no dispute that
Beck pursued all available administrative remedies at the Custer County Jail
because he submitted an inmate request form about his “severe acid reflux” and
stomach pain. (See Filing No. 32 at CM/ECF p. 30.) Instead, Defendants argue that
Beck failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the Nebraska Political
Subdivisions Tort Claims Act (“PSTCA”) before filing this action.6 However, the
United States Supreme Court has stated:

6

Defendants cite Cole v. Isherwood, 716 N.W.2d 36 (Neb. 2006) for
support. In Cole, the Nebraska Supreme Court concluded that “Cole filed his §
9

In Woodford [v. Ngo], we held that to properly exhaust administrative
remedies prisoners must “complete the administrative review process
in accordance with the applicable procedural rules,” [548 U.S. 81, 88
(2006)]-rules that are defined not by the PLRA, but by the prison
grievance process itself. Compliance with prison grievance
procedures, therefore, is all that is required by the PLRA to “properly
exhaust.” The level of detail necessary in a grievance to comply with
the grievance procedures will vary from system to system and claim
to claim, but it is the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that
define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.
Jones, 549 U.S. at 218. Beck complied with the Custer County Jail grievance procedures
and that “is all that is required by the PLRA to ‘properly exhaust.’” Id.
C. Qualified Immunity
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because they
are immune from suit in their individual capacities under the doctrine of qualified
immunity. “Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for civil
damages and the burdens of litigation ‘insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.’” McKenney v. Harrison, 635 F.3d 354, 358 (8th Cir. 2011)
(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “Stated another way,
1983 claims prematurely because he did not exhaust his state tort claims before
filing his § 1983 action.” 716 N.W.2d at 43. (emphasis in original) In other words,
to comply with the PLRA exhaustion requirement, Cole was required to exhaust
his administrative remedies under the Nebraska State Tort Claims Act before filing
his § 1983 action. See id. at 42-43. The court finds Cole distinguishable, most
importantly, because the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services informed
inmates that, as part of its grievance procedure, they may file a tort claim under the
State Tort Claims Act. See Cole v. Isherwood, 653 N.W.2d 821, 828 (Neb. 2002)
(citing Pratt v. Clarke, 604 N.W.2d 822 (Neb. 1999)). The Custer County Jail does
not.

10

qualified immunity shields a defendant from suit if he or she could have reasonably
believed his or her conduct to be lawful in light of clearly established law and the
information that the defendant possessed.” Smithson v. Aldrich, 235 F.3d 1058,
1061 (8th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation and citation omitted). “The qualified
immunity standard gives ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting all but
the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Id.
Qualified immunity requires a two-part inquiry: (1) whether the facts shown
by the plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional or statutory right, and (2)
whether that right was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s alleged
misconduct. Nance v. Sammis, 586 F.3d 604, 609 (8th Cir. 2009). If no reasonable
fact-finder could answer yes to both of these questions, the official is entitled to
qualified immunity. Id. “Courts may exercise their discretion in deciding which of
the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first.” Akins
v. Epperly, 588 F.3d 1178, 1183 (8th Cir. 2009).
At the time of the alleged constitutional violation, Plaintiff was a pretrial
detainee awaiting extradition to Texas. Because Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee,
his deliberate indifference claim is analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause. See Ryan v. Armstrong, 850 F.3d 419, 425 (8th Cir. 2017).
The standard applied in this context “borrow[s] from the Eighth Amendment
deliberate-indifference standard applicable to claims of prison inmates.” Id.
(quoting Bailey v. Feltmann, 810 F.3d 589, 593 (8th Cir. 2016)). To prevail under
the Eighth Amendment, Plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he suffered from an
objectively serious medical need, and (2) Defendants knew of, but deliberately
disregarded, that need. Saylor v. Nebraska, 812 F.3d 637, 644 (8th Cir. 2016). “A
medical condition is ‘objectively serious’ if the prisoner was diagnosed by a doctor
or it is so obvious that a lay person would recognize the medical need.” Id. “The
subjective prong of deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard that
requires a mental state of more ... than gross negligence. It requires a mental state
akin to criminal recklessness.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

11

The undisputed facts show that Beck did not suffer from an objectively
serious medical need. During his 2014 period of confinement at the Custer County
Jail, Beck was not diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment, rather, his
treatment was optional according to Dr. Lawrence. Therefore, Beck’s condition
must have been so obvious that a layperson would easily recognize the need for
medical treatment. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has found a serious
medical need that was obvious to a layperson where an inmate: was pregnant,
bleeding, and passing blood clots; had swollen and bleeding gums and complained
of extreme tooth pain; experienced excessive urination, diarrhea, sweating, weight
loss, and dehydration related to known diabetes; or exhibited signs of early labor
and her medical records clearly documented a history of rapid labor and delivery.
See Jones v. Minn. Dept. of Corr., 512 F.3d 478, 482 (8th Cir. 2008) (internal
citations omitted).
Beck’s symptoms do not rise to the level of the inmates’ symptoms in those
cases where the Eighth Circuit has found a serious medical need that was obvious
to a layperson. Beck had stomach pain and “severe acid reflux” that, according to
him, resulted in blood in his stool. He does not allege the frequency or severity of
blood in his stool. Nevertheless, Dr. Lawrence opined that she would not have
changed her course of treatment for Beck even if she had known that he had blood
in his stool. Further evidence that Beck did not have an objectively serious medical
need was that jail staff did not observe any signs of medical distress from Beck.
Perhaps most telling, Beck refused to take prescribed antacid medication to relieve
his discomfort – discomfort that jail staff had successfully relieved for Beck in the
past with similar antacid medications. “The prison officials’ background
knowledge is part of the analysis” of “whether a medical need is sufficiently
obvious.” Id. And, Beck does not allege any medical issues since October 30,
2014, despite the alleged lack of medical treatment. Accordingly, Beck fails to
show that he suffered from an objectively serious medical need.
Alternatively, even if Beck suffered from an objectively serious medical
need, he fails to show that either Goldsby or Osmond was deliberately indifferent
12

to that medical need. For Osmond, Beck “must allege and show that the supervisor
personally participated in or had direct responsibility for the alleged violations” or
“that the supervisor actually knew of, and was deliberately indifferent to or tacitly
authorized, the unconstitutional acts.” Saylor, 812 F.3d at 644 (citation omitted).
Beck fails to show that Osmond was involved in, or directly responsible for, his
alleged insufficient medical care. Osmond was not generally present for or
involved in the day-to-day activities at the Custer County Jail. On one occasion
Beck informed Osmond about his stomach hurting and requested to see a doctor.
During this encounter, Beck was standing upright and did not appear to Osmond to
be in medical distress. Osmond promptly informed Goldsby, who oversees the dayto-day activities of the Custer County Jail, of Beck’s request to see a doctor. This
evidence does not show that Osmond knew or had a reason to believe that Beck
later received insufficient medical care. See id.
Similarly, Goldsby consulted with jail staff upon learning of Beck’s October
29th and 30th complaints. Jail staff did not express any concerns about Beck to
Goldsby, and their personal observations of him correlated with Goldsby’s own
that Beck did not appear to be in medical distress. In fact, according to their
observations, Beck exhibited normal behavioral and activity levels. Still, Goldsby
called Dr. Lawrence and read to her Beck’s request and grievance forms verbatim.
Later that same day, Goldsby attempted to give Beck his first dose of Zantac,
which Dr. Lawrence prescribed to Beck after her discussion with Goldsby. Based
upon Beck’s medical history, Goldsby had no reason to doubt Dr. Lawrence or that
prescription antacid medication would relieve Beck’s “severe acid reflux” and
stomach pain. Meloy v. Bachmeier, 302 F.3d 845, 849 (8th Cir. 2002) (citation
omitted) (“Prison officials cannot substitute their judgment for a medical
professional’s prescription.”).
If Beck did indeed suffer from an objectively serious medical need, Goldsby
and Osmond did not exhibit deliberate indifference to that medical need. They
were aware of Beck’s medical need and took steps to meet it. See Saylor, 812 F.3d
at 645. They had no reason to believe that prescription antacid medication from Dr.
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Lawrence was inadequate to treat Beck’s “severe acid reflux” and stomach pain,
and frankly, no one will know because Beck refused to take the medication. Beck’s
refusal to take the medication evidences a case of disagreement with treatment and
“mere disagreement with treatment decisions does not rise to the level of
constitutional violation.” See Jolly v. Knudsen, 205 F.3d 1094, 1096 (8th Cir.
2000) (quoting Estate of Rosenberg v. Crandell, 56 F.3d 35, 37 (8th Cir. 1995)).
Accordingly, the court finds that Beck’s deliberate indifference claim
against each Defendant fails as a matter of law. “If the court finds no constitutional
violation occurred, the analysis ends and the issue of qualified immunity is not
addressed.... This is not to say, however, the defendant official is entitled to
qualified immunity. Rather, if no constitutional violation occurred, plaintiff’s claim
fails as a matter of law because plaintiff did not prove an essential element of the §
1983 claim.” Ambrose v. Young, 474 F.3d 1070, 1077 n.3. (8th Cir. 2007)
(citations omitted). Alternatively, because there was no constitutional violation,
each Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. See Payne v. Britten, 749 F.3d
697, 707 (8th Cir. 2014) (“For example, a district court could begin and end with
the first question, granting qualified immunity because there was no constitutional
violation.”).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:
1.
granted.

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Filing No. 31) is

2.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Filing No. 35) is
denied as moot.
3.

A separate judgment will be entered.

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Dated this 12th day of September, 2017.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Richard G. Kopf
Senior United States District Judge

15