Taser International, Inc. v. Stinger Systems, Inc. et al
Filing
283
ORDER Denying 217 Joint Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Granting in part and Denying in part 223 Motion for Rule 56(d) Relief. Signed by Judge Miranda M. Du on 8/2/2012. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - SLR)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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DISTRICT OF NEVADA
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***
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TASER INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
Case No. 2:09-cv-289-MMD-PAL
Plaintiff,
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ORDER
v.
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STINGER SYSTEMS, et al.,
Defendants.
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(Defendants‘ Joint Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment – dkt. no. 217;
Taser‘s Motion for Rule 56(d) Relief
– dkt. no. 223)
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Before this Court are Defendants‘ Joint Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
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(dkt. no. 217) and Plaintiff‘s Motion for Rule 56(d) Relief (dkt. no. 223).
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I.
BACKGROUND
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A.
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Plaintiff TASER International (hereinafter ―TASER‖), a publicly-traded company,
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develops numerous technologies for use by law enforcement, military, private security
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agencies, and consumers. It is most well-known for its TASER Electronic Control Device
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(―ECD‖) product line, a weapon that delivers electrical current to a subject, like a ―stun
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gun,‖ causing temporary incapacitation. Unlike a stun gun, however, TASER‘s ECDs can
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fire small probes that attach to a subject and allow a user to temporarily incapacitate a
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subject from a distance.
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ECDs.
Parties
TASER has experienced significant success marketing its
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Defendant Stinger Systems (―Stinger‖) is a former publically traded company that
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has since sold its assets to Karbon Arms, Inc. It produced a competing ECD. Defendant
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Robert Gruder (―Gruder‖) was Stinger‘s CEO during the time period pertinent to this
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litigation. Defendant James F. McNulty, Jr. (―McNulty‖), an attorney licensed to practice
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law in California, sold patents and molds to Stinger in exchange for shares of Stinger
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stock. TASER alleges that with Gruder‘s approval, McNulty drafted misleading press
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releases for Stinger that negatively affected TASER‘s stock value.
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Bestex Company (―Bestex‖) is a privately held company that distributes traditional
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stun guns, or stun batons, in addition to other ―self-protection products.‖ Yong Su Park
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owns Bestex. Defendant McNulty also allegedly drafted press releases for Bestex, and
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has represented and counseled Bestex pro bono in previous matters. Plaintiff‘s Second
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Amended Complaint alleges that McNulty authored press releases and other documents
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issued by Stinger and Bestex with Gruder‘s assistance and/or approval that attempted
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to, and succeeded in, damaging TASER by manipulating TASER and Stinger‘s stock
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prices. Plaintiff alleges that TASER was damaged by the misleading information when
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investors ―shorted‖ TASER stock due to the artificially depressed share price, causing
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investors to be more hesitant to infuse capital into the company. Plaintiff additionally
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alleges that McNulty owned shares in Stinger and Law Enforcement Associates (―LEA‖),
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a publically traded company that produces and sells surveillance equipment for law
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enforcement agencies, when he authored the misleading press releases.
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B.
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TASER‘s case revolves around the drafting and publishing of a series of allegedly
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misleading and/or false press releases by Bestex and the Defendants that TASER
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claims were designed to devalue its stock and harm its reputation. TASER alleges that
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McNulty was a central player in this scheme, creating and drafting the releases and
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approaching LEA about partnering to engage in similar conduct.
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Facts
1.
May 21, 2007 release (concerning Arizona litigation)
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On January 5, 2007, TASER brought an action in the District of Arizona against
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Stinger claiming patent infringement, patent false marking, and Lanham Act false
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advertising claims (―Arizona litigation‖). In addition to the patent claims, TASER brought
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Lanham Act false advertising claims alleging that various misleading and/or false
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product-to-product comparisons were made on Stinger‘s website and communicated by
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a Stinger agent to a law enforcement official. Neither Gruder nor McNulty were parties
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to that lawsuit, but McNulty served as Stinger‘s counsel at the time. On May 20, 2009,
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the parties filed a ―Stipulation to Dismiss Claims Under the Lanham Act‖ wherein they
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voluntarily dismissed the Lanham Act claims for the purposes of ―streamlining‖ the
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litigation, making note that ―there has been no resolution of any factual or legal issue on
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the merits, and the dismissal of those claims should not be construed as an adjudication
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against or in favor of either party.‖
(See dkt. no. 217-C.) The Court signed the
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stipulation, and included that same language. (Dkt. no. 217-D.) The case ended in a
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finding that Stinger infringed one of TASER‘s patents resulting in a permanent injunction
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enjoining Stinger from producing an infringing ECD gun. (See dkt. no. 217-E.) Final
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judgment was entered on August 27, 2010. (Id.)
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TASER alleges that a press release published by Stinger involving both McNulty
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and Gruder misled consumers about the nature of the Arizona litigation. On May 21,
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2007, Judge Murguia, the presiding judge of the Arizona litigation, entered a protective
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order in the case. On May 31, 2007, Stinger issued an allegedly misleading release
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concerning this protective order that TASER claims caused a $40,000,000 loss in
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TASER market capital resulting from a drop in stock price.
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2.
January 9-11, 2008 releases (concerning patent reexamination)
TASER further alleges that a series of press releases published in January 2008
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similarly damaged TASER.
On January 9, 2008, Stinger issued a press release
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concerning documents it filed with the United States Patent and Trademark Office to
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have one of Taser‘s patents reexamined. TASER alleges the January 9 release was
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misleading. On January 10, 2008, Stinger issued another allegedly misleading release
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concerning an independent firm‘s analysis of the patent reexamination documents
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publicized in the January 9, 2008, release. On January 11, 2008, Stinger issued a third
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release in which it commented on the controversy in allegedly misleading ways.
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3.
April 24, 2008, press release and September 6, 2008, email
(concerning Stinger lawsuit)
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On April 28, 2008, Stinger filed a lawsuit against TASER in the District of Arizona
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that TASER alleges was vexatious and served as the basis for other misleading press
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releases. See Stinger Systems, Inc. v. TASER Int’l, No. 08-747 (D. Ariz. filed Apr. 28,
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2008) (―Stinger lawsuit‖). The lawsuit alleged false advertising, unfair competition, and
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injurious falsehood. The complaint concerned TASER‘s circulation of a study conducted
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by the National Institute of Justice (―NIJ‖), the research, development, and evaluation
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arm of the United States Department of Justice. Stinger accused TASER of misleading
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consumers about the nature of the report. The lawsuit was filed on April 18, 2008, but
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TASER alleges that Stinger waited to announce the suit until April 24, 2008, the same
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day that TASER released its quarterly earnings. According to TASER, the April 24,
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2008, press release announcing the lawsuit was misleading because the suit itself was
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meritless and because Stinger had no intention of prosecuting the suit. Stinger never
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served TASER, and voluntarily dismissed the lawsuit after the service cutoff date passed
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and after an order to show cause was issued against Stinger. TASER alleges that the
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Stinger lawsuit was intended merely to facilitate the misleading press release.
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TASER also alleges that a September 6, 2008, email sent by Stinger Regional
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Sales Director Kevin Scholz, entitled ―Stinger Sues Taser,‖ included misleading text
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concerning the Stinger lawsuit and a misleading attachment (hereinafter ―the Stinger
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packet‖). TASER further alleges that Stinger issued a press release on February 21,
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2008, before the filing of the Stinger lawsuit that included similar misleading statements
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concerning the NIJ report.
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4.
January 17, 2008, press release (concerning Bestex)
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TASER alleges that in January 2007, McNulty approached LEA President Paul
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Feldman (―Feldman‖) on behalf of Bestex to propose a sham agreement between Bestex
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and LEA to facilitate the publication of press releases that would drive up LEA stock and
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hurt TASER‘s value. TASER provided transcripts of recorded conversations between
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Feldman and McNulty describing this proposal, including how McNulty planned to use
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strategic lawsuits to damage TASER and its stock. On February 9, 2007, LEA wrote to
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McNulty rebuffing McNulty and refusing to enter into the arrangement.
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Almost a year later on January 17, 2008, TASER alleges that McNulty issued a
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press release on behalf of Bestex that TASER claims misled the public into believing that
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Bestex and LEA had discussed and entered into an agreement. TASER alleges that
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McNulty admitted authoring this release to try to push up LEA stock.
5.
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Other press releases
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TASER alleges that a number of other similarly misleading press releases were
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issued by Defendants. These were published on June 9, 2008, and October 26, 2009,
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and included allegedly misleading information comparing Stinger products with TASER
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products in a manner intended to injure and devalue TASER.
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C.
This Action
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TASER filed its original Complaint in this case on February 11, 2009, against
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Stinger, McNulty, and Gruder, alleging 1) violations of the Securities Exchange Act of
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1932, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 2) trade libel/defamation; 3) unfair competition in violation of
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the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); 4) abuse of process; and 5) deceptive trade
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practices. Upon Defendants‘ motion, this Court dismissed the Securities Exchange Act
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claim. TASER filed its Second Amended Complaint on July 28, 2010, alleging all but
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one of the same claims, replacing the Securities Exchange Act claim with a civil
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conspiracy claim. This Court granted summary judgment to Defendants on the abuse of
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process and civil conspiracy claims. (See Dkt. no. 213.)
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II.
LEGAL STANDARD
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Although motions for partial summary judgment are common, Rule 56 of the
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs summary judgment, does not contain
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an explicit procedure entitled ―partial summary judgment.‖ As with a motion under Rule
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56(c), partial summary judgment is proper ―if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
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interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
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there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
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judgment as a matter of law.‖ Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
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The purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trials when there is no
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dispute as to the facts before the court. Nw. Motorcycle Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 18
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F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings,
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the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits ―show there is no
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genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a
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matter of law.‖ Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 (1986). An issue is ―genuine‖
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if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable fact-finder could find for
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the nonmoving party and a dispute is ―material‖ if it could affect the outcome of the suit
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under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986).
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Where reasonable minds could differ on the material facts at issue, however, summary
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judgment is not appropriate. Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 441 (9th Cir.
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1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1171 (1996). ―The amount of evidence necessary to raise
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a genuine issue of material fact is enough ‗to require a jury or judge to resolve the
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parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.‘‖ Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp., 718 F.2d 897,
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902 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89
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(1968)). In evaluating a summary judgment motion, a court views all facts and draws all
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inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Kaiser Cement Corp. v.
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Fishbach & Moore, Inc., 793 F.2d 1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 1986).
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The moving party bears the burden of showing that there are no genuine issues
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of material fact. Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib. Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir. 1982). ―In
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order to carry its burden of production, the moving party must either produce evidence
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negating an essential element of the nonmoving party‘s claim or defense or show that
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the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its
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ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.‖ Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210
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F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000).
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requirements, the burden shifts to the party resisting the motion to ―set forth specific
Once the moving party satisfies Rule 56‘s
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facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.‖ Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. The
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nonmoving party ―may not rely on denials in the pleadings but must produce specific
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evidence, through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that the dispute
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exists,‖ Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991), and ―must do
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more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.‖
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Orr v. Bank of Am., 285 F.3d 764, 783 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted). ―The
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mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff‘s position will be
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insufficient.‖ Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
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III.
DISCUSSION
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A.
Joint Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (dkt. no. 217)
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Defendants‘ Joint Motion seeks judgment on the following six1 issues:
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1. TASER‘s standing to sue for violation of 15 U.S.C. § 78j
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2. Claims preclusion
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3. Judicial estoppel
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4. McNulty‘s joint and several liability for violations of 28 U.S.C. § 1125(a)
by Stinger
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5. TASER‘s failure to establish Lanham Act violation for Bestex‘s January
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17, 2008, press release
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6. TASER‘s failure to establish Lanham Act violation for Stinger‘s April 24,
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2008, press release and September 6, 2008, email and attachment
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The Court will address each issue in turn below.
1.
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TASER‘s 15 U.S.C. § 78j standing
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Defendants argue that TASER lacks standing to bring a 15 U.S.C. § 78j securities
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fraud action. This Court previously dismissed this count on March 25, 2012. (See dkt.
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no. 36.) On June 1, 2010, TASER sought to include it again in its Motion to Amend, (dkt.
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Defendants initially sought partial summary judgment as to a seventh issue –
TASER‘s standing to sue for deceptive trade practices – but withdrew their request in
their Reply. The Court will not address it.
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no. 57), and the Court rebuffed TASER again for attempting to bring it. (See dkt. no. 86
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at 2: 8-10). After filing its Second Amended Complaint, TASER erroneously retained in
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the document caption a reference to this original securities fraud claim. Both parties
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agree that no securities fraud claim exists per this Court‘s order, so summary judgment
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as to this claim is denied as moot.2
2.
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Claim preclusion
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Defendants argue that TASER‘s trade libel and deceptive trade practices claims
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are precluded under the doctrine of claim preclusion. On May 20, 2009, Stinger and
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TASER filed a ―Stipulation to Dismiss Claims Under the Lanham Act‖ in the Arizona
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litigation wherein they voluntary dismissed Lanham act claims for the purposes of
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―streamlining‖ the litigation, making note that ―there has been no resolution of any factual
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or legal issue on the merits, and the dismissal of those claims should not be construed
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as an adjudication against or in favor of either party.‖ (See Dkt. no. 217-C.) Defendants
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argue that TASER‘s 2007 suit filed in the District of Arizona precludes this suit by virtue
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of the stipulated agreement to dismiss the claims. TASER counters by arguing that no
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identity of the claims exists and that no final judgment on the merits was entered in the
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previous Arizona case.
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―The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits bars
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further claims by parties or their privies based on the same cause of action.‖ In re
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Schimmels, 127 F.3d 875, 881 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Montana v. United States, 440
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U.S. 147, 153 (1979)). Claim preclusion has three elements: 1) an identity of the claims,
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2) a final judgment on the merits, and 3) privity between the parties. Headwaters, Inc. v.
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U.S. Forest Serv., 399 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005).
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Defendants seek summary judgment on this issue rather than an order denying
the claim as moot, yet no § 78j claim has survived for this Court to adjudicate at the
summary judgment stage. The proper course of action is to deny summary judgment as
moot for the claim‘s erroneous inclusion in the Second Amended Complaint‘s caption.
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a.
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In determining whether there is an identity of claims, the Ninth Circuit considers
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Identity of claims
four factors:
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Whether rights or interests established in the prior judgment would be
destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the second action; (2) whether
substantially the same evidence is presented in the two actions; (3)
whether the two suits involve infringement of the same right; and (4)
whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts.
The last of these criteria is the most important.
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Headwaters, 399 F.3d at 1052 (quoting Constantini v. Trans World Airlines, 681 F.2d
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1199, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 1982); see also U.S. v. Tohono O’Odham Nation, ___ U.S. ___,
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131 S. Ct. 1723, 1730 (2011) (―The now-accepted test in preclusion law for determining
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whether two suits involve the same claim or cause of action depends on factual overlap‖)
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(emphasis added).
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There exists no identity of facts between the Arizona litigation and this one. The
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Arizona case arose from alleged patent infringement on three patents, false advertising
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under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) relating to product-to-product comparisons made by Stinger
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and Stinger‘s agent, and patent false marketing. The facts that gave rise to this litigation
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revolve around a series of press releases published between May 31, 2007, and
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October 26, 2009, actions that occurred after the filing of the Arizona lawsuit.3 The case
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before this Court concerns representations made by Defendants in a series of press
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releases that were not the subject of the prior suits. There is no overlapping
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―transactional nucleus of facts,‖ see Headwater, 399 F.3d at 1052, and the differing
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types of claims preclude a finding of claim preclusion. TASER does not bring any patent
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///
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Gruder‘s declaration attached to the Joint Motion suggests that the settlement in
the Arizona litigation concerned claims revolving around the same press releases that
are the subject of this litigation. The complaint in the record demonstrates that the press
releases were not the subject of the Arizona litigation. Defendants have not provided
undisputed evidence that the press releases became an issue as the Arizona litigation
proceeded.
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infringement claims. TASER here alleges unfair competition under § 1125(a)(1)(A), but
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alleged false advertising under § 1125(a)(1)(B) in the Arizona litigation.4
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Putting aside the obviously different patent infringement issues in the Arizona
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case, it is true that in both suits TASER fundamentally complains about unfair business
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practices. But such a general commonality between the suits is not enough to preclude
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TASER from bringing an additional suit, for that would, as TASER rightly points out,
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secure in Defendants an indefinite right into the future to engage in myriad different
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forms of unfair business practices and Lanham Act violations. That surely cannot be the
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law.
For these reasons, no identity of the claims exists.
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b.
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Final judgment on the merits
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In addition, TASER argues there was no final judgment on the merits,
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notwithstanding Defendants‘ citation to Headwaters for the proposition that a stipulated
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dismissal with prejudice may preclude a party from reasserting the same claims in a
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subsequent action in the same court.
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―actually passes directly on the substance of a particular claim.‖ Semtec Int’l, Inc. v.
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Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 501-02 (2001).
Preclusion requires that the prior judgment
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Defendants‘ argument is inapposite for the simple reason that it overlooks the
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plain, unambiguous language in the settlement agreement that the agreement not have
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claim preclusive effect. See U.S. ex rel. Barajas v. Northrop Corp., 147 F.3d 905, 911
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(9th Cir. 1998) (―A settlement can limit the scope of the preclusive effect of a dismissal
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with prejudice by its terms.‖). The agreement notes that both parties maintain the merits
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Defendant Gruder in his declaration says that the settlement negotiations in the
Arizona litigation concerned Lanham Act unfair competition claims (as opposed to false
advertising claims). This characterization conflicts with the record before this Court.
Specifically, TASER‘s Arizona complaint labeled the relevant Counts 4 and 5 as false
advertising claims, whereas the complaint in this case is captioned as bringing unfair
competition claims.
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of their respective claims, but ―wish to streamline the litigation.‖ (See dkt. no. 217-C at
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¶¶ 4-5.) The settlement concludes with following paragraph:
TASER and Stinger stipulate and agree that although the Lanham Act
claims in the case should be dismissed with prejudice, there has been no
resolution of any factual or legal issue on the merits, and the dismissal of
those claims should not be construed as an adjudication against or in favor
of either party.
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5
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(Id. at ¶ 8.) This paragraph is expressly intended to preclude the application of res
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judicata, since the parties clearly intended that no adjudication on the merits (and thus,
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no final judgment) was made. Defendants argue in their Reply that such language is
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standard and included solely to indicate that neither party admits culpability. Were that
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argument tenable, then paragraphs 4 and 5 would be rendered superfluous. See, e.g.,
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ELM Retirement Center, LP v. Callaway, 246 P.3d 938, 942 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (―In
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interpreting a contract, we do not construe one term in a way that renders another
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meaningless.‖).
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Indeed, Defendants cite to Epic Metals Corp. v. H. H. Robertson Co., 870 F.2d
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1574, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1989) for the proposition that parties must ―expressly reserve in a
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consent judgment the right to relitigate some or all issues that would otherwise have
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been barred,‖ which is precisely what happened here. This would be an altogether
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different case without this express language, and Defendants might then stand on a
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different footing in making their preclusion argument. Defendants also rely on Reyn’s
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Pasta Bella LLV v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 748 (9th Cir. 2006) for the rule that a
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court‘s approval of a settlement constitutes a final judgment on the merits for claim
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preclusion purposes even as to untried factually related claims that the court has not
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actually passed upon. Reyn’s Pasta Bella is of no use to Defendants, however, since
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the case involved the very same set of allegedly unlawful financial conduct that gave rise
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to both cases.
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different, and cannot be the basis for the application of preclusion doctrine.
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///
Here, as previously explained, the factual predicates are altogether
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c.
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Defendants further argue that the stipulated dismissal constituted an accord and
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Accord and satisfaction
satisfaction that serves to clear any obligations and liabilities between the two parties.
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To establish an accord and satisfaction, Defendants must demonstrate four
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elements: ―(1) a proper subject matter; (2) competent parties; (3) an assent or meeting of
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the minds of the parties; and (4) consideration.‖ Flagel v. Sw. Clinical Physiatrists, P.C.,
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755 P.2d 1184, 1188 (Ariz. 1988).
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Even assuming that the other three requirements of a proper accord and
9
satisfaction are met, the inclusion of the express language discussed above destroys
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whatever claim Defendants have to the existence of a meeting of the minds that conflicts
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with this express language.
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Contractor, Inc., 505 P.2d 547, 549 (Ariz. 1973) (a court ―will not disregard [the] plain
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and definite meaning [of a contract] and substitute another that is less convincing‖);
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Ringle v. Bruton, 86 P.3d 1032, 1039 (Nev. 2004) (―[W]hen a contract is clear,
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unambiguous, and complete, its terms must be given their plain meaning and the
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contract must be enforced as written; the court may not admit any other evidence of the
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parties‘ intent because the contract expresses their intent‖). No accord and satisfaction
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existed since the express language of the settlement forecloses the application of claim
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preclusion.
3.
20
See, e.g., Vinnell Corp. v. State ex rel. Bob Skousen
Judicial estoppel
21
Defendants argue that TASER is estopped from claiming injuries from the
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February 21, 2008, release, since TASER claimed in the Arizona litigation that the losses
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it sought in this suit were the exclusive result of alleged patent infringement and
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damages from the January 9, 10, and 11, 2008 press releases. TASER counters by
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noting that Defendants‘ argument is based on an expert damages report filed in the
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Arizona litigation which was not adopted by the Court and which did not represent
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TASER‘s position.
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///
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―Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine that precludes a party from gaining an
2
advantage by asserting one position, and then later seeking an advantage by taking a
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clearly inconsistent position.‖ Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 778,
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782 (9th Cir. 2001). In determining whether to apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel, a
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court may apply three factors outlined by the Supreme Court in New Hampshire v.
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Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750 (2001).
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inconsistent‘ with its earlier position.‖ Id. at 750. Second, courts often inquire whether
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the party achieved success in the prior proceeding, as ―judicial acceptance of an
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inconsistent position in a later proceeding would create the perception that either the first
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or the second court was misled.‖ Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). Third,
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courts consider whether, if not estopped, ―the party seeking to assert an inconsistent
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position would derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the other
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party.‖ Id. at 751. The Ninth Circuit has restricted judicial estoppel to cases where the
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court relied on the party‘s previous inconsistent position. See Hamilton, 270 F.3d at 783.
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First, it is not clear that TASER‘s position on damages in the Arizona lawsuit is
First, ―a party‘s later position must be ‗clearly
Defendants‘ arguments are based on the
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clearly inconsistent with the case at bar.
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expert damages report which was not adopted by the Court, and which did not represent
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any position adopted by TASER.
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damages incurred by TASER on the three days in which some of the challenged press
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releases were published, the existence of this expert report does not conflict with any
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positions taken by TASER here. As explained in Part III.A.2, not only are the claims in
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the two cases different, the factual predicates that underlie the claims are different. The
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Arizona litigation involved patent infringement and false advertising on a website, while
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this suit involves allegedly misleading press releases. These are not the same factual
25
predicates, so failure to bring a claim in one does not estop TASER from bringing a claim
26
for the other. For this reason, Defendants‘ citation to New Hampshire is unavailing.
27
New Hampshire involved the application of judicial estoppel on a water boundary case
28
that involved fundamentally the same dispute as the original case. The state of New
While the report offered its analysis of potential
13
1
Hampshire sought to redefine its boundaries as against Maine, directly contrary to a prior
2
settlement agreement between the two states in place over twenty years ago. Here, the
3
cases are fundamentally distinct, involve different sets of challenged acts, and involve
4
different legal rights.
5
Second, TASER would not retain an unfair advantage by pursuing its claims here.
6
The Arizona litigation concerned patent infringement and false advertising, and this
7
litigation concerns unfair competition. Failing to allow TASER to present evidence in
8
support of the latter would prejudice TASER‘s right to pursue civil violations against
9
Defendants independent of its prior patent victory. For these reasons, it is inappropriate
10
11
to apply judicial estoppel to bar TASER from pursuing its suit.
4.
McNulty‘s joint and several liability
12
Defendants argue that McNulty is not jointly and severally liable for any 1125(a)
13
violations on the part of Stinger‘s, but they again misconstrue the law. As discussed
14
above, ―a corporate officer‘s active participation in infringing activity is sufficient to
15
subject him or her to joint and several liability‖ for Lanham Act violations. See Hair
16
Assocs., 987 F. Supp. at 590-91; see, e.g., Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts
17
Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1023 (9th Cir. 1985) (affirming award of joint and several liability),
18
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1059 (1986); PepsiCo, Inc. v. IRIE Motivations, Inc., 2008 WL
19
5732153, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2008) (awarding joint and several liability for Lanham
20
Act violations); see also 4 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 25:23 (4th
21
ed. 2007) (―Since trademark infringement and unfair competition are torts, the doctrine of
22
joint tortfeasors is applicable.‖). So long as there is some showing made that McNulty
23
was personally involved in the challenged conduct, Defendants‘ argument fails as a
24
matter law. Although TASER has not deposed McNulty to determine his exact
25
involvement with Stinger Systems – for example, whether he directly authored the
26
challenged press releases, what his exact motivations behind the press releases were,
27
whether he had authority over the publication of the press releases, and what influence
28
he had within Stinger Systems – Defendants have not met their burden of showing, as a
14
1
matter of law, that McNulty had no personal involvement in the creation, drafting, and
2
publication of the releases.
5.
3
Lanham Act claim for Bestex January 17, 2008, release
4
Next, Defendants seek summary judgment on TASER‘s Lanham Act claim for the
5
January 17, 2008, Bestex release arguing that, in the absence of naming Bestex, no
6
claim can proceed against McNulty, Gruder, or Stinger. Defendants note that TASER
7
does not show that Stinger or Gruder had anything to do with the release, or that
8
McNulty himself published the release. Defendants additionally argue that TASER does
9
not demonstrate that Gruder or McNulty are direct competitors of TASER, which is
10
required to state a Lanham Act violation.
11
A principal may be held liable for infringing acts of an agent acting with actual or
12
apparent authority under the Lanham Act. American Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Winback and
13
Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1429-34 (3d Cir. 1994) (―[T]he Lanham Act is
14
derived generally and purposefully from the common law tort of unfair competition, and
15
its language parallels the protections afforded by state common law and statutory
16
torts.‖), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1103 (1995). ―[A] corporate officer‘s active participation in
17
infringing activity is sufficient to subject him or her to joint and several liability for
18
trademark infringement with the corporation.‖
19
Replacement Servs., Inc., 987 F. Supp. 569, 590-91 (W.D. Mich. 1997). ―[P]ersonal
20
liability for trademark infringement and unfair competition is established if the officer is a
21
moving, active conscious force behind [the defendant corporation‘s] infringement.‖
22
Bambu Sales, Inc. v. Sultana Crackers, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 899, 913 (E.D.N.Y. 1988)
23
(internal quotations omitted).
Hair Assocs., Inc. v. National Hair
24
TASER has not yet demonstrated that Stinger or Gruder were involved in the
25
Bestex release, and the evidence of Stinger‘s involvement in this release is either
26
inconclusive or nonexistent. Given, however, Plaintiff‘s legitimate concerns about
27
inadequate discovery – for example, no deposition has been taken of either Gruder or
28
///
15
1
Park – a ruling on the issue of Gruder or Stinger‘s liability for the Bestex release would
2
be premature, and is barred by Rule 56(d).
3
TASER does, however, provide sufficient evidence of McNulty‘s involvement in
4
the Bestex release to create a material issue of fact to warrant denial of summary
5
judgment.
6
Communications, Inc., 812 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir. 1987), ask this Court to strike Plaintiff‘s
7
unfair competition claim as to this release against both individual defendants since
8
neither are direct competitors of TASER‘s. While it is true that the Ninth Circuit in Halicki
9
refused to ―mutilate‖ the Lanham Act by expanding unfair competition actions to allow
10
those against non-competitors (in that case, a producer of a movie against a theater
11
company), Defendants pick at straws by asking this Court to rule that the individual
12
defendants must be direct competitors to TASER. See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d
13
1093, 1109 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that the plaintiff in Halicki ―lacked a discernibly
14
competitive interest: he and the distributor were not independent actors in the
15
marketplace, but rather had a contractual relationship in which the distributor agreed to
16
act in the marketplace on the plaintiff's behalf.‖).
17
Gruder acted as agents of the infringing company (in this case, Bestex) and a showing of
18
―active participation‖ in or a ―moving, active conscious force behind‖ infringing activity,
19
see Hair Assocs., Inc., 987 F. Supp. at 590-91, suffices to hold them liable for Lanham
20
Act unfair competition.
21
Summary Judgment as to the civil conspiracy claim that both Gruder and McNulty were
22
agents of Stinger, thereby triggering the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine. (See dkt.
23
no. 132 at 6.) Bestex need not be named in order for its agent to be personally liable.
24
See, e.g., Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602, 606 (3d Cir. 1978) (explaining
25
that individual corporate officer may be held liable for unfair infringement when he is an
26
―actual participant‖ in the tort); Solo Cup Co. v. Paper Machinery Corp., 359 F.2d 754,
27
760 (7th Cir. 1966) (―the individual defendant cannot hide behind the corporate veil‖ in
28
an unfair infringement action); Lahr v. Adell Chemical Co., 300 F.2d 256, 260 (1st Cir.
Defendants,
citing
to
cases
including
Halicki
v.
United
Artists
A showing that either McNulty or
Indeed, Defendants argued in their Joint Partial Motion for
16
1
1962) (same); Hair Associates, 987 F. Supp. at 590-591 (same); Bambu Sales, 683 F.
2
Supp. at 913 (same).5
3
With respect to McNulty, the Court holds that Defendants have not met their
4
burden on summary judgment. Notwithstanding whatever additional discovery Plaintiff
5
might need from McNulty, the record before the Court demonstrates that, at the very
6
least, McNulty was personally involved in the Bestex release.
7
McNulty to the PR Wire Service with the entire release demonstrates some level of
8
personal participation in the publication of the email. This fact, alongside TASER‘s
9
general demonstration of McNulty‘s efforts to propose, write, and push the press release
10
tactics, raises a genuine issue of material fact regarding how involved McNulty was in
11
the creation and publication of the Bestex release. TASER need not demonstrate that
12
McNulty published the release himself (though the aforementioned email is very close to
13
actual publication). Defendants do not demonstrate as a matter of law that McNulty is
14
free from § 1125(a) liability for the Bestex release.
6.
15
An email written by
Stinger‘s April 24, 2008, and September 6, 2008, publications
16
Finally, Defendants argue that TASER‘s Lanham Act claims surrounding Stinger‘s
17
April 24, 2008, press release and September 6, 2008, email (both relating to the Stinger
18
lawsuit that TASER claims was malicious) fail as a matter of law because TASER does
19
not demonstrate that they were false or misleading. After considering the evidence
20
available at this stage of the litigation, the Court cannot hold as a matter of law that the
21
press releases and the Stinger packet were not false or misleading.
22
―The Lanham Act was intended to make actionable the deceptive and misleading
23
use of marks and to protect persons engaged in commerce against unfair competition.‖
24
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 767-68 (1992) (quoting 15 U.S.C. §
25
1127). ―Lanham Act Section 43(a) [codified as 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)] jurisprudence
26
27
28
5
The fact that McNulty was not a paid employee is immaterial for this analysis,
since he was, by all accounts, acting as an agent of Stinger in the course of his legal
counsel and release writing.
17
1
recognizes two distinct protectable interests: protection against unfair competition in the
2
form of an action for false advertising and protection against false association in the form
3
of a lawsuit for false endorsement.‖ Kournikova v. Gen. Media Commc’ns Inc., 278 F.
4
Supp. 2d 1111, 1116-17 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
The prohibition on unfair competition under section 43 of the Lanham Act provides
5
6
7
8
9
10
that
[a]ny person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, . . . uses
in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of
fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which—
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as
to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his
or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person....
11
12
***
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is
or is likely to be damaged by such act.
13
14
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). ―Section 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), is one of the few provisions
15
[of the Act] that goes beyond trademark protection and addresses unfair competition.‖
16
Sybersound Records, Inc. v. UAV Corp., 517 F.3d 1137, 1143 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting
17
Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 28 (2003)).
18
―To demonstrate falsity within the meaning of the Lanham Act, a plaintiff may
19
show that the statement was literally false, either on its face or by necessary implication,
20
or that the statement was literally true but likely to mislead or confuse consumers.‖
21
Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 1997). Even if
22
the releases are literally false, the Lanham Act prohibits misleading, confusing, or
23
deceptive advertisements. Id.
24
a.
April 24, 2008 (dkt. no. 95-17)
25
The press release headline reads ―TASER sued for false advertising, unfair
26
competition and injurious falsehood.‖ It describes how the Stinger suit arises out of the
27
distribution of the NIJ report that the release says was based on an older version of
28
Stinger‘s technology. The release includes quotations from the complaint‘s allegations
18
1
that describe how TASER represented to these consumers that the report was up to
2
date. The release also included allegedly misleading assessments of Stinger‘s newest
3
technology as against TASER‘s.
4
The facts surrounding the institution of the Stinger lawsuit demonstrate at least a
5
triable issue of fact as to whether the lawsuit was filed for the purpose of releasing
6
misleading press statements. First, Stinger did not serve TASER. Second, the release
7
does not provide adequate background into the nature of the NIJ report, who the NIJ is,
8
or what the report said. Third, there is evidence in the record that Stinger and McNulty
9
wanted to pursue misleading press releases as an avenue for devaluing TASER,
10
thereby making it more likely that the lawsuit and the April 28, 2008, release were
11
intended to mislead. Fourth, the telephone recordings suggest that McNulty
12
contemplated vexatious litigation meant to drive down TASER stock.
13
Based on these facts, Defendants have not met their burden of demonstrating
14
that no genuine issue of material facts exists as to whether the April 24, 2008, release
15
was misleading. The mere fact that the Stinger lawsuit was indeed pending when the
16
press release was distributed does not foreclose a Lanham Act claim. See id.
17
18
b.
Kevin Scholz email and Stinger Packet (dkt. nos. 95-15 and
95-16)
19
For the same reasons, there remains a genuine issue of material fact regarding
20
whether the Scholz email and Stinger packet are misleading or deceptive. The email
21
sent by Scholz discusses the lawsuit of TASER and includes within its attachment an
22
almost verbatim copy of the April 24 press release. It additionally talks about TASER
23
―masquerading‖ the NIJ report, claims there was collusion between the university
24
conducting an independent test of TASER‘s products and TASER‘s Board of Advisors,
25
and makes a number of other allegations against TASER. Given that the impetus of the
26
email appears to be the Stinger lawsuit – the subject line read ―Stinger Sues TASER‖ –
27
Defendants cannot demonstrate as a matter of law that the Stinger packet email or
28
attachment were not misleading, deceptive, or confusing.
19
Based on the foregoing, Defendants‘ Joint Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
1
2
is denied.
3
B.
4
TASER seeks a ruling from this Court denying Defendants‘ Joint Motion on the
5
ground that TASER has not had adequate opportunity to reap the fruits of discovery for
6
the purposes of responding to the Motion. Defendants contend that Rule 56(d) relief is
7
inappropriate because Plaintiff has all relevant information it needs to defend the Motion.
8
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d), if, in response to a summary judgment motion, ―a
9
nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present
10
facts essential to justify its opposition,‖ the Court may defer consideration of the motion,
11
deny the motion, allow the parties time to complete additional discovery, or grant other
12
appropriate relief. The party requesting additional time to conduct discovery to oppose
13
summary judgment ―must show: (1) it has set forth in affidavit form the specific facts it
14
hopes to elicit from further discovery; (2) the facts sought exist; and (3) the sought-after
15
facts are essential to oppose summary judgment.‖ Family Home & Fin. Ctr., Inc. v. Fed.
16
Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 525 F.3d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 2008). If the nonmovant does
17
not satisfy these requirements, the Court may rule on summary judgment without
18
granting additional discovery. Id. Rule 56(d) has been read as ―requiring, rather than
19
merely permitting, discovery ‗where the nonmoving party has not had the opportunity to
20
discover information that is essential to its opposition.‘‖ Metabolife Intern., Inc. v.
21
Wornick, 264 F.3d 832, 846 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 n. 5).
Motion for Rule 56(d) Relief (dkt no. 223)
22
First and foremost, because the Court denies summary judgment on the six
23
issues discussed above, Taser‘s request for Rule 56(d) relief as to them is denied as
24
moot.
25
///
26
///
27
///
28
///
20
1
The following issues require consideration of evidence not available to the
2
nonmovant, TASER, as they have to do with questions of Stinger and Gruder‘s role in
3
the challenged conduct:
1.
4
TASER‘s failure to establish Lanham Act violation for Bestex‘s January 17,
2008, press release (with respect to Defendants Stinger and Gruder)
5
2.
6
TASER‘s failure to establish Lanham Act violation for Stinger‘s April 24,
7
2008, press release and September 6, 2008, email and attachment (with
8
respect to Defendants Stinger and Gruder)
9
Given that TASER has not had the opportunity to depose Gruder and Yong Suk
10
Park (see dkt. no. 264 at 5-6), TASER does not have at its disposal all of the facts
11
necessary to adequately respond to the remaining issues. TASER‘s Rule 56(d) Motion
12
as to these issues is granted.
13
IV.
14
15
16
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Defendants‘ Joint Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment (dkt. no. 217) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Plaintiff‘s Motion for Rule 56(d) Relief (dkt. no.
17
223) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
18
DATED THIS 2nd day of August 2012.
19
20
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
21
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