Robinson v. State of Nebraska

Filing 44

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration (filing no. 39 ) is denied. Plaintiff's Motion for Supplemental Filing (filing no. 41 ) and motion for status (filing no. 43 ) are granted in accordance with this Memorandum and Order. Ordered by Senior Judge Richard G. Kopf. (Copy mailed to pro se party)(LKO)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
ERIC M. ROBINSON,
Plaintiff,

8:18CV73

vs.
STATE OF NEBRASKA,

MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER

Defendant.
This matter is before the court on Plaintiff Eric M. Robinson’s (“Plaintiff” or
“Robinson”) Motion for Reconsideration (filing no. 39), Motion for Supplemental
Filing (filing no. 41), and what the court construes as a motion for status (filing no.
43). Robinson’s motion for status is granted. The court now reviews Robinson’s
Motion for Reconsideration and will consider his Motion for Supplemental Filing
and the other supplemental materials he filed as part of the motion. (See Filing
Nos. 40 & 42.)1
Because Robinson has not indicated which provision of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure he is relying upon in making his motion for reconsideration, it may
be treated either as a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend judgment or as a Rule
60(b) motion for relief from judgment.2 See Sanders v. Clemco Indus., 862 F.2d
161, 168 (8th Cir. 1988). But whichever rule is applied, the motion fails.

Thus, the court grants Robinson’s Motion for Supplemental Filing (filing no. 41)
to the extent it will be considered along with his motion for reconsideration. The court
notes that Robinson’s motion and supplemental materials total approximately 130 pages.
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A Rule 59(e) motion “must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of
judgment.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). A Rule 60(b) motion “must be made within a reasonable
time.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c)(1). Plaintiff’s motion was timely filed on March 25, 2019.
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Rule 59(e) motions serve the limited function of correcting manifest errors
of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence. United States v. Metro. St.
Louis Sewer Dist., 440 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 2006). Such motions cannot be used
to introduce new evidence, tender new legal theories, or raise arguments which
could have been offered or raised prior to entry of judgment. Id.
Under Rule 60(b), a court may grant a party relief from a judgment for the
following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence,
could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under
Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is
based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or
applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). Relief under the catchall provision, Rule 60(b)(6), is available
only in “extraordinary circumstances.” Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 777–78
(2017) (quoting Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005)).
Here, Robinson asks the court to reconsider its Memorandum and Order and
Judgment (filing nos. 37 & 38) entered on March 14, 2019, dismissing Robinson’s
Complaint (filing no. 1) without prejudice because, inter alia and as best the court
can determine, the court erred in treating Robinson’s Complaint as a 42 U.S.C. §
1983 action, failed to consider all the materials filed in support of the Complaint,
failed to liberally construe Robinson’s pleadings, and generally failed to give
adequate consideration to Robinson’s claims. The court is unmoved by Robinson’s
arguments but will address those which warrant further comment.

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First, Robinson takes issue with the court’s characterization of his pleadings
as full of “ramblings, frustrations, and commentary” and asserts that the court
misused Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to avoid giving his
pleadings the proper liberal construction due to pro se litigants’ pleadings. (See,
e.g., Filing No. 40 at CM/ECF pp. 17–20.) Robinson contends that the court failed
to give a “full statement of his claim,” (filing no. 39 at CM/ECF p. 11), but if the
court has failed to do so it is because the court cannot understand Robinson’s
statement of his claim as his pleadings are prolix, disjointed, and lacking in rational
organization and comprehensibility. The court has done its best in liberally
construing Robinson’s Complaint and supplemental pleadings, but liberal
construction can only go so far. Moreover, the court’s obligation to liberally
construe Robinson’s pleadings does not relieve him from compliance with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 8, no matter what type of civil
action Robinson files be it a § 1983 action, special fraud proceeding, habeas, or
other civil action. See NEGenR 1.3(g) (pro se litigants are “bound by and must
comply with all local and federal procedural rules”); Schooley v. Kennedy, 712
F.2d 372, 373 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (concluding pro se litigants are not
excused from compliance with procedural and local rules). Thus, the court finds no
reason to revisit its determination that Robinson’s Complaint fails to comply with
Rule 8.
Robinson also challenges the court’s docketing and construction of his
Complaint as an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Robinson asserts that he did not
file this action under § 1983 but rather as a “supercharged habeas corpus, pleading
for special matters” of fraud. (See, e.g., Filing No. 39 at CM/ECF p. 24–25, 42;
Filing No. 41 at CM/ECF pp. 1–2.) Again, because the Complaint is prolix and
difficult to understand, the court did its best to liberally construe it, not only as an
action under § 1983 but as seeking relief in an action in equity under Rule 60(d)
for fraud on the court and, thus, generally as raising a federal question. Robinson’s
opposition to the court’s consideration of his Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
does not change the court’s conclusion that dismissal was proper based on
Robinson’s failure to set forth sufficient factual allegations of fraud that would
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entitle him to relief under Rule 60(d)(1) or (3)3 and that Robinson’s challenges to
his criminal convictions must be pursued in a habeas action according to the
dictates of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
Additionally, it appears Robinson misconstrues the court’s construction of
his Complaint’s allegations as some kind of endorsement of their validity and
merit. (See Filing No. 42 at CM/ECF pp. 8–12.) That is not the case. In stating the
allegations as the court understood them, the court was merely summarizing the
allegations to provide the background upon which to conduct the legal analysis of
Robinson’s complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). While Robinson
believes his claims are valid, the law requires plausible factual allegations
demonstrating his entitlement to relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79
(2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged. . . . But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the
court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” (quoting
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2))). As the court concluded in the Memorandum and Order

Moreover, upon further consideration of Robinson’s claims pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(d), the court is convinced that it lacks jurisdiction to grant Robinson relief
from his state criminal convictions in an action under Rule 60(d) as such rule is a federal
civil rule inapplicable to state court judgments. See Wells v. King, 340 F. App'x 57, 58
(3d Cir. 2009) (“We are similarly unaware of any power that a federal court has to
overturn a state criminal conviction obtained by fraud, outside of power authorized by
statute; i.e. through a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.”); Byrd v.
Beard, No. CV 91-432, 2019 WL 2106382, at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 13, 2019) (“Rule 60(d),
however, may not be used to allege fraud upon the state court in the underlying criminal
proceeding.”).
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dismissing this matter, Robinson’s conclusory assertions of fraud are insufficient to
meet this burden.4
Upon consideration of Robinson’s motion, the court concludes Robinson has
not demonstrated any legitimate reason for altering, amending, or otherwise
obtaining any relief from the court’s judgment of dismissal. He has not shown that
the dismissal was the result of manifest error of law or fact nor has he presented
any “extraordinary circumstances” justifying relief. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to
establish sufficient grounds for setting aside the court’s judgment under Rule 59(e)
or Rule 60(b).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:
1.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (filing no. 39) is denied.

2.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Supplemental Filing (filing no. 41) and motion
for status (filing no. 43) are granted in accordance with this Memorandum and
Order.

Contrary to Robinson’s suggestion that the court failed to consider all his
hundreds of pages of documents in concluding no fraud claim had been alleged, the court
did review all of his documents, and as best the court could tell, Robinson’s claims
focused on the CR14-9536 “Case Action Summary” allegedly forged by Lancaster
County Court Judge Acton and which allegedly permeated and invalidated all his
subsequent criminal proceedings. To the extent Robinson may be challenging ongoing
state court proceedings (see, e.g., filing no. 39 at CM/ECF pp. 41–44), the court would
refrain from exercising jurisdiction over such claims under principles of abstention.
Harmon v. City of Kansas City, Mo., 197 F.3d 321, 325 (8th Cir. 1999) (“In Younger v.
Harris, [401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971)], the Supreme Court advanced the position that
federal courts should refrain from interfering with pending state judicial proceedings
absent extraordinary circumstances.”).
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Dated this 3rd day of January, 2020.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Richard G. Kopf
Senior United States District Judge

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