Johnson v. Clayton et al

Filing 120

ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment 79 is DISMISSED for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Remand 82 this case back to state court is GRANTED. Signed by Chief Judge Robert C. Jones on 5/11/11. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - MMM)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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DISTRICT OF NEVADA

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ALEESHA JOHNSON, as natural parent of )
JEREMIAH L. SCOTT, JR., a minor, and )
JAYLA-LYNN SCOTT, a minor,
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Plaintiffs,
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v.
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GRACE CLAYTON, individually and as )
adoptive parent of STACEY CLAYTON; )
STACEY CLAYTON, a minor, individually;)
FELICIA TUCKER, individually and in her )
official capacity; WILLIE STEWART, individually)
and in his official capacity; SUSAN)
ROTHSCHILD, individually and in her official)
capacity; NANCY MCLANE, individually and in)
her official capacity; CLARK COUNTY)
DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES;)
COUNTY OF CLARK, a political subdivision of)
the State of Nevada; DOES I-X, individuals; and )
ROE CORPORATIONS I-X,
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Defendants.
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___________________________________ )

2:08-cv-1810-RCJ-LRL
ORDER

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Currently before the Court are Defendants Grace and Stacey Clayton’s (collectively
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“Clayton Defendants”) Motion for Summary Judgment (#79) and Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand
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(#82).
BACKGROUND

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In December 2008, Defendants Felicia Tucker, Susan Rothschild, Nancy Mclane, Clark
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County Department of Family Services, and County of Clark (collectively “County Defendants”)
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filed a petition of removal to this Court based on federal question jurisdiction. (Pet. for Removal
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(#1) at 2-3). In support of the petition, County Defendants attached Plaintiffs’ complaint filed

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originally in the District Court of Clark County. (Compl. (#1) at 5). The complaint alleged that

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Plaintiffs sought compensation from all defendants for damages “sustained due to the sexual

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abuse of the minor children Jeremiah L. Scott, Jr., and Jayla-Lynn Scott, while in the custody,

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care, and control of the above named [d]efendants.” (Id. at 6). Plaintiffs alleged the following

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causes of action: (1) violation of civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Tucker and

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Stewart; (2) violation of civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Rothschild, Clark County,

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and Mclane; (3) violation of civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Clark County; (4)

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negligence against Tucker, Stewart, Rothschild, Mclane, and Clark County; (5) negligence against

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Grace Clayton; (6) assault and battery by Stacey Clayton; (7) intentional infliction of emotional

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distress by Stacey Clayton; and (8) liability for willful acts of child against Stacey Clayton. (Id. at

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9-16).

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In March 2009, Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed Willie Stewart, without prejudice, from the

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lawsuit. (Stewart Dismissal (#15) at 2). In April 2010, this Court granted the parties’ stipulation

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and order of dismissal, with prejudice, as to the County Defendants. (See Order (#117)). The

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only remaining defendants in this case are Grace and Stacey Clayton.

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DISCUSSION

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), “in any civil action of which the district courts have

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original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that

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are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the

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same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

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The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if the district

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court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The

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Ninth Circuit has held that a “dismissal on the merits is different from a dismissal on jurisdictional

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grounds. If the district court dismisses all federal claims on the merits, it has discretion under §

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1367(c) to adjudicate the remaining claims; if the court dismisses for lack of subject matter

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jurisdiction, it has no discretion and must dismiss all claims.” Herman Family Revocable Trust

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v. Teddy Bear, 254 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 2001).

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Here, the Court lacks original jurisdiction over the claims in this case because all federal
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jurisdiction claims against the County Defendants have been dismissed pursuant to a settlement

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agreement. (See Order (#117) at 2). Because this Court lacks federal question jurisdiction, and

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diversity jurisdiction never existed, the Court finds that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the

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four remaining state-law claims against the Clayton Defendants. Accordingly, the Court

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dismisses the Clayton Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (#79) for lack of subject-matter

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jurisdiction and grants Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand (#82) the case back to state court for

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adjudication of the remaining state-law claims against the Clayton Defendants. Alternatively, the

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Court finds that, even if it had the discretion to retain jurisdiction over the state-law claims pursuant

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to § 1367(c), the Court declines to exercise that discretion.
CONCLUSION

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For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment (#79)
is DISMISSED for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Remand (#82) this case back to state court
is GRANTED.

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DATED: This _____ day of May, 2011.
11th

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_________________________________
United States District Judge

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