Carrillo et al v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department et al

Filing 55

ORDER Denying 37 Defendant Andrew Ubbens' Motion for Attorney Fees. Signed by Judge Kent J. Dawson on 3/16/12. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - EDS)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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DISTRICT OF NEVADA

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PETRA CARRILLO, et al.,

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Plaintiffs,

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v.

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Case No. 2:10-CV-02122-KJD-GWF

LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE
DEPARTMENT, et al.,

ORDER

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Defendants.
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Presently before the Court is Defendant Andrew Ubbens’ Motion for Attorney Fees (#37).
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Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition (#41).
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On August 1, 2011, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion to
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dismiss. After close scrutiny and analysis Plaintiffs’ claims against Andrew Ubbens were dismissed,
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because the Court determined that Ubbens was not the proximate cause of decedent’s death. Now
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Ubbens has moved for an award of his attorney’s fees as a prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
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As a general rule, “a district court may in its discretion award attorney’s fees to a prevailing
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defendant . . . upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without
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foundation, even though it was not brought in subjective bad faith.” Christiansburg Garment Co. v.
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E.E.O.C., 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978). Christiansburg was a Title VII case and two years later, the
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United States Supreme Court applied the Christiansburg rationale in the context of 42 U.S.C. § 1983

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cases. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14-16 (1980). By frivolous, the court means that the

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litigation must be “meritless in the sense that it is groundless or without foundation.” Hughes, 449

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U.S. at 14; see also Dooley v. Reiss, 736 F.2d 1392, 1396 (9th Cir. 1984). In other words litigation

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is frivolous if the result is obvious or the arguments are wholly without merit. See Glanzman v.

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Uniroyal, Inc. 892 F.2d 58, 61 (9th Cir. 1989).

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However, “[a] defendant stands in a different equitable position from that of a prevailing

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plaintiff. Nevertheless, Congress intended to protect defendants from ‘litigation having no legal or

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factual basis.” Mitchell v. Los Angeles Ct. Superintendent of Schools, 805 F.2d 844, 847 (9th Cir.

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1986)(quoting Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 420). “Only in exceptional cases did Congress intend that

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defendants be awarded attorney’s fees.” Id. at 848. This is not an exceptional case. While the Court

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ultimately concluded that Ubbens was not the proximate cause of the death at issue, close analysis

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was required for the Court to reach that determination. This was not a case where there was no legal

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or factual basis for the complaint. It is unlike other cases where the Court has awarded attorney’s

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fees to prevailing defendants in section 1983 actions where, for example, the plaintiff was on notice

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of what facts were needed to allege a claim, knew those facts did not exist and brought the claim

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anyway.

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Andrew Ubbens’ Motion for
Attorney Fees (#37) is DENIED.
DATED this 16th day of March 2012.

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_____________________________
Kent J. Dawson
United States District Judge

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