Young v. Boggs et al

Filing 37

ORDER Denying 22 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Kent J. Dawson on 3/19/12. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - ASB)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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DISTRICT OF NEVADA

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APRIL M. YOUNG,

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Plaintiff,

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v.

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ANDREA BOGGS, et al.,

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Case No. 2:10-CV-01846-KJD-LRL

Defendants.

ORDER

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Presently before the Court is Defendant Weyerhaeuser Company’s Motion to Dismiss (#22).

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Plaintiff filed a response in opposition (#28) to which Weyerhaeuser replied (#29).

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I. Background

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Plaintiff’s former employer, Defendant Pardee Homes (“Pardee”), terminated Plaintiff on

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December 30, 2006. (#18). On August 27, 2007, two-hundred forty (240) days after her

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termination, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

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(“EEOC”) requesting a discrimination charge be filed against Pardee. Attached to the EEOC Intake

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Questionnaire was a nine (9) page statement by Young detailing the facts that she relied on. In the

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opening paragraph of the attachment, Plaintiff stated: “Pardee Homes and ultimately Weyerhaeuser

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Company should be held liable for racial discrimination against me in violation of Title VII of the

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Civil Rights Act of 1964.” On August 3, 2011, Plaintiff filed her Third Amended Complaint (#18)

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against Pardee, Pardee’s parent company, Weyerhaeuser Company (“Weyerhaeuser”), and her former

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manager at Pardee, Andrea Boggs (“Boggs”) (collectively “Defendants”). Plaintiff asserts race and

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age discrimination and retaliation in violation of: 42 U.S.C. § 1981; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

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of 1964; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; and 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act

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(“ADEA”). Defendant Weyerhaeuser has now moved to dismiss all claims against it asserting that

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Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies against it

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II. Motion to Dismiss

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Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a Plaintiff’s complaint for “failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” A properly pled complaint must provide “a short

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and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

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8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While Rule 8 does not require

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detailed factual allegations, it demands more than “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation

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of the elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Papasan

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v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). “Factual allegations must be enough to rise above the

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speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint

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must contain sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal,

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129 S. Ct. at 1949 (internal citation omitted).

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In Iqbal, the Supreme Court clarified the two-step approach district courts are to apply when

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considering motions to dismiss. First, the Court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations

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in the complaint; however, legal conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Id. at 1950.

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Mere recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory statements, do not

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suffice. Id. at 1949. Second, the Court must consider whether the factual allegations in the

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complaint allege a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 1950. A claim is facially plausible when the

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Plaintiff’s complaint alleges facts that allow the court to draw a reasonable inference that the

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defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. at 1949. Where the complaint does not permit the

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court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has “alleged—but not
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shown—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). When the

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claims in a complaint have not crossed the line from conceivable to plausible, Plaintiff’s complaint

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must be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

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III. Analysis

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Before bringing a suit for unlawful discrimination, a plaintiff must have first filed a charge

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alleging unlawful discrimination with the EEOC. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(d); Federal Exp. Corp. v.

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Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 395 (2008); EEOC v. Nat’l Educ. Assoc. Alaska, 422 F.3d 840, 847 (9th

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Cir. 2005). In Holowecki, the Supreme Court held that:

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“[in] addition to the information required by the regulations, i.e., an allegation and
the name of the charged party, if a filing is to be deemed a charge it must be
reasonably construed as a request for the agency to take remedial action to protect the
employee's rights or otherwise settle a dispute between the employer and the
employee.

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Holowecki, 552 U.S. at 402. Defendant Weyerhaeuser asserts that Plaintiff’s charge of

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discrimination is insufficient to establish that it should have anticipated that it would be named in her

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suit. However, Holowecki makes clear that the statute requires that an aggrieved individual file a

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charge before filing suit. Id. at 403-404. The statute does not condition an individual’s right to sue

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upon the agency taking any action. Id. The fact that Weyerhaeuser was not informed by the EEOC

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of the charges and that it did not take part in the conciliation process does not prevent Plaintiff’s

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action. Her statement that Weyerhaeuser should be held liable for the acts of discrimination is

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enough to satisfy the statutory requirement. Accordingly, Weyerhaeuser’s motion to dismiss is

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denied.

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IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Weyerhaeuser Company’s Motion
to Dismiss (#22) is DENIED.
DATED this 19th day of March 2012.

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_____________________________
Kent J. Dawson
United States District Judge

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