Mann v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC
Filing
64
ORDER Granting 5 and 9 Motions to Dismiss. Plaintiffs complaint is DISMISSED in its entirety. Denying 37 Motion for judicial notice. Signed by Judge Larry R. Hicks on 12/18/2012. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - SLR)
1
2
3
4
5
6
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
7
DISTRICT OF NEVADA
8
***
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
9
JOHN W. MANN
10
Plaintiff,
11
v.
12
NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE; et al.,
13
Defendants.
2:12-cv-1077-LRH-CWH
ORDER
14
15
Before the court is defendant Stewart Title Guaranty Company’s (“Stewart Title”) motion to
16
dismiss. Doc. #5.1 Pro se plaintiff John W. Mann (“Mann”) filed an opposition (Doc. #17) to which
17
Stewart Title replied (Doc. #26).
18
Also before the court is defendant Nationstar Mortgage LLC’s (“Nationstar”) motion to
19
dismiss (Doc. #9) to which defendant First American Trustee Servicing Solution, LLC
20
(“First American”) joined (Doc. #29). Plaintiff Mann filed an opposition (Doc. #23) to which
21
Nationstar replied (Doc. #39).
22
I.
23
Facts and Background
In November 2006, Mann purchased real property through two separate loans: a first loan
24
executed by non-party Freemont Investment & Loan, and a second loan executed by the seller of
25
the property, non-party John F. Stanhagen Jr. In March 2007, Mann refinanced the first deed of
26
1
Refers to the court’s docket number.
1
trust executed by Freemont Investment & Loan through a new deed of trust executed by defendant
2
Nationstar. Mann eventually defaulted on the property and defendants initiated non-judicial
3
foreclosure proceedings.
4
Subsequently, on June 22, 2012, Mann filed a complaint against defendants alleging three
5
causes of action: (1) Nevada Unfair Lending Practices Act, NRS 598D.100; (2) quiet title; and
6
(3) violation of NRS 107.080. Doc. #1, Exhibit A. Thereafter, defendants filed the present motions
7
to dismiss. Doc. ##5, 9.
8
II.
Legal Standard
9
Defendants seek dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure
10
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state
11
a claim, a complaint must satisfy the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) notice pleading
12
standard. See Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2008). That
13
is, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
14
entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The Rule 8(a)(2) pleading standard does not require
15
detailed factual allegations; however, a pleading that offers “‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a
16
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action’” will not suffice. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.
17
Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
18
Furthermore, Rule 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter,
19
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. at 1949 (quoting
20
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows
21
the court to draw the reasonable inference, based on the court’s judicial experience and common
22
sense, that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. See id. at 1949-50. “The plausibility
23
standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
24
defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
25
defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to
26
relief.” Id. at 1949 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
2
1
In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court accepts the facts alleged in the complaint as
2
true. Id. However, “bare assertions . . . amount[ing] to nothing more than a formulaic recitation of
3
the elements of a . . . claim . . . are not entitled to an assumption of truth.” Moss v. U.S. Secret
4
Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951) (brackets in original)
5
(internal quotation marks omitted). The court discounts these allegations because “they do nothing
6
more than state a legal conclusion—even if that conclusion is cast in the form of a factual
7
allegation.” Id. (citing Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951.) “In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to
8
dismiss, the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that content, must be
9
plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Id.
10
III.
Discussion
11
A. Nevada Unfair Lending Practices Act
12
NRS 598D.100 prohibits lenders from making loans “without determining, using
13
commercially reasonable means or mechanisms, that the borrower has the ability to repay the home
14
loan.” NRS 598D.100(1)(b). However, this suitability language was added in mid-2007 when the
15
statute was amended. Although Mann alleges that defendants violated the present version of the
16
statute, his loan originated in early 2007, prior to the current amendment. Therefore, Mann’s loan
17
cannot have violated the current statutory language requiring a determination that a borrower has
18
the ability to repay the loan.
19
Additionally, Mann’s unfair lending practices claim is barred by the applicable statute of
20
limitations. The statute of limitations on an unfair lending practices claim under NRS 598D is two
21
(2) years. See NRS § 11.190(3)(a). Mann refinanced the property in 2007, and did not file the
22
present action until 2012, over three years after the statute of limitations had expired.
23
B. Quiet Title
24
Under Nevada law, a quiet title action may be brought by someone who claims an adverse
25
interest in property. NRS § 40.010. Here, defendants do not claim any interest in the property
26
adverse to Mann’s interest in the property.
3
1
Further, in a quiet title action, the burden of proof rests with the plaintiff to prove good title
2
in himself and to allege that he was paid any debt owed on the property. See Wensley v. First Nat.
3
Bank of Nevada, 2012 WL 1971773 (D. Nev. 2012). It is undisputed that Mann was in default on
4
the mortgage loan. Therefore, the court finds that Mann has no grounds to quiet title against
5
defendants.
6
C. NRS 107.080
7
In his complaint, Mann alleges that defendants improperly foreclosed on his property
8
because none of the defendants hold the original mortgage note. See Doc. #1, Exhibit A.
9
At the time of Mann’s foreclosure, Nevada law did not require the production of the
10
original note before one of the statutorily enumerated parties initiates a non-judicial foreclosure.
11
Weingarter v. Chase Home Finance, LLC, 702 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1280 (D. Nev. 2010).
Further, there is no private right of action for tort damages under section 107.080. See
12
13
Chavez v. Cal Recon. Co., 2010 WL 2545006, *2, (D. Nev. 2010). The only available remedy
14
under section 107.080 is for the court to void a trustee’s sale that was undertaken in violation of the
15
statute. As there has been no trustee’s sale, Mann is not entitled to any remedy for defendants’
16
alleged failure to comply with NRS 107.080. Therefore, the court finds that Mann fails to allege a
17
claim upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, the court shall grant defendants’ motions to
18
dismiss and dismiss Mann’s complaint in its entirety.
19
In granting defendants’ motions to dismiss, the court notes that Mann is appearing pro se in
20
this action. Usually in such a circumstance the court would grant Mann leave to file an amended
21
complaint to state a cause of action against defendants upon which relief can be granted. However,
22
in this instance, the court finds that amendment would be futile because the motions to dismiss are
23
not based on identified pleading defects, but on matters of law that are well settled in this district.
24
Therefore, the court shall not grant pro se plaintiff Mann leave to file an amended complaint.
25
///
26
///
4
1
2
3
4
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motions to dismiss (Doc. ##5, 9) are
GRANTED. Plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. #1, Exhibit A) is DISMISSED in its entirety.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for judicial notice (Doc. #37) is
DENIED.
5
IT IS SO ORDERED.
6
DATED this 18th day of December, 2012.
7
__________________________________
LARRY R. HICKS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
5
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?