Yah v. Livnow Homes, LLC

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - Although Plaintiff's Complaint as pleaded is subject to summary dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), in lieu of dismissal Plaintiff's Motion to Amend, Filing No. 14 , is granted. Plaintiff shall have until Apr il 3, 2025, to file an amended complaint. When amending the Complaint, Plaintiff is advised of the following: a. Plaintiff must adequately allege the stage of state court proceedings at issue and/or any judgment to which he seeks review. While Pl aintiff need not submit formal briefing on the applicability (or lack thereof) of the Rooker-Feldman and Younger doctrines, Plaintiff should include facts supporting this Court's jurisdiction in light of those doctrines. b. In support of all c laims, Plaintiff should be mindful to provide facts (as opposed to conclusions) which establish what each Defendant did to him, when Defendant(s) did it, how each Defendants actions harmed him, and what specific legal rights Plaintiff believes eac h Defendant violated. Should Plaintiff require further time to comply with this Memorandum and Order he must move for an extension, in writing, prior to the expiration of the deadline for compliance. The Clerk's Office is directed to set pro se case management deadlines in this case using the following text: April 3, 2025: check for second amended complaint. The Motions Addressing Ongoing State Proceedings (Filing Nos. 11 , 12 , 13 , and 15 ) are denied without prejudice to reassertion after the amended complaint has been filed. Failure to comply with this Memorandum and Order shall result in the dismissal of this case without further notice. Ordered by Senior Judge John M. Gerrard. (Copy mailed to pro se party)(LKO)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
MA YAH II,
Plaintiff,

8:25CV121

vs.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
LIVNOW HOMES, LLC,
Defendant.
This matter is now before the Court on a Motion seeking leave to amend
or supplement the complaint1 (the “Motion to Amend”), Filing No. 14, a motion
seeking a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order and a
motion for hearing on that same motion, see Filing Nos. 11 and 15, a motion to
stay state court proceedings, Filing No. 13, and a motion for emergency stay of
county court proceedings, Filing No. 12 (collectively the “Motions Addressing
Ongoing State Proceedings”), all filed by Plaintiff Ma Yah II (“Plaintiff”), a nonprisoner. The matter is also before the Court to perform an initial review of
Plaintiffs’ Complaint to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).2
For the reasons set forth below, the finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint is
subject to dismissal, but in lieu of dismissal this Court grants Plaintiff’s Motion
to Amend at Filing No. 14 and shall allow Plaintiff to amend his Complaint
consistent with this Memorandum and Order. The Court will deny the pending

1 The Court notes that while the initial filing in this matter

at Filing No. 1 is titled “Petition for
Temporary Injunction,” as Plaintiff refers to it as a complaint which he seeks to amend, for ease of
reference the Court shall refer to it as the Complaint throughout this Memorandum and Order.
Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis on February 27, 2025. See Filing No. 7.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s Complaint is subject to review by this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
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Motions Addressing Ongoing State Proceedings, Filing Nos. 11–13 and 15,
without prejudice to reassertion after an amended complaint has been filed.
As an initial matter, Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides “[t]he court should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so
requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The applicable standard is summarized in
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962), which states:
If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff
may be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an
opportunity to test his claims on the merits. In the absence of any
apparent reason—such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory
motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue prejudice to the
opposing party by virtue of the allowance of the amendment,
futility of amendment, etc.—the leave sought should, as the rules
require, be “freely given.”
Id. In addition, Nebraska Civil Rule 15.1 provides that “[a] party who moves
for leave to amend a pleading (including a request to add parties) must file as
an attachment to the motion an unsigned copy of the proposed amended
pleading that clearly identifies the proposed amendments.” NECivR 15.1(a).
In pro se cases, the Court may consider an amended pleading as supplemental
to the original pleading. NECivR 15.1(b).
Here, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to amend his complaint seeking a
temporary injunction to “include new facts and claims arising from the
February 10, 2025, mandate issued by the . . . County Court,” see Filing No. 14,
leave to do so is granted. However, the Court notes that in amending the
Complaint, Plaintiff should take note of the following jurisdictional issues
when explaining why this Court has jurisdiction over this proceeding, as his
Complaint, as pleaded, is subject to dismissal.
In the pending Motions Addressing Ongoing State Proceedings, as well
as in the Complaint, it appears Plaintiff asks this Court to take action to stop
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eviction proceedings occurring in state court. The jurisdictional question that
appears to arise from the Plaintiff’s claims as currently pleaded involves the
applicability of the Younger and Rooker-Feldman doctrines, which likely
preclude this Court from addressing Plaintiff’s claims.
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), “the Supreme Court advanced
the position that federal courts should refrain from interfering with pending
state judicial proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances.” See Fuller v.
Ulland, 76 F.3d 957, 959 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 43–44).
There are essentially three issues that must be addressed in determining
whether to invoke the Younger doctrine, which requires this Court to abstain
from intervening in ongoing state court proceedings: (1) whether the action
complained of constitutes an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) whether the
proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) whether there is an
adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional
challenges. See Middlesex v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982).
If all three questions are answered affirmatively, a federal court should abstain
unless it detects “bad faith, harassment, or some extraordinary circumstance
that would make abstention inappropriate.” Id. at 435.
Here, it appears there are eviction proceedings taking place in the state
courts which Plaintiff seeks to enjoin and there is little question eviction
proceedings address important state interests. See Filing No. 1. Plaintiff
alleges that the state courts, (1) denied him due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment via denying Plaintiff notice and an opportunity to understand the
appellate court’s decision before enforcing a state court writ, (2) denied him
“fundamental fairness” by issuing a Writ of Restitution without allowing
Plaintiff to be “informed of the ruling or challenge its execution”, and (3)
denying Plaintiff due process via enforcing a ruling without meaningful
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opportunity for judicial review. Filing No. 1 at 3–4. While it appears to this
Court that there is little reason Plaintiff could not raise any due process
challenges he may bring here in those same state court proceedings, the Court
shall allow Plaintiff to amend to provide such a basis, if any.
Moreover, even if the state court proceedings were not still ongoing and
instead had proceeded to judgment, it is unlikely this Court could exercise
jurisdiction over this matter under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. RookerFeldman prohibits lower federal courts from exercising appellate review of
state court judgments. See Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923);
D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983). The Rooker-Feldman
doctrine generally applies where a case is brought by the losing party in a state
court action, complaining of injuries caused by the state court’s judgment
rendered before the district court proceedings commenced, and inviting the
district court to review and reject that judgment. See Exxon Mobile Corp. v.
Saudia Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). Ultimately, “no matter
how erroneous or unconstitutional the state court judgment may be, the
Supreme Court of the United States is the only federal court that could have
jurisdiction to review a state court judgment.” Brokaw v. Weaver, 305 F.3d
660, 664 (7th Cir. 2002) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
Rooker-Feldman is, however, a narrow doctrine that does not extend to
a case merely “because a party attempts to litigate in federal court a matter
previously litigated in state court.” Exxon, 544 U.S. at 293. Only where the
alleged injury for which a plaintiff seeks redress stems directly from the state
court judgment itself, rather than from some separate injury caused by the
defendant, does the federal court have no jurisdiction to review. Skit Intern.,
Ltd. v. DAC Techs. of Ark., Inc., 487 F.3d 1154, 1157 (8th Cir. 2007) (emphasis
added).

Therefore, the crucial inquiry in determining if a claim is so
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inextricably intertwined with a state judgment that it cannot be heard by a
federal court has been explained as hinging upon a determination of “whether
the federal plaintiff seeks to set aside a state court judgment or whether he [or
she] is, in fact, presenting an independent claim.” Brokaw, 305 F.3d at 664-65
(citation omitted).
Here, it is almost inevitable that the present action will run afoul of the
Rooker–Feldman doctrine, if the state court proceedings run to judgment (if
they have not already done so). See Newell v. Rolling Hills Apartments, 134 F.
Supp. 2d 1026, 1040 (N.D. Iowa 2001) (discussing the applicability of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine to state eviction proceedings) (citing Jacobs v. Gear
Props., 242 F.3d 375, 2001 WL 87440 (8th Cir. Feb. 2, 2001) (table op.); Long
v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548 (7th Cir. 1999)).

While it is not

impossible to circumvent the Rooker-Feldman doctrine by, for example,
alleging that there was no reasonable opportunity to raise a claim this Court
has jurisdiction to address in the challenged state court proceeding, id.,
Plaintiff should keep in mind if this Court is the proper forum for presenting
his claims, and if so, provide facts in support of any such contention.
That leaves the Court with the pending Motions Addressing Ongoing
State Proceedings, Filing Nos. 11-13 and 15), all of which request varying
forms of preliminary injunctive relief with respect to the ongoing state court
proceedings. As such, they require the Court to consider the four Dataphase
factors: (1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; (2) the state of the
balance between this harm and the injury that granting the injunction will
inflict on other parties; (3) the probability that the movant will succeed on the
merits; and (4) the public interest. Johnson v. Minneapolis Park & Recreation
Bd., 729 F.3d 1094, 1098 (8th Cir. 2013); (citing Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L
Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 114 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc)).
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The Court concedes that the possibility of eviction from his residence
might satisfy the requirement of irreparable harm. See Dataphase, 640 F.2d at
114 n.9. And the other factors might favor the plaintiff as well. See id.
But in deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction, likelihood of
success on the merits is the most significant factor. Laclede Gas Co. v. St.
Charles Cty., 713 F.3d 413, 419-20 (8th Cir. 2013). A party seeking injunctive
relief need not necessarily show a greater than 50 percent likelihood that it
will prevail on the merits. Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota,
South Dakota v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 731 (8th Cir. 2008). But the absence of
a likelihood of success on the merits strongly suggests that preliminary
injunctive relief should be denied. Barrett v. Claycomb, 705 F.3d 315, 320 (8th
Cir. 2013).
Here, for the reasons explained above, the Court finds a high likelihood
of failure on the merits, at least on the plaintiff's claims as currently pleaded.
There is little likelihood of success on the merits of claims over which the Court
lacks jurisdiction, or that the Court should abstain from deciding. Accordingly,
the Court will deny the Motions Addressing Ongoing State Proceedings,
without prejudice to reassertion premised on an amended complaint that cures
the problems explained above.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1.

Although Plaintiff’s Complaint as pleaded is subject to summary

dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), in lieu of dismissal Plaintiff’s Motion to
Amend, Filing No. 14, is granted. Plaintiff shall have until April 3, 2025, to
file an amended complaint.

When amending the Complaint, Plaintiff is

advised of the following:

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a.

Plaintiff must adequately allege the stage of state court

proceedings at issue and/or any judgment to which he seeks review.
While Plaintiff need not submit formal briefing on the applicability (or
lack thereof) of the Rooker-Feldman and Younger doctrines, Plaintiff
should include facts supporting this Court’s jurisdiction in light of those
doctrines.
b.

In support of all claims, Plaintiff should be mindful to

provide facts (as opposed to conclusions) which establish what each
Defendant did to him, when Defendant(s) did it, how each Defendant’s
actions harmed him, and what specific legal rights Plaintiff believes each
Defendant violated.
2.

Should Plaintiff require further time to comply with this

Memorandum and Order he must move for an extension, in writing, prior to
the expiration of the deadline for compliance.
3.

The Clerk’s Office is directed to set pro se case management

deadlines in this case using the following text: April 3, 2025: check for second
amended complaint.
4.

The Motions Addressing Ongoing State Proceedings (Filing Nos.

11, 12, 13, and 15) are denied without prejudice to reassertion after the
amended complaint has been filed.
5.

Failure to comply with this Memorandum and Order shall result

in the dismissal of this case without further notice.
Dated this 4th day of March, 2025.
BY THE COURT:
John M. Gerrard
Senior United States District Judge
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