In Re: Western States Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust Litigation (MDL 1566)

Filing 2416

ORDER granting ECF No. 2277 Motion for District Judge to Reconsider Order; vacating ECF No. 2270 Order; and granting ECF Nos. 2286 and 2299 Motions for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Robert C. Jones on 5/23/16. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - JC)

1
2
3
4
5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEVADA

6
_____________________________________

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

)
)
In re WESTERN STATES WHOLESALE
)
NATURAL GAS ANTITRUST
)
LITIGATION
)
_____________________________________ )
)
ARANDELL CORP. et al.,
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
)
vs.
)
)
XCEL ENERGY INC. et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
_____________________________________ )
)
REORGANIZED FLI, INC.,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
)
vs.
)
)
WILLIAMS COMPANIES, INC. et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
)

2:03-cv-01431-RCJ-PAL
MDL No. 1566
ORDER

2:07-cv-01019-RCJ-PAL

2:05-cv-01331-RCJ-PAL

21
22
23
24

These consolidated cases arise out of the energy crisis of 2000–2002. Plaintiffs (retail
buyers of natural gas) allege that Defendants (natural gas traders) manipulated the price of
natural gas by reporting false information to price indices published by trade publications and

1 of 14

1

engaging in wash sales. Pending before the Court are a motion to reconsider and two motions

2

for summary judgment.

3

I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2003, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (“JPML”) transferred seven class

4
5

action cases from various districts in California to this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 as

6

Multidistrict Litigation (“MDL”) Case No. 1566, assigning Judge Pro to preside. Since then, the

7

JPML has transferred in several more actions from various districts throughout the United States.

8

Between 2003 and 2015, Judge Pro ruled on many motions to remand, to dismiss, and for

9

summary judgment. He also approved several class settlements. Several parties settled on their

10

own. One or more of the cases have been to the Court of Appeals twice and to the Supreme

11

Court once. In 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed several dismissals under the filed rate

12

doctrine and remanded for further proceedings. In 2013, the Court of Appeals reversed several

13

summary judgment orders, ruling that the Natural Gas Act did not preempt state law anti-trust

14

claims and that certain Wisconsin- and Missouri-based Defendants should not have been

15

dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari as to

16

preemption under the Natural Gas Act and affirmed. The case was soon thereafter reassigned to

17

this Court when Judge Pro retired. The Court granted three motions to dismiss for lack of

18

personal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs have asked the Court to reconsider that order, and Defendants in

19

two of the actions have separately moved for summary judgment.

20

II.

21

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS
A court must grant summary judgment when “the movant shows that there is no genuine

22

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

23

Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those which may affect the outcome of the case. See Anderson

24
2 of 14

1

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if

2

there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See

3

id. A principal purpose of summary judgment is “to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported

4

claims.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986).

5

In determining summary judgment, a court uses a burden-shifting scheme. The moving

6

party must first satisfy its initial burden. “When the party moving for summary judgment would

7

bear the burden of proof at trial, it must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a

8

directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.” C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co. v.

9

Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation and internal quotation marks

10

omitted). In contrast, when the nonmoving party bears the burden of proving the claim or

11

defense, the moving party can meet its burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence to negate

12

an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case; or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving

13

party failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that party’s case on

14

which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323–24.

15

If the moving party fails to meet its initial burden, summary judgment must be denied and

16

the court needn’t consider the nonmoving party’s evidence. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398

17

U.S. 144 (1970). If the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the

18

nonmoving party to establish a genuine issue of material fact. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

19

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). To establish the existence of a factual dispute,

20

the nonmoving party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is

21

sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the

22

parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors

23

Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir. 1987). In other words, the nonmoving party cannot avoid

24
3 of 14

1

summary judgment by relying solely on conclusory allegations unsupported by facts. See Taylor

2

v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, the opposition must go beyond the

3

assertions and allegations of the pleadings and set forth specific facts by producing competent

4

evidence that shows a genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S.

5

at 324.

6

At the summary judgment stage, a court’s function is not to weigh the evidence and

7

determine the truth, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson, 477

8

U.S. at 249. The evidence of the nonmovant is “to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are

9

to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255. But if the evidence of the nonmoving party is merely

10

colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. See id. at 249–50.

11

Notably, facts are only viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party where there is

12

a genuine dispute about those facts. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). That is, even

13

where the underlying claim contains a reasonableness test, where a party’s evidence is so clearly

14

contradicted by the record as a whole that no reasonable jury could believe it, “a court should not

15

adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Id.

16

III.

ANALYSIS

17

A.

Motion to Reconsider

18

Plaintiffs Briggs & Stratton Corp. and Carthage College (collectively, “Movants”) ask the

19

Court to reconsider its dismissals of Defendants Reliant Energy, Inc. (“New Reliant”), CMS

20

Energy Corp. (“CMS”), and Cantera Gas Co. (“Cantera”). Movants do not ask the Court to

21

reconsider as to Defendant Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, because they have tentatively settled

22

with that Defendant.

23
24
4 of 14

1

Movants argue that Defendants failed to note in their previous motion that Movants were

2

not yet parties to the case when Judge Pro granted the previous motions to dismiss for lack of

3

personal jurisdiction. Movants note that the allegations in the Third Amended Complaint

4

(“TAC”) (by which they joined the case) are the same as those in the Second Amended

5

Complaint (“SAC”) against which Judge Pro granted motions to dismiss as against Wisconsin

6

Plaintiffs. Movants note that Defendants never moved against Movants as to the TAC, however,

7

but only against other Plaintiffs as to the SAC, and although the similarity of the allegations

8

might lead the Court to rule similarly to Judge Pro, the Court of Appeals in fact reversed Judge

9

Pro’s grant of Defendants’ motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction as to those

10
11

Plaintiffs who appealed.
In response, Defendants note that Movants were parties to the appeal decided in 2013 but

12

that they did not appeal the personal jurisdiction dismissal orders. Defendants note that the

13

personal jurisdiction issue concerns a defendant’s contacts with a forum state, not a defendant’s

14

contacts with any particular plaintiff, and that each plaintiff need not therefore be given an

15

opportunity to argue the issue for himself.

16

The Court agrees with Movants that neither Judge Pro’s dismissal as to the SAC only

17

(and not as to the TAC whereby Movants joined as Plaintiffs) nor Movants’ failure to raise the

18

personal jurisdiction issue on appeal after joining the appeal (apparently for some other reason,

19

as they would not have had standing to appeal a personal jurisdiction dismissal not entered

20

against them) did not result in the direct loss of the issue as to Movants. Defendants also note,

21

however, that the Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal orders as to AEPES because Judge Pro

22

had relied only on allegations concerning direct natural gas sales without considering broader

23

allegations of anticompetitive behavior directed at Wisconsin (and Missouri). See In re W. States

24
5 of 14

1

Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d 716, 742 (9th Cir. 2013). Defendants argue

2

that Judge Pro did consider allegations of anticompetitive behavior in the dismissal orders at

3

issue here, however, and that even if those rulings did not apply to Movants’ substantively

4

identical allegations in the TAC under the law of the case doctrine, the Court should adopt Judge

5

Pro’s reasoning anew. That would appear sensible at first glance, but as Movants correctly note,

6

the Court of Appeals ruled that the allegations in the SAC (which the parties appear to agree are

7

substantively identical to those in the TAC in relevant respects) were sufficient to support

8

personal jurisdiction. Therefore, even if Judge Pro conducted the required analysis as to

9

Defendants that he did not conduct as to AEPES, the Court of Appeals has already declared the

10

outcome, i.e., that the SAC’s (and hence the TAC’s) allegations concerning personal jurisdiction

11

over Defendants in Wisconsin are sufficient. The Court therefore reconsiders and denies the

12

motions to dismiss.

13

B.

Motions for Summary Judgment

14

1.

CES’s Motion

15

CenterPoint Energy Services, Inc. (“CES”) is a Defendant in Case No. 2:07-cv-1019,

16

which is Western District of Wisconsin Case No. 2:07-cv-76, the same case at issue as to the

17

motion to reconsider addressed, supra. (See Third Am. Compl. in Case No. 2:07-cv-1019, ECF

18

No. 1846). CES asks the Court to grant it summary judgment against the TAC. CES notes that

19

it is implicated only in six paragraphs of the TAC. (See id. ¶¶ 55–60, at 37–41). CES argues that

20

it is not alleged to have engaged in any anticompetitive activity or other wrongdoing in or

21

directed to Wisconsin. Rather, it is only alleged to be affiliated with Defendant Reliant Energy

22

Services, Inc. (“RES”).

23
24
6 of 14

1

CES explains that during the first one-third of the Relevant Time Period (January 1, 2000

2

to October 31, 2002, (see id. ¶ 1)), CES and RES were subsidiaries of the previous Reliant

3

Energy, Inc. (“Old Reliant”); CES was a natural gas distributor, and RES was involved in

4

wholesale energy and trading. RES became a subsidiary of a new corporation (“New Reliant”)

5

with the same name as Old Reliant during the Relevant Time Period, and CES became a

6

subsidiary of CenterPoint Energy, Inc. (“CenterPoint”). Thereafter, the only corporate

7

relationships between any of these entities were between CES and its parent CenterPoint and

8

between RES and its parent New Reliant. Moreover, CES argues, Plaintiffs have not alleged that

9

CES has ever manipulated, participated in a conspiracy to manipulate, or become the subject of

10

any government investigation into the manipulation of the price of natural gas in Wisconsin

11

during the Relevant Time Period.

12

The TAC includes the following allegations against CES: (1) Plaintiff Ladish Co., Inc.

13

purchased natural gas from CES, (id. ¶ 14); (2) CES was formerly known as Reliant Energy

14

Retail, Inc., CenterPoint Energy Marketing, Inc., and CenterPoint Energy Gas Services, Inc., (id.

15

¶¶ 55, 60); (3) CES is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Texas, (id.

16

¶ 60); and (4) during the Relevant Time Period, CES was a subsidiary of Old Reliant and sold

17

natural gas at unlawfully inflated prices directly to Ladish Co. for use in Wisconsin, as well as to

18

many other members of the class, (id.). In other words, CES is accused in the TAC of selling

19

natural gas in Wisconsin at unlawfully inflated prices. Unlike the other Defendants listed in the

20

TAC, CES is not accused of unlawfully inflating or conspiring to unlawfully inflate the price of

21

the natural gas, reporting false prices, engaging in wash trades, being investigated for

22

anticompetitive activities, or having been aware of such conduct. Nor does the TAC accuse CES

23

of having done any of these things under any of its former names.

24
7 of 14

1

The claim against CES is made under the Wisconsin Antitrust Act, which states, “Every

2

contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or

3

commerce is illegal.” Wis. Stat. § 133.03(1). A contract is in restraint of trade if it unreasonably

4

limits competition in any business. See Milwaukee Linen Supply Co. v. Ring, 246 N.W. 567, 568

5

(Wis. 1933). Such a contract is illegal if it is unreasonable, meaning it “is greater than is

6

required for the protection of the person for whose benefit the restraint is imposed” or “imposes

7

undue hardship upon the person restricted.” See Journal Co. v. Bundy, 37 N.W.2d. 89, 92 (Wis.

8

1949) (quoting id. (quoting Restatement (First) of Contracts §§ 513–15)). CES argues that

9

simply selling natural gas is not an anticompetitive activity in restraint of trade, and that the

10
11

conduct of RES cannot be imputed to CES.
Plaintiffs note in response that Judge Pro denied CES’s motion to dismiss for failure to

12

state a claim that made the same arguments as against the SAC. But the substance of Judge

13

Pro’s order makes clear that he simultaneously permitted amendment of the SAC to add

14

Plaintiffs and substantive amendments to the allegations against CES. (See Order 2, ECF No.

15

1834). Although Judge pro addressed some arguments against permitting amendment as futile,

16

he listed but did not address the substance of CES’s argument that neither the SAC nor the TAC

17

stated a claim against CES. It is therefore not fair to say that Judge Pro rejected the arguments

18

made in the present motion such that the law of the case is dispositive.

19

In any case, the sufficiency of the allegations is not the issue under the present motion,

20

but the production of evidence sufficient to support a verdict. Plaintiffs have adduced excerpts

21

of the deposition of Eric Sullivan, the “person most knowledgeable” deponent for CES, wherein

22

he admits that in addition to simply selling gas to Wisconsin customers, CES provided

23

management services whereby it would allow its customers to “lock in” prices for future

24
8 of 14

1

purchases, that CES traded financial instruments to accomplish this, and that these instruments

2

were financial swaps with RES, its exclusive trading partner for such instruments. (See Sullivan

3

Dep. 97–98, 108–09, 116–17, 163–64, 224–26, 259, 262–65, ECF No. 2354-3). The Court finds

4

that this is not enough to create a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to support a verdict

5

under section 133.03(1). Sullivan distinguished pure trading from trades “paired with a physical

6

gas contract . . . to lock in a cost of gas for the customer,” (id. 117:6–10), and he also explained

7

that CES entered into swap agreements with its supplier RES in order to protect itself against

8

changing prices after locking in prices with customers, and that CES didn’t concern itself with

9

whether RES itself traded directly in natural gas in order to hedge itself against its own risk, (id.

10

259:11–19). There is no evidence that CES participated in a conspiracy or direct acts in restraint

11

of trade. Although a jury could find that CES’s price swaps with RES (if reported and published

12

as if they had constituted natural gas sales, as has apparently occurred in other cases) may have

13

caused an increase in the market price of natural gas by artificially inflating the perceived

14

demand, see E&J Gallo Winery v. EnCana Energy Servs., No. CV F 03-5412, 2008 WL

15

4224492 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2008), there is no evidence adduced showing that CES knowingly

16

engaged in swaps in conspiracy with RES (a critical element of § 133.03(1), as with the Sherman

17

Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1) with the purpose of increasing the price of natural gas (as opposed

18

to the legitimate purpose of securing itself against rising rates after locking in prices to its

19

customers), knew that RES or others were engaged in such behavior, or even reported its swaps

20

with RES as sales.

21

2.

22

Oneok, Inc. and Oneok Energy Services Co., LP, formerly known as Oneok Energy

23

Oneok’s Motion

Marketing & Trading Co. (collectively, “Oneok”), are Defendants in Case No. 2:05-cv-1331,

24
9 of 14

1

which is District of Kansas Case No. 2:05-cv-2389. (See Am. Compl., ECF No. 11 in Case No.

2

2:05-cv-1331). Oneok asks the Court to grant it summary judgment against the Amended

3

Complaint (“AC”), arguing that the claims are precluded either directly or as released under a

4

settlement agreement reached in a consolidated class action brought in the Southern District of

5

New York (“the NYMEX Case”). The Court determines the motion on the issue of release, not

6

claim preclusion.

7

The Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint (“ACCAC”) in the NYMEX Case

8

alleged that the defendants had manipulated the prices of natural gas futures and options on the

9

New York Mercantile Exchange (“NYMEX”) between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2002

10

by reporting inaccurate, misleading, and false trading information, including artificial volume

11

and price information, to trade publications that compile and publish such information. The AC

12

here makes the same allegations. (Compare Am. Compl. ¶¶ 46–54, with Am. Consol. Class

13

Action Compl. ¶¶ 5, 60–70, ECF No. 2300-1). Oneok was a Defendant under the ACCAC. The

14

plaintiff class in the NYMEX Case was defined as persons who had bought or sold natural gas

15

futures or options on NYMEX during the relevant times. On May 24, 2006, the court in the

16

NYMEX case entered a Final Judgment and Order of Dismissal (“the First Settlement Order”)

17

with an expanded plaintiff class definition reaching back to June 1, 1999. The first group of

18

settling class members was to receive a total of nearly $73 million. On June 15, 2007, the court

19

in the NYMEX case entered a Final Judgment and Order of Dismissal (“the Second Settlement

20

Order”) with a similarly defined plaintiff class. The second group of settling class members was

21

to receive a total of nearly $28 million. Paragraph 6 of the First Settlement Order and Paragraph

22

5 of the Second Settlement Order provided for releases of the parties from further litigation:

23

The Released Parties are finally and forever released and discharged from
any manner of claims . . . and causes of action in law, admiralty, or equity,

24
10 of 14

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

whether class, individual, or otherwise in nature . . . whether known or unknown,
suspected or unsuspected, whether concealed or hidden, or in law, admiralty, or
equity, that the Representative Plaintiffs and other members of the Class who
have not timely opted out of the settlement and excluded themselves from the
Class (“Settling Plaintiffs’’), or any of them, individually, or as a class (whether
or not they make a claim upon or participate in the Settlement Funds), ever had,
now have or hereafter can, shall or may have, against the Released Parties arising
from or relating in any way to trading in NYMEX Natural Gas Contracts
(including purchasing, selling, or holding any NYMEX Natural Gas Contract, or
taking or making delivery of physical natural gas pursuant to any NYMEX
Natural Gas Contract, or any combination thereof, whether as a hedger or
speculator), whether or not asserted in the Action, including without limitation,
claims which (a) arise from or relate in any way to any conduct complained of in
any complaint filed in the Action, (b) have been asserted or could have been
asserted in any state or federal court or any other judicial or arbitral forum against
the Released Parties or any one of them, (c) arise under or relate to any federal or
state commodity price manipulation law, any state or federal unfair or deceptive
business or trade practices law, or other law or regulation, or common law,
including, without limitation, the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.,
the federal antitrust laws (as that term is defined in 15 U.S.C. § 12), or state
antitrust laws and/or (d) the claims brought in this Action. The Settling Plaintiffs,
and each of them, are hereby enjoined from asserting any such claims against the
Released Parties.

13

(First Settlement Order ¶ 6(a), at 4–6, ECF No. 2300-5 (emphases added; footnote omitted)).

14

The omitted footnote defines “Released Parties” as, inter alia, the settling defendants and their

15

predecessors and successors. (See id. 4 n.3, at 4–5). The release language of the Second

16

Settlement Order is the same in relevant respects. (See Second Settlement Order ¶ 5(a), at 4–5,

17

ECF No. 2300-7).

18

These releases would seem to bar the present claims against Oneok. Both Oneok entities

19

were Defendants in the NYMEX case. (See Am. Consol. Class Action Compl. ¶¶ 39–40).

20

Plaintiff in the present case is Reorganized Farmland, Inc., as successor-in-interest to previous

21

Plaintiff J.P. Morgan Trust Co., N.A., as trustee of the FI Liquidating Trust (“Farmland”).

22

Farmland was a member of the NYMEX class according to uncontroversial facts admitted by

23

Farmland’s “person most knowledgeable” deponent. (See Schuck Dep. 54–56, ECF No. 2300-10

24
11 of 14

1

(noting that Farmland entered into natural gas futures contracts on NYMEX in 2000 and 2001)).

2

The NYMEX court found that notice to the class had been sufficient and that the settlements

3

were fair and reasonable, and Oneok provides evidence that the claims administrator mailed both

4

notices to Farmland’s agent, (see Glenn Aff., ECF No. 2300-11; Young Aff., ECF No. 2300-12),

5

and also mailed the second notice to Farmland itself, (see Young Aff.). There is no evidence that

6

Farmland opted out of the class.

7

In response, Farmland argues that the NYMEX Case concerned harm to natural gas

8

futures traders via Defendants’ acts, i.e., the artificial inflation of futures prices via reporting

9

false prices and engaging in wash trades, whereas the present case concerns harm to natural gas

10

consumers due to those acts. That is the long and short of Farmland’s argument, and the Court

11

rejects it. The release language of the Settlements is easily broad enough to preclude the present

12

claims. The release clause releases Oneok and other settling defendants from “any manner of

13

claims . . . and causes of action” by settling plaintiffs:

14
15
16

relating in any way to trading in NYMEX Natural Gas Contracts . . . including . . .
claims which . . . relate in any way to any conduct complained of in any complaint
filed in the Action [or which] arise under or relate to any federal or state
commodity price manipulation law, any state or federal unfair or deceptive
business or trade practices law, or other law or regulation, or common law,
including, without limitation . . . state antitrust laws.

17
(First Settlement Order ¶ 6(a), at 4–6 (emphases added; footnote omitted)). The language of the

18
release is of course broader than the natural release as a matter of law that would have resulted

19
from the settlement under ordinary principles of claim preclusion, otherwise the release would

20
serve no purpose. And the language of the release here is extremely broad. It releases Oneok

21
from the present claims even without recourse to any of its “catch-all” provisions, because it

22
explicitly releases Oneok from any claims that arise under any state antitrust laws. Even if the

23
release were not so specific as to state antitrust claims, it releases Oneok as to any claims relating

24
12 of 14

1

in any way to any conduct complained of in the ACCAC, and, as noted supra, the AC here and

2

the ACCAC in the NYMEX action both complain of Oneok’s alleged manipulation of NYMEX

3

futures prices via the reporting of inaccurate, misleading, and false trading information,

4

including artificial volume and price information, to trade publications that compile and publish

5

such information. (Compare Am. Compl. ¶¶ 46–54, with Am. Consol. Class Action Compl. ¶¶ 5,

6

60–70).
Nor is the affirmative defense of release waived. Oneok pled the defense of “Release” as

7
8

its thirtieth affirmative defense in its initial Answer. (See Answer 15, ECF No. 85 in Case No.

9

2:05-cv-1331). The nature of the defense was all Oneok was required to state in order to

10

preserve it. See, e.g., Rockwell Automation, Inc. v. Beckhoff Automation, LLC, 23 F. Supp. 3d

11

1236, 1241–42 (D. Nev. 2014) (Jones, J.). Moreover, the Answer went beyond simply

12

identifying the nature of the defense. It identified the alleged release as being based on Farmland

13

not having opted out of the settlement class in the NYMEX Case, which it identified by name

14

and case number. This pleading would satisfy Rule 8(c) even if the Court of Appeals were to

15

adopt a rule applying the strictures of Iqbal and Twombly to affirmative defenses, which no court

16

of appeals has done to this Court’s knowledge.

17

///

18

///

19

///

20

///

21

///

22

///

23

///

24
13 of 14

CONCLUSION

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Reconsider (ECF No. 2277) is
GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Order (ECF No. 2270) is VACATED, and the
Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 2248, 2249, 2250) are DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motions for Summary Judgment (ECF Nos. 2286,
2299) are GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 23rd day of May, 2016.

10
11
12

_____________________________________
ROBERT C. JONES
United States District Judge

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
14 of 14