Quinn v. James Thomas et al

Filing 155

ORDER Denying 140 Motion for Attorney Fees. Signed by Judge Kent J. Dawson on 8/15/12. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - MMM)

1
2
3
4
5
6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

7

DISTRICT OF NEVADA

8
9

STEPHEN P. QUINN,

10

Plaintiff,

11

v.

12

JAMES THOMAS, et al.,

13

Case No. 2:09-CV-00588-KJD-RJJ

Defendants.

ORDER

14
15
16

Presently before the Court is Defendant Kai Degner’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees (#140).
Plaintiff filed a response in opposition (#142) to which Defendant replied (#144).

17

On August 8, 2011, the Court granted (#133) Defendant Kai Degner’s motion for summary

18

judgment finding that Plaintiff had failed to present admissible evidence demonstrating that Degner

19

had disseminated Plaintiff’s private information in violation of his civil rights. Now Degner has

20

moved for an award of his attorney’s fees as a prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

21

As a general rule, “a district court may in its discretion award attorney’s fees to a prevailing

22

defendant . . . upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without

23

foundation, even though it was not brought in subjective bad faith.” Christiansburg Garment Co. v.

24

E.E.O.C., 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978). Christiansburg was a Title VII case and two years later, the

25

United States Supreme Court applied the Christiansburg rationale in the context of 42 U.S.C. § 1983

26

cases. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14-16 (1980). By frivolous, the court means that the

1

litigation must be “meritless in the sense that it is groundless or without foundation.” Hughes, 449

2

U.S. at 14; see also Dooley v. Reiss, 736 F.2d 1392, 1396 (9th Cir. 1984). In other words litigation

3

is frivolous if the result is obvious or the arguments are wholly without merit. See Glanzman v.

4

Uniroyal, Inc. 892 F.2d 58, 61 (9th Cir. 1989).

5

However, “[a] defendant stands in a different equitable position from that of a prevailing

6

plaintiff. Nevertheless, Congress intended to protect defendants from ‘litigation having no legal or

7

factual basis.” Mitchell v. Los Angeles Ct. Superintendent of Schools, 805 F.2d 844, 847 (9th Cir.

8

1986)(quoting Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 420). “Only in exceptional cases did Congress intend that

9

defendants be awarded attorney’s fees.” Id. at 848. This is not an exceptional case. The Court

10

ultimately concluded on a motion for summary judgment that Plaintiff had not presented evidence

11

demonstrating that a question of fact existed about whether Degner had disseminated Plaintiff’s

12

private information. This was not a case where there was no legal or factual basis for the complaint.

13

In fact, Degner admitted that he had run a SCOPE report and obtained Plaintiff’s private

14

information.1 It is unlike other cases where the Court has awarded attorney’s fees to prevailing

15

defendants in section 1983 actions where, for example, the plaintiff was on notice of what facts were

16

needed to allege a claim, knew those facts did not exist and brought the claim anyway. Here, there

17

has been no showing that Plaintiff subjectively knew that Degner had not disseminated his private

18

information.

19
20
21

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Kai Degner’s Motion for Attorneys’
Fees (#140) is DENIED.
DATED this 15TH day of August 2012.

22
23

_____________________________
Kent J. Dawson
United States District Judge

24
25
1

26

SCOPE reports are private records, generally used by law enforcement, of an individual’s personal information,
including birth date, social security number, and criminal history.

2