Cruz et al v. Wabash National Corporation

Filing 26

ORDER Granting 7 Motion to Dismiss. First and Second Causes of Action are DISMISSED without prejudice. Third Cause of Action is DISMISSED with prejudice. Signed by Judge Lloyd D. George on 3/18/2014. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - SLR)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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DISTRICT OF NEVADA

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JESSE CRUZ, et al.,

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Plaintiffs,

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v.

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Case No. 2:12-cv-1627-LDG (VCF)
ORDER

WABASH NATIONAL
CORPORATION,

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Defendant.
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In their complaint, the plaintiffs allege that on April 17, 2010, plaintiff Jesse Cruz

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“was forced to pull over on the side of the road due to a defect in the trailer” that defendant

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Wabash National Corporation built in 1998. W abash moves to dismiss (#7), which motion

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the plaintiffs oppose (#8). Having considered the arguments and the complaint, the Court

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will grant the motion.

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Motion to Dismiss

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The defendant’s motion to dismiss, brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6),
challenges whether the plaintiffs’ complaint states “a claim upon which relief can be

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granted.” In ruling upon this motion, the court is governed by the relaxed requirement of

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Rule 8(a)(2) that the complaint need contain only “a short and plain statement of the claim

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showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” As summarized by the Supreme Court, a

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plaintiff must allege sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, “to state a claim to relief that

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is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

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Nevertheless, while a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s

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obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels

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and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”

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Id., at 555 (citations omitted). In deciding whether the factual allegations state a claim, the

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court accepts those allegations as true, as “Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance . . .

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dismissals based on a judge’s disbelief of a complaint’s factual allegations.” Neitzke v.

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Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). Further, the court “construe[s] the pleading s in the

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light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Outdoor Media Group, Inc. v. City of

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Beaumont, 506 F3.d 895, 900 (9 th Cir. 2007).

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However, bare, conclusory allegations, including legal allegations couched as

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factual, are not entitled to be assumed to be true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “[T]he tenet

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that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is

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inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal 556 U.S.

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(2009). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be

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supported by factual allegations.” Id., at 1950. Thus, this court considers the conclusory

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statements in a complaint pursuant to their factual context.

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, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949

To be plausible on its face, a claim must be more than merely possible or

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conceivable. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the

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mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged–but it has not ‘show[n]’–‘that the

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pleader is entitled to relief.” Id., (citing Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2)). Rather, the factual

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allegations must push the claim “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly.
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550 U.S. at 570. Thus, allegations that are consistent with a claim, but that are more likely

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explained by lawful behavior, do not plausibly establish a claim. Id., at 567.

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An indicator that the plaintiffs’ complaint is deficient is when their opposition, as in

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this case, begins by reciting facts not alleged in the complaint. In considering the motion,

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however, the Court is limited to considering the facts alleged in the complaint, not facts that

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the plaintiff could have pled. Regardless of whether the plaintiffs could have sufficiently

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pled how the trailer was defective (and without deciding whether their opposition asserts

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sufficient facts to support claims for negligence and strict products liability), they did not do

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so in their complaint. Accordingly, dismissal of these claims is appropriate.

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As to plaintiffs’ claim for breach of the implied warranty of fitness, Wabash correctly

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notes that such a claim in Nevada requires horizontal privity. See Long v. Flanigan

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Warehouse Co., 79 Nev. 241, 246, 382 P.2d 399 (Nev. 1963). The plaintiffs’ reliance upon

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Hiles Co. v. Johnston Pump Co. of Pasadena, Cal., 93 Nev. 73, 560 P.2d 154 (Nev. 1977)

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is plainly misplaced, as that decision recognized the well-established point that “vertical

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privity is not required in actions for personal or property injury caused by defective

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products.” Id. at 78 (emphasis added). 1 Further, given that the plaintiffs limit their

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opposition to arguing that Nevada “dispensed with the privity requirement,” and have not

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suggested they could allege horizontal privity, the Court will dismiss this claim with

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prejudice.

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Therefore, for good cause shown,

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THE COURT ORDERS that Defendant Wabash National Corporation’s Motion to

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Dismiss (#7) is GRANTED as follows: Plaintiffs’ First and Second Causes of Action are

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The plaintiffs’ quotation of this language while omitting the word “vertical” is
not well-taken, particularly as the court in Hiles expressly distinguished Long because Long
“dealt with horizontal, not vertical privity. . . .” 93 Nev. at 78.
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DISMISSED without prejudice; Plaintiffs’ Third Cause of Action is DISMISSED with

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prejudice.

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DATED this ______ day of March, 2014.

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Lloyd D. George
United States District Judge

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