Cy Wakeman, Inc. v. Nicole Price Consulting, LLC et al
Filing
57
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - IT IS ORDERED that Wakeman's Motion for Preliminary Injunction (filing 26 ) is denied. Ordered by Judge John M. Gerrard. (TCL)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
CY WAKEMAN, INC., an Iowa
corporation, Individually and as
Assignee of John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
8:16-CV-541
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
vs.
NICOLE PRICE CONSULTING, LLC
d/b/a LIVELY PARADOX, a Missouri
limited liability company and
NICOLE D. PRICE,
Defendants.
The primary opponents in this case are Cy Wakeman, founder of
plaintiff Cy Wakeman, Inc. (collectively, Wakeman), and Nicole Price, who is
a defendant along with her eponymous LLC (collectively, Price). Wakeman
accuses Price of, among other things, violating copyrights held by Wakeman
and misappropriating Wakeman's trade secrets. Filing 1 at 6-7.
Wakeman seeks to preliminarily enjoin Price from that alleged conduct.
See filing 26. The parties have presented evidence, and the Court has
conducted an evidentiary hearing at which Wakeman and Price both
testified. On the evidence presented, the Court finds that Wakeman has
failed to show the necessary likelihood of success on the merits of her claims,
and failed to demonstrate that she has been—or will be—irreparably harmed
in the absence of a preliminary injunction. So, Wakeman's motion (filing 26)
will be denied.
I. BACKGROUND
Wakeman is in the business of providing business training and
coaching services, with speeches and seminars on business leadership and
employee advancement. Filing 28-2 at 1. Wakeman's programs are primarily
based on a concept she calls "Reality-Based Leadership." Filing 28-2 at 1.
Wakeman is also the author of two books based on that concept: RealityBased Leadership, published in 2010, and The Reality-Based Rules of the
Workplace, published in 2013. Those books, according to Wakeman, have
combined sales of approximately 46,000 copies. Filing 55 at 24.
Price worked for Wakeman from 2012 until 2016. Filing 28-2 at 1. Price
was one of Wakeman's featured speakers, and also assisted in the
development of new programs, including a presentation on "Reality-Based
Diversity and Inclusion in the Workplace." Filing 28-2 at 1; see filing 28-9.
Wakeman terminated Price's employment in 2016; according to Wakeman,
she fired Price after she found out about Price's intent to launch a competing
business. Filing 28-2 at 2. After her termination, Price started her own
consulting business. Filing 34-1 at 1. And she published her own book, Lively
Paradox, which she says has sold about 200 copies. Filing 34-1 at 2.
Wakeman sued Price, alleging in relevant part that Lively Paradox
infringed on Wakeman's copyrights in Reality-Based Leadership, The RealityBased Rules of the Workplace, and the text and images of the PowerPoint
presentation associated with "Reality-Based Diversity and Inclusion in the
Workplace." Filing 1 at 2-7. Wakeman also alleges that Price has
misappropriated Wakeman's trade secrets by publicly revealing some of
Wakeman's confidential clients. Filing 1 at 7. Wakeman asks for a
preliminary injunction "with regard to the sales, distribution and use of
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copyrighted materials and references to confidential Wakeman clients on
[Price's] real and virtual materials." Filing 26 at 2.
II. DISCUSSION
When deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the Court
weighs the four Dataphase factors: (1) the threat of irreparable harm to the
movant; (2) the state of the balance between this harm and the injury that
granting the injunction will inflict on other parties; (3) the probability that
the movant will succeed on the merits; and (4) the public interest. Johnson v.
Minneapolis Park & Recreation Bd., 729 F.3d 1094, 1098 (8th Cir. 2013);
(citing Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 114 (8th Cir. 1981)
(en banc)). A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, and the
movant bears the burden of establishing its propriety. Roudachevski v. AllAm. Care Centers, Inc., 648 F.3d 701, 705 (8th Cir. 2011); see also Winter v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
1. COPYRIGHT CLAIMS
As noted above, Wakeman claims that Price's Lively Paradox infringes
on Wakeman's own copyrighted works.
(a) Likelihood of Success on the Merits
The Court begins by assessing Wakeman's likelihood of success on the
merits of her copyright claim, because in deciding whether to grant a
preliminary injunction, likelihood of success on the merits is the most
significant factor. Laclede Gas Co. v. St. Charles Cnty., 713 F.3d 413, 419-20
(8th Cir. 2013). A party seeking injunctive relief need not necessarily show a
greater than 50 percent likelihood that it will prevail on the merits. Planned
Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724,
-3-
731 (8th Cir. 2008). But the absence of a likelihood of success on the merits
strongly suggests that preliminary injunctive relief should be denied. Barrett
v. Claycomb, 705 F.3d 315, 320 (8th Cir. 2013).
The elements of copyright infringement are (1) ownership of a valid
copyright and (2) copying original elements of the copyrighted work. Warner
Bros. Entm't v. X One X Prods., 644 F.3d 584, 595 (8th Cir. 2011). Copying
can be shown either by (1) direct evidence, or (2) access to the copyrighted
material and substantial similarity between the copyrighted work and the
allegedly infringing work. Id. There is no direct evidence of copying here.1 So,
the question is whether the works are substantially similar.
Determination of substantial similarity involves a two-step analysis.
Rottlund, 452 F.3d at 731. There must be substantial similarity both of ideas
and of expression. Id. Similarity of ideas is evaluated extrinsically, focusing
on objective similarities in the details of the works. Id. If the ideas are
substantially similar, then similarity of expression is evaluated using an
intrinsic test depending on the response of the ordinary, reasonable person to
the forms of expression. Id. In other words, the Court must first consider
whether the general idea of the works is objectively similar (the "extrinsic"
portion of the test) and then determine whether there is similarity of
expression (the "intrinsic" portion of the test). See Taylor Corp. v. Four
1
Wakeman suggests in passing that she has shown direct copying. Filing 27 at 18-19. But
to prove direct copying is to disprove independent creation. Rottlund Co. v. Pinnacle Corp.,
452 F.3d 726, 732 (8th Cir. 2006). Direct evidence of copying is rarely available because it
includes evidence such as party admissions, witness accounts of the physical act of copying,
and common errors in the works of plaintiffs and the defendants. See id. (collecting cases);
see also Moore v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 972 F.2d 939, 941-42 (8th Cir. 1992). There
is no comparable evidence here.
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Seasons Greetings, LLC, 315 F.3d 1039, 1043 (8th Cir. 2003).2 Wakeman has
not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of either step of that analysis.
(i) Extrinsic Similarity
Extrinsically, Wakeman points to several parts of Lively Paradox that,
she says, represent content taken "nearly verbatim" from her copyrighted
works. Filing 27 at 5-14. She argues that "Lively Paradox violates the
'extrinsic test' by objectively stealing the expression, organization and
application of certain ideas from Wakeman-copyrighted works." Filing 35 at
3. But the extrinsic test requires more than that: "[t]he extrinsic inquiry is an
objective one, looking to specific and external criteria of substantial similarity
between the original elements (and only the original elements) of a protected
work and an alleged copy." Copeland v. Bieber, 789 F.3d 484, 489 (4th Cir.
2015) (quotations omitted). Wakeman has done little to categorically identify
such external criteria here. Compare filing 35 at 3 with, e.g., Swirsky v.
Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 845-49 (9th Cir. 2004).
And because it is focused only on the original elements of the
copyrighted work, a court examining extrinsic similarity must first engage in
"analytic dissection," separating out those parts of the work that are original
and protected from those that are not. Id.; see Three Boys Music Corp. v.
Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 485 (9th Cir. 2000); Herzog v. Castle Rock Entm't, 193
F.3d 1241, 1257 (11th Cir. 1999). In other words, extrinsic similarity cannot
be shown by cherry-picking common ideas between the works—at least, not
without considering whether those common ideas are original, copyrightable
2
Wakeman represents this analysis as being disjunctive—that is, she says that the
extrinsic and intrinsic tests are "two ways" to demonstrate substantial similarity, only one
of which need be met. Filing 35 at 3. But it is clearly a two-step analysis, requiring the
plaintiff to satisfy both tests. E.g. Taylor, 403 F.3d at 966.
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elements of the copyrighted works. See Universal Furniture Int'l, Inc. v.
Collezione Europa USA, Inc., 618 F.3d 417, 436 (4th Cir. 2010); see also
Herzog, 193 F.3d at 1257.3
And here, most if not all of the comparable elements Wakeman points
to are references to common ideas or experiences that both Lively Paradox
and Wakeman's works drew from underlying common sources. The principle
that a copyright does not protect ideas, but only the expression of those ideas,
is longstanding. Frye v. YMCA Camp Kitaki, 617 F.3d 1005, 1008 (8th Cir.
2010); see Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,
217-18 (1954); see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). "Ideas as such are not subject to
copyright. Nor is the right to the use of certain words protected by copyright.
A copyright secures the right to that arrangement of words which the author
has selected to express [her] ideas." Funkhouser v. Loew's, Inc., 208 F.2d 185,
189 (8th Cir. 1953) (citations omitted).
Price presented evidence, and testified at length, about the original
source for many of the ideas common to Lively Paradox and Wakeman's
copyrighted works. Filing 34-1 at 4, 6-9; filing 56 at 18-23. Those ideas are
not protected by Wakeman's copyrights, only the expression of those ideas—
and the Court is not persuaded that the expression of those ideas in Lively
Paradox is particularly similar to Wakeman's expression of those ideas.
There are, after all, only so many ways to accurately explain those ideas.
3
Contrary to Wakeman's suggestion, filing 35 at 1-2, the assertion that a copyrighted work
contains non-copyrightable elements is not tantamount to suggesting that the copyright is
invalid: copyright protection may extend to the components of a work that are original to
the author, even if not every element of the work may be protected. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348-49 (1991).
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Factual works are different from fictional works. Subsequent
authors wishing to express the ideas contained in a factual work
often can choose from only a narrow range of expression.
Therefore, similarity of expression may have to amount to
verbatim reproduction or very close paraphrasing before a factual
work will be deemed infringed.
Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 488 (9th
Cir. 1984) (cleaned up); see Iverson v. Grant, 946 F. Supp. 1404, 1417-18
(D.S.D. 1996), aff'd, 133 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 1998).
There are, to be sure, instances of probably non-coincidental similarity,
such as Lively Paradox's use of illustrations that are markedly similar—or, in
one instance, identical—to PowerPoint slides included in "Reality-Based
Diversity and Inclusion in the Workplace." See filing 27 at 8-11. But the
Court is not fully persuaded that, in this context, the design choices
associated with conveying the ideas are materially significant—and, because
it is hard to discern the content of "Reality-Based Diversity and Inclusion in
the Workplace" based only on the PowerPoint slides that are protected by
Wakeman's copyright, it is also hard to assess the context in which the
illustrations are being used in both works.
(ii) Intrinsic Similarity
And, even if the Court was persuaded that the instances relied upon by
Wakeman showed extrinsic similarity, the Court is not convinced that the
works are intrinsically similar, based on the response of the ordinary,
reasonable person to the forms of expression. Infringement of expression
occurs only when the total concept and feel of the works in question are
substantially similar. Hartman v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 833 F.2d 117, 120-21
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(8th Cir. 1987); see Taylor, 315 F.3d at 1043. And Wakeman's "scattershot
approach" to demonstrating similarity "cannot support a finding of
substantial similarity because it fails to address the underlying issue:
whether a lay observer would consider the works as a whole substantially
similar to one another." Williams v. Crichton, 84 F.3d 581, 590 (2d Cir. 1996);
see McMahon v. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 1296, 1304 (E.D. Mo. 1980).
So, the Court must evaluate the works in their entirety.
Reality-Based Leadership contains advice for workplace supervisors; it
attempts to identify causes of workplace unhappiness and presents a detailed
plan for combatting them, in oneself and others. It emphasizes reacting to
empirical facts instead of interpreting them through a preexisting narrative,
and can be loosely summarized as urging personal accountability and a focus
on productive results from leadership strategies. It notes, for its audience, a
difference between management and leadership.
The Reality-Based Rules of the Workplace contains many of the same
ideas, but is intended for employees at every level, not just management and
leadership. As a result, it puts a greater emphasis on personal accountability,
not motivating or engaging others. It contains tools for self-assessment and
self-improvement.
"Reality-Based Diversity and Inclusion in the Workplace" (filing 28-9)
is, as noted above, difficult to fully assess based only on a PowerPoint
presentation. But it appears that "Reality-Based Diversity and Inclusion in
the Workplace" is directed at those in leadership and management who are
seeking particular advice on addressing diversity issues. It presents the same
strategies as Reality-Based Leadership, but aims them more precisely at the
challenges and opportunities presented by workplace diversity.
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Lively Paradox (filing 29-2) is a different kind of book, based on a far
more personal narrative from the perspective of a Black woman in the
workplace. It discusses ideas relating to power in relationships between
people, based on their different attributes and in different contexts, and what
behavior is appropriate for those who have more power in a relationship. It
offers advice on learning to manage and accept differences. It describes
different biases people have, conscious and unconscious, and presents
strategies for addressing and overcoming them. Generally, Lively Paradox is
focused on providing advice specifically tailored for those who are
disempowered because they are "different, underrepresented, or on the
fringes of societal norms." Filing 29-2 at 46.
Like Reality-Based Leadership, Lively Paradox does mention ideas like
"personal accountability," "learned helplessness," and "unconscious bias," but
it discusses those ideas in a different context and with a different purpose.
When the works are considered in their entirety, the common ideas they
share do not demonstrate that the works are intrinsically similar. "The test is
whether the resemblance would be recognized by ordinary observation, not
fine analysis or argument. Hypercritical [dissection] of sentences and
incidents should not be resorted to in an attempt to show substantial
similarity." McMahon, 486 F. Supp. at 1304 (citations and quotations
omitted); see Funkhouser, 208 F.2d at 190; see also Banker's Promotional
Mktg. Grp., Inc. v. Orange, 926 F.2d 704, 705 (8th Cir. 1991). Even if some of
the same underlying material was relied upon, the works bear no real
resemblance to each other. See Funkhouser, 208 F.2d at 190; see also Orange,
926 F.2d at 705.
As a result, the Court finds that, at least based on the evidence
presented at this stage of the proceeding, Wakeman has not shown a "fair
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chance of prevailing" on her claims. See Powell v. Noble, 798 F.3d 690, 698
(8th Cir. 2015).4
(b) Likelihood of Irreparable Harm
Furthermore, a preliminary injunction cannot issue without a showing
of irreparable harm. Dataphase, 640 F.2d at 114 n.9. To show a threat of
irreparable harm, the movant must show that the harm is certain and great
and of such imminence that there is a clear and present need for equitable
relief.5 Roudachevski, 648 F.3d at 706. Stated differently, the harm "must be
4
Price also suggests that Wakeman failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits
because she failed to address any of Price's affirmative defenses. Filing 33 at 10. On that
point, Wakeman has the stronger argument: the better-reasoned approach is that
"'[b]ecause 'the burdens at the preliminary injunction stage track the burdens at trial,' once
the moving party has carried its burden of showing a likelihood of success on the merits,
the burden shifts to the non-moving party to show a likelihood that its affirmative defense
will succeed." Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d 1146, 1158 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 429 (2006)).
5
Wakeman suggests that irreparable harm may be presumed upon a finding of likelihood of
success on the merits in a copyright case. Filing 27 at 21-22. The Court disagrees: the
Supreme Court "has consistently rejected invitations to replace traditional equitable
considerations with a rule that an injunction automatically follows a determination that a
copyright has been infringed." eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392-93
(2006); see Winter, 555 U.S. at 22 (plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief are required to
demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction); see also Flava
Works, Inc. v. Gunter, 689 F.3d 754, 755 (7th Cir. 2012); Flexible Lifeline Sys., Inc. v.
Precision Lift, Inc., 654 F.3d 989, 998 (9th Cir. 2011); Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 82
(2d Cir. 2010); Christopher Phelps & Assocs., LLC v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 543 (4th Cir.
2007); cf. Novus Franchising, Inc. v. Dawson, 725 F.3d 885, 894-95 (8th Cir. 2013)
(discussing authority rejecting presumption of irreparable harm and affirming district
court's denial of injunctive relief based on failure to prove irreparable harm).
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actual and not theoretical." Brady v. Nat'l Football League, 640 F.3d 785, 794
(8th Cir. 2011). And harm is not irreparable when a party can be fully
compensated for its injuries through an award of damages. Gen. Motors Corp.
v. Harry Brown's, LLC, 563 F.3d 312, 319 (8th Cir. 2009).
Wakeman presented no evidence that her book sales or speaking
engagements had been affected by Price's alleged appropriation of
Wakeman's copyrighted materials—and, even if such evidence had been
presented, there is no reason that the injury of lost customers or lost sales
could not be remediated with money damages. Cf. Novus Franchising, 725
F.3d at 895; World Wide Polymers, Inc. v. Shinkong Synthetic Fibers Corp.,
694 F.3d 155, 161 (2d Cir. 2012).
Wakeman also argues that she has shown irreparable harm because
she was asked by her publisher to take material adapted from "Reality-Based
Diversity and Inclusion in the Workplace" out of her third book, No Ego,
because of concerns posed by Lively Paradox. Filing 27 at 22; see filing 28-2 at
2; filing 35-1; filing 55 at 15-16. But as the Court understands the record,
that book's contents were final before the Court's evidentiary hearing—so, it
is not clear to the Court how a preliminary injunction would unscramble that
egg. See filing 35-1; filing 55 at 17. Nor is it clear how a preliminary
injunction would address this issue, even with respect to any future
publications, given the Court's understanding that it is the copyright on
Lively Paradox, and not its sales, that concerns Wakeman's publisher.
It is the movant's burden to "demonstrate that irreparable injury is
likely in the absence of an injunction." Winter, 555 U.S. at 22 (emphasis in
original); see Minn. Bearing Co. v. White Motor Corp., 470 F.2d 1323, 1326
(8th Cir. 1973). The implication of that proposition is that an injunction
should not issue where the allegedly irreparable injury would occur despite
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the injunction. Accordingly, "[i]t is black letter law that an injunction will not
issue when it would be ineffectual." United States v. Parish of St. Bernard,
756 F.2d 1116, 1123 (5th Cir. 1985). The Court has been presented with no
reason to believe that the preliminary injunction Wakeman requests "with
regard to the sales, distribution and use of copyrighted materials," filing 26 at
2, would address any injury related to Wakeman's inability to publish her
diversity-related materials.
(c) Remaining Factors
Obviously, having found little evidence to establish irreparable harm to
Wakeman, the Court's finding regarding the balance of harms also weighs in
favor of Price. The Court sees little evidence that Wakeman is being
irreparably harmed, but the injunction sought by Wakeman would be
devastating to Price. Filing 34-1 at 10. Because a preliminary injunction is an
extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right, the Court must balance the
competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the
granting or withholding of the requested relief. Winter, 555 U.S. at 24.
Granting
an
injunction
could
effectively
close
Price's
business—so,
accordingly, the balance of harms tips toward Price.
Finally, while Wakeman is correct that there is a public interest in
protecting intellectual property, filing 27 at 24, there is also a public interest
in free competition. See Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp. v. Lenox Labs., Inc., 815
F.2d 500, 505 (8th Cir. 1987). The Court does not find the public interest to
weigh in favor of granting or denying injunctive relief.
(d) Conclusion
Based on the Dataphase factors, the Court finds that Wakeman has not
demonstrated the propriety of injunctive relief on her copyright claims.
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2. TRADE SECRETS
Wakeman also seeks to have Price enjoined from "references to
confidential Wakeman clients on [Price's] real and virtual materials." Filing
26 at 2. But, insofar as this is styled as a trade secrets claim, the Court finds
no likelihood of success on the merits.
Wakeman's trade secrets claim is brought pursuant to the Nebraska
Trade Secrets Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 87-501 et seq. And under Nebraska law,
a "trade secret" is defined as information that:
(a)
Derives independent economic value, actual or potential,
from not being known to, and not being ascertainable by proper
means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its
disclosure or use; and
(b)
Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 87-502(4).
The alleged "trade secrets" at issue here are the customer relationships
between Wakeman and certain clients who, according to Wakeman, want
their relationship with Wakeman to remain confidential. Wakeman argues
that "[w]hile the entirety of Wakeman's customer list was not, and is not, a
trade secret—Wakeman promotes its work on behalf of some clients on its
website—the nature of Wakeman's coaching and consulting business make
disclosure of other clients' identities a confidential matter." Filing 27 at 25.
So, those clients have entered into confidentiality agreements with
Wakeman. Filing 28-2.
But even if those customer relationships are sufficiently secret, it is far
from clear to the Court how they have independent economic value. Who,
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precisely, are the "other persons" to whom the relationships are unknown,
but who "can obtain economic value from [their] disclosure or use"?
Nebraska's statutory definition of "trade secret" is derived from the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 537-38 (2005 & Supp. 2017), and under
that definition, the "existence of a trade secret is determined by the value of a
secret[.]" AvidAir Helicopter Supply, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 663 F.3d 966,
972 (8th Cir. 2011). In other words, secrecy does not equal economic value.
GAB Bus. Servs., Inc. v. Lindsey & Newsom Claim Servs., Inc., 99 Cal. Rptr.
2d 665, 678 (Ct. App. 2000), disapproved on other grounds by Reeves v.
Hanlon, 95 P.3d 513 (Cal. 2004).
So, even if information is confidential, it cannot be a "trade secret"
unless it has "independent economic value"—that is, if possession of the
secret information confers a competitive advantage. See Capital Asset
Research Corp. v. Finnegan, 160 F.3d 683, 688 (11th Cir. 1998); Religious
Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1090 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Fox
Sports Net N., L.L.C. v. Minnesota Twins P'ship, 319 F.3d 329, 336 (8th Cir.
2003). Wakeman argues that "[t]he independent economic value created by
[the] secrecy [of Wakeman's client list] is the business those clients generate,
business which would not be generated if Wakeman was unable to maintain
their privacy." Filing 27 at 26. But that is just value to Wakeman, and is not
independent value. Wakeman has identified no one else who could obtain an
economic advantage from knowing who Wakeman's confidential clients are.6
While Wakeman suggests in passing that "disclosure notifies competitors of
6
Wakeman has not suggested that the information has independent economic value to
Price—and correctly so, because Price already has that information, and "[i]f the principal
persons who can obtain economic benefit from information are aware of it, there is no trade
secret." Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1 cmt., 14 U.L.A. at 538.
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potential opportunities," filing 27 at 27, that is only "the most general of
assertions," and falls short of demonstrating how a competitor, armed with
knowledge of Wakeman's client relationships, could reap economic value from
knowing them. See Finnegan, 160 F.3d at 683.
In the absence of a "trade secret" within the applicable statutory
definition, the Court is not persuaded that Wakeman has any likelihood of
success on her trade secrets claim. The absence of a likelihood of success on
the merits strongly suggests that preliminary injunctive relief should be
denied. Barrett, 705 F.3d at 320. So, while Wakeman has presented evidence
of some harm resulting from the disclosure of client information, and the
balance of harms and public interest do not weigh against injunctive relief,
the Court finds that Wakeman's failure to show any meaningful likelihood of
success on the merits precludes a preliminary injunction.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Wakeman has not
carried her burden of proving the propriety of injunctive relief. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Wakeman's Motion for Preliminary
Injunction (filing 26) is denied.
Dated this 24th day of January, 2018.
BY THE COURT:
John M. Gerrard
United States District Judge
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