Mkhitaryan et al v. US Bancorp et al
Filing
25
ORDER Granting 13 US Bank's Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge James C. Mahan on 10/5/11. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - EDS)
1
2
3
4
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5
DISTRICT OF NEVADA
6
7
8
SERGEY MKHITARYAN and SUREN
MKHITARYAN,
2:11-CV-1055 JCM (CWH)
9
Plaintiffs,
10
11
v.
12
U.S. BANCORP, et al.,
13
Defendants.
14
15
ORDER
16
Presently before the court is defendant U.S. Bank’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ Fair
17
Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) claim. (Doc. #13). The plaintiffs Sergey Mkhitaryan
18
(“Sergey”) and Suren Mkhitaryan (“Suren”) have responded (doc. #21), and the defendant has
19
replied (doc. #22).
20
The instant dispute stems from the repossession of Sergey’s vehicle by co-defendant Speedy
21
Recovery, Inc. (“Speedy”). The repossession agent allegedly trespassed and terrorized the plaintiffs
22
with his baseball bat in order to repossess the vehicle. (Complaint ¶ 26 through ¶ 32). Plaintiffs
23
allege one federal claim against defendants for violation of the FDCPA. The plaintiffs’ state law
24
claims for relief against the defendants include: (1) negligent hiring, (2) assault, (3) intentional
25
infliction of emotional distress, and (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress.
26
...
27
...
28
James C. Mahan
U.S. District Judge
1
DISCUSSION
2
Defendant U.S. Bank’s present motion to dismiss (doc. # 13) asserts that the claim for
3
violation of the FDCPA should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
4
for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted.
5
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), dismissal is proper when a complaint fails
6
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In order for a plaintiff to survive a 12(b)(6) motion,
7
he must “provide the grounds for [] entitlement to relief [which] requires more than labels and
8
conclusions. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007). Under rule 8(a)(2), a
9
complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
10
to relief,” and must be more than “an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”
11
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), quoting
12
Twombly at 555.
13
The FDCPA is intended to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors
14
and to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices
15
are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent state action to protect consumers
16
against debt collection abuses. 15 U.S.C. 1592(e). A claim under this act requires the plaintiff to
17
demonstrate that (1) the defendant is a “debt collector”; (2) the plaintiff is the object of collection
18
activity from a consumer debt; and (3) the defendant engaged in some act or omission
19
specifically prohibited by the act. Dikun v. Streich, 369 F. Supp. 2d 781, 184-85 (E.D. Va. 2005).
20
Here, plaintiffs’ fail to meet the first element.
21
The debt collection act imposes liability only on “debt collectors,” that is “any person
22
who uses instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal
23
purpose of which is the collection of any debt, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect,
24
directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. §
25
1692a(6). However, the statute’s definition of “debt collector” excludes a person who collects a
26
debt “to the extent that such activity...(ii) concerns a debt which was originated by such person,”
27
and excludes a person who collects debt that “concerns a debt obtained by such person as a
28
James C. Mahan
U.S. District Judge
-2-
1
secured party in a commercial credit transaction involving the creditor.” § 1692(F).
2
Furthermore, the FDCPA definition of “debt collector” does not include the consumer’s
3
creditors. Perry v. Stewart Title Co., 756 F.2d 1197, 1208 (5th Cir. 1985). The FDCPA defines
4
“creditor” as “any person who offers or extends credit creating a debt or to whom a debt is
5
owed.Ӥ 1692(a)(4). U.S. Bank is the original creditor under the FDCPA, as it financed the
6
purchase of Sergey’s vehicle.
7
Plaintiffs allege that, although “creditors” are not “debt collectors” under the act, there are
8
several factual situations in which “creditors” are liable as “debt collectors.” However, none of
9
the authorities cited to in the plaintiffs’ opposition (doc. #21), relate to the facts alleged in the
10
11
complaint.
In conclusion, the FDCPA does not apply to U.S. Bank because the bank is not a “debt
12
collector” as defined by the FDCPA and similar statutes. Kenneweg v. IndyMac Bank, FSB, 2011
13
WL 13853, *2 (D. Nev. Jan. 4, 2011) (holding the FDCPA inapplicable where defendants are not
14
debt collectors as defined in the statute). Thus, the motion to dismiss is granted as to this claim
15
for relief.
16
Accordingly,
17
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that defendant U.S. Bank’s
18
19
motion to dismiss (doc. #5) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED.
(#13)
DATED October 5, 2011.
20
21
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
NITED STATES
D
JUD
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
James C. Mahan
U.S. District Judge
-3-
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?