Mitchell v. Skolnik et al
Filing
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ORDER Denying 29 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Signed by Judge James C. Mahan on 3/2/2012. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - SLR)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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DISTRICT OF NEVADA
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TARZ MITCHELL,
#63139
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Plaintiff,
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vs.
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HOWARD SKOLNIK, et al.,
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Defendants.
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2:10-cv-01339-JCM-GWF
ORDER
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Presently before the court is plaintiff Tarz Mitchell’s emergency motion for preliminary
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injunction. (Doc. #29). Defendants Brian Williams, et. al. filed a response (doc. #30), to which plaintiff
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has not replied.
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I.
Background
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Plaintiff is a prisoner held by the Nevada Department of Corrections (“NDOC”) at Southern
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Desert Correctional Center (“SDDC”). (Doc. #1, Ex. A). Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated his
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due process rights by using his designation as a member of a security-threat-group (“STG”) to retaliate
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against him for filing grievances against prison officials. Id.
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Plaintiff’s motion for emergency injunctive relief contends that defendants intended to place
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plaintiff in danger when they attempted to house him with a known member of a rival gang, and that
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prison officials assigned this placement in retaliation for grievances filed by plaintiff. (Doc. #29).
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Plaintiff further alleges that sanctions were imposed against him when he refused this housing
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assignment with an identified member of a rival STG, that defendants could still place him with a rival
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gang member in the future, and that such an assignment is contrary to the goals of NDOC administrative
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regulations. Id. Finally, plaintiff claims that he is being denied the right to file grievances. Id.
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Defendants argue that there is no need for this court to grant preliminary injunctive relief to
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protect plaintiff from his allegedly unsafe housing assignment because plaintiff was not forced to accept
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the assignment when he refused it and is not currently housed with a gang rival. (Doc. #30).
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Additionally, plaintiff has not been designated as a member of a STG since January of 2010, and he has
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the opportunity to file grievances. Id.
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Plaintiff now moves for a preliminary injunction compelling defendants to (1) classify plaintiff
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as a “level one” inmate; (2) refrain from housing plaintiff with known gang rivals; and (3) recognize
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plaintiff’s First Amendment right to file grievances. Id.
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II.
Discussion
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A.
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The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) allows the court to issue an order for preliminary
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injunctive relief with respect to prison conditions. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). When preliminary injunctive
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relief is requested with respect to prison conditions, “[t]he court shall give substantial weight to any
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adverse impact on public safety or the operation of the criminal justice system caused by the preliminary
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relief . . . .” Id. Therefore, when balancing hardships, the court must be particularly concerned with the
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hardship caused by judicial interference in the operation of a prison. See id. If a preliminary injunction
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is granted, it “must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court
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finds required preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm.” Id.
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Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, a court may issue a preliminary injunction only
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on notice to the other party. Federal courts must consider the following factors in determining whether
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to issue a preliminary injunction: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the likelihood of
Legal Standard
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irreparable injury if preliminary relief is not granted; (3) balance of hardships; and (4) advancement of
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the public interest. Winter v. N.R.D.C., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
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1.
Likelihood of success on the merits
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Plaintiff first moves the court for a preliminary injunction requiring NDOC to classify plaintiff
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as a level-one inmate. (Doc. #29). Prisoners have no due process right to a particular prisoner
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classification. Hernandez v. Johnston, 833 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1987). Furthermore, plaintiff does
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not dispute defendants’ assertion that plaintiff has not had the STG classification since January of 2010.
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(Doc. #30).
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Plaintiff next asks the court for an injunction preventing defendants from housing him with
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identified rival gang members. Plaintiff asserts that he refused his housing assignment in order to avoid
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a confrontation with his assigned cell-mate, a rival gang member, and that the defendants “could”
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attempt to house him with a rival gang member again. (Doc. #29). Defendants’ unrefuted response is
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that once plaintiff refused his housing assignment he was not housed with a member of a rival STG and,
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therefore, is not in danger. Plaintiff’s belief that he could be forced to accept a similar housing
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assignment in the future is conjectural and unsubstantiated.
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Finally, plaintiff moves that this court “inform the defendants that plaintiff has a . . .
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constitutional right to [file] grievances.” (Doc. #29). In the instant case, the plaintiff has been allowed
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to file complaints and has been given the opportunity to appeal rejections. (See Doc. #1 Ex. A-1).
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Plaintiff has also been provided a forum to have his grievances heard by this court.
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Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction has failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success
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on the merits. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. Therefore, the likelihood of success factor weighs against
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granting the motion for a preliminary injunction.
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2.
Likelihood of irreparable injury
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Plaintiff no longer bears a STG designation, is not currently housed with a rival gang member,
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and has the opportunity to be heard by this court. Therefore, the likelihood of irreparable injury factor
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weighs against granting a preliminary injunction.
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3.
Balance of hardships
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Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2), “[t]he court shall give substantial weight to any adverse
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impact on public safety or the operation of the criminal justice system caused by the preliminary relief
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. . . .” Therefore, when balancing the hardships in this case, the court must take particular care not to
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unduly burden the defendants by meddling in the operation of SDDC.
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The defendants’ substantial interest in avoiding the adverse impact which may result from
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preliminary relief is greater than the hardship sustained by the plaintiff. As described above, it is not
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likely that the plaintiff will suffer any meaningful hardships if he is not granted preliminary injunctive
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relief. Therefore, the balance of hardships factor weighs against granting the preliminary injunction.
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4.
Public interest
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The primary public interest to be considered in this context is public safety. 18 U.S.C. §
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3626(a)(2). Public safety is best served by prisons managed within the discretion of prison officials.
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Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 540 (1979). The public interest factor weighs against granting the
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preliminary injunction.
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III.
Conclusion
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Plaintiff’s motion fails to demonstrate (1) a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable
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injury, (3) a balance of hardships in his favor, or (4) that a preliminary injunction would be in the public
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interest. Under these circumstances, a preliminary injunction is not warranted.
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Accordingly,
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that plaintiff Tarz Mitchell’s
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emergency motion for preliminary injunction (doc. #29) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.
DATED this 2nd day of March, 2012.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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