Valentine v. Thomas et al

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - For the reasons stated above, this action is dismissed without prejudice. Judgment shall be entered by separate document. Ordered by Senior Judge Richard G. Kopf. (Copy mailed to pro se party) (KLF)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
VERONICA VALENTINE,
Plaintiff,
v.
WADIE THOMAS,
CUNNINGHAM, JUVENILE
COURT OF NEBR, PALERNO, and
JAMES,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

8:16CV249

MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER

Plaintiff, a non-prisoner, filed her Complaint in this matter on June 7, 2016.
(Filing No. 1.) Plaintiff has been given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Filing
No. 5.) The court now conducts an initial review of Plaintiff’s claims to determine
whether summary dismissal is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
I. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT
Plaintiff sues the Juvenile Court of Nebraska and four individuals requesting
that everyone who is proceeding in forma pauperis in the Nebraska Juvenile Court be
provided a free bill of exceptions for appeal and that she, in particular, needs a bill of
exceptions free of charge “to vindicate our constitutional rights of Due process/equal
Protection.” Plaintiff is apparently attempting to appeal a decision of the juvenile
court involving the removal of her child from her home, but is being required to pay
for a bill of exceptions although she is proceeding in forma pauperis. (Filing No. 1.)

II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS ON INITIAL REVIEW
The court is required to review in forma pauperis complaints to determine
whether summary dismissal is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The court
must dismiss a complaint or any portion thereof that states a frivolous or malicious
claim, that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B).
III. DISCUSSION OF CLAIMS
Liberally construed, Plaintiff’s Complaint requests injunctive relief in the form
of a directive to the Nebraska Juvenile Court that it should provide to Plaintiff, free
of charge, a bill of exceptions for purposes of appeal. Although not at all clear,
Plaintiff could also be requesting an injunction to stop the continuing deprivation of
her parental rights. Finally, Plaintiff could also be challenging a juvenile-court
judgment.
A. Domestic-Relations Exception to Federal Jurisdiction
Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief are subject to dismissal under the
domestic relations exception to federal court jurisdiction. It is well-settled that “the
whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs
to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States.” In re Burrus, 136
U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890). Even if this court were to liberally construe Plaintiff’s
Complaint to allege that she requests relief from the continued deprivation of her
parental rights in violation of her constitutional rights, the substance of such claims
concern state-law domestic relations matters. This is particularly so where it is clear
from Plaintiff’s allegations that her son’s care and custody is the subject of a juvenile
court case in Nebraska Juvenile Court that she seeks to appeal. See Overman v. U.S.,
563 F.2d 1287,1292 (8th Cir. 1977) (“There is, and ought to be, a continuing federal
2

policy to avoid handling domestic relations cases in federal court in the absence of
important concerns of a constitutional dimension. . . . Such cases touch state law and
policy in a deep and sensitive manner and as a matter of policy and comity, these local
problems should be decided in state courts.”) (internal quotations omitted).
B. Younger Abstention
Further, even if this court did not lack jurisdiction based on the domestic
relations exception, this court is without jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims for
injunctive relief under the abstention doctrine set out by the Supreme Court in
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-45 (1971). Under Younger, abstention is
mandatory where: (1) there is an ongoing state proceeding; (2) an important state
interest is implicated; and (3) the plaintiff has an avenue open for review of
constitutional claims in the state court. See Aaron v. Target Corp., 357 F.3d 768, 774
(8th Cir. 2004) (“Under Younger v. Harris, federal courts should abstain from
exercising jurisdiction in cases where equitable relief would interfere with pending
state proceedings in a way that offends principles of comity and federalism.”)
Here, each of the three Younger conditions is satisfied. First, the state
proceeding in the Nebraska Juvenile Court, and the appeal therefrom, are apparently
ongoing. Second, disputes concerning the care and custody of minors implicate
important state interests. Third, there is no indication that the state courts could not
afford Plaintiff the opportunity for judicial review of any civil rights challenges.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief are dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Carson P. ex rel. Foreman v. Heineman, 240 F.R.D. 456, 529 (D.
Neb. 2007) (“‘federal court oversight of state court operations, even if not framed as
direct review of state court judgments’ . . . is problematic, calling for Younger
abstention. . . . The relief that the plaintiffs seek would interfere extensively with the
ongoing state proceedings for each plaintiff.” (quoting 31 Foster Children v. Bush,
329 F.3d 1255, 1278-1279 (11th Cir. 2003)).

3

C. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
To the extent Plaintiff’s Complaint can be construed to challenge a judgment
of the juvenile court, this court also lacks jurisdiction. Only the Supreme Court has
the authority to entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify a state court judgment.
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a)
(granting the United States Supreme Court the power to review final judgments
rendered by high courts of a state). In addition, federal courts do not have jurisdiction
to review final state court judgments in judicial proceedings. District of Columbia
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-86 (1983). Together, these two
principles have merged to become the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine stands for the proposition that federal district
courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to review final state judgments or to review
claims that are inextricably intertwined with state court decisions. See Riehm v.
Engelking, 538 F.3d 952, 964 (8th Cir. 2008) (explaining limited scope of the RookerFeldman doctrine); see e.g., Ballinger v. Culotta, 322 F.3d 546, 548-49 (8th Cir.
2003) (concluding Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred the district court from considering
plaintiff’s claim that the state court unconstitutionally infringed on his parental rights);
Amerson v. Iowa, 94 F.3d 510, 513 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that it is “inappropriate for
a federal court to address a claim that necessitates invalidating a state court judgment
on a matter committed to the states in order to grant the relief sought”). It is not
possible for the court to grant the requested relief without disrupting the judicial
process of the Nebraska Juvenile Court.

4

IV. CONCLUSION
Because an amendment to Plaintiff’s complaint would be futile, the court will
dismiss this action because Plaintiff may not use this lawsuit to interfere with actions
that have been decided or are pending in a state juvenile case.1
IT IS ORDERED:
1.

For the reasons stated above, this action is dismissed without prejudice.

2.

Judgment shall be entered by separate document.

DATED this 14th day of June, 2016.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Richard G. Kopf
Senior United States District Judge
1

There does appear to be authority allowing Plaintiff to receive a bill of
exceptions free of charge in order to appeal the juvenile court’s judgment:
In civil or criminal cases in which a party is permitted to proceed in
forma pauperis, the court shall direct that the expenses of printing the
record on appeal, if such printing is required by the appellate court, be
paid by the county in the same manner as other claims are paid.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2305 (Westaw 2016). See also Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2301.01
(Westlaw 2016) (“Any county or state court, except the Nebraska Workers’
Compensation Court, may authorize the commencement, prosecution, defense, or
appeal therein, of a civil or criminal case in forma pauperis.”); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 252307 (Westlaw 2016) (“In any civil or criminal case in which a party is permitted to
proceed in forma pauperis, on appeal the court shall direct that the expense of printing
of the appellate briefs, if such printing is required by the court, be paid by the county
in the same manner as other claims are paid.”).
5