Young v. Boggs et al

Filing 14

ORDER Granting 4 Motion to Dismiss. FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is granted leave to file a second amended complaint within fourteen (14) days. Signed by Judge Kent J. Dawson on 7/11/11. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - MMM)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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DISTRICT OF NEVADA

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10 APRIL M. YOUNG, an individual,
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Plaintiff,

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Case No. 2:10-cv-01846-KJD-LRL
ORDER

13 ANDREA BOGGS, an individual;
PARDEE HOMES OF NEVEDA, a
14 Domestic Corporation; WEYERHAEUSER
COMPANY, a Foreign Corporation; DOES
15 1-10, and ROE Corporations A through Z,
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Defendants.

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Presently before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (#4). Plaintiff filed a response

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in opposition (#8) to which Defendants replied (#10).

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I. Background

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Plaintiff’s former employer, Defendant Pardee Homes (“Pardee”), terminated Plaintiff on

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December 30, 2006. (#8-1). On August 27, 2007, two-hundred forty (240) days after her

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termination, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the EEOC requesting a discrimination charge be filed

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against Pardee. On September 8, 2010, Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint (#1-1) against Pardee,

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Pardee’s parent company, Weyerhaeuser Company (“Weyerhaeuser”), and her former manager at

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Pardee, Andrea Boggs (“Boggs”) (collectively “Defendants”). Plaintiff asserts race and age

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discrimination and retaliation in violation of: NRS 14.065; NRS 613.330; 42 U.S.C. § 1981; Title

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VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; and 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) of the Age

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Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). Defendant has moved to dismiss: (1) all the state

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law claims; (2) the Title VII, ADEA, and Nevada state law claims against Boggs; and (3) the Title

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VII, ADEA, and Nevada state law claims against Weyerhaeuser.

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II. Motion to Dismiss

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Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a Plaintiff’s complaint for “failure

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to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” A properly pled complaint must provide “a short

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and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

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8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While Rule 8 does not require

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detailed factual allegations, it demands more than “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation

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of the elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Papasan

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v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). “Factual allegations must be enough to rise above the

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speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint

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must contain sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal,

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129 S. Ct. at 1949 (internal citation omitted).

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In Iqbal, the Supreme Court clarified the two-step approach district courts are to apply when

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considering motions to dismiss. First, the Court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations

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in the complaint; however, legal conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Id. at 1950.

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Mere recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory statements, do not

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suffice. Id. at 1949. Second, the Court must consider whether the factual allegations in the

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complaint allege a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 1950. A claim is facially plausible when the

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Plaintiff’s complaint alleges facts that allow the court to draw a reasonable inference that the

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defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. at 1949. Where the complaint does not permit the

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court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has “alleged—but not

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shown—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). When the
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claims in a complaint have not crossed the line from conceivable to plausible, Plaintiff’s complaint

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must be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

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A. Nevada State Law Claims

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Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims on the grounds that Plaintiff

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did not file a charge with the Nevada Equal Rights Commission (“NERC”) within the one-hundred

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eighty (180) day deadline required by NRS 613.430 and therefore did not exhaust her administrative

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remedies. Plaintiff contends that she filed her charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity

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Commission (“EEOC”) within the three-hundred (300) day EEOC deadline and therefore she

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constructively filed with NERC by the required deadline.

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“[A] charge filed with the EEOC is ‘constructively filed’ with the state agency either on the

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same day that the charge was filed with the EEOC or on the day the EEOC refers the complaint to

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the state agency.” Peterson v. State of California, 319 Fed.Appx. 679 (9th Cir. 2009); citing EEOC

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v. Commercial Office Products Co., 486 U.S. 107, 112-113 (1988). NRS 613.430 requires plaintiffs

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who wish to bring lawsuits under Nevada’s unfair employment practice laws to file charges with

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NERC within 180 days after the alleged discriminatory or retaliatory act. This 180 day deadline is

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not expanded even though Nevada has a work sharing agreement with the EEOC that lengthens the

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deadline to file with the EEOC to 300 days. Kora v. Renown Health, 2010 WL 2609049, *3 (D.Nev.

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2010). Federal EEOC deadlines do not affect state law deadlines. Id.

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Here, Plaintiff filed her charges with the EEOC two-hundred forty (240) days after the

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alleged discriminatory or retaliatory act. Therefore, even though her filing with the EEOC was

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constructively filed with NERC, it was filed sixty (60) days past the Nevada deadline.

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Plaintiff further contends that NRS 233.160(1)(b) provides a three-hundred (300) day statute

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of limitations to file with NERC. However, NRS 233.160(1)(b) does not apply to claims in which

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the Plaintiff seeks to file a court action. Rather it only applies to claims which will be investigated

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and pursued by NERC. Plaintiff never filed a claim with NERC nor did she pursue any of the NERC

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remedies detailed in NRS 233.160. Therefore, NRS 233.160 does not apply. The applicable statute
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is NRS 613.430 and its one-hundred eighty (180) day deadline applies here. Accordingly, Plainitff’s

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state law claims are dismissed.

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B. Title VII, ADEA, and Nevada State Law Claims, Against Boggs

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Defendants have also moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VII, ADEA, and Nevada state law

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claims against Boggs on the basis that there is no individual liability under those statutes. Plaintiff

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agrees that Boggs is not a proper party for the Title VII or Nevada state law claims, but contends that

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Boggs is a proper party for the 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim. Defendants do not dispute the 42 U.S.C. §

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1981 claim. Therefore, because there is no opposition to the dismissal of the Title VII, ADEA, and

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Nevada state law claims against Boggs, the Court dismisses those claims.

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C. Title VII, ADEA, and Nevada State Law Claims, Against Weyerhaeuser

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Defendants have also moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VII, ADEA, and Nevada state law

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claims against Weyerhaeuser on the basis that Weyerhaeuser was not named in the EEOC filing and

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therefore not given the required notice of the charges. Plaintiff contends that Weyerhaeuser and

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Pardee are integrated enterprises and thus because Pardee was named in the EEOC filing,

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Weyerhaeuser should have anticipated it would be named in this action.

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If a defendant who was not named in the EEOC filing “should have anticipated” that it would

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be named in the subsequent suit, the Court has jurisdiction over that defendant. EEOC v. National

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Education Association, Alaska, 422 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir. 2005). However, a parent company

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should not necessarily anticipate it will be named in a suit against its subsidiary because, “[i]t is a

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general principle of corporate law deeply ‘ingrained in our economic and legal systems’ that a parent

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corporation . . . is not liable for the acts of its subsidiaries.” U.S. v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 61

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(1998), (quoting Douglas & Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39

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Yale L.J. 193 (1929)). But, if a parents and subsidiary are integrated enterprises, the parent is liable

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for charges against the subsidiary and thus should anticipate it will be named in the suit. EEOC

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Compliance Manual, § 2 Threshold Issues (2000), Covered Entities (b)(1)(a)(iii)(a).

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looks to four factors to determine if a parent and subsidiary are integrated enterprises: “(1)
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The Court

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interrelation of operations; (2) common management; (3) centralized control of labor relations; and

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(4) common ownership or financial control.” Kang v. U. Lim America, Inc., 296 F.3d 810, 815 (9th

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Cir. 2002) (quoting Childs v. Local 18, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 719 F.2d 1379, 1382 (9th

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Cir.1983).

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Here, Plaintiff states in her Response in Opposition (#8) that Weyerhaeuser and Pardee are

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integrated enterprises because, Weyerhaeuser set terms and conditions for hiring, performance

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evaluations, promotions, terminations, and benefits and it paid salary. These allegations all weigh in

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favor of indicating that Weyerhaeuser and Pardee are integrated enterprises. See Kang, 296 F.2d at

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815. However, the only fact regarding the entities’ relationship alleged in the Amended Complaint

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(#1-1) is that Weyerhaeuser is Pardee’s parent company. The mere fact that Weyerhaeuser is

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Pardee’s parent company is not a sufficient factual allegation to indicate that the two entities are also

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integrated enterprises. Therefore, based on the Amended Complaint’s allegations regarding the

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entities relationship, it is only speculative that Weyerhaeuser should have anticipated being named in

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the present suit. Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss (#4) is granted with leave to amend within

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fourteen (14) days.

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IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (#4) is

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GRANTED;

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is granted leave to file a second amended
complaint within fourteen (14) days.
DATED this 11th day of July 2011.

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_____________________________
Kent J. Dawson
United States District Judge

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