Griffin v. Countrywide Home Loan Servicing LP et al

Filing 17

ORDER Denying 12 Motion to Remand to State Court. Signed by Judge Gloria M. Navarro on 7/5/11. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - ASB)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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DISTRICT OF NEVADA

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NINA S. GRIFFIN,
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Plaintiff,

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vs.

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COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOAN
SERVICING, et al.,

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Defendants.

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Case No.: 2:11-cv-00953-GMN-LRL
ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Nina S. Griffin’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion to Remand

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(ECF No. 12). For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (ECF No. 12) will be

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DENIED.

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I.

BACKGROUND

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Plaintiff initially filed this lawsuit in state court seeking quiet title to the real property

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located at 5222 Rock Cabin Court, North Las Vegas, NV 89031 and attributing a number of

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wrongful foreclosure practices to Defendants. Defendants subsequently removed the lawsuit to

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this court based on diversity and federal question jurisdiction.

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Plaintiff now seeks to remand the case, arguing that federal question jurisdiction does not

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exist but ignoring Defendants’ contention with regard to diversity jurisdiction.

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II.

DISCUSSION

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A civil action brought in a state court may be removed by the defendant to a federal

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district court if the district court could have had original jurisdiction over the matter. 28 U.S.C. §

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1441(a). But, “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks

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subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). District courts

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have subject matter jurisdiction over civil actions arising under federal law, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331,

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or where no plaintiff is a citizen of the same state as a defendant and the amount in controversy

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exceeds $75,000.00, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

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Removal statutes are strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. Gaus v. Miles, Inc.,

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980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). “Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as

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to the right of removal in the first instance.” Id. The defendant has the burden of establishing that

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removal is proper. Id.

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Plaintiff’s Motion only attacks Defendants’ assertion that removal was proper because this

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Court has federal question jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s lawsuit. Plaintiff does not address the

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alternate ground that Defendants set forth for this Court to have subject matter jurisdiction:

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namely, that the Court has diversity jurisdiction.
Here, Defendants have demonstrated that Plaintiff is a Nevada citizen and that Defendants

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are all citizens of states other than Nevada. (See Am. Pet. For Removal ¶¶ 6-15, ECF No. 6.)

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Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand does not contest this complete diversity. Defendants have also

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shown that, because the trustee’s sale that Plaintiff wishes to set aside generated revenues of

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$258,432.59, the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00. (See Am. Pet. For Removal ¶ 16,

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ECF No. 6.) Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand does not contest this showing, either. Thus,

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Defendants have shown--without objection from Plaintiff--that the prerequisites for diversity

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jurisdiction exist in this case. The Court accepts this showing and finds that Defendants have

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met their burden of establishing diversity jurisdiction. Because diversity jurisdiction is an

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independent ground upon which a federal court may base its subject matter jurisdiction, the Court

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need not address Plaintiff’s argument that she did not raise a federal question in her Complaint.

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In her Motion to Remand, Plaintiff also makes vague allegations about how “Defendant’s

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failure to join in or consent to removal jurisdiction renders the Notice of Removal procedurally

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defective.” (Mot. 7, ECF No. 7:20-21.) It is not clear which Defendant Plaintiff is referring to in

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this statement, but one thing is clear: the only Defendant that had been properly served at the

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time this case was removed--Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., (see Pet. For

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Removal 2 ¶ 3, ECF No. 1)--was among the parties that initially removed this action, and it did

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so through its own counsel. Because only properly joined and served Defendants need to join in

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the petition for removal, see Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1193 n.1 (9th Cir.

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1988), and because the only party that appears to have been properly served here did join in the

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petition, removal was procedurally proper. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion will be denied.

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CONCLUSION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (ECF No. 12) is
DENIED.
DATED this 5th day of July, 2011.

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________________________________
Gloria M. Navarro
United States District Judge

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