Righthaven LLC v. DiBiase

Filing 45

ORDER Denying 27 Motion to Dismiss and Granting in part and Denying in part 17 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Chief Judge Roger L. Hunt on 4/15/2011. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - SLR)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

DISTRICT OF NEVADA

10

***

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

RIGHTHAVEN, LLC, a Nevada limitedliability company,

)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
THOMAS A. DIBIASE, an individual,
)
)
Defendant.
)
_______________________________________)
THOMAS A. DIBIASE, an individual,
)
)
Counterclaimant,
)
)
vs.
)
)
RIGHTHAVEN, LLC, a Nevada limited)
liability company,
)
)
Counterdefendant.
)
_______________________________________)

Case No.: 2:10-cv-01343-RLH-PAL
ORDER
(Motion to Dismiss–#17;
Motion to Dismiss–#27)

Before the Court is Defendant/Counterclaimant Thomas A. DiBiase’s Motion to

24

Dismiss (#17, filed Oct. 29, 2010) for failure to state a claim. The Court has also considered

25

Plaintiff/Counterdefendant Righthaven, LLC’s Opposition (#29, filed Dec. 2, 2010), and DiBiase’s

26

Reply (#35, filed Dec. 15, 2010).

AO 72
(Rev. 8/82)

1

1

Also before the Court is Righthaven’s Motion to Dismiss (#27, filed Dec. 1, 2010)

2

for failure to state a claim. The Court has also considered DiBiase’s Opposition (#37, filed Jan. 7,

3

2011), and Righthaven’s Reply (#39, filed Jan. 17, 2011).

4

BACKGROUND

5

DiBiase maintains a website that publishes information regarding the prosecution of

6

so-called “no-body” murder cases—a homicide prosecution where the victim is missing and

7

presumed dead, but no body is found. Righthaven filed suit against DiBiase for copyright

8

infringement alleging that DiBiase displayed a Las Vegas Review Journal article concerning a “no-

9

body” murder case on his website. Righthaven claims to be the copyright owner of that article.

10

Righthaven’s complaint seeks several remedies, only two of which are relevant for this order: (1)

11

an order transferring control of the domain name of DiBiase’s website to Righthaven, and (2)

12

attorney’s fees. DiBiase brought a counterclaim against Righthaven for declaratory relief, asking

13

the Court to declare that he did not infringe on Righthaven’s alleged copyright.

14

Both parties subsequently filed motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the

15

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. DiBiase’s motion is limited to a request that the Court dismiss

16

Righthaven’s demand for transfer of his website’s domain name and for attorney’s fees.

17

Righthaven’s motion requests the Court to dismiss DiBiase’s counterclaim. For the reasons

18

discussed below, the Court denies Righthaven’s motion and grants DiBiase’s motion in part and

19

denies it in part.

20
21
22

DISCUSSION
I.

Legal Standard
A court may dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which

23

relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(6) is an appropriate vehicle to

24

challenge legally deficient remedies. See Whittlestone v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 974 (9th

25

Cir. 2010). A properly pled complaint must provide “a short and plain statement of the claim

26

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While Rule 8 does not

AO 72
(Rev. 8/82)

2

1

require detailed factual allegations, it demands “more than labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic

2

recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

3

“Factual allegations must be enough to rise above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at

4

555. Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to

5

“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (internal citation

6

omitted).
In Iqbal, the Supreme Court recently clarified the two-step approach district courts

7
8

are to apply when considering motions to dismiss. First, a district court must accept as true all

9

well-pled factual allegations in the complaint; however, legal conclusions are not entitled to the

10

assumption of truth. Id. at 1950. Mere recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported only

11

by conclusory statements, do not suffice. Id. at 1949. Second, a district court must consider

12

whether the factual allegations in the complaint allege a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 1950. A

13

claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff’s complaint alleges facts that allows the court to draw

14

a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. at 1949. Where

15

the complaint does not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the

16

complaint has “alleged—but not shown—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. (internal

17

quotation marks omitted). When the claims in a complaint have not crossed the line from

18

conceivable to plausible, plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

19

II.

DiBiase’s Motion to Dismiss

20

As mentioned above, DiBiase’s motion is limited to a request that the Court dismiss

21

Righthaven’s demand for an order transferring DiBiase’s website domain name to Righthaven and

22

for attorney’s fees.

23

A.

24

Transfer of Domain Name
Righthaven’s complaint requests the Court to direct Heritage Web Design, LLC, the

25

current registrar of DiBiase’s website domain name (www.nobodycases.com), to lock that domain

26

and transfer control of it to Righthaven. However, “[t]he remedies for infringement ‘are only

AO 72
(Rev. 8/82)

3

1

those prescribed by Congress,’” Sony Corp. Of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,

2

431 (1984) (quoting Thompson v. Hubbard, 131 U.S. 123, 151 (1889)), and Congress has never

3

expressly granted plaintiffs in copyright infringement cases the right to seize control over the

4

defendant’s website domain. Therefore, the Court finds that Righthaven’s request for such relief

5

fails as a matter of law and is dismissed.

6

B.

7

Attorney’s Fees
Righthaven’s complaint also requests attorney’s fees incurred by Righthaven in this

8

action pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 505. Under § 505, the Court has discretion to award reasonable

9

attorney’s fees to the prevailing party. DiBiase argues that the Court should dismiss Righthaven’s

10

request for attorney’s fees because such relief requires an independent attorney-client relationship.

11

DiBiase further argues that because Righthaven’s principals are its lawyers there is not an

12

independent attorney-client relationship. Although the Court finds merit in DiBiase’s argument, it

13

nevertheless denies his motion because any determination on attorney’s fees at this point in the

14

litigation is simply premature.

15

III.

16

Righthaven’s Motion to Dismiss
DiBiase’s counterclaim against Righthaven seeks a declaration by the Court that

17

DiBiase has not infringed Righthaven’s copyright. Righthaven asks the Court to dismiss that

18

counterclaim because it is unnecessary and duplicative of the issues already presented in

19

Righthaven’s complaint. The Court disagrees. The Court finds that DiBiase’s counterclaim serves

20

a useful purpose because, among other things, it will guide DiBiase’s website operations (and the

21

operations of other, similarly situated parties) in the future. Furthermore, the Court finds that

22

DiBiase has pled sufficient facts to make his request for declaratory relief a plausible claim.

23

Therefore, the Court denies Righthaven’s motion.

24

///

25

///

26

///

AO 72
(Rev. 8/82)

4

1

CONCLUSION

2

Accordingly, and for good cause appearing,

3

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that DiBiase’s Motion to Dismiss (#17) is GRANTED

4

in part and DENIED in part, as described herein.

5
6
7

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Righthaven’s Motion to Dismiss (#27) is
DENIED.
Dated: April 15, 2011

8

____________________________________
ROGER L. HUNT
Chief United States District Judge

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
AO 72
(Rev. 8/82)

5