Goodwin v. Coffey

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - Plaintiff's Complaint (Filing No. 1 ) is dismissed without prejudice. The court will enter judgment by a separate document. Ordered by Senior Judge Richard G. Kopf. (Copy mailed to pro se party) (KLF)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
VIOLET L. GOODWIN,
Plaintiff,

8:17CV385

vs.
MICHAEL COFFEY, Judge Michael
Coffey;

MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER

Defendant.
Plaintiff filed her Complaint on October 13, 2017. (Filing No. 1.) She has
been given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Filing No. 5.) The court now
conducts an initial review of Plaintiff’s Complaint to determine whether summary
dismissal is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
I. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT
Plaintiff has filed suit against Defendant Judge Michael Coffey, “a state
judge of Nebraska in Douglas County.” (Filing No. 1 at CM/ECF p.2.) Plaintiff is
the daughter of Billy Roy Tyler and alleges that Judge Coffey discriminates against
her for that reason. Plaintiff alleges that Judge Coffey is engaged in a “conspiracy”
with the Clerk of the District Court of Douglas County, Nebraska, to have all cases
involving parties suspected of being associated with Billy Roy Tyler assigned to
Judge Coffey. Once such cases are assigned, Judge Coffey “invariably violates the
rights of such person.” (Id. at CM/ECF p.3.)
Plaintiff alleges Judge Coffey discriminated against Plaintiff in her divorce
case when he refused to award Plaintiff the marital home, custody of the children,
child support, and alimony. The state court records relating to Plaintiff’s divorce

case,1 available to this court online, show that the case is currently pending on
Plaintiff’s appeal to the Nebraska appellate courts. The court takes judicial notice
of these state court records. See Stutzka v. McCarville, 420 F.3d 757, 760 n.2 (8th
Cir. 2005) (court may take judicial notice of judicial opinions and public records).
Plaintiff claims there is no basis in law or fact to award custody to Plaintiff’s
husband based on his criminal record and lifestyle, and Judge Coffey’s decision to
do so is “bizarre” and “contrary to the norm. (Filing No. 1 at CM/ECF p.4.)
Plaintiff alleges that she is being denied due process and equal protection of the
law as a result of Judge Coffey’s decisions and handling of the proceedings.
Plaintiff seeks an injunction against Judge Coffey and a declaration that Judge
Coffey is violating Plaintiff’s due process rights.
II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS ON IN INITIAL REVIEW
The court is required to review in forma pauperis complaints to determine
whether summary dismissal is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court
must dismiss a complaint or any portion of it that states a frivolous or malicious
claim, that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B).
Pro se plaintiffs must set forth enough factual allegations to “nudge[] their
claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,” or “their complaint must be
dismissed.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569–70 (2007); see also
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”).

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Violet Goodwin v. David Goodwin, Case No. CI17-2781, District Court of Douglas
County, Nebraska.

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“The essential function of a complaint under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure is to give the opposing party ‘fair notice of the nature and basis or
grounds for a claim, and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.’”
Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Hopkins v. Saunders, 199 F.3d 968, 973 (8th Cir. 1999)). However, “[a]
pro se complaint must be liberally construed, and pro se litigants are held to a
lesser pleading standard than other parties.” Topchian, 760 F.3d at 849 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
Liberally construed, Plaintiff here alleges federal constitutional claims. To
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights
protected by the United States Constitution or created by federal statute and also
must show that the alleged deprivation was caused by conduct of a person acting
under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Buckley v. Barlow,
997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993).
III. DISCUSSION OF CLAIMS
A. Judicial Immunity
Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Coffey are barred by judicial immunity. A
judge is immune from suit, including suits brought under section 1983 to recover
for alleged deprivation of civil rights, in all but two narrow sets of circumstances.
Schottel v. Young, 687 F.3d 370, 373 (8th Cir. 2012). “First, a judge is not immune
from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial
capacity. Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature,
taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
An act is judicial if “it is one normally performed by a judge and if the
complaining party is dealing with the judge in his judicial capacity.” Id. (internal
citations omitted).

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Here, Plaintiff alleges Judge Coffey had her case assigned to him due to her
relation to Billy Roy Tyler and proceeded to render decisions against her favor
despite Plaintiff’s “spotless” record. (Filing No. 1 at CM/ECF p.4.) Although
Plaintiff alleges he acted in violation of her rights to due process and equal
protection, Plaintiff alleges no facts against Judge Coffey that would fall outside
the scope of his duties in presiding over Plaintiff’s divorce proceedings.
Accordingly, Judge Coffey is immune from suit.
B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In addition to Defendants’ immunity from suit, Plaintiff’s claims for
injunctive and declaratory relief are subject to dismissal under the domestic
relations exception to federal court jurisdiction. It is well-settled that “the whole
subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to
the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States.” In re Burrus, 136
U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890). Although this domestic relations exception to federal
jurisdiction does not apply to a civil action that merely has domestic relations
overtones, federal courts lack jurisdiction where the action is a mere pretense and
the suit is actually concerned with domestic relations issues. See, e.g., Drewes v.
Ilnicki, 863 F.2d 469, 471 (6th Cir. 1988).
Here, the substance of Plaintiff’s claims concerns state law domestic
relations matters. This is particularly so where it is clear from Plaintiff’s
allegations and the available state court records that her divorce is the subject of
ongoing state court proceedings. The state courts would be better equipped to
handle the issues that have arisen in the course of Plaintiff’s divorce proceedings
and her displeasure with the decisions rendered by Judge Coffey. See Overman v.
U.S., 563 F.2d 1287,1292 (8th Cir. 1977) (“There is, and ought to be, a continuing
federal policy to avoid handling domestic relations cases in federal court in the
absence of important concerns of a constitutional dimension. . . . Such cases touch
state law and policy in a deep and sensitive manner and as a matter of policy and

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comity, these local problems should be decided in state courts.”) (internal citations
and quotations omitted).
Further, even if the court did not lack jurisdiction based on the domestic
relations exception, the court would refrain from exercising jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s claims for equitable relief under the abstention doctrine set out by the
Supreme Court in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-45 (1971). Under Younger,
abstention is mandatory where: (1) there is an ongoing state proceeding; (2) an
important state interest is implicated; and (3) the plaintiff has an avenue open for
review of constitutional claims in the state court. See Aaron v. Target Corp., 357
F.3d 768, 774 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Under Younger v. Harris,[] federal courts should
abstain from exercising jurisdiction in cases where equitable relief would interfere
with pending state proceedings in a way that offends principles of comity and
federalism.”)
Here, each of the three Younger conditions is satisfied. First, the state
proceedings are ongoing. Second, disputes concerning dissolution of a marriage
and care and custody of minors implicate important state interests. Third, there is
no indication that the state courts could not afford Plaintiff the opportunity for
judicial review of any civil rights challenges. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims are
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that: Plaintiff’s Complaint (Filing No. 1) is
dismissed without prejudice. The court will enter judgment by a separate
document.
Dated this 29th day of January, 2018.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Richard G. Kopf
Senior United States District Judge

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