Middlebrook v. General Motors et al

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER that Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed without prejudice, and Judgment will be entered by separate document. Ordered by Senior Judge Richard G. Kopf. (Copy mailed to pro se party)(LAC)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
THERESA E. MIDDLEBROOK,
Plaintiff,
v.
GENERAL MOTORS and
ALLY INSURANCE COMPANY
AND FINANCE,
Defendants.

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8:18CV286

MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER

Plaintiff filed her pro se Complaint on June 22, 2018 (Filing No. 1), and has
been given leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Filing No. 5). The court now conducts
an initial review of the Complaint to determine whether summary dismissal is
appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
I. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT
Plaintiff alleges she purchased a General Motors vehicle on November 15,
2012, and immediately began to experience mechanical problems. Plaintiff claims
Defendants are not honoring their warranties. She wants the vehicle repaired or
replaced.
II. APPLICABLE STANDARDS ON INITIAL REVIEW
The court is required to review in forma pauperis complaints to determine
whether summary dismissal is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court must
dismiss a complaint or any portion of it that states a frivolous or malicious claim, that

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Pro se plaintiffs must set forth enough factual allegations to “nudge[ ] their
claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,” or “their complaint must be
dismissed.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569-70 (2007); see also
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”).
“The essential function of a complaint under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure is to give the opposing party ‘fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds
for a claim, and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.’” Topchian v.
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hopkins v.
Saunders, 199 F.3d 968, 973 (8th Cir. 1999)). However, “[a] pro se complaint must
be liberally construed, and pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than
other parties.” Topchian, 760 F.3d at 849 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.
Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal
district courts is generally set forth in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Under these
statutes, federal jurisdiction is available only when a “federal question” is presented
(i.e., in a civil action arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States) or when the parties are of diverse citizenship and the amount in controversy
exceeds $75,000.
Plaintiff’s Complaint does not present a “federal question.” Rather, Plaintiff
asserts a state-law claim for breach of warranty. While the diversity-of-citizenship
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requirement of § 1332 appears satisfied, the amount in controversy obviously is less
than $75,000. Plaintiff states that the purchase price of the vehicle was approximately
$17,500, and that she bought extended warranty coverage for an additional $2,000
(Filing No. 1, p. 9).
IV. CONCLUSION
The court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction in this case.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed without prejudice, and
Judgment will be entered by separate document.
DATED this 27th day of June, 2018.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Richard G. Kopf
Senior United States District Judge

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